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Alleles	  –	  different	  forms	  of	  the	  same	  gene.	  
	  
Area-­‐wide	  control	  	  –	  methods	  of	  reducing	  pest	  damage	  whose	  effectiveness	  depends	  on	  application	  
over	  large	  expanses.	  This	  contrasts	  particularly	  with	  personal	  protection,	  for	  example	  as	  provided	  by	  
bed	  nets	  and	  repellents.	  
	  
Biosafety	  committee	  –	  group	  responsible	  for	  implementing	  policies	  and	  guidelines	  related	  to	  use	  of	  
potentially	   hazardous	   biological	   agents,	   including	   but	   not	   limited	   to	   infectious	   agents,	   human	  
materials,	   and	   recombinant	  DNA	   studies.	   This	   group	   ensures	   that	   research	   involving	   these	   agents	  
does	   not	   endanger	   researchers,	   laboratory	   workers,	   human	   research	   subjects,	   the	   public	   or	   the	  
environment.	  	  
	  
Cartagena	   Protocol	   on	   Biosafety	   –	   an	   international	   agreement	   dealing	   with	   the	   safe	   handling,	  
transport	  and	  use	  of	   living	  modified	  organisms	   (LMOs)	   resulting	   from	  modern	  biotechnology.	   See:	  
http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/	  
	  
Clinical	   disease	   incidence	   –	   the	   number	   of	   new	   clinical	   cases	   per	   unit	   of	   time	   for	   the	   at-­‐risk	  
population.	   This	   is	   typically	   determined	   by	   voluntary	   reporting	   of	   symptoms	   or	   community-­‐based	  
active	  case	  detection	  followed	  by	  a	  laboratory	  diagnosis	  test.	  
	  
Cluster	  randomized	  trials	  –	  trials	  that	  group	  individuals	  into	  clusters,	  such	  as	  residents	  of	  particular	  
villages	  or	  urban	  neighbourhoods.	  Each	  cluster	  is	  assigned	  randomly	  an	  experimental	  treatment	  such	  
as	  a	  placebo	  or	  drug,	  or,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  genetically	  modified	  mosquitoes	  (GMMs),	  releases	  may	  be	  in	  
one	  set	  of	  clusters	  and	  not	  in	  another.	  
	  
Community	   engagement	   –	   practices	   undertaken	   to	   inform	   stakeholders	   about	   the	   diseases	   and	  
vectors	  of	   interest	  and	  goals	  of	  a	  proposed	  research	  study	  or	   intervention	  trial,	  and	  to	  understand	  
their	  perspectives	  and	  reaction.	  	  
	  
Confinement	   –	   utilization	   of	  measures	   that	   seek	   to	   prevent	   unplanned	   or	   uncontrolled	   release	   of	  
organisms	   into	   the	   environment.	   This	   may	   involve	   physical	   confinement	   (sometimes	   termed	  
“containment”)	  within	  a	  large	  cage	  that	  simulates	  the	  disease-­‐endemic	  setting	  while	  minimizing	  the	  
possibility	  of	  escape	  and/or	  ecological	  confinement	  by	  geographic/spatial	  and/or	  climatic	  isolation.	  	  
	  
Declaration	   of	   Helsinki	   –	   a	   set	   of	   ethical	   principles	   for	   the	   medical	   community	   regarding	   human	  
experimentation,	  issued	  by	  the	  World	  Medical	  Association.	  	  
	  
Deployment	  –	  implementation	  of	  GMM	  technology	  as	  part	  of	  a	  national	  or	  regional	  programme	  for	  
vector	  control.	  
	  
Drive	   (also	   called	   gene	   drive)	   –	   a	  mechanism	   that	   increases	   the	   transmission	   of	   a	   transgene	   in	   a	  
population	   above	   that	  which	  would	  be	  expected	  based	  on	  Mendelian	   inheritance.	   The	   increase	   is	  
reflected	  in	  the	  excess	  proportion	  of	  progeny	  that	  carry	  the	  transgene.	  
	  
Ecosystem	   –	   a	   biological	   system	   composed	   of	   a	   community	   of	   organisms	   and	   the	   nonliving	  






Endemic	  –	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  disease	  is	  present	  continuously	  at	  some	  level	  in	  an	  area.	  
	  
Endpoint	   –	   an	   event	   or	   outcome	   that	   can	   be	   measured	   objectively	   to	   determine	   whether	   the	  
intervention	  being	  studied	  has	  the	  desired	  effect.	  
	  
Entomological	   inoculation	   rate	   (EIR)	   –	   a	   measure	   of	   the	   degree	   of	   infection	   risk	   that	   a	   human	  
population	   is	  exposed	   to	   for	  a	  particular	  disease,	  as	  determined	  by	  assessing	   the	  vector	  mosquito	  
population.	  It	   is	  described	  by	  the	  frequency	  of	  infectious	  mosquitoes	  feeding	  upon	  a	  person	  within	  
some	  unit	  of	  time,	  such	  as	  per	  day	  or	  year.	  
	  
Epidemic	   –	   an	   increase	   in	   incidence	   and	   prevalence	   of	   disease	   affecting	  many	   people	   rapidly	   and	  
extensively	  and	  above	  normal	  levels	  in	  an	  area,	  but	  not	  continuously	  present	  at	  such	  levels.	  
	  
Ethics	   –	   an	   activity	   or	   inquiry	   intended	   to	   shed	   light	   on	   the	   correctness	   or	   justifiability	   of	   a	   given	  
course	  of	  conduct.	  
	  
Ethics	   committee	   (also	   called	   institutional	   ethics	   committee,	   institutional	   review	   board	   or	   ethical	  
review	  board)	  –	  a	  group	  charged	  with	  providing	  oversight	  for	  biomedical	  and	  behavioural	  research	  
involving	  humans,	  with	  the	  aim	  to	  protect	  the	  rights	  and	  welfare	  of	  research	  subjects.	  
	  
Ethical	  review	  board	  –	  see	  Ethics	  committee.	  
	  
Fitness	   –	   description	   of	   the	   ability	   to	   both	   survive	   and	   reproduce,	   and	   is	   equal	   to	   the	   long-­‐term	  
average	  contribution	  to	  the	  gene	  pool	  by	   individuals	  having	  a	  particular	  genotype	  or	  phenotype.	   If	  
differences	   between	   alleles	   of	   a	   given	   gene	   affect	   fitness,	   then	   the	   frequencies	   of	   the	   alleles	  will	  
change	  over	  generations,	  the	  alleles	  with	  higher	  fitness	  become	  more	  common.	  
	  
Gene	  –	  a	  segment	  of	  DNA	  that	  contains	  information	  required	  by	  cells	  for	  synthesis	  of	  a	  product.	  	  
Gene	  flow	  –	  the	  movement	  (expressed	  as	  increase	  in	  frequency)	  of	  genes	  or	  alleles	  into	  a	  population	  
from	  one	  or	  more	  other	  populations.	  
Genetically	  engineered	  mosquitoes	  –	  see	  Genetically	  modified	  mosquitoes.	  
Genetically	   modified	   mosquitoes	   (GMMs)	   –	   also	   called	   genetically	   engineered	   mosquitoes,	  
transgenic	   mosquitoes,	   or	   living	   modified	   mosquitoes	   –	   	   mosquitoes	   that	   have	   heritable	   traits	  
derived	   through	   use	   of	   recombinant	   DNA	   technology,	   which	   alter	   the	   strain,	   line,	   or	   colony	   in	   a	  
manner	   usually	   intended	   to	   result	   in	   reduction	   of	   the	   transmission	   of	   mosquito-­‐borne	   human	  
diseases	   –	   see	   also	   Genetically	   Modified	   Organism.	   GMM	   is	   also	   likely	   to	   be	   characterized	   by	  
introduced	  heritable	  marker	  traits	  to	  facilitate	  monitoring	  upon	  release	  into	  the	  environment	  and	  in	  
some	  cases	  may	  include	  only	  such	  markers,	  as	  for	  population	  biology	  studies.	  
Genetically	  modified	  organism	  (GMO)	  –	  also	  called	  living	  modified	  organism	  –	  any	  organism	  that	  has	  
in	   its	  genome	  novel	  DNA	  of	  endogenous,	  exogenous,	  or	  mixed	  origin	  that	  was	  made	  using	  modern	  
recombinant	  DNA	   technology.	  Although	   successive	   selective	  breeding	  of	   strains	  of	  organisms	  with	  
naturally-­‐occurring	  allelic	  variations	  also	  results	  in	  strains	  with	  genotypes	  different	  from	  the	  natural	  	  
population,	  these	  are	  excluded	  from	  this	  definition.	  	  





Good	  clinical	  practice	   (GCP)	  –	  an	   international	  quality	  standard	   for	   trials	  involving	  human	  subjects,	  
including	  protection	  of	  human	  rights,	  assurance	  of	  safety	  and	  efficacy	  and	  standards	  on	  conduct	  of	  




Hazard	  –	  an	  event,	  activity	  or	  other	  cause	  of	  a	  negative	  consequence	  or	   impact	   identified	   in	  a	  risk	  
analysis.	  
	  
Horizontal	   gene	   transfer	   (HGT)	   –	   heritable	   transfer	   of	   a	   functional	   genetic	   element	   from	   one	  
organism	   to	   another	   without	  mating,	   most	   often	   relating	   to	   genetic	   exchange	   between	   different	  
species.	  
	  
Infection	  incidence	  –	  the	  rate	  at	  which	  new	  infections	  occur	  during	  the	  specific	  period	  of	  time.	  
	  
Informed	   consent	   –	   the	  process	   intended	   to	   ensure	   that	  human	   subjects	  who	  will	   be	  observed	  or	  
involved	  in	  a	  research	  activity	  are	  fully	  and	  explicitly	  advised	  of	  all	  risks,	  costs	  or	  inconveniences	  they	  
may	  bear	  as	  a	  result	  of	  participating	  as	  a	  research	  subject,	  and	  voluntarily	  agree	  to	  accept	  or	  bear	  
those	  risks	  and	  costs.	  
	  
Institutional	  ethics	  committee	  (IEC)	  –	  see	  Ethics	  committee.	  
	  
Institutional	  review	  board	  (IRB)	  –	  see	  Ethics	  committee.	  
	  
Integrated	   vector	   management	   (IVM)	   –	   a	   rational	   decision-­‐making	   process	   for	   the	   effective	   and	  
efficient	  use	  of	  a	  combination	  of	  available	  resources	  in	  the	  management	  of	  vector	  populations,	  so	  as	  
to	  reduce	  or	  interrupt	  transmission	  of	  vector-­‐borne	  diseases.	  See:	  
http://www.who.int/malaria/vector_control/ivm/en/	  	  
	  
Living	  modified	  mosquitoes	  –	  see	  Genetically	  modified	  mosquitoes.	  
	  
Mark-­‐release-­‐recapture	  –	  a	  method	  used	  to	  estimate	  population	  size	  of	  free-­‐living	  animals,	  including	  
mosquitoes,	   and	   to	   study	   population	   survival	   and	   dispersal	   in	   space	   and	   time.	   A	   portion	   of	   the	  
mosquito	   population	   under	   study	   is	   captured,	   marked	   (usually	   with	   fluorescent	   powders)	   and	  
released.	   A	   portion	   of	   the	   population	   into	   which	   they	   were	   released	   is	   captured	   later	   and	   the	  
number	  of	  marked	  mosquitoes	  within	  the	  sample	  is	  counted.	  The	  proportion	  of	  marked	  mosquitoes	  
in	  the	  second	  sample	  allows	  estimation	  of	  the	  total	  number	  of	  animals	  in	  the	  whole	  population.	  
	  
Non-­‐target	   organism	   –	   any	   organism	   that	   is	   not	   a	   direct	   target	   of	   an	   intended	   intervention.	   For	  
GMM	  the	  direct	  target	  organism	  is	  other	  mosquitoes	  of	  the	  same	  species	  in	  the	  wild	  population.	  	  
	  
Nuremberg	  Code	  –	  an	  ethics	  code	  that	  serves	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  bioethical	  principles	  ensuring	  the	  rights	  
of	  human	  subjects	  in	  medical	  research.	  	  
	  
Off-­‐target	   effects	   –	   	   the	   outcomes	   of	   actions	   that	   are	   not	   directed	   to	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   action,	  
whether	   anticipated	   or	   not,	   possibly	   affecting	   either	   target	   or	   non-­‐target	   organisms.	   Off-­‐target	  
effects	  may	  have	  negative,	  neutral	  or	  positive	  impacts	  on	  the	  intended	  purpose.	  
	  
Pathogen	  –	  an	  organism	  that	  causes	  disease.	  In	  dengue	  infection,	  the	  pathogen	  is	  a	  virus.	  In	  malaria	  






Penetrance	   –	   the	   frequency	   at	  which	   a	   trait	   is	   expressed	   in	   individuals	   carrying	   a	   particular	   gene	  
associated	  with	  the	  trait.	  
	  
Pharmacovigilance	   –	   the	   process	   of	   collecting,	   monitoring,	   researching,	   assessing	   and	   evaluating	  
information	  on	  the	  long-­‐term	  adverse	  effects	  of	  medicines.	  
	  
Phenotype	   –	   the	   observable	   characteristics	   of	   an	   organism,	   based	   on	   genetic	   and	   environmental	  
influences.	  
	  
Population	  regulation	  –	  maintenance	  of	  a	  population	  around	  or	  near	  an	  equilibrium	  level,	  such	  as	  by	  
density-­‐dependent	  factors.	  
	  
Population	   replacement	  –	   strategies	   that	   target	   vector	   competence	  with	   the	   intent	   to	   reduce	   the	  
inherent	  ability	  of	  individual	  mosquitoes	  to	  transmit	  a	  given	  pathogen.	  
	  
Population	   suppression	   –	   strategies	   that	   target	   vector	   “demography”	   with	   the	   intent	   to	   reduce	  
(suppress)	   the	   size	   of	   the	  natural	  mosquito	   population	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   it	  would	  not	   be	   able	   to	  
sustain	  pathogen	  transmission.	  
	  
Prevalence	  of	  infection	  –	  the	  frequency	  of	  infection	  within	  a	  population	  at	  any	  given	  time.	  
	  
Refractoriness	   –	   a	   condition	   in	   which	   the	   mosquito	   is	   intrinsically	   unable	   to	   support	   the	  
development	  of	  a	  pathogen	  to	  an	  infective	  stage	  or	  to	  a	  point	  of	  sufficient	  abundance	  such	  that	  the	  
mosquito	  cannot	  transmit	  disease.	  	  
Regulation	  –	  an	  official	  rule	  to	  manage	  the	  conduct	  of	  those	  to	  whom	  it	  applies,	  usually	  developed	  
from	  legal	  interpretations	  of	  legislation	  and	  implemented	  by	  government	  ministries	  or	  agencies.	  	  
	  
Regulatory	   agency	   (also	   called	   regulatory	   authority,	   ministry,	   regulatory	   body,	   or	   regulator)	   –	   a	  
public	  authority	  or	  government	  entity	  responsible	  for	  exercising	  authority	  over	  some	  area	  of	  activity	  
in	  a	  supervisory	  capacity.	  	  
	  
Risk	  –	  an	  objective	  measure	  of	  the	  product	  of	  the	  likelihood	  and	  consequences	  of	  a	  hazard,	  defined	  
within	  a	  prescribed	  set	  of	  circumstances.	  Risk	  is	  often	  described	  as	  a	  probability	  distribution	  of	  a	  set	  
of	  consequences	  over	  a	  defined	  time	  period.	  
	  
Risk	  analysis	  –	   the	  process	  comprised	  of	   risk	   identification,	   risk	  assessment,	   risk	  management	  and	  
risk	  communication.	  
	  
Risk	  assessment	  –	  a	  methodological	  approach	   to	  define	  and	  characterize	  hazards,	  and	   to	  estimate	  
the	  exposure	  or	   likelihood	  of	  each	  hazard	  occurring	  as	  well	  as	   the	  potential	  adverse	   impact	  of	   the	  
hazard	  (harm).	  	  
	  
Risk	  management	  –	  the	  process	  of	  identifying	  and	  implementing	  measures	  that	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  
reduce	  risk	  to	  an	  acceptable	  level.	  
	  
Risk	  communication	  –	   the	  process	   through	  which	   risk	  concerns	  and	  risk	   tolerance	   is	  articulated	  by	  
relevant	   stakeholders	   and	   results	   of	   risk	   assessment	   and	   risk	  management	   are	   communicated	   to	  






Self-­‐limiting	  –	  GMM	  approaches	  where	  the	  genetic	  modification	  will	  not	  pass	  on	  indefinitely	  through	  
subsequent	  generations.	  	  
	  
Self-­‐sustaining	  (also	  called	  self-­‐propagating)	  –	  GMM	  approaches	  where	  the	  heritable	  modification	  is	  
spread	  and	  maintained	  indefinitely	  through	  the	  target	  population.	  	  
	  
Sterile	  insect	  technique	  (SIT)	  –	  the	  inundative	  release	  of	  factory-­‐produced	  sexually	  sterile	  insects	  into	  
wild	   native	   insect	   populations	   so	   that	   there	   is	   a	   high	   ratio	   of	   sterile	   males	   to	   wild	   females.	  
Sterilization	   is	   usually	   accomplished	   using	   radiation	   or	   chemicals.	   The	   effect	   is	   population	  
suppression,	   and	   the	   effort	   is	   most	   effective	   when	   continual	   and	   over	   large	   areas	   to	   reduce	   the	  
effects	  of	  fertile	   immigrants.	  Release	  only	  of	  males	   is	  preferred	  although	  release	  of	  both	  sexes	  has	  
also	  been	  effective.	  SIT	  has	  been	  applied	  most	  widely	  against	  agricultural	  pests.	  
	  
Traits	   –	   phenotypes	   that	   result	   from	   single	   or	   multiple	   genes	   and	   their	   interactions	   with	   the	  
environment.	  
	  
Transboundary	  movement	  –	  movement	  across	  national,	  state	  or	  other	  political	  lines	  of	  demarcation.	  
	  
Transgenic	  mosquitoes	  –	  see	  Genetically	  modified	  mosquitoes.	  
	  








APHIS	   US	  Animal	  and	  Plant	  Health	  Inspection	  Service	  
CBD	   Convention	  on	  Biological	  Diversity	  
CPB	   Cartagena	  Protocol	  on	  Biosafety	  
CSO	   Civil	  society	  organization	  
DNA	   Deoxyribonucleic	  acid	  
EA	   Environmental	  assessment	  
EFSA	   European	  Food	  Safety	  Authority	  
EIA	   Environmental	   impact	   assessment	   (also	   known	   as	   a	   strategic	   environmental	  
assessment	  or	  environment	  impact	  statement	  
EIR	   Entomological	  inoculation	  rate	  
EIS	   Environmental	  Impact	  Statement	  under	  the	  US	  National	  Environmental	  Policy	  Act	  
ERA	   Environmental	  risk	  assessment	  
EU	   European	  Union	  
FAO	   Food	  and	  Agriculture	  Organization	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  
FDA	   US	  Food	  and	  Drug	  Administration	  
FFDCA	   US	  Federal	  Food	  Drug	  and	  Cosmetic	  Act	  
FIFRA	   US	  Federal	  Insecticide	  and	  Rodenticide	  Act	  	  
FNIH	   Foundation	  for	  the	  National	  Institutes	  of	  Health	  
GM	   Genetically	  modified	  
GMM	   Genetically	  modified	  mosquito	  
GMO	   Genetically	  modified	  organism	  
IPPC	   International	  Plant	  Protection	  Convention	  	  
ISPM	   International	  Standards	  for	  Phytosanitary	  Measures	  
LMO	   Living	  modified	  organism	  
NAPPO	   North	  American	  Plant	  Protection	  Organization	  
NEPA	   National	  Environmental	  Policy	  Act	  (USA)	  	  
NTO	   Non-­‐target	  organism	  
RA	   Risk	  assessment	  
RM	   Risk	  management	  
SOP	   Standard	  operating	  procedure	  
SPS	   WTO	  Agreement	  on	  the	  Application	  of	  Sanitary	  and	  Phytosanitary	  Measures	  	  
SIT	   Sterile	  insect	  technique	  
UNDP	   United	  Nations	  Development	  Programme	  
USDA	   US	  Department	  of	  Agriculture	  	  
WHO	   World	  Health	  Organization	  
WHO-­‐TDR	   World	  Health	  Organization	   Special	   Programme	   for	   Research	   and	   Training	   in	   Tropical	  
Diseases	  








Vector-­‐borne	  diseases	  are	  endemic	  in	  more	  than	  100	  countries	  and	  affect	  approximately	  half	  of	  the	  
world’s	   population.	   Many	   types	   of	   arthropods	   may	   serve	   as	   disease	   vectors,	   but	   this	   guidance	  
focuses	   particularly	   on	   mosquitoes.	   Mosquitoes	   transmit	   several	   diseases	   of	   major	   global	   public	  
health	  importance,	  including	  malaria	  and	  dengue	  fever.	  	  
Despite	  ongoing	  and	   intensive	  control	  efforts,	  malaria	  and	  dengue	  continue	  to	  exact	  a	  huge	  public	  
health	  toll.	  Malaria	  is	  considered	  the	  world’s	  most	  important	  parasitic	  infectious	  disease.	  Estimates	  
of	  malaria-­‐related	  deaths	  in	  2010	  range	  from	  655	  000	  (WHO,	  2011)	  to	  over	  1.2	  million	  (Murray	  et	  al.,	  
2012),	  with	   the	  majority	   of	   deaths	   occurring	   among	  African	   children	   under	   five	   years	   of	   age.	   The	  
international	  Roll	  Back	  Malaria	  partnership	  has	  pledged	  a	  goal	   to	  “eradicate	  malaria	  worldwide	  by	  
reducing	   the	   global	   incidence	   to	   zero	   through	   progressive	   elimination	   in	   countries.”1	   	   Yet	   it	   is	  
acknowledged	   widely	   that	   this	   goal	   will	   not	   be	  met	   without	   new	   tools	   (Greenwood	   et	   al.,	   2008;	  
Mendis	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Alonso	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Alonso	  &	  Tanner,	  2013).	  An	  estimated	  2.5	  billion	  people	  live	  
in	   areas	   where	   dengue	   viruses	   can	   be	   transmitted.	   Despite	   a	   plan	   adopted	   by	   the	   Pan-­‐American	  
Health	  Organization	  (PAHO)	  and	  its	  Member	  States	  to	  eventually	  eradicate	  Aedes	  aegypti,	  the	  main	  
vector	  of	  dengue	  in	  the	  Americas	  (PAHO,	  1997;	  1998),	  dengue	  continues	  to	  plague	  countries	  in	  Latin	  
America,	   as	  well	   as	   Asia	   and	   Africa.	   In	   2013,	   the	   estimated	   global	   burden	   of	   dengue	  was	   revised	  
upward	  to	  390	  million	  infections	  per	  year	  (Bhatt	  et	  al,	  2013).	  WHO	  recently	  called	  dengue	  the	  most	  
important	   mosquito-­‐borne	   viral	   disease	   with	   an	   epidemic	   potential	   in	   the	   world,	   citing	   a	   30-­‐fold	  
increase	  in	  the	  global	  incidence	  of	  dengue	  during	  the	  past	  50	  years	  and	  recognizing	  that	  the	  human	  
and	  economic	   costs	   are	   staggering.	  WHO	   further	  acknowledged	   that	   innovations	   in	   vector	   control	  
deserve	  more	  attention	  as	  playing	  a	  key	  part	  in	  reducing	  transmission	  and	  disease	  burden.2	  	  	  	  
Attacking	  mosquito	  vectors	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  effective	  ways	  to	  reduce	  the	  transmission	  of	  disease	  
in	  endemic	  areas.	  Application	  of	  mosquito	  population	  reduction	  methods	  was	  central	  to	  successful	  
elimination	   of	   malaria	   transmission	   in	   Italy	   and	   the	   United	   States	   of	   America	   in	   the	   early	   20th	  
century	   (Kitron	  &	   Spielman,	   1989)	   and,	   transiently,	   of	   dengue	   in	   the	   Americas	   in	   the	   early	   1960s	  
(Pinheiro	  &	  Corber,	  1997).	  Vector-­‐targeted	  approaches	  remain	  a	  mainstay	  of	  current	  disease-­‐control	  
practices.	  However,	  given	  the	  magnitude	  of	  ongoing	  malaria	  and	  dengue	  incidence,	  current	  efforts	  
clearly	  are	  insufficient	  to	  meet	  the	  need.	  Moreover,	  dependence	  on	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  insecticides	  
for	  vector	  control	  increases	  the	  risk	  that	  mosquitoes	  will	  develop	  resistance,	  as	  is	  now	  being	  widely	  
reported	   (Butler,	   2011).	   In	   2012,	  WHO	   confirmed	   that	   insecticide	   resistance	   is	   being	   reported	   in	  
two-­‐thirds	   of	   countries	   with	   ongoing	   malaria	   transmission,	   and	   that	   resistance	   affects	   all	   major	  
vector	  species	  and	  classes	  of	  insecticide	  (WHO,	  2012).	  	  
In	  considering	  the	  potential	  of	  new	  technologies	  to	  address	  the	  unmet	  needs	  of	  mosquito	  control,	  it	  
is	  necessary	  to	  evaluate	  the	  benefits	  and	  risks	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  current	  situation.	  The	  potential	  
public	  health	  benefit	  of	  practical	  and	  effective	  new	  tools	  to	  reduce	  or	  even	  eradicate	  diseases	  such	  
as	  malaria	  and	  dengue	   is	   clear	  and	  widely	   recognized.	  Both	   the	   risks	   incurred	  by	   testing	  new,	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Roll	  Back	  Malaria:	  http://www.rollbackmalaria.org/rbmvision.html,	  accessed	  25	  May	  2014.	  
2	  Second	  WHO	  report	  on	  neglected	  tropical	  diseases:	  





unproven	  strategies	  and	  the	  risks	  to	  human	  health	  and	  the	  environment	  posed	  by	  maintaining	  the	  
status	  quo,	  which	  include	  ongoing	  disease	  and	  use	  of	  broad	  spectrum	  insecticides,	  should	  be	  taken	  
into	  account	  in	  decision-­‐making.	  	  
For	   more	   than	   two	   decades,	   scientists	   have	   been	   working	   to	   harness	   the	   promise	   of	   molecular	  
biology	  to	  develop	  genetically	  modified	  mosquitoes	  (GMMs)	  for	  use	  as	  public	  health	  tools	  to	  prevent	  
the	  transmission	  of	  these	  diseases.	  Several	  of	  these	  genetic	  technologies	  are	  now	  advancing	  to	  field	  
testing.	  The	  introduction	  of	  molecular	  biology	  techniques	  represents	  the	  next	  step	  in	  a	  progression	  
that	   builds	   on	   the	   widespread	   success	   of	   programmes	   employing	   release	   of	   radiation-­‐sterilized	  
insects	   to	  control	   the	  Mediterranean	   fruit	   fly	   (Med	   fly)	  and	  other	   insect	  pests	  affecting	  plants	  and	  
animals,	  a	  process	  known	  as	  Sterile	  Insect	  Technique	  (Dyck,	  Hendrichs	  &	  Robinson,	  2005).	  Radiation-­‐	  
and	  chemo-­‐sterilization	  methods	  also	  have	  been	  applied	  to	  mosquitoes	  (Dame	  et	  al.,	  2009),	  but	  they	  
pose	   several	   difficulties	   that	   might	   be	   overcome	   using	   genetic	   modification	   technologies.	   Recent	  
advances	   in	   the	   development	   of	  GMMs	  have	   raised	  hopes	   for	   the	   availability	   of	   new,	   potent	   and	  
cost-­‐effective	  tools	  to	  aid	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  malaria	  and	  dengue.	  Data	  on	  which	  to	  base	  evaluation	  
of	  the	  protective	  potential	  of	  GMMs	  can	  only	  be	  collected	  through	  testing,	   including	  testing	  under	  
the	   natural	   conditions	   in	   which	   the	   technology	   would	   be	   utilized.	  Without	   the	   ability	   to	   conduct	  
careful	   and	   stepwise	   testing,	   no	   new	   technology	   can	   be	   brought	   to	   fruition	   for	   the	   public	   good.	  
However,	   given	   the	   novelty	   of	   GMMs,	   concerns	   have	   been	   raised	   about	   the	   need	   for	   thorough,	  
thoughtful	   and	   transparent	   preparation	   for	   and	   conduct	   of	   field	   trials	   (Reeves	   et	   al.,	   2012)	   and	  
frameworks	  for	  environmental	  risk	  assessment	  (RA)	  have	  been	  produced	  at	  various	  levels	  (examples	  
are	  provided	  in	  Section	  3.	  Biosafety,	  and	  in	  David	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  
Since	  2001,	  scientists	  involved	  in	  this	  research	  have,	  with	  the	  support	  of	  TDR,	  the	  Special	  Programme	  
for	  Research	  and	  Training	  in	  Tropical	  Diseases	  (WHO-­‐TDR)	  and	  other	  funders,	  gathered	  periodically	  
to	  consider	  issues	  relevant	  to	  testing	  and	  implementation	  of	  genetically	  modified	  vectors.	  Through	  
such	  discussions,	  broad	  agreement	  has	  been	  reached	  within	  the	  scientific	  community	  on	  two	  tenets,	  
which	  thus	  far	  have	  been	  observed.	  
• First,	   field-­‐testing	   should	  begin	  with	   release	  of	   sterile	  or	  otherwise	   self-­‐limiting	  modified	  male	  
mosquitoes	   in	   order	   to	   gain	   experience	   with	   the	   technology	   under	   circumstances	   where	   its	  
effects	   can	   be	   controlled	   by	   halting	   releases	   (Benedict	   &	   Robinson,	   2003).	   Field	   releases	   of	  
GMMs	   carried	  out	   to	   date	   have	   focused	  on	   the	   testing	   of	   non-­‐replicating,	   functionally	   sterile,	  
males	  (which	  do	  not	  bite).	  	  
• Second,	   testing	   of	  modified	  mosquitoes	   incorporating	   gene	   drive	   should	   begin	   under	   physical	  
confinement	   (Alphey	   et	   al.,	   2002;	   Benedict	   et	   al.,	   2008).	   No	  GMMs	  designed	   to	   replicate	   and	  
spread	  the	  modification	  to	  wild-­‐type	  mosquitoes	  have	  yet	  been	  tested	  outside	  of	  the	  laboratory.	  	  
As	  the	  research	  progresses,	  a	  need	  has	  been	  expressed	  both	  within	  the	  scientific	  community	  and	  by	  
the	   public	   for	   additional	   standards	   and	   guidance.	  WHO-­‐TDR	   and	   the	   Foundation	   for	   the	   National	  
Institutes	  of	  Health	  (FNIH)	  co-­‐sponsored	  a	  technical	  consultation	  meeting	  in	  2009	  to	  assess	  current	  
progress	  and	  future	  development	  of	  genetically	  modified	  mosquito	  technologies.	  The	  meeting	  was	  
attended	   by	   participants	   from	   around	   the	   world	   with	  expertise	   in	   molecular	   biology,	   medical	  
entomology,	   ecology,	   regulatory	   requirements,	   ethical,	   social	   and	   cultural	   issues,	   as	   well	   as	   staff	  
from	   WHO,	   FNIH	   and	   other	   research	   funders	   WHO-­‐TDR,	   2010).	   Participants	   recommended	   the	  
establishment	   by	   WHO	   and	   FNIH	   of	   a	   working	   group	   to	   develop	   a	   comprehensive	   guidance	  





mosquitoes	   and	   addressing	   legal,	   ethical,	   social	   and	   cultural	   issues	   that	   arise	   during	   their	  
development	  and	  deployment.	  A	  multidisciplinary	  effort	  was	  subsequently	  commissioned	  and	  over	  
40	   experts	   recruited	   to	   contribute	   at	   various	   stages	   of	   development.	   In	   accordance	   with	   the	  
recommendations,	   the	  group	   included	  many	  members	  who	  possessed	  a	  broad	  knowledge	   in	   their	  
topic	  areas	  but	  were	  not	   involved	  directly	   in	   research	  on	  GMMs.	  A	  draft	  guidance	   framework	  was	  
produced	  and	  opened	   for	   public	   comment	   in	   late	   2012.	  Responses	   to	  public	   comment	  have	  been	  
incorporated	  into	  this	  current	  version.	  	  
Because	  of	  the	  breadth	  of	  different	  genetic	  approaches	  that	  are	  under	  consideration	  and	  conditions	  
under	  which	  they	  might	  be	  used,	  it	   is	  not	  possible	  to	  provide	  an	  exact	  formula	  for	  evaluation	  of	  all	  
GMM	   technologies.	   It	   will	   be	   necessary	   to	   determine	   the	   specific	   needs	   on	   a	   case-­‐by-­‐case	   basis.	  
Thus,	  the	  guidance	  framework	  presented	  here	  does	  not	  offer	  precise	  instructions	  for	  testing	  GMMs,	  
but	   rather	   aims	   to	   support	   informed	   and	   thoughtful	   process	   development.	   Efficacy	   and	   safety	  
testing	  standards	  are	  proposed	  that	  are	  complementary	  to	  those	  used	  for	  trials	  of	  other	  new	  public	  
health	   tools,	   including	   drugs,	   vaccines	   and	   insecticides,	   drawing	   also	   from	   relevant	   experience	   in	  
agriculture	  and	  biocontrol.	   The	  guidance	   framework	  examines	   the	   fundamental	   considerations	   for	  
addressing	  public	   engagement	   and	   transparency	  needs	   in	   research	  on	  GMMs,	   taking	   into	   account	  
lessons	   learned	   from	   previous	   introductions	   of	   new	   technologies	   in	   the	   fields	   of	   health	   and	  
agriculture.	   Finally,	  while	   it	   reviews	  existing	   regulatory	   requirements	   and	  guidance	   that	   are	  either	  
directly	  pertinent	  to	  research	  on	  GMMs	  or	  may	  provide	  precedents	  for	  establishing	  the	  appropriate	  
level	  of	  oversight,	  it	  is	  understood	  that	  such	  precedents	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  expanded	  and	  refined	  as	  
research	   on	   modified	   mosquitoes	   proceeds.	   This	   Guidance	   Framework	   for	   Testing	   of	   Genetically	  
Modified	  Mosquitoes	   is	   intended	  to	   foster	  quality	  and	  consistency	   in	   the	  processes	   for	   testing	  and	  
regulating	  new	  genetic	  technologies.	  It	  is	  hoped	  that	  it	  will	  contribute	  to	  comparability	  of	  results	  and	  
credibility	  of	  conclusions	  in	  addressing	  the	  requirements	  for	  decision-­‐making	  by	  countries	  interested	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1. Despite	   ongoing	   control	   efforts,	   diseases	   transmitted	   by	   mosquitoes,	   such	   as	   malaria	   and	  
dengue,	   continue	   to	   pose	   an	   enormous	   global	   health	   burden.	   Multinational	   public	   health	  
organizations	   have	   called	   for	   the	   eradication	   of	  malaria	   and	   of	   the	  major	  mosquito	   vector	   of	  
dengue.	   There	   is	   broad	   recognition	  of	   the	  need	   for	   improved	   tools	   to	   combat	   these	  diseases,	  
including	  tools	  for	  vector	  control.	  
2. Currently	   available	  methods	   to	   control	  mosquito	   vectors	   of	  malaria	   and	  dengue	   are	  based	  on	  
the	   use	   of	   insecticides	   and	   elimination	   of	   mosquito	   larval	   breeding	   sites.	   In	   considering	   the	  
potential	  of	  new	  technologies	  to	  address	  the	  unmet	  needs	  of	  mosquito	  control,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  
evaluate	  their	  risks	  and	  benefits	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  current	  situation.	  Thus,	  the	  risk	  incurred	  by	  
testing	  new	  and	  unproven	  strategies	  should	  be	  weighed	  against	  the	  risks	  to	  human	  health	  and	  
the	  environment	  posed	  by	  maintaining	  the	  status	  quo,	  which	  includes	  both	  ongoing	  disease	  and	  
exposure	   to	   broad-­‐spectrum	   insecticides,	   and	   of	   the	   changing	   status	   of	   factors	   affecting	  
mosquito	  abundance,	  such	  as	  land	  use,	  urbanization	  and	  climate.	  
3. GMMs	   have	   been	   proposed	   as	   a	   possible	   new	   tool	   to	   reduce	   transmission	   of	   malaria	   and	  
dengue.	  This	  Guidance	  Framework	   is	   intended	   to	   foster	  quality	  and	  consistency	  of	  procedures	  
for	   testing	   of	   GMMs,	   which	   will	   contribute	   to	   comparability	   of	   results	   and	   credibility	   of	  
conclusions	  in	  addressing	  the	  needs	  for	  decision-­‐making	  by	  those	  considering	  the	  use	  of	  GMMs	  
as	  public	  health	  tools	  to	  control	  mosquito-­‐borne	  diseases.	  The	  Guidance	  Framework	  should	  be	  
useful	  to	  readers	  interested	  in:	  
• GMM	  technologies	  and	  applications	  that	  currently	  are	  being	  contemplated;	  
• safety,	   efficacy,	   regulatory	   and	   social/ethical	   issues	   involved	   in	   taking	   GMMs	   from	   the	  
laboratory	  to	  field	  testing;	  
• precedents	  that	  exist	  for	  how	  these	  issues	  have	  been	  dealt	  with	  to	  date;	  
• existing	   regulatory	   frameworks	   and	   international	   agreements	   that	   are	   relevant	   to	   GMM	  
testing	  and	  eventual	  implementation.	  	  
4. GMM	   technologies	   currently	   under	   development	   are	   aimed	   at	   either	   reducing	   the	   size	   of	   the	  
mosquito	   vector	   population	   to	   an	   extent	   that	   will	   significantly	   reduce	   pathogen	   transmission	  
(“population	   suppression”)	   or	   at	   replacing	   the	   current	   population	   with	  mosquitoes	   that	   have	  
been	  made	  less	  capable	  of	  transmitting	  a	  particular	  pathogen	  (“population	  replacement”).	  	  
5. These	   technologies	   can	   be	   further	   defined	   according	   to	   how	   long	   the	  GMMs	   are	   intended	   to	  
persist	   in	   the	   environment	   following	   release.	   The	   persistence	   of	   the	   GMM	  effect	  will	   depend	  
upon	  the	  transgene	  components	  and	  their	  behaviour.	  
6. With	   “self-­‐limiting”	   approaches,	   the	   genetic	   modification	   is	   designed	   to	   decline	   in	   frequency	  
within	   the	   mosquito	   population	   over	   time	   until	   it	   disappears.	   In	   some	   cases,	   the	   GMMs	   are	  
meant	   to	  be	  sterile	  and	  thus	  unable	   to	  pass	   the	  genetic	  modification	  on	  to	   future	  generations	  





into	  the	  local	  mosquito	  population,	  but	  it	  is	  expected	  that	  crossing	  with	  local	  mosquitoes	  over	  a	  
number	  of	  generations	  will	  reduce	  the	  modification	  until	  it	  is	  lost.	  Thus,	  the	  protective	  effect	  of	  
self-­‐limiting	  approaches	  can	  only	  be	  maintained	  by	  periodic	  re-­‐releases	  of	  GMMs,	  and	  how	  often	  
these	  releases	  must	  be	  performed	  will	  depend	  upon	  the	  type	  of	  genetic	  modification.	  From	  a	  RA	  
perspective,	   these	   releases	   can	   be	   readily	   halted	   and	   this	   should	   decrease	   the	   possibility	   of	  
producing	   undesirable	   changes	   in	   the	   environment.	   However,	   the	   need	   for	   frequent	  
reintroductions	  is	  associated	  with	  ongoing	  costs	  of	  production	  and	  delivery.	  	  
7. With	   “self-­‐sustaining”	   approaches,	   the	   genetic	  modification	   is	   intended	   to	   be	   spread	   into	   the	  
local	  mosquito	   population	   and	   to	   persist	   indefinitely.	   These	   approaches	   have	   the	   potential	   to	  
provide	   highly	   durable	   and	   cost-­‐effective	   protection	   against	   pathogen	   transmission,	   but	   any	  
unforeseen	   effects	   may	   be	   more	   difficult	   to	   reverse	   than	   would	   be	   the	   case	   for	   self-­‐limiting	  
approaches.	  
8. GMM	   technologies	   offer	   several	   theoretical	   advantages	   over	   conventional	   vector	   control	  
strategies.	  They	  may	  reach	  mosquito	  populations	  and	  mosquito	   larval	  breeding	  sites	  that	  have	  
traditionally	  been	  the	  hardest	  and	  most	  expensive	  to	  access	  by	  exploiting	  the	  natural	  behaviour	  
of	  mosquitoes	  to	  mate	  and	  seek	  sites	  for	  egg	  laying.	  For	  example,	  GMMs	  would	  be	  well	  suited	  to	  
urban	   settings,	   where	   current	   control	   measures	   are	   largely	   ineffective	   due	   to	   the	   wide	  
availability	  of	  cryptic	  mosquito	  larval	  breeding	  sites.	  Additionally,	  GMMs	  may	  reach	  outdoor	  and	  
day-­‐biting	   mosquitoes	   that	   often	   escape	   control	   methods	   such	   as	   bed	   nets	   and	   indoor	  
insecticide	   spraying.	   The	   modification	   could	   be	   made	   highly	   specific	   for	   the	   target	   mosquito	  
species,	   which	   would	   avoid	   ecological	   and	   environmental	   hazards	   associated	   with	   commonly	  
used	   broad-­‐spectrum	   insecticides.	   GMMs	   could	   provide	   continuous	   protection	   in	   situations	  
where	  other	  disease	  control	  methods	  have	  been	  interrupted,	  and	  prevent	  the	  reintroduction	  of	  
the	   pathogen	   after	   successful	   elimination	   efforts.	   It	   is	   important	   also	   to	   note	   that	   GMM	  
technologies	  could	  be	  used	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  compatible	  with	  other	  disease	  control	  methods	  and	  
could	  be	  incorporated	  into	  integrated	  vector	  management	  programmes.	  	  
9. Theoretical	  disadvantages	  also	  have	  been	  raised	  for	  GMMs,	  including	  several	  unknowns	  related	  
to	  possible	  ecosystem	  interactions.	  Because	  of	  the	  breadth	  of	  different	  genetic	  approaches	  that	  
are	  under	  consideration	  as	  well	  as	  conditions	  under	  which	  they	  might	  be	  used,	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  
to	  provide	  a	  universal	  formula	  for	  evaluation	  of	  GMM	  technologies.	  As	  with	  other	  public	  health	  
technologies,	   case-­‐specific	   testing	   will	   be	   required	   to	   understand	   the	   advantages	   and	  
disadvantages	   of	   a	   particular	   GMM	   approach,	   keeping	   in	  mind	   both	   the	   potential	   benefits	   as	  
well	  as	  risks.	  This	  can	  begin	  prior	  to	  field-­‐testing	  as	  particular	  GMM	  approaches	  are	  developed,	  
building	  on	  principles	  already	  described	  for	  existing	  technologies.	  
10. A	  phased	  testing	  pathway	  is	  recommended	  for	  GMMs,	  analogous	  to	  the	  development	  pathway	  
for	   other	   new	   public	   health	   tools,	   with	   systematic	   assessment	   of	   safety	   and	   efficacy	   at	   each	  
step.	  New	  GMM	  technologies	  would	  first	  move	  from	  the	   laboratory	  (Phase	  1)	  to	  testing	  under	  
confined	   conditions	   that	   provide	   a	   more	   natural	   setting	   but	   still	   limit	   release	   into	   the	  
environment	   (Phase	  2).	   Phase	  2	  may	   involve	   testing	  under	  physical	   confinement,	   as	   in	  a	   large	  
cage	  equipped	  to	  simulate	  a	  disease-­‐endemic	  setting,	  or	  under	  ecological	  confinement,	  as	  under	  
geographic,	  spatial	  or	  climatic	  isolation.	  RA	  and	  prior	  experience	  with	  the	  technology	  will	  inform	  





ecological	   confinement	   will	   differ	   because	   of	   the	   different	   levels	   of	   environmental	   exposure.	  
Following	  confined	  testing,	  GMMs	  may	  proceed	  to	  a	  series	  of	  staged	  open	  release	  trials	  in	  Phase	  
3,	   designed	   to	   measure	   performance	   under	   different	   conditions	   and	   to	   assess	   the	   ability	   of	  
GMMs	  to	  reduce	  infection	  and/or	  disease	  in	  human	  populations.	  Based	  on	  results	  from	  Phase	  3,	  
a	   decision	  may	   be	  made	   to	   deploy	   GMMs	   as	   a	   public	   health	   intervention	   (Phase	   4).	   Phase	   4	  
would	  be	  accompanied	  by	  a	  plan	  for	  long-­‐term	  monitoring	  of	  safety	  and	  efficacy.	  	  
11. The	   transition	   from	   one	   phase	   to	   the	   next	   will	   be	   subject	   to	   “go/no-­‐go”	   decision	   criteria,	  
including	  efficacy	  and	  safety	  endpoints,	  regulatory	  and	  ethical	  approvals,	  and	  social	  acceptance.	  
Testing	  would	  not	  proceed	  if	  either	  the	  responsible	  regulatory	  authority	  or	  the	  developer	  makes	  
a	   “no-­‐go”	   decision	   or	   places	   a	   trial	   on	   hold	   in	   order	   to	   collect	  more	   information.	   Community	  
acceptance	  would	  be	  a	  critical	  determinant	  in	  deciding	  whether	  testing	  could	  move	  forward	  in	  a	  
particular	  location.	  	  
12. The	  critical	  path	  for	  GMM	  development	  will	  include	  not	  only	  proof	  of	  efficacy,	  but	  also	  proof	  of	  
acceptability	   and	   deliverability.	   Risk	   analysis,	   community	   and	   other	   stakeholder	   engagement,	  
and	   regulatory	   approval	   all	   contribute	   to	   proof	   of	   acceptability.	   Cost-­‐effectiveness	   of	   the	  
technology	   vs.	   other	   available	   disease	   control	   methods	   also	   may	   influence	   acceptability.	  
Deliverability	  will	   require	   consideration	   of	   an	   operating	  model	  with	   appropriate	   prospects	   for	  
financing	   to	   support	   deployment	   and	   subsequent	   monitoring,	   sufficient	   technical	   and	  
production	  capacity,	  quality	  control	  processes,	  methods	  for	  management	  and	  mitigation	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  adverse	  effects,	  as	  well	  as	  commitment	  to	  ongoing	  stakeholder	  engagement.	  
Efficacy	  evaluation	  
13. GMMs	   must	   be	   effective	   in	   reducing	   transmission	   of	   the	   targeted	   pathogen(s)	   and	   not	  
detrimental	  to	  the	  environment	  and	  human	  health	  if	  they	  are	  used	  as	  public	  health	  intervention	  
tools.	   Demonstration	   of	   efficacy	   will	   be	   a	   critical	   determinant	   for	   decision-­‐making	   about	  
deployment.	  
14. The	  efficacy	  of	  GMMs	  may	  be	  measured	  by	  both	  entomological	  and	  epidemiological	  endpoints.	  
The	  entomological	   endpoint	   is	   a	   reduction	   in	   the	   risk	   of	   disease	   transmission	   as	  measured	  by	  
specific	  mosquito	  population	  characteristics.	  The	  epidemiological	  endpoint	  is	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  
incidence	  of	  infection	  or	  disease	  in	  human	  populations.	  Whereas	  entomological	  endpoints	  may	  
be	  relevant	  through	  all	  phases	  of	  testing,	  epidemiological	  endpoints	  will	  probably	  only	  become	  
significant	  as	  research	  progresses	  to	  larger	  trials	  under	  Phase	  3.	  
15. The	   most	   direct	   measure	   of	   an	   entomological	   endpoint	   is	   a	   reduction	   in	   the	   estimated	  
transmission	   intensity,	   which	   is	   called	   the	   entomological	   inoculation	   rate	   (EIR).	   Because	  
measuring	   EIR	   reductions	   is	   difficult	   or	   impossible	   during	   Phase	   1	   and	   Phase	   2,	   it	   will	   be	  
necessary	  to	  infer	  reductions	  in	  EIR	  by	  surrogate	  vector	  indicators	  that	  would	  contribute	  to	  the	  
EIR,	  such	  as	  vector	  population	  size,	  transgene	  frequency,	  GMM	  fitness,	  or	  pathogen	  replication	  
within	  the	  vector.	  	  
16. A	   potentially	   powerful	   design	   for	   determining	   efficacy	   of	   GMM	   applications	   is	   the	   cluster	  
randomized	   trial.	   Such	   trials	  must	  be	  designed	   to	  allow	  measurable	   reductions	   in	  an	  endpoint	  





detecting	   significant	   results.	   The	   influence	   of	   seasonal	   and	   inter-­‐annual	   variations	   and	   spatial	  
heterogeneity	   in	   incidence	   on	   trial	   design	  must	   be	   considered.	   “Go”	   and	   “no-­‐go”	   criteria	   for	  
moving	  forward	  should	  be	  determined.	  Independent	  monitoring	  of	  trials	  is	  recommended.	  	  
17. GMMs	  will	  most	   likely	   be	   applied	   in	   the	   context	   of	   conventional	   control	  measures.	   Thus,	   the	  
effect	   of	   other	   ongoing	   control	   measures	   on	   the	   outcomes	   of	   the	   GMM	   trials	   must	   be	  
considered	   in	   the	   trial	   design.	   The	   efficiency	   of	  GMMs	   relative	   to	   conventional	   control	  will	   in	  
part	  determine	  their	  utility.	  	  
Biosafety	  
18. Risk	  is	  the	  likelihood	  that	  harm	  will	  occur	  from	  a	  particular	  action.	  The	  level	  of	  risk	  is	  estimated	  
as	   the	   product	   of	   the	   expected	   probability	   that	   a	   harmful	   event	   will	   occur	   and	   the	   expected	  
consequences,	  or	  impact,	  of	  the	  event.	  	  
19. RA	   is	   a	   methodological	   approach	   to	   systematically	   define	   the	   level	   of	   risk.	   Risk	  management	  
(RM)	   encompasses	   strategies	   developed	   to	   avoid	   and	   reduce	   risk	   to	   acceptable	   levels.	   Risk	  
analysis	   encompasses	   RA	   and	   RM,	   as	   well	   as	   risk	   awareness	   and	   risk	   communication.	   Risk	  
analysis	   should	   articulate	   and	   inform	   the	   concerns	   on	  which	   to	   focus	   and	   the	   acceptability	   of	  
risks,	  and	  convey	  the	  results	  of	  these	  processes	  to	  the	  public	  and	  to	  decision-­‐makers.	  	  
20. The	  core	  functions	  of	  risk	  analysis	  are	  assessment	  and	  management.	  RA	  should	  determine:	  the	  
planned	   actions	   and	   potential	   routes	   of	   exposure	   for	   defined	   hazards,	   how	   these	   can	   be	  
measured	  and	   the	   limits	  of	  concern;	  a	  characterization	  of	  events	   leading	   to	  potential	  negative	  
impacts	  of	  the	  GMMs;	  the	  anticipated	  level	  of	  exposure	  to	  these	  events	  leading	  to	  quantification	  
of	   the	   likelihood	   and	   consequences	   of	   their	   effect	   on	   target	   organisms,	   non-­‐target	   organisms	  
(NTOs)	   and	  human	  health;	   and	   the	   levels	   of	   uncertainty	   associated	  with	   the	   potential	   events,	  
levels	   of	   exposure,	   and	   their	   consequences.	   RM	   should	   identify	   and	   evaluate	   proportionate	  
measures	   that	   are	   needed	   to	   mitigate	   any	   harm	   or	   uncertainty	  and	   demonstrate	   how	   both	  
standard	   and	   responsive	   measures	   would	   make	   the	   identified	   risks	   acceptable	   to	   regulators.	  
Additional	   risk	   communication	  may	   be	   needed	   to	   determine	   that	   RM	   is	   also	   acceptable	   to	   a	  
wider	  community.	  	  
21. The	  evaluation	  of	  risk	  should	  be	  set	  against	  the	  benefits	  of	  GMMs	  for	  improving	  human	  health	  
on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis.	  Cost-­‐benefit	  or	  cost-­‐effectiveness	  analyses	  can	  provide	  the	  framework	  
under	  which	   the	  appropriate	   (economic,	  health,	   social)	   returns	  of	   a	  GMM-­‐release	  programme	  
may	  be	  quantified,	  and	  provide	  a	  context	  for	  decision-­‐making	  about	  the	  level	  of	  acceptable	  risk.	  
RA	  of	  novel	  technologies	  should	  be	  set	  against	  the	  risk	  of	  relevant	  alternatives,	  such	  as	  the	  risk	  
of	  no	  action	  or	  the	  risk	  of	  conventional	  control	  methods.	  For	  example,	  “causes	  more	  harm”	  than	  
current	  practice	  is	  a	  reasonable	  comparator	  for	  RA	  of	  GMM-­‐based	  vector	  control	  systems.	  	  
22. On	  evaluation,	  risk	  in	  some	  cases	  may	  be	  judged	  as	  negligible,	  as	  when	  the	  probability	  a	  harmful	  
event	  will	  occur	  is	  determined	  to	  be	  very	  low	  or	  the	  consequences	  of	  an	  event	  occurring	  would	  
be	  minimal.	  Moreover,	   in	  many	  cases,	  despite	  potentially	  harmful	  events	  being	   identified,	   the	  
practical	   level	   of	   risk	   to	   which	   the	   public	   is	   exposed	   can	   be	   reduced	   to	   acceptable	   levels	   by	  






23. Biosafety	  considerations	  in	  Phase	  1	  testing	  of	  GMMs	  should	  include:	  
• how	   appropriate	   comparators	   will	   be	   chosen,	   what	   appropriate	   comparisons	   should	   be	  
made,	  and	  what	  endpoints	  will	  be	  used	  for	  these	  comparisons	  of	  risk;	  	  	  
• stability	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  transgene	  at	  the	  population-­‐level	  and	  the	  consequences	  of	  
incomplete	  or	  partial	  transgene	  function;	  
• the	  phenotype	  of	  GMMs	  with	  multiple	  transgenes,	  rather	  than	  the	  effect	  of	  individual	  genes;	  
• the	  methodology	   for	   and	   impact	   of	   sex	   separation,	   if	   appropriate	   to	   the	  GMM	   technology	  
being	  assessed;	  
• how	   GMMs	   will	   be	   discriminated	   within	   a	   wild	   population	   after	   release,	   how	   the	  
maintenance	  of	  gene	  integrity	  will	  be	  monitored,	  and	  how	  trial	  endpoints	  will	  be	  determined;	  
• the	   type,	   strength	  and	   function	  of	   the	  appropriate	  ecological	  processes	  affecting	   the	  GMM	  
population;	  
• appropriate	  ecological	  and	  biological	  comparisons	  for	  NTOs.	  
24. Additional	  biosafety	  considerations	  in	  Phase	  2	  testing	  should	  include:	  
• determination	   of	   the	   need	   for	   physically	   confined	   testing	   prior	   to	   ecologically	   confined	  
testing;	  
• appropriate	   site	   selection	   criteria	   for	   confined	   trials,	   bearing	   in	   mind	   the	   spatial	   location,	  
timing	  and	  duration	  of	  ecologically	  confined	  field	  trials;	  
• spatial	  extent	  of	  the	  trial,	  including	  potential	  risks	  in	  areas	  outside	  the	  designated	  trial	  site(s);	  
• development	   of	   detailed	   standard	   operating	   procedures	   (SOPs)	   to	   ensure	   that	   rearing,	  
release	  and	  monitoring	  are	  carried	  out	  consistent	  with	  the	  relevant	  assumptions	  made	  in	  RA,	  
with	  clear	  lines	  of	  responsibility	  and	  reporting,	  and	  RM	  strategies	  for	  field	  trials;	  
• potential	  for	  unanticipated	  effects	  on	  disease	  burden;	  
• non-­‐target	  species	  assessments,	  if	  appropriate,	  for	  confined	  field	  trials.	  
25. Additional	  biosafety	  considerations	  in	  Phase	  3	  testing	  should	  include:	  
• characterization	   of	   local	   target	   mosquito	   ecology	   as	   required	   to	   set	   appropriate	   trial	  
endpoints,	  including	  impact	  on	  human	  health	  and	  the	  wider	  environment;	  
• methods	  for	  evaluating	  GMM	  success	  through	  population-­‐level	  assessments;	  
• appropriate	   RM	   plans	   for	   any	   potential	   resistance	   to	   the	   genetic	  modification,	   designating	  
the	  lines	  of	  responsibility	  for	  managing	  this	  risk;	  
• proportionate	   assessment	   and	   management	   of	   non-­‐target	   and	   off-­‐target	   effects	   and	   the	  
likely	  risk	  of	  transgenic	  gene	  flow;	  
• proportionate	  assessment	  and	  management	  of	  risks	  associated	  with	  the	  mass	  production	  of	  
mosquitoes.	  
26. If	  and	  when	  a	  decision	  is	  made	  to	  deploy	  GMMs	  broadly	  as	  a	  public	  health	  tool,	  there	  may	  be	  a	  
need	  for	  post-­‐implementation	  quality	  control	  and	  surveillance	  to	  monitor	  for	  effectiveness	  and	  
development	  of	  specific	  risks	  identified	  by	  post-­‐release	  assessment.	  Biosafety	  considerations	  in	  
Phase	  4	  should	  include:	  






• methods	  available	   for	  ongoing	  monitoring	  of	  safety	   for	   the	  environment	  and	  human	  health	  
(in	   a	   manner	   analogous	   to	   pharmacovigilance,	   the	   monitoring	   applied	   to	   medicines	   after	  	  
introduction	  to	  market);	  
• available	  mitigation	  methods	  in	  the	  case	  that	  a	  negative	  effect	  is	  observed;	  	  
• risk	  implications	  and	  management	  of	  the	  movement	  of	  GMMs	  across	  borders.	  	  
27. Independent	  ongoing	  safety	  review	  during	  testing	  is	  recommended,	  covering	  relevant	  aspects	  of	  
environmental	   monitoring	   and	   human	   health.	   This	   may	   be	   accomplished	   through	   existing	  
institutional	  or	  national	  level	  biosafety	  committees	  or	  through	  the	  establishment	  of	  new	  review	  
bodies	   focused	  on	  GMM	  activities.	  The	  strengthening	  of	  biosafety	  oversight	  capabilities	  within	  
disease	   endemic	   countries	   should	   be	   encouraged.	   National	   biosafety	   laws	   and	   regulations	  
developed	  primarily	  to	  regulate	  genetically	  modified	  (GM)	  plants	  may	  need	  to	  be	  reinterpreted	  
for	  GMM,	  or	  additional	  guidance	  provided.	  
Ethics	  and	  public	  engagement	  
28. In	  the	  design	  of	  GMM	  trials,	  a	  key	  set	  of	  questions	  relates	  to	  the	  ethical	  implications,	  including	  
the	   nature	   and	   scope	   of	   the	   obligation	   to	   respect	   host	   communities	   and	   what	   type	   of	  
protections	  should	  be	  provided	  to	  them.	  Respect	  for	  communities	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  
overarching	  ethical	  goal	  within	  GMM	  trials.	  
29. Although	  activities	  of	  ethical	  reflection	  and	  engagement	  often	  overlap	  with	  those	  of	  regulatory	  
compliance,	   ethical	   issues	   and	   responsibilities	   are	   generally	   broader	   than	   just	   those	   activities	  
specifically	  mandated	  by	  administrative	  law	  or	  organizational	  policies.	  It	  should	  not	  be	  assumed	  
that	   regulatory	   compliance	   implies	   that	   ethical	   and	   community	   engagement	   responsibilities	  
have	  been	  addressed	  adequately.	  	  
30. 	  Democratic	  governance	  of	   technology	  requires	   that	  proposals	  on	   issues	  such	  as	   the	   testing	  of	  
GMMs	  be	  discussed	   and	  debated	  openly	   in	   a	  manner	   that	   receives	   the	   attention	  of	   scientists	  
and	  decision-­‐makers,	  and	  in	  a	  way	  that	  ensures	  that	  stakeholders’	  voices	  can	  be	  heard.	  
31. The	   ethics	   and	   engagement	   component	   of	   a	   GMM	   research	   programme	   will	   take	   place	   at	  
multiple	  levels,	  three	  of	  which	  are	  mentioned	  below.	  
• Within	  the	  project	  team.	  Team	  members	  and	  their	  advisers	  should	  articulate	  the	  value	  and	  
social	  purpose	  of	  the	  research,	  engage	  in	  ongoing	  and	  structured	  ethical	  reflection	  (including	  
consideration	  of	  dissenting	  opinions	  and	   legitimate	  public	  concerns),	  document	  publicly	  the	  
ethics	   and	   engagement	   activities	   that	   have	   been	   done,	   and	   evaluate	   the	   performance	   of	  
these	  activities.	  All	  of	  these	  efforts	  should	  contribute	  to	  further	  development	  and	  refinement	  
of	  plans	  and	  methods.	  
• With	  the	  host	  community.	  Researchers	  have	  ethical	  responsibilities	  to	  people	  living	  within	  a	  
trial	  site.	  For	  that	  subset	  of	   individuals	  classified	  as	  “human	  research	  subjects”	  according	  to	  
standard	  regulatory	  criteria,	  informed	  consent	  obligations	  will	  apply.	  However,	  there	  may	  be	  
many	   individuals	   living	  within	  a	  trial	  site	  who	  are	  not,	   in	  a	  traditional	  sense,	  subjects	  of	  the	  
research	   at	   hand,	   but	   who	   nonetheless	   may	   be	   affected	   by	   the	   conduct	   of	   research.	  
Community	  engagement	  addresses	  ethical	  obligations	  to	  these	  people,	  including	  undertaking	  





interests	  at	  stake,	   finding	  out	  what	  concerns	  they	  may	  have,	  responding	  to	  those	  concerns,	  
and	  reaching	  some	  form	  of	  agreement	  about	  whether	  the	  trial	  should	  proceed.	  	  
• With	   third	  parties.	   Individuals	  not	   immediately	  associated	  with	   the	   trial	   site	   such	  as	  public	  
health	   or	   international	   development	   organizations,	   other	   scientists,	  members	   of	   CSOs,	   the	  
press,	   and	   the	   general	   public,	   will	   take	   an	   interest	   in	   the	   conduct	   and	   outcome	   of	   the	  
research.	  The	  ethical	  obligation	  to	  third	  parties	  is	  not	  to	  seek	  them	  out	  proactively	  to	  ensure	  
awareness	   of	   the	   research,	   but	   to	   consider	   and	   respond	   to	   their	   expressed	   concerns	   and	  
interests	  in	  a	  respectful	  manner.	  GMM	  projects	  should	  incorporate	  a	  communications/public	  
engagement	  strategy	  that	  includes	  education	  about	  the	  goal	  and	  methods,	  but	  also	  provides	  
opportunities	  for	  follow-­‐up	  discussion.	  
32. Ethics	   and	   engagement	   activities	   should	   be	   considered	   before	   Phase	   1	   proof-­‐of-­‐concept	  work	  
has	  been	  completed.	  Adequate	  plans	  for	  communication	  and	  engagement	  should	  be	  put	  in	  place	  
before	  	  the	  earliest	  stages	  of	  field	  testing	  begin.	  Community	  engagement	  activities	  should	  begin	  
during	   the	   collection	   of	   baseline	   entomological	   data,	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   the	   possibility	   of	  
misunderstandings	   and	   miscommunications	   that	   could	   undermine	   respect	   for	   the	   host	  
community	  and	  jeopardize	  future	  research.	  Plans	  also	  should	  include	  initiating	  interactions	  with	  
policy-­‐makers	  to	  explain	  research	  goals	  and	  develop	  an	  open	  dialogue.	  
33. Community	  engagement	  and	  authorization	  activities	  will	  be	  necessary	   in	  Phase	  2	  of	   the	  GMM	  
testing	   pathway.	   Before	   proceeding	   to	   confined	   release	   trials,	   plans	   should	   be	   in	   place	   for	  
responding	   to	   ethical	   obligations	   to	   individuals	   being	   asked	   to	   participate	   as	   human	   research	  
subjects	  and/or	  to	  communities	  being	  asked	  to	  host	  trials.	  Communications	  should	  explain	  that	  
trials	  are	  research	  activities	  intended	  to	  test	  a	  new	  technology,	  a	  protective	  effect	  is	  not	  assured,	  
and	   the	   community	  must	   continue	   to	   employ	   other	   available	  methods	   to	   protect	   themselves	  
from	  disease	  transmission.	  
34. Community	  engagement	  and	  authorization	  activities	  will	  expand	  in	  Phase	  3,	  and	  human	  subjects	  
issues	   will	   become	   more	   prominent	   in	   trials	   undertaken	   to	   determine	   the	   epidemiological	  
impact	  of	  GMMs.	  	  
35. In	  Phase	  4,	  ethical	  responsibilities	  to	  those	  who	  are	  affected	  by	  the	  technology	  are	  increasingly	  
likely	   to	   converge	   with	   established	   processes.	   Deployment	   of	   GMMs	   will	   be	   a	   public	   health	  
initiative	  and	  will	  take	  place	  in	  the	  context	  of	  existing	  legal,	  regulatory	  and	  political	  institutions.	  
However,	  the	  need	  for	  public	  engagement	  activities	  is	  likely	  to	  continue.	  
36. It	  will	  be	  important	  for	  members	  of	  the	  scientific	  team	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  ethics	  and	  engagement	  
activities.	   However,	   many	   aspects	   of	   these	   activities	   will	   also	   require	   the	   specialized	   skills	   of	  
social	   scientists	   and	   communications	   experts.	   Adequate	   funding	   for	   these	   activities	   will	   be	  
imperative	  for	  the	  successful	  accomplishment	  of	  the	  research	  objectives.	  
37. A	   need	   can	   be	   anticipated	   for	   training	   of	   project	   scientists	   about	   research	   ethics,	   and	   of	  
institutional	   or	   national	   ethics	   review	   committees	   in	   the	   specialized	   issues	   associated	   with	  






38. Regulation	  is	  an	  enabling	  process	  that	  ensures	  that	  safety	  and	  efficacy	  are	  consistent	  with	  social	  
values.	  Regulation	  of	  GMMs	  may	  be	  encountered	  early	  in	  the	  research	  process	  and	  throughout	  
development	  and	  implementation.	  Regulation	  can	  be	  expected	  at	  institutional,	  state,	  provincial	  
and	  national	  levels,	  all	  of	  which	  may	  have	  to	  be	  addressed	  concurrently.	  
39. Each	   country	   has	   its	   own	   sovereign	   regulatory	   process,	   but	   overarching	   international	  
agreements	  or	  treaties	  also	  may	  be	  relevant.	  Early	  investigation	  of	  the	  regulatory	  processes	  in	  a	  
given	  country	  and	  open	  communication	  with	  the	  national	  officials,	  risk	  assessors,	  and	  decision-­‐
makers	  are	  imperative	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  requirements	  relevant	  to	  GMMs.	  
40. Early	   interaction	  with	   regulators	  will	   serve	   to	   identify	   the	   appropriate	   regulatory	   pathway	   for	  
GMMs,	   and	   proactive	   communications	   will	   help	   to	   build	   understanding	   within	   regulatory	  
agencies	   about	   the	   GMM	   technology,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   goals	   and	  methodologies	   of	   the	   project.	  
There	   may	   be	   a	   need	   to	   strengthen	   familiarity	   with	   entomology	   research	   methods	   and/or	  
biosafety	  procedures,	  and	  this	  should	  be	  planned	  for	  accordingly.	  	  
41. The	  Cartagena	  Protocol	  on	  Biosafety	  (CPB)	  is	  accepted	  by	  almost	  all	  developing	  countries	  and	  is	  
anticipated	   to	   be	   an	   important	   influence	   on	   GMM	   regulatory	   processes	   and	   RAs.	   It	   will	   be	  
essential	  to	  work	  with	  regulators	  to	  ensure	  understanding	  of	  the	  differences	  between	  GMM	  and	  
GM	  plants	   or	   crops,	   including	   the	   fact	   that	   human	  health	   benefits	   are	   relevant	   as	   part	   of	   the	  
regulatory	  decision-­‐making	  process	  for	  GMMs.	  Limited	  resources	  available	  to	  GMM	  developers,	  
especially	  where	  products	  are	  intended	  primarily	  to	  serve	  the	  public	  health	  needs	  of	  developing	  
countries,	   make	   it	   important	   for	   authorities	   to	   exercise	   discretion	   in	   imposing	   regulatory	  
requirements,	  taking	  into	  account	  scientific	  rationale	  and	  relative	  risks.	  
42. Regulation	   of	   GMMs	   may	   present	   unanticipated	   costs	   and	   potential	   delays	   that	   must	   be	  
recognized	  as	  early	  as	  possible.	  Plans	  for	  dealing	  with	  such	  contingencies	  should	  be	  put	  in	  place	  
and	  suitably	  resourced.	  
43. Informed	  public	  involvement	  and	  consent	  in	  the	  GMM	  regulatory	  decision	  process	  is	  a	  necessity	  
if	   implementation	   is	   to	   occur	   without	   adverse	   public	   reaction.	   Regulatory	   processes	   often	  
include	  formal	  public	  consultation	  opportunities.	  
44. While	   there	   is	   currently	   no	   standardized	   procedure	   for	   addressing	   potential	   transboundary	  
movement	  of	  GMMs	  that	  are	  self-­‐sustaining	  or	  with	  gene	  drive,	  some	  precedent	  is	  provided	  by	  
prior	  introductions	  of	  classical	  biological	  control	  agents	  in	  agriculture.	  A	  regional	  notification	  and	  
agreement	   process	   may	   be	   advisable	   for	   planned	   introductions	   capable	   of	   autonomous	  
international	  movement	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  provisions	  in	  the	  Cartagena	  Protocol	  and	  may	  best	  
involve	  a	  multilateral	  organization	  in	  a	  coordinating	  capacity.	  
	  






1.	  Introduction	  	  
	  
	  
Current	  mosquito	  control	  efforts	  rely	  heavily	  on	  chemical	  methods	  including	  insecticide-­‐treated	  bed	  
nets,	   indoor	   residual	   spraying	   with	   insecticides,	   outdoor	   insecticide	   fogging,	   and	   application	   of	  
chemical	   larvicides,	   or	  management	   of	   standing	  water	   for	  mosquito	   larval	   breeding	   sites.	   Despite	  
diligent	  application	  of	  available	  control	  strategies,	  including	  improvements	  and	  expanded	  use	  of	  bed	  
nets,	   mosquito-­‐borne	   diseases	   such	   as	   dengue	   (WHO,	   2012),3	   and	   malaria	   (Murray	   et	   al.,	   2012;	  
WHO,	  2013)	  continue	  to	  pose	  major	  global	  health	  challenges.	  WHO	  experts	  have	  stated	  that,	  “global	  
eradication	  of	  malaria	  cannot	  be	  expected	  with	  existing	  tools”	  due	  to	  the	  difficulties	  of	  interrupting	  
transmission	   in	   sites	  with	  ongoing	  high	  vectorial	   capacities	   (Mendis	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Malaria	  mapping	  
and	  modelling	  studies	  support	  this	  conclusion	  (Hay	  et	  al.,	  2009,	  Griffin	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  Similarly,	  a	  WHO	  
Special	   Programme	   for	   Research	   and	   Training	   in	   Tropical	   Diseases	   (WHO-­‐TDR)-­‐sponsored	   dengue	  
scientific	  working	  group	  acknowledged	  that,	  “we	  are	  collectively	  failing	  to	  meet	  the	  threat	  posed	  by	  
dengue	  as	  the	  disease	  spreads	  unabated	  and	  almost	  40%	  of	  the	  world’s	  population	  now	  live	  at	  risk	  
of	  contracting	  it”	  (Farrar	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  Re-­‐emergence	  of	  dengue	  over	  the	  last	  two	  decades	  is	  exacting	  
an	   increasing	   public	   health	   and	   economic	   toll	   (Shepard	   et	   al.,	   2011,	   Shepard	   et	   al.,	   2013).	   The	  
disease	   is	   now	   recognized	   as	   one	   of	   the	   most	   common	   reasons	   for	   hospital	   admission	   in	   the	  
Americas	   and	   Asia	   during	   the	   rainy	   seasons	   (Whitehorn	  &	   Farrar,	   2010).	  WHO	  has	   acknowledged	  
that,	   “innovative	   vector	   control	   tools	   are	   badly	   needed,”	   and	   in	   particular	   that,	   “methods	   that	  
improve	   the	   ability	   to	   deliver	   persistent	   treatments	  more	   rapidly	   and	   efficiently	   into	   large	   urban	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Dengue	  and	  severe	  dengue:	  http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs117/en/,	  accessed	  25	  May	  2014.	  
Summary:	  The	  need	  for	  better	  methods	  to	  combat	  mosquito-­‐borne	  diseases	  is	  widely	  recognized.	  Recent	  
research	   offers	   the	   possibility	   that	   genetically	   modified	   mosquitoes	   (GMMs)	   could	   be	   used	   to	   prevent	  
pathogen	  transmission.	  GMMs	  provide	  several	  theoretical	  advantages	  that	  may	  make	  them	  attractive	  for	  
vector	   control,	   such	   as	   specificity	   and	   the	   ability	   to	   function	   in	   areas	   that	   are	   difficult	   to	   reach	   with	  
conventional	   control	  methods.	  Different	  GMM	  technologies	  under	   consideration	   include	   those	  aimed	  at	  
reducing	  the	  number	  of	  mosquito	  vectors	  in	  a	  given	  region	  (population	  suppression)	  or	  rendering	  the	  local	  
mosquitoes	  unable	   to	   transmit	  a	  pathogen	   (population	   replacement).	  Both	   types	  of	   technologies	  can	  be	  
designed	  so	  that	  GMMs	  persist	  for	  only	  a	  brief	  period	  of	  time	  (self-­‐limiting)	  or	  so	  that	  the	  modification	  is	  
passed	   on	   through	   local	  wild	  mosquitoes	   and	   persists	   indefinitely	  within	   the	   local	  mosquito	   population	  
(self-­‐sustaining).	  	  
Ongoing	  releases	  of	  self-­‐limiting	  GMMs	  will	  be	  required	  to	  maintain	  effectiveness.	  Self-­‐limiting	  approaches	  
may	  be	  attractive	  from	  an	  environmental	  safety	  perspective	  since	  they	  are	  not	  expected	  to	  persist	  in	  the	  
environment	   or	   to	   spread	   far	   beyond	   the	   release	   site.	   However,	   self-­‐sustaining	   approaches	   ultimately	  
could	   provide	   more	   durable	   and	   cost-­‐effective	   public	   health	   solutions.	   A	   phased	   testing	   pathway	   is	  
recommended,	   in	   which	   new	   GMM	   strategies	   move	   from	   the	   laboratory,	   to	   testing	   in	   more	   natural	  
environments	  under	  confined	  conditions,	  and	  finally	  to	  open	  release	  trials,	  with	  each	  transition	  dependent	  
upon	   satisfactory	   demonstration	   of	   efficacy	   and	   safety.	   When	   GMM	   are	   incorporated	   into	   national	   or	  
regional	   vector	   control	  programmes,	   the	  need	   for	  ongoing	   case-­‐specific	  monitoring	  of	   effectiveness	  and	  
safety	   should	  be	  considered	   to	  ensure	  acceptable	  quality	  and	  performance	  standards	  and	   to	   inform	  any	  
necessary	  management	  responses.	  	  
	  





communities	   in	   a	   sustained	  way	  are	  urgently	  needed”	   (WHO,	  2012). Limitations	  of	   current	   vector	  
control	  methods	   include:	   inability	   to	   reach	  mosquito	   larval	   breeding	   sites	   and	   adult	   resting	   sites;	  
evolution	  of	  resistance	  to	  chemical	  agents;	  compliance	  and	  infrastructure	  issues;	  concern	  about	  the	  
impact	  on	  the	  environment	  and/or	  toxicity	  to	  humans;	  and,	  importantly,	  cost.	  The	  ongoing	  costs	  of	  
vector	  control	  are	   substantial,4	  and	  maintaining	   the	  high	   levels	  of	  donor	  and	  national	  government	  
support	   necessary	   to	   achieve	   high	   coverage	   of	   control	   measures	   over	   long	   periods	   of	   time	   has	  
historically	  proven	  daunting	  (Mills,	  Lubell	  &	  Hanson,	  2008;	  Leach-­‐Kemon	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  Thus,	  for	  both	  
operational	   and	   economic	   reasons,	   there	   is	   a	   recognized	   need	   for	   new,	   sustainable,	   and	   cost-­‐
effective	  vector	  control	  tools.	  
Intensive	   interest	   arose	   in	   the	   late	   1980s	   for	   the	   application	   of	   modern	   genetic	   engineering	  
technology	  to	  arthropod	  vectors	  as	  a	  useful	  approach	  for	  limiting	  transmission	  of	  human	  pathogens	  
(Beaty	   et	   al.,	   2009).	   Subsequent	   research	   has	   focused	   in	   large	   part	   on	   two	   high	   impact	  mosquito	  
species,	   Anopheles	   gambiae	   and	   Aedes	   aegypti,	   which	   serve	   as	   major	   vectors	   for	   malaria	   and	  
dengue,	  respectively.	  	  
Substantial	   progress	   has	  been	  made	  on	   challenges	   such	   as	   sequencing	   the	   genomes	  of	   these	   two	  
important	   vector	   species,	   achieving	   stable	   germline	   transformation,	   identifying	   sex-­‐,	   tissue-­‐	   and	  
stage-­‐specific	   DNA	   control	   elements,	   identifying	   genes	   involved	   in	   susceptibility	   or	   resistance	   to	  
infection/insecticides,	   and	   developing	  models	   for	   methods	   to	   spread	   heritable	  modifications	   into	  
native	  mosquito	  populations	  within	  an	  epidemiologically	   relevant	   timeframe	  as	  needed	  to	  achieve	  
disease	  control.	  The	   initial	   technical	  objective,	  germline	   transformation,	  has	  been	  accomplished	   in	  
all	  major	  mosquito	  genera	  (Allen	  et	  al.,	  2001;	  Catteruccia	  et	  al.,	  2000;	  Jasinskiene	  et	  al.,	  1998)	  and	  
can	   be	   considered	   routine	   for	   several	   species.	   Beyond	   similar	   preliminary	   achievements,	   effector	  
genes	  have	  been	  developed	  that	  accomplish	  proof	  of	  principle	  for	  either	  refractoriness	  or	  sterility.	  
Examples	  include:	  1)	  mosquitoes	  refractory	  to	  malaria	  parasites	  (Ito	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  Corby-­‐Harris	  et	  al.,	  
2010,	   Isaacs	   et	   al.,	   2011;	   Isaacs	   et	   al.,	   2012)	   and	  dengue	   virus	   (Travanty	   et	   al.,	   2004;	   Franz	   et	   al.,	  
2006);	   and,	   2)	   mosquitoes	   that	   are	   sterile	   (Windbichler,	   Papathanos	   &	   Crisanti,	   2008)	   or	   that	  
function	  in	  a	  manner	  to	  limit	  reproductive	  potential	  (Fu	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Galizi	  et	  al.,	  2014;	  Phuc	  et	  al.,	  
2007;	   Thomas	   et	   al.,	   2000).	   Additional	  methods	   have	   been	   proposed	   or	   demonstrated	   that	   await	  
development	   in	   transgenic	   mosquitoes	   (e.g.	   Marshall	   et	   al.,	   2010;	   Papathanos	   et	   al.,	   2009;	  
Schliekelman	   &	   Gould,	   2000).	   Efforts	   can	   also	   be	   envisioned	   to	   develop	   additional	   effectors	   to	  
reduce	  life	  span	  or	  alter	  behaviours	  in	  a	  beneficial	  way.	  	  
Although	   much	   work	   remains	   to	   be	   done,	   it	   is	   now	   possible	   to	   envision	   a	   pathway	   towards	   the	  
realization	   of	   the	   successful	   implementation	   of	   genetic	   technologies	   for	   the	   control	   of	  mosquito-­‐
borne	   diseases.	   A	   multidisciplinary	   effort	   will	   be	   required,	   encompassing	   not	   only	   additional	  
scientific	  advances,	  but	  also	  complementary	  planning	  for	  ethically	  and	  environmentally	  responsible	  
testing	  as	  well	  as	  for	  reliable,	  cost-­‐effective	  and	  socially	  acceptable	  deployment.	  Consequently,	  the	  
technical	   consultation	  on	  GMMs	  organized	   in	  May	  2009	  by	  WHO-­‐TDR	  and	   the	  Foundation	   for	   the	  
National	   Institutes	   of	   Health	   (FNIH)	   recommended	   that	   a	   guidance	   framework	   be	   developed	   for	  
assessing	  safety	  and	  efficacy	  and	  addressing	  regulatory	  and	  ethical,	  social	  and	  cultural	  issues	  during	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Global	  Malaria	  Action	  Plan,	  Table	  II.4:	  http://www.rollbackmalaria.org/gmap/2-­‐5.html,	  accessed	  25	  May	  
2014.	  





the	  development	  and	  testing	  of	  GMMs	  (WHO,	  2009).	  The	  framework	  presented	  here	  is	  intended	  to	  
provide	  a	  basis	  for	  conduct	  of	  trials	  according	  to	  best	  practices	  that	  will	  contribute	  to	  comparability	  
of	  results	  and	  credibility	  of	  conclusions.	  This	  should	  facilitate	  decision-­‐making	  by	  countries	  regarding	  
the	  potential	  testing	  and	  use	  of	  GMMs	  as	  public	  health	  tools	  for	  prevention	  and	  control	  of	  malaria,	  
dengue	  and	  other	  mosquito-­‐borne	  diseases.	  	  
1.1	  GMM	  technologies	  
Currently	  contemplated	  GMM	  technologies	  are	  designed	  to	  have	  the	  following	  two	  major	  types	  of	  
effect.	  
• Population	   suppression	   –	   strategies	   that	   target	   vector	   “demography”	   with	   the	   intent	   to	  
reduce	   (suppress)	   the	   size	   of	   the	   mosquito	   population	   such	   that	   it	   would	   not	   be	   able	   to	  
sustain	   pathogen	   transmission.	   These	   include	   methods	   to	   reduce	   the	   overall	   numbers	   of	  
female	  mosquitoes	  (with	  or	  without	  a	  concomitant	  direct	  effect	  on	  males),	  which	  will	  result	  
in	   decreased	   reproduction.	   Examples	   of	   how	   this	   could	   be	   accomplished	   include	   biasing	  
against	  the	  development	  of	  female	  progeny	  (sex-­‐ratio	  distortion),	  reducing	  female	  fertility,	  or	  
introducing	  a	  mechanism	  that	   incapacitates	  or	  kills	  young	  female	  mosquitoes.	  This	  category	  
also	   includes	   methods	   to	   shorten	   the	   lifespan	   of	   female	   mosquitoes,	   thus	   decreasing	   the	  
length	   of	   time	   available	   both	   to	   transmit	   a	   pathogen	   from	   one	   person	   to	   the	   next	   and	   to	  
reproduce.	  
• Population	  replacement	  –	  strategies	  that	  target	  vector	  competence	  with	  the	  intent	  to	  reduce	  
the	  inherent	  ability	  of	  individual	  mosquitoes	  to	  transmit	  a	  given	  pathogen.	  This	  involves	  the	  
introduction	   of	   engineered	   DNA	   and/or	   the	   manipulation	   of	   endogenous	   genes	   so	   as	   to	  
inhibit	  pathogen	  replication	  within	  the	  mosquitoes,	  making	  them	  refractory	  to	  transmission	  
of	  particular	  viruses	  or	  parasites.	  Upon	  release	  into	  the	  environment,	  these	  refractory	  GMMs	  
will	   be	   expected	   to	   introduce,	   through	   mating,	   the	   change	   into	   the	   local	   mosquito	  
population,	  “replacing”	  their	  inherent	  ability	  to	  spread	  the	  targeted	  pathogen	  with	  a	  reduced	  
or	  eliminated	  transmission	  capability.	  	  
These	   strategies	   can	   be	   further	   categorized	   according	   to	   the	   ability	   of	  GMMs	   to	   persist	   following	  
release	  (Table	  1.1;	  Alphey,	  2014).	  This	  will	  depend	   largely	  on	  a	  combination	  of	  two	  characteristics.	  
The	  first	  is	  “fitness	  cost”	  (a	  decrease	  in	  the	  mosquito's	  ability	  to	  survive	  and	  reproduce	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
the	   genetic	   modification)	   and	   the	   second	   is	   “drive”	   (a	   mechanism	   to	   increase	   the	   frequency	   of	  
effector	  genes	   in	  a	  population	  at	  a	  rate	  faster	  than	  would	  be	  expected	  through	  normal	  Mendelian	  
inheritance).	  The	  following	  two	  general	  approaches	  are	  being	  pursued.	  
• Self-­‐limiting	   –	   approaches	   in	   which	   the	   GMMs	   are	   unable	   to	   pass	   the	   modification	   on	  
indefinitely	  through	  subsequent	  generations.	  Self-­‐limiting	  approaches	  are	  designed	  to	  impose	  
a	  significant	  fitness	  cost,	  which	  will	  cause	  the	  GMMs	  to	  decline	  in	  frequency	  over	  time	  until	  
they	   disappear	   within	   the	   local	   population	   unless	   they	   are	   maintained	   by	   periodic	   new	  
releases.	   In	  general,	  the	  greater	  the	  fitness	  penalty,	  the	  shorter	  the	  time	  period	  over	  which	  
the	  GMMs	  would	  be	  expected	   to	  maintain	   their	  effectiveness.	   Indeed,	  a	   subset	  of	   the	  self-­‐
limiting	   approach	   is	   comprised	   of	   GMMs	   that	   limit	   the	   number	   of	   viable	   adult	   progeny	  
produced	   from	   mating	   and	   hence	   the	   amount	   of	   genetic	   material	   passed	   to	   future	  





generations.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  genetic	  modification	  may	  aim	  for	  “sterility”	  (the	  GMMs	  do	  not	  
reproduce)	  or	   late-­‐acting	   lethality	   (the	  GMMs	   reproduce	  but	  most	  of	   their	   progeny	  do	  not	  
survive	   to	  adulthood).	  Other	   self-­‐limiting	  approaches	   impose	  a	   less	   severe	   fitness	  cost,	  and	  
therefore	   the	  modification	  will	   disappear	  more	   gradually	   from	   a	   population	  when	   releases	  
stop.	   Some	  of	   these	   are	  designed	   to	  have	   a	   transient	   gene	  drive	   system	   that	  breaks	  down	  
over	   time,	   at	   which	   point	   harmful	   effects	   on	   fitness	   predominate	   and	   the	   modification	   is	  
expected	   to	   disappear	   from	   the	   population	   without	   recurrent	   releases.	   Thus,	   with	   self-­‐
limiting	  approaches,	  the	  combined	  effect	  of	  the	  fitness	  cost,	  which	  works	  against	  persistence,	  
and	  drive,	  which	  promotes	  persistence,	  will	  dictate	  how	  long	  the	  GMMs	  will	  remain	  effective	  
in	  the	  field	  and	  how	  often	  additional	  releases	  will	  be	  required.	  
	  	  
A	   spectrum	   of	   different	   self-­‐limiting	   approaches	   is	   under	   development.	   Some	   are	   being	  
constructed	   to	   function	   similarly	   to	   the	   sterile	   insect	   technique	   (SIT)	   that	   has	   been	   used	  
successfully	   against	   pest	   insects	   affecting	   livestock	   and	   crops	   (Lindquist	   et	   al.,	   1992;	  Dyck,	  
Hendrichs	  &	  Robinson,	  2005).	  In	  this	  case,	  few,	  if	  any,	  viable	  offspring	  are	  expected	  to	  result	  
from	  the	  mating	  of	  GMMs	  with	  native	  mosquitoes.	  The	  reproductive	  potential	  of	   the	   local	  
population,	   therefore,	   is	   expected	   to	   decrease,	   resulting	   in	   population	   suppression.	   Such	  
approaches	   will	   require	   frequent	   inundative	   releases	   of	   GMMs	   to	  maintain	   effectiveness.	  
With	   self-­‐limiting	   approaches	   at	   the	   other	   end	   of	   the	   spectrum,	   i.e.	   those	   that	   impose	   a	  
lower	  fitness	  cost	  and	  incorporate	  weak	  drive,	  GMMs	  from	  an	  initial	  release	  are	  expected	  to	  
mate	   productively	   with	   local	   mosquitoes	   and	   introduce	   the	   desired	   effect	   into	   the	  
population.	   However,	   the	   modification	   will	   gradually	   be	   diluted	   over	   a	   number	   of	  
generations	   of	   crossing	   with	   native	   mosquitoes	   until	   it	   is	   lost.	   Less	   frequent	   releases,	  
involving	  lower	  numbers	  of	  GMMs,	  would	  be	  required	  to	  maintain	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  this	  
type	  of	  self-­‐limiting	  approach.	  
	  	  
Computer	   simulations	   support	   the	   potential	   for	   self-­‐limiting	   approaches	   to	   substantially	  
reduce	   vector-­‐borne	  diseases	   (e.g.	  Atkinson	  et	   al.,	   2007,	   Legros	  et	   al.,	   2012).	  Moreover,	   it	  
has	  been	  argued	  by	  some	  that	  release	  of	  self-­‐limiting	  constructs	  should	  constitute	  the	  early	  
stages	   of	   field	   testing	   in	   order	   to	   gain	   experience	   with	   GMM	   technology	   under	  
circumstances	   where	   its	   effects	   could	   be	   withdrawn	   by	   halting	   releases	   (Benedict	   &	  
Robinson,	  2003).	  	  
	  
• Self-­‐sustaining	   –	   approaches	   in	   which	   heritable	   modifications	   are	   intended	   to	   spread	  
indefinitely	  through	  the	  target	  population.	  Self-­‐sustaining	  approaches	  must	  be	  able	  to	  spread	  
the	   effector	   mechanism	   into	   native	   mosquito	   populations	   within	   an	   epidemiologically	  
relevant	  timeframe.	  Thus,	  they	  require	  a	  strong	  drive	  mechanism	  capable	  of	  overcoming	  any	  
fitness	   costs	   and	   increasing	   rapidly	   the	   frequency	   of	   the	   effector	   gene(s)	   from	   low	   initial	  
levels	  to	  fixation,	  or	  near	  fixation.	  Once	  established,	  self-­‐sustaining	  approaches	  are	  intended	  
to	  be	  relatively	  stable	  and	  to	  require	  smaller	  and	  infrequent	  inoculative	  releases	  to	  maintain	  
effectiveness.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   population	   replacement,	   the	   modification	   may	   become	   fixed	  
permanently	   within	   the	   local	   population.	   With	   self-­‐sustaining	   population	   suppression	  
strategies,	  the	  modification	  may	  spread	  until	  the	  local	  vector	  population	  is	  greatly	  reduced	  or	  





eventually	   eliminated.	   Computer	   simulations	   support	   the	   potential	   for	   self-­‐sustaining	  
approaches	  to	  provide	  complete	  elimination	  of	  the	  disease	  pathogen	  in	  some	  circumstances,	  
potentially	  replacing	  existing	  control	  methods	  (e.g.	  Deredec	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  
	  





Self-­‐limiting	   Self-­‐sustaining	  
Population	  suppression	   -­‐	  Modification	   reduces	   the	   number	   of	  
progeny	  
-­‐	   Possesses	   either	   no	   gene	   drive	   or	  
weak	   drive	   that	   will	   pass	   the	  
modification	   through	   only	   a	   limited	  
number	  of	  generations	  
-­‐	   Not	   intended	   to	   persist	   in	   the	  
absence	  of	  continued	  releases	  
	  
-­‐	   Modification	   reduces	   the	  
number	  of	  progeny	  
-­‐	  Possesses	  strong	  gene	  drive	  	  
-­‐	   Intended	   to	   spread	   the	  
modification	   indefinitely	   or	  
until	   the	   mosquito	   population	  
is	  eliminated	  
	  
Population	  replacement	   -­‐	   Modification	   limits	   pathogen	  
replication,	   thereby	   reducing	  
transmission	  	  
-­‐	   Possesses	   weak	   gene	   drive	   that	   will	  
pass	   the	   modification	   through	   only	   a	  
limited	  number	  of	  generations	  
-­‐	   Intended	  to	  persist	  only	  until	  diluted	  
out	  of	  the	  population	  
	  
-­‐	   Modification	   limits	   pathogen	  
replication,	   thereby	   reducing	  
transmission	  	  
-­‐	  Possesses	  strong	  gene	  drive	  	  
-­‐	   Intended	   to	   spread	   the	  




1.2	  Characteristics	  of	  GMMs	  
GMM	  technologies	  offer	  certain	  potentially	  favourable	  design	  characteristics	  as	  new	  vector	  control	  
tools.	  
	  
• They	   could	   provide	   area-­‐wide	  protection	   that	   is	   accessible	   to	   everyone,	   regardless	   of	   their	  
socioeconomic	  level,	  and	  they	  do	  not	  require	  people	  to	  change	  their	  behaviour	  in	  order	  to	  be	  
effective.	  
• They	  would	  not	  require	  application	  of	  a	  chemical	  that	  must	  come	  into	  direct	  physical	  contact	  
with	  the	  mosquito	  to	  be	  effective.	  	  
• They	   could	   reach	   mosquito	   populations	   and	   their	   larval	   breeding	   sites	   that	   have	   been	  
traditionally	   the	   hardest	   and	   most	   expensive	   to	   reach	   using	   conventional	   vector	   control	  
strategies	  by	  exploiting	   the	  natural	   seeking	  behaviour	  of	   the	  mosquitoes	   to	   find	  mates	  and	  
oviposition	  sites.	  This	  would	  include	  outdoor	  and/or	  day-­‐biting	  vectors	  that	  escape	  control	  by	  
bed	  nets	  and	  indoor	  spraying	  but	  may	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  transmission.	  
• A	  high	   level	   of	   specificity	   and	   stability	  would	   reduce	   ecological,	   environmental	   and	   human	  
health	  hazards	  associated	  with	  currently	  available	  broad	  spectrum	  insecticides.	  





• They	   would	   be	   well	   suited	   to	   application	   in	   urban	   environments	   where	   current	   control	  
measures	  largely	  have	  proven	  inadequate.	  	  
• Technologies	   aimed	   at	   population	   suppression	   could	   reduce	   transmission	   of	   all	   pathogens	  
transmitted	  by	  the	  same	  vector	  mosquito.	  For	  example,	  suppression	  of	  Aedes	  aegypti	  vectors	  
could	  reduce	  transmission	  of	  dengue,	  yellow	  fever	  and	  chikungunya	  viruses.	  	  
Self-­‐sustaining	  approaches	  have	  additional	  envisioned	  characteristics	  that	  would	  be	  useful	  in	  disease	  
elimination	  or	  eradication	  efforts.	  
• Limited	  need	  for	  reapplication	  would	  minimize	  the	  requirement	  for	  ongoing	  mass	  production	  
and	  delivery,	  which	  should	  make	  their	  use	  relatively	  inexpensive.	  	  
• Durability	   of	   activity	   should	  maintain	   effectiveness	   even	   in	   situations	   where	   other	   disease	  
control	  methods	  must	  be	   temporarily	   suspended,	   as,	   for	  example,	  due	   to	  adverse	  weather	  
conditions	  or	  civil	  unrest.	  	  
• Population	  replacement	  technologies	  would	  reduce	  or	  eliminate	  the	  pathogen,	  rather	  than	  a	  
particular	  mosquito	  vector.	  By	  not	  leaving	  an	  empty	  ecological	  niche,	  their	  effects	  should	  not	  
be	  limited	  by	  the	  potential	  for	  invasion	  of	  the	  treated	  area	  by	  other	  competent	  vectors.	  
• Some	   of	   the	   technologies	   could	   affect	   more	   than	   one	   local	   vector	   species	   if	   cross-­‐mating	  
occurs	  even	  at	   low	  levels,	  thus	  having	  the	  potential	  to	  reduce	  disease	   in	  regions	  where	   it	   is	  
transmitted	  by	  related	  species.	  
Theoretical	   disadvantages	   of	   GMMs	   also	   have	   been	   proposed.	   These	   include	   possible	   ecosystem	  
effects.	   	  An	  example	  is	  the	  complexity	  of	  applying	  a	  species-­‐specific	  technology	  in	  situations	  where	  
disease	  is	  spread	  by	  multiple	  vectors	  and	  the	  possibility	  that	  removal	  of	  the	  current	  disease	  vector	  
may	   allow	   a	   new	   vector	   to	   become	   established.	   Other	   potential	   issues	   are	   the	   development	   of	  
resistance	  over	  time,	  either	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  mosquito	  or	  the	  pathogen,	  and	  the	  loss	  of	  immunity	  
by	  people	   in	  treated	  areas	  over	  time;	  however,	  these	  possibilities	  also	  are	  shared	  by	  other	  control	  
methods	  such	  as	   insecticides	  and	  drugs.	  Such	  possible	  hazards	  must	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration	  in	  
risk	  assessment	  (RA)	  (Section	  3.	  Biosafety).	  
1.3	  Potential	  utility	  of	  GMMs	  
GMMs	  are	  primarily	  being	  developed	  for	  use	  within	  disease	  endemic	  or	  epidemic	  situations	  as	  part	  
of	  an	  area-­‐wide	  control	  programme	  to	  reduce	  the	  rate	  of	  pathogen	  transmission.	  GMMs	  are	  likely	  to	  
be	   used	   as	   part	   of	   an	   integrated	   approach,	   in	   conjunction	   with	   other	   disease	   control	   methods.	  
GMMs	  are	  compatible	  with	  use	  of	  drugs	  and	  vaccines,	  as	  well	  as	  common	  vector	  control	  methods	  
such	   as	   source	   reduction.	   Importantly,	   GMM-­‐mediated	   methods	   to	   reduce	   the	   force	   of	   disease	  
transmission	  by	   reducing	   the	  number	  of	   infectious	  bites	  could	   improve	   the	  protective	  potential	  of	  
new	   vaccines.	   For	   example,	   modelling	   suggests	   that	   a	   pre-­‐erythrocytic	   malaria	   vaccine	   would	   be	  
much	  more	   effective	   in	   low	   transmission	   settings	   than	   in	   high	   transmission	   settings	   (Penny	  et	   al.,	  
2008).	  Likewise,	  concurrent	  use	  of	  a	  vaccine	  would	  reduce	  the	  possibility	  that	  prolonged	  reduction	  in	  
pathogen	  exposure	  due	  to	  effective	  transmission	  control	  might	  result	  in	  loss	  of	  immunity	  within	  the	  
human	  population	  (Ghani	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  	  





Because	   they	   would	   not	   require	   a	   high	   level	   of	   individual	   participation,	   GMMs	   may	   not	   be	   as	  
susceptible	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  compliance	  that	  is	  sometimes	  seen	  with	  conventional	  control	  programmes	  
after	  disease	   rates	   fall	  and	   the	  perceived	   threat	   is	   low.	  Ongoing	  area-­‐wide	  protection	  provided	  by	  
GMMs,	  especially	   those	   that	  are	   self-­‐sustaining,	   could	  prevent	   the	   reintroduction	  of	   the	  pathogen	  
into	  the	  population	  (for	  example,	  by	  immigration	  of	  infected	  persons	  or	  mosquitoes)	  after	  successful	  
regional	  elimination	  efforts.	  This	  may	  provide	  a	  valuable	  tool	  for	  disease	  eradication.	  
Certain	  GMM	  technologies	  could	  also	  be	  useful	  as	  a	  preventative	  measure	  in	  regions	  where	  disease	  
is	  not	  yet	  occurring.	  For	  example,	  where	  exotic	  mosquito	  species	  may	  be	   introduced,	  GMMs	  could	  
help	   to	   prevent	   their	   establishment.	   This	   is	   analogous	   to	   current	   utilization	   of	   SIT	   to	   prevent	  
Mediterranean	  fruit	  fly	  infestation	  in	  otherwise	  pest-­‐free	  areas.	  	  
1.4	  GMM	  testing	  pathway	  
A	   series	   of	   workshops	   held	   in	   London	   and	   Atlanta	   in	   2001	   (Alphey	   et	   al.,	   2002),	   Wageningen	   in	  
2002,5	   and	   Nairobi	   in	   2004,6	   began	   a	   process	   to	   discuss	   requirements	   related	   to	   the	   testing	   and	  
implementation	   of	   genetically	   modified	   (GM)	   vectors.	   The	   concept	   of	   phased	   testing	   was	   widely	  
advocated.	  The	  recommendation	  to	  develop	  a	  phased	  testing	  pathway	  was	  reiterated	  at	  a	  technical	  
consultation,	  held	  in	  Geneva	  in	  May	  2009,	  which	  focused	  on	  practical	  and	  technical	  issues	  associated	  
with	  moving	  new	  GMM	  technologies	  from	  the	  laboratory	  to	  field	  testing	  (WHO,	  2009).	  	  
In	  accordance	  with	  these	  earlier	  recommendations,	  a	  stepwise	  testing	  process	  as	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  
1.1	   is	   proposed	   in	   this	   guidance	   framework.	   Subsequent	   sections	   expand	   upon	   specific	  
considerations	   related	   to	   efficacy	   testing,	   safety	   testing,	   ethical,	   social	   and	   cultural	   issues,	   and	  
regulatory	  decisions	  to	  be	  addressed	  at	  each	  phase.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Ecological	  aspects	  for	  application	  of	  genetically	  modified	  mosquitoes:	  
http://library.wur.nl/frontis/malaria/index.html,	  accessed	  25	  May	  2014.	  
6	  Bridging	  laboratory	  and	  field	  research	  for	  genetic	  control	  of	  disease	  vectors:	  	  
http://library.wur.nl/frontis/disease_vectors/index.html,	  accessed	  25	  May	  2014.	  










For	  simplicity,	  the	  illustration	  describes	  a	  unidirectional	  pathway.	  In	  practice,	  however,	  repetitions	  of	  
some	  segment(s)	  of	  the	  pathway	  may	  be	  required	  in	  order	  to	  improve	  the	  technology	  and	  refine	  the	  
procedures	  until	  the	  requirements	  for	  moving	  to	  the	  next	  phase	  are	  met.	  	   	  
Phase	   1	   is	   anticipated	   to	   begin	  with	   small-­‐scale	   laboratory	   studies	   for	   efficacy	   and	   safety	   testing,	  
followed	  by	  testing	   in	   larger	  population	  cages	   in	  a	   laboratory	  setting	  conducted	  under	  appropriate	  
containment	   facilities	   and	   procedures.7	   Laboratory	   testing	   under	   highly	   controlled	   conditions	   will	  
allow	   preliminary	   assessment	   of	   whether	   the	   GMMs	   demonstrate	   the	   desired	   biological	   and	  
functional	  characteristics,	  with	  an	  eye	  toward	  future	  efficacy	  and	  safety.	  	  
For	   those	  GMMs	  showing	  promise	   in	  Phase	  1,	  Phase	  2	   initiates	  confined	  testing	   in	  a	  more	  natural	  
setting	  but	  under	  conditions	  that	  will	  limit	  release	  into	  the	  environment.	  Small	  trials	  in	  Phase	  2	  may	  
involve	  testing	  under	  physical	  confinement	  (sometimes	  termed	  “containment”)	  within	  a	   large	  cage	  
that	  simulates	  the	  disease-­‐endemic	  setting	  while	  minimizing	  the	  possibility	   for	  escape.	   In	  the	  early	  
stages	   of	   testing	   of	   mosquitoes	   incorporating	   gene	   drive,	   experts	   have	   advocated	   testing	   under	  
physical	  confinement,	  such	  as	  within	  a	  greenhouse	  or	  screen-­‐house	  type	  facility	  (Alphey	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  
Scott	   et	   al.,	   2002,	   Benedict	   et	   al.,	   2008).	   Phase	   2	   testing	   also	  may	   involve	   small-­‐scale	   ecologically	  
confined	   field	   release.	   Ecological	   confinement	   entails	   geographic/spatial	   and/or	   climatic	   isolation	  
intended	  to	   limit	   the	  spread	  of	  GMMs	   into	   the	  environment.	  The	  decision	  about	   requirements	   for	  
one	  or	  both	  components	  of	  Phase	  2	   testing	  will	  be	  made	  by	   the	  national	   regulatory	  authority	  and	  
will	  probably	  depend	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  GMM	  technology,	  prior	  knowledge	  of	  its	  effects	  in	  other	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  For	  example,	  arthropod	  containment	  levels:	  
http://www.liebertonline.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1089/153036603322163475,	  accessed	  25	  May	  2014;	  or	  
Australian	  Government	  (2006).	  
	  





environments	   and	   other	   factors	   that	   are	   taken	   into	   account	   in	   the	   process	   of	   RA	   (Section	   3.	  
Biosafety).	   A	   situation	   in	   which	   a	   physically	   confined	   trial	  might	   not	   be	   deemed	   necessary	  might	  
arise,	   for	   example,	   when	   a	   technology	   has	   already	   been	   tested	   and	   found	   to	   be	   safe	   in	   another	  
venue.	  It	  should	  be	  noted,	  however,	  that	  the	  regulatory	  requirements	  for	  physically	  vs.	  ecologically	  
confined	  trials	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  different,	  since	  an	  ecologically	  confined	  trial	  involves	  intentional,	  
although	   limited,	   release	   into	   the	   environment.	   Phase	   2	   trials	   will	   continue	   the	   assessment	   of	  
biological	  and	  functional	  activity	  of	  GMMs,	  including	  their	  effect	  on	  local/wild-­‐type	  mosquitoes,	  but	  
because	   of	   their	   limited	   scale	   will	   only	   rarely	   provide	   information	   on	   the	   disease	   impact	   of	   the	  
technology.	  Moving	  on	  to	  initiation	  of	  larger	  GMM	  trials	  in	  the	  environment	  and	  in	  disease-­‐endemic	  
countries	  will	  require	  thoughtful	  consideration	  and	  the	  application	  of	  relevant	  ethical	  and	  regulatory	  
practices	  (Section	  4.	  Ethics	  and	  public	  engagement;	  and	  Section	  5.	  Regulatory	  frameworks).	  	  
Contingent	   upon	   satisfactory	   results	   of	   confined	   testing	   in	   Phase	   2,	   the	   GMM	   technology	   may	  
proceed	   to	   staged	   open	   release	   trials	   under	   Phase	   3.	   It	   is	   likely	   that	   this	   will	   involve	   a	   series	   of	  
sequential	   trials	   of	   increasing	   size,	   duration	   and	   complexity,	   to	   be	   conducted	   at	   a	   single	   site	   or	  
multiple	  sites.	  These	  trials	  may	  be	  designed	  to	  assess	  performance	  under	  various	  conditions,	  such	  as	  
different	   levels	   of	   pathogen	   transmission,	   seasonal	   variations	   in	  mosquito	   density,	   or	   presence	   of	  
other	   disease	   vectors	   in	   the	   region.	  While	  measurement	   of	   entomological	   parameters	   is	   likely	   to	  
remain	  the	   focus	  of	  early	  Phase	  3	   trials,	   later	   trials	   in	   this	  phase	  may	   include	  measurement	  of	   the	  
impact	  of	  GMMs	  on	  infection	  and/or	  disease	  in	  human	  populations.	  Trials	  to	  show	  epidemiological	  
impact	   must	   be	   designed	   accordingly,	   with	   considerable	   thought	   on	   the	   needs	   for	   achieving	   a	  
statistically	   meaningful	   result.	   Although	   still	   focused	   on	   intense	   examination	   of	   the	   function	   and	  
efficacy	  of	  GMMs,	  Phase	  3	  trials	  effectively	  institute	  a	  limited	  deployment	  of	  the	  technology;	  this	  will	  
especially	  be	  the	  case	  for	  self-­‐sustaining	  approaches	  that	  are	  anticipated	  to	  persist.	  
Approval	   for	   moving	   forward	   to	   each	   consecutive	   phase	   of	   testing	   (phases	   1–3)	   will	   be	   the	  
responsibility	  of	  the	  relevant	  national	  regulatory	  authority.	  The	  identity	  of	  this	  authority	  may	  differ	  
among	   individual	   countries	   (for	   examples,	   see	   Appendix	   1)	   as	   national	   legislation	   or	   policy	   may	  
invest	  this	  responsibility	  with	  a	  lead	  ministry	  or	  a	  board/commission	  representing	  several	  ministries.	  
Several	  levels	  of	  oversight	  and	  review	  will	  most	  likely	  be	  required	  before	  bringing	  the	  decision	  to	  the	  
national	   level	   (Section	  5.	   Regulatory	   frameworks).	   Thus,	   the	   institution	   conducting	   the	   research	   is	  
expected	   to	   have	   its	   own	   independent	   committees	   overseeing	   biosafety	   and	   the	   involvement	   of	  
human	   subjects.	   Intermediate	   jurisdictional	   units	   of	   government	  may	   impose	   additional	   levels	   of	  
regulation.	  
Results	  of	  Phase	  3	  testing	  will	  form	  the	  basis	  for	  determination	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  technology	  should	  
move	  into	  wider	  scale	  application	  as	  part	  of	  a	  national	  or	  regional	  programme	  for	  vector	  and	  disease	  
control.	  The	  ultimate	  decision	  on	  deployment	  of	  GMMs	  as	  a	  public	  health	  tool	  (Phase	  4)	  will	  involve	  
the	   national	   regulatory	   authority,	   and	   may	   additionally	   involve	   authorities	   responsible	   for	  
determining	   national	   or	   regional	   disease	   control	   priorities	   (if	   different	   from	   the	   regulatory	   body).	  
Phase	  4	  constitutes	  an	  ongoing	  surveillance	  phase	   that	  will	   assess	  effectiveness	  under	  operational	  
conditions	   (both	  entomological	  and	  epidemiological	   impact),	  accompanied	  by	  monitoring	  of	  safety	  
over	   time	  and	  under	  diverse	   situations.	   Long-­‐term	   surveillance	  of	   safety	   for	  human	  health	  will	   be	  





analogous	   to	   the	   pharmacovigilance8	   applied	   in	   medicine	   but,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   GMMs,	   aspects	   of	  
environmental	   safety	   should	   also	   be	   considered.	   Ongoing	   monitoring	   will	   be	   aimed	   at	   ensuring	  
sustained	  quality	   and	  performance	   for	  disease	   control,	   and	  determining	  whether	   any	   changes	   are	  
needed	   in	   management	   of	   either	   the	   GMM	   technology	   itself	   or	   other	   aspects	   of	   an	   integrated	  
control	  programme.	   In	   this	   regard,	   it	  will	  be	   important	   to	  ensure	   that	  a	  perceived	  decrease	   in	   the	  
disease	  threat	  following	  implementation	  of	  GMMs	  does	  not	  lead	  people	  living	  in	  the	  area	  to	  become	  
complacent	  and	  revert	  to	  behaviours	  that	  could	  increase	  transmission	  pressure.	  	  
1.5	  Decision-­‐making	  
In	  determining	  whether	  any	  GMM	  technology	  should	  move	  forward	  from	  one	  phase	  to	  the	  next,	  it	  is	  
expected	  that	  the	  responsible	  regulatory	  authority	  will	  take	  into	  consideration	  criteria	  of	  both	  safety	  
and	  efficacy	  for	  its	  intended	  use.	  As	  described	  in	  subsequent	  sections	  of	  this	  Guidance	  Framework,	  
the	   transition	   from	  one	   phase	   to	   the	   next	  will	   be	   subject	   to	   defined	   “go/no-­‐go”	   decision	   criteria,	  
including	  efficacy	  and	  safety	  endpoints,	  and	  be	  contingent	  upon	  regulatory	  and	  ethical	  approvals.	  	  
The	  meaning	  of	  “safe”	  is	  not	  easily	  defined,	  as	  it	  is	  recognized	  that	  virtually	  all	  public	  health	  products	  
(including	   those	   currently	   in	   widespread	   use	   against	   diseases	   such	   as	   malaria	   and	   dengue)	   have	  
some	  ability	  to	  cause	  adverse	  effects	  under	  certain	  conditions.	  Thus,	  a	  new	  product	  such	  as	  GMMs	  is	  
often	   assessed	   in	   the	   regulatory	   review	  process	   by	   determining	  whether	   its	   benefits	   outweigh	   its	  
risks.9	   The	   primary	   potential	   benefit	   of	   GMMs	  would	   be	   the	   improvement	   of	   human	   health,	   and	  
therefore	  efficacy	  data	  will	  enter	   into	  decision-­‐making	  regarding	  benefit.	  The	  stringency	  of	  efficacy	  
demonstration	   required	   to	   judge	   a	   new	   technology	   worthy	   of	   moving	   forward	   may	   well	   be	  
influenced	   by	   the	   potential	   for	   adverse	   effects	   associated	  with	   the	   technology,	  which	   in	   turn	  will	  
differ	  according	  to	  the	  phase	  of	  testing.	  Variations	  in	  individual	  judgement,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  context	  in	  
which	  decisions	  are	  being	  made,	  can	  lead	  to	  differing	  opinions	  about	  risk-­‐benefit	  assessment.	  Some	  
might	  advocate	  for	  withholding	  regulatory	  approval	  until	  absolute	  assurance	  of	  the	  absence	  of	  risk	  is	  
available,	   regardless	   of	   benefit.	   However,	   regulators	   may	   feel	   that	   other	   contextual	   factors	   also	  
should	   be	   taken	   into	   account,	   such	   as	   the	   severity	   of	   the	   health	   problem	   addressed	   by	   the	   new	  
technology,	  and	  the	  availability	  and	  utility	  of	  alternative	  disease	  control	  methods	  (FDA,	  2013).	  With	  
regard	   to	   genetically	   modified	   organisms	   (GMOs),	   the	   Nuffield	   Council	   on	   Bioethics	   has	  
recommended	   “comparison	   of	   the	   risks	   of	   the	   status	   quo	  with	   those	   posed	   by	   possible	   paths	   of	  
action,”	  recognizing	  that	  “there	  can	  be	  dangers	  in	  inaction,	  or	  alternative	  courses	  of	  action,	  as	  well	  
as	  in	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  particular	  innovation”	  (Nuffield	  Council	  on	  Bioethics,	  2014?).	  	  
Other	  considerations	  beyond	  risk-­‐benefit	  may	  come	   into	  play,	  especially	  when	  decisions	  are	  being	  
made	   to	   deploy	   a	   new	   technology	   as	   part	   of	   the	   national	   disease	   control	   programme	   (Phase	   4).	  
Economic	  evaluations	  may	  be	  used	  to	  compare	  alternative	  courses	  of	  action	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  weighing	  
the	  options	  and	  making	  sound	  decisions	  about	  investment	  of	  scarce	  resources.	  Cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  
provides	   for	   the	   systematic	   calculation	   of	   benefits	   and	   costs	   in	   monetary	   terms	   and	   over	   time.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  WHO	  Pharmacovigilance:	  
http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/quality_safety/safety_efficacy/pharmvigi/en/index.html,	  accessed	  25	  
May	  2014.	  
9	  For	  example,	  FDA	  (2013),	  EMA	  (2011)	  and	  Explanation	  of	  statutory	  framework	  for	  risk-­‐benefit	  balancing	  for	  
public	  health	  pesticides:	  http://epa.gov/pesticides/health/risk-­‐benefit.htm,	  accessed	  25	  May	  2014.	  





However,	   for	   public	   health	   interventions,	   it	  may	  be	  difficult	   to	   calculate	   the	   benefits	   of	   improved	  
health	   in	   financial	   terms.	   A	   related	   method	   for	   comparing	   the	   relative	   costs	   and	   outcomes	   of	  
multiple	  courses	  of	  action	  is	  cost-­‐effectiveness	  analysis,	  which	  expresses	  benefit	  as	  a	  measurement	  
of	   a	   particular	   health	   gain.	   For	   example,	   cost-­‐effectiveness	   analysis	   might	   allow	   comparison	   of	  
alternative	  malaria	   or	   dengue	   control	  methods	   in	   terms	   of	   costs	   required	   to	   achieve	   a	   particular	  
reduction	   in	   mortality	   or	   clinical	   disease.	   Public	   health	   decision-­‐makers	   may	   take	   a	   sectoral	  
approach,	  comparing	  cost	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  all	  possible	  disease	  interventions	  to	  select	  a	  mix	  that	  
provides	  maximum	   health	   benefits	   within	   given	   resource	   constraints.	   Issues	   that	   will	   need	   to	   be	  
factored	  into	  decision-­‐making	  include	  whether	  the	  GMM	  technology	  will	  replace	  or	  reduce	  the	  need	  
for	  other	  control	  measures	  and,	  if	  not,	  how	  much	  the	  addition	  of	  GMMs	  to	  ongoing	  disease	  control	  
efforts	  will	  enhance	  the	  overall	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  programme.	  	   	   	  
1.6	  Critical	  path	  for	  GMM	  development	  
Proof	  of	  concept	   for	  efficacy	  of	   the	  GMM	  technology	   is	  one	  component	  of	   the	  critical	  path.	  Other	  
key	   elements	   must	   be	   engaged	   for	   proof	   of	   acceptability	   as	   well	   as	   proof	   of	   deliverability	   and	  
sustainability	   (Figure	   1.2).	   Proof	   of	   acceptability	   involves	   risk	   analysis,	   regulatory	   approval	   and	  
community/stakeholder	  authorization.	  As	  mentioned,	  cost-­‐effectiveness	  of	  the	  technology	  vs.	  other	  
available	   disease	   control	  methods	  may	   influence	   acceptability.	   Proof	   of	   deliverability	   involves	   the	  
development	  of	  an	  operating	  model	  with	  planning	  for	  sufficient	  technical	  capacity	  to	  support	  wider-­‐
scale	   deployment,	   production	   capability	   at	   an	   appropriate	   scale,	   financing	   to	   support	   deployment	  
and	   subsequent	   monitoring,	   methods	   for	   field-­‐applicable	   high-­‐throughput	   monitoring	   for	   quality	  
control,	  management	  and	  mitigation	  capability	   in	  case	  of	  adverse	  events,	  and	  ongoing	  stakeholder	  
engagement.	   Sustainability	   will	   have	   different	   implications	   depending	   on	   whether	   the	   GMM	  
technology	   is	   self-­‐limiting	   or	   self-­‐sustaining,	   but	   in	   either	   case	   an	   important	   aspect	   will	   include	  
planning	  the	  response	  should	  indications	  of	  resistance	  to	  first-­‐generation	  GMMs	  be	  detected	  during	  
Phase	  4	  monitoring.	  As	   is	  the	  case	  for	  drugs	  and	  insecticides,	  this	  may	  require	  support	  for	  ongoing	  
research	  to	  develop	  next-­‐generation	  products.	  
Challenges	   remain	   in	   the	   identification	  of	   a	   viable	  model	   for	   the	  development	  of	  GMMs	  as	  public	  
health	  tools.	  Public	  agencies	  and	  philanthropic	  funders	  may	  provide	  the	  resources	  for	  phases	  1	  and	  2	  
research.	   However,	   the	   level	   of	   support	   that	   will	   be	   required	   beyond	   early,	   small-­‐scale,	   Phase	   3	  
testing	  may	  be	  beyond	  the	  capacity	  of	  such	  research	  funders.	  In	  the	  standard	  business	  model	  used	  
for	  drugs,	  vaccines	  and	  insecticides	  (including	  those	  against	  malaria	  and	  dengue),	  industry	  would	  be	  
expected	   to	   pick	   up	   a	   promising	   lead	   and	   provide	   additional	   financing	   for	   its	   development	   into	   a	  
marketable	   product.	   However,	   GMMs	   are	   a	   new	   technology	   primarily	   being	   developed	   for	   use	   in	  
low-­‐	   to	   middle-­‐income	   countries	   and	   their	   potential	   for	   direct	   financial	   returns	   is	   uncertain	  
(especially	   with	   self-­‐sustaining	   versions).	   Small	   biotechnology	   companies	   with	   limited	   resources	  
currently	   represent	   the	   only	   direct	   industry	   involved	   in	   GMM	   development.	   Public-­‐private	  
partnerships,	  non-­‐profit	  corporations,	  and	  other	  models	  of	  broadly	  supported	  funding	  consortia	  may	  
provide	   good	   precedents	   for	   GMM	   development.	   Furthermore,	   technology	   transfer	   to	   disease-­‐
endemic	  countries	  is	  an	  important	  goal	  of	  GMM	  research.	  





This	  Guidance	   Framework	   focuses	  primarily	  on	   the	  most	   immediate	   issues	   to	  be	  addressed	   in	   the	  
critical	  path	  to	  GMM	  development:	  proof	  of	  efficacy	  (testing	  for	  entomological	  and	  epidemiological	  
impact)	  and	  acceptability	  (biosafety,	  ethics	  and	  engagement,	  and	  regulatory	  requirements).	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It	   is	  envisaged	   that	  GMM	  strategies	  will	  be	   implemented	   in	  area-­‐wide	  control	  programmes.	  These	  
are	  conducted	  over	  large	  areas	  that	  may	  include	  several	  communities	  and	  contain	  at	  a	  minimum	  the	  
generational	  dispersal	  range	  of	  the	  target	  species.	  Area-­‐wide	  control	  depends	  on	  the	  treatment	  of	  
such	  large	  regions	  for	  success,	  particularly	  in	  situations	  where	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  control	  measure	  
will	   be	   influenced	  by	   the	  potential	   for	   reinvasion.	   This	   implementation	   scale	   stands	   in	   contrast	   to	  
interventions	  such	  as	   repellents	  or	  nets	   that	  are	  effective	  at	  both	  household	  and	   individual	   levels.	  
Thus,	   the	   scale	   of	   testing	   and	   exposure	   of	   entire	   populations	   to	   GMM	   interventions	   have	  
implications	   for	   how	   trials	   can	   be	   conducted.	   Preliminary	   experiments	   can	   be	   conducted	   in	  
laboratories	  and	  outdoor	  cages,	  but	  testing	  during	  phases	  1–3	  proceeds	  through	  increasingly	  larger	  
scale	   (Figure	  1.1),	  ultimately	   to	  open-­‐field	   releases	   in	  which	   the	  efficacy	  of	   the	   technology	   can	  be	  
assessed	   most	   realistically.	   The	   purpose	   of	   any	   open-­‐release	   experiments	   should	   be	   clear	   and	  
experimental	  protocols	  should	  be	  made	  available	  in	  advance.	  
While	   GMM	   technology	   has	   not	   yet	   been	   tested	   extensively	   in	   the	   field,	   experience	   gained	   from	  
conventional	   mosquito	   control	   programmes	   using	   methods	   such	   as	   indoor	   residual	   insecticide	  
spraying,	  outdoor	  space	  spraying	  and	  larviciding	  can	  help	  predict	  its	  efficacy.	  Experience	  from	  sterile	  
insect	   control	   programmes	  on	   agricultural	   pests	  will	   also	   be	   helpful	   in	   predicting	   outcomes,	   since	  
population	   suppression	   or	   preventive	   releases	   are	   the	   most	   immediate	   aims	   of	   planned	   genetic	  
mosquito	   control.	   Although	   conventional	   insecticidal	   control	   is	   usually	   not	   species-­‐specific,	   its	  
Summary:	  Both	  entomological	  and	  epidemiological	  endpoints	  may	  be	  used	  to	  test	  the	  efficacy	  of	  GMMs	  in	  
reducing	  morbidity	  and	  mortality	  from	  vector-­‐borne	  diseases.	  The	  entomological	  endpoint	  is	  a	  reduction	  in	  
the	   likelihood	   of	   disease	   transmission	   due	   to	   mosquito	   population	   characteristics,	   and	   will	   be	   the	  
predominant	  outcome	  measure	  in	  phases	  1–2	  and,	  possibly,	  early	  Phase	  3,	  trials.	  Because	  this	  is	  difficult	  to	  
measure	   directly,	   surrogate	   indicators	   may	   be	   chosen,	   and	   these	   may	   include	   vector	   population	   size,	  
transgene	  frequency,	  and	  ability	  to	  support	  pathogen	  replication	  and/or	  GMM	  fitness.	  The	  epidemiological	  
endpoint	   is	   a	   measurable	   reduction	   in	   the	   incidence	   of	   infection	   or	   disease	   in	   human	   populations.	  
Epidemiological	   outcomes	   will	   be	   detected	   most	   easily	   when	   trials	   are	   conducted	   in	   high-­‐transmission	  
settings.	  The	  specifics	  of	  conducting	  such	  trials	  will	  differ	  for	  the	  malaria	  and	  dengue	  interventions	  that	  are	  
the	   focus	   of	   this	   document.	   These	   differences	   include	   the	   fact	   that	   persistent	   endemic	   transmission	  
locations	  are	  available	  for	  malaria	  intervention	  trials,	  and	  therefore	  effects	  may	  be	  observed	  more	  rapidly	  
and	  unequivocally	  than	  in	  dengue	  trials,	  which	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  conducted	  in	  locations	  where	  transmission	  is	  
more	  heterogeneous	  and	  thus	  less	  predictable.	  Cluster	  randomized	  trials	  offer	  a	  powerful	  design	  for	  Phase	  
3	  evaluation	  of	  efficacy	  against	  disease	  transmission	  in	  field	  trials.	  Trial	  designs	  must	  take	  into	  account	  the	  
likelihood	   of	   significant	   seasonal	   and	   inter-­‐annual	   variations.	   Non-­‐linear	   relationships	   between	  
entomological	   and	   epidemiological	   outcomes	   may	   also	   be	   anticipated.	   Much	   of	   the	   entomological	  
monitoring	   required	   will	   employ	   methods	   used	   in	   any	   vector-­‐control	   programme.	   However	   certain	  
monitoring	  measures,	  such	  as	  phenotypic	  stability,	  will	  be	  unique	  to	  GMMs.	  “Go”	  and	  “no-­‐go”	  criteria	  for	  
moving	   to	   the	   next	   phase	   of	   testing	   should	   be	   determined	   prior	   to	   trials.	   Specific	   entomological	   and	  
epidemiological	  measures	  are	  recommended	  for	  each	  phase	  of	  testing.	  





effects	   are	   similar	   to	   self-­‐limiting	  GMMs	   in	   that	   they	   are	   not	   permanent.	   This	   self-­‐limiting	   nature	  
provides	  a	  degree	  of	  intrinsic	  safety,	  in	  that	  implementation	  can	  be	  halted	  to	  mitigate	  and,	  possibly,	  
reverse	  adverse	  effects.	  
This	   chapter	   focuses	  on	   three	   key	   issues	  of	   efficacy	   evaluation:	   1)	   the	  definition	  of	   entomological	  
and	  epidemiological	  efficacy	  endpoints	  of	  GMMs;	  2)	  methodology	  issues	  and	  considerations	  related	  
to	   empirical	  measurement	   of	   efficacy;	   and	   3)	   empirical	  measures	   of	   efficacy	   in	   the	   four	   different	  
development	  phases.	  This	  guidance	  relates	  to	  malaria	  and	  dengue	  vectors,	  as	  development	  of	  these	  
applications	   is	  currently	   the	  most	  advanced	  and	   their	  biology	   represents	  many	  other	  vector-­‐borne	  
disease	   systems.	  Other	   disease	   vectors	   also	  may	   become	   targets	   of	   GMM	   control,	   but	   details	   for	  
determining	  their	  efficacy	  will	  not	  be	  discussed	  specifically.	  
Feasible	   applications	   of	   GMMs	   that	   will	   not	   be	   addressed	   in	   this	   section	   include	   those	   in	   which	  
mosquito	  control	  agencies	  might	  want	  to	  use	  GMMs	  against	  the	  threat	  of	  disease	  or	  introduction	  of	  
a	   vector.	   For	   example,	   such	   a	   preventative	   release	   is	   used	   in	   California	   and	   Florida,	   USA,	   where	  
exclusion	   is	   accomplished	   by	   conventional	   SIT	   programmes	   against	   Mediterranean	   fruit	   flies.10	  
Powerful	  population	  suppression	  by	  GMM	  strategies	  could	  find	  a	  market	  against	  pest	  mosquitoes	  in	  
mosquito	   control	   programmes,	   even	   where	   disease	   transmission	   is	   not	   a	  major	   consideration.	   In	  
such	  cases,	  the	  entomological	  outcome	  of	  the	  frequency	  and	  scale	  of	  target	  species	  outbreaks	  would	  
be	  sufficient	  to	  demonstrate	  efficacy.	  Similarly,	   the	  release	  of	  GMMs	  containing	  drive	  mechanisms	  
to	  spread	  refractoriness	  in	  a	  population	  might	  be	  used	  to	  preclude	  the	  onset	  of	  transmission.	  If	  such	  
protection	  were	  inexpensive,	  stable	  and	  acceptable,	  it	  might	  be	  implemented	  with	  minimal	  proof	  of	  
efficacy	  against	  disease.	  
2.1	  Efficacy	  end	  points	  of	  GMMs	  	  
The	   efficacy	   measurements	   of	   GMMs	   can	   be	   defined	   by	   entomological	   and	   epidemiological	  
outcomes.	   These	   differ	   according	   to	   the	   disease,	   the	   vector	   species	   and	   the	   epidemiological	  
circumstances.	  Endemic	  disease	  situations	  are	  common	  for	  malaria	  and	  the	  effects	  of	  interventions	  
during	  trials	  conducted	  in	  such	  locations	  may	  be	  determined	  more	  rapidly	  than	  for	  dengue,	  which	  is	  
often	   spatially	   and	   temporally	   heterogeneous.	   These	   differences,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   occurrence	   of	  
multiple	  vectors	   in	  one	  place	  (particularly	  for	  malaria)	  determine	  the	  measures	  of	  efficacy	  that	  are	  
appropriate	  and	  feasible.	  Researchers	  planning	  trials	  must	  consider	  not	  only	  what	   is	   ideal,	  but	  also	  
whether	   field	  sites	  are	  available	   for	  determining	  specific	  epidemiological	  outcomes	  using	  the	  most	  
powerful	  protocols.	  
The	  epidemiological	  endpoint	  is	  a	  reduction	  in	  infection	  or	  clinical	  disease	  incidence	  
In	  trials	  designed	  to	  prove	  epidemiological	   impact,	   reductions	  may	  be	  measured	  by	  various	  means	  
including	   infection	   incidence,	   clinical	   disease	   incidence	   or	   prevalence	   of	   infection	   in	   at-­‐risk	  
populations.	  In	  general,	  trials	  designed	  to	  detect	  a	  decrease	  in	  the	  incidence	  of	  infection	  will	  be	  able	  
to	   achieve	   a	   statistically	   meaningful	   result	   with	   a	   smaller	   cohort	   size	   than	   trials	   that	   measure	  
decreased	   incidence	   of	   disease,	   since	   only	   a	   subset	   of	   those	   infected	  may	   develop	   overt	   disease.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  USDA-­‐CDFA	  Mediterranean	  Fruit	  Fly	  Exclusion	  Program:	  http://www.cdfa.ca.gov/phpps/pdep/prpinfo/,	  
accessed	  25	  May	  2014.	  	  





Reduced	   infection	   incidence	   is	   generally	   expected	   to	   result	   in	   decreased	  mortality	   and	  morbidity,	  
although	   this	   will	   not	   always	   be	   the	   case;	   for	   example,	   during	   resurgence	   of	   disease	   in	   a	   naïve	  
human	   population,	   unusually	   high	   rates	   of	   morbidity	   and	   mortality	   may	   occur.	   Multi-­‐year	   data	  
collection	   may	   be	   required	   to	   demonstrate	   positive	   effects	   where	   disease	   is	   epidemic,	   highly	  
variable	  from	  year	  to	  year	  or	  of	  low	  prevalence.	  Pre-­‐existing	  immunity	  to	  pathogens	  and	  viruses	  also	  
may	  influence	  measures	  of	  efficacy	  and	  must	  be	  considered	  in	  the	  experimental	  design.	  	  
The	   entomological	   endpoint	   is	   a	   reduction	   in	   the	   likelihood	   of	   disease	   transmission	   due	   to	  
mosquito	  population	  characteristics	  
The	   entomological	   measure	   of	   transmission	   (also	   called	   “force”	   or	   “intensity”)	   due	   to	   mosquito	  
population	   characteristics	   is	   the	   entomological	   inoculation	   rate	   (EIR).	   EIR	   describes	   the	   degree	   of	  
infection	   risk	   that	   a	   human	   population	   is	   exposed	   to	   for	   a	   particular	   disease	   as	   determined	   by	  
assessing	   the	  vector	  mosquito	  population.	  EIR	  would	  be	  a	  distribution	  of	   frequencies	  of	   infectious	  
bites	   over	   time	   for	   a	   range	   of	   people	   with	   different	   demographic	   characteristics	   in	   the	   area.	   A	  
control	  programme	  would	  shift	  this	  distribution	  to	  a	   lower	  mean	  frequency,	  but	  the	  shift	  might	  be	  
more	  or	  less	  for	  different	  demographic	  groups.	  EIR	  is	  influenced	  by	  several	  factors	  that	  are	  specific	  
to	   the	   geographic	   area,	   including	   climate,	   bionomics	   of	   local	   vectors	   and	   socioeconomic	   factors.	  
Accurate	   measures	   of	   EIR	   are	   most	   easily	   made	   when	   the	   prevalence	   of	   a	   pathogen	   is	   high	   –	  
hyperendemic	   disease	   transmission	   scenarios	   –	   and	   most	   difficult	   when	   prevalence	   is	   low	   or	   in	  
epidemic	  situations.	  It	  should	  also	  be	  anticipated	  that	  the	  level	  of	  disease	  transmission	  might	  change	  
during	  trials	  for	  reasons	  unrelated	  to	  the	  trial	  itself,	  unusual	  weather	  that	  affects	  vector	  abundance	  
being	   the	   most	   common	   influence.	   Researchers	   designing	   the	   trial	   should	   prepare	   for	   such	  
eventualities	  by	  proposing	  variations	  of	  the	  protocols	  during	  the	  planning	  phase	  and	  considering	  the	  
need	   for	   adaptive	   management	   during	   the	   trial	   (assuming	   this	   is	   acceptable	   to	   regulatory	  
authorities).	   The	   EIR	   varies	  widely	   in	   time	   and	   space	   in	   regions	   of	   epidemic	   transmission,	   and	   its	  
direct	  determination	  will	  seldom	  be	  feasible.	  In	  practice,	  its	  measurement	  requires	  analysis	  of	  field-­‐
collected	  mosquitoes	  –	  often	  in	  large	  numbers	  and	  over	  long	  periods	  of	  time	  –	  for	  the	  presence	  of	  
infective	  pathogens,	  so	  it	  can	  be	  determined	  only	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  at-­‐risk	  human	  populations.	  	  
While	   a	   measured	   reduction	   in	   the	   EIR	   is	   the	   most	   desirable	   of	   entomological	   outcomes,	  
demonstrating	  this	  will	  be	  difficult	  or	   impossible	  during	  confined	  Phase	  2	  and	  many	  Phase	  3	  trials.	  
This	  difficulty	  will	  be	  particularly	  great	  when	  there	   is	   the	  potential	   for	  substantial	  heterogeneity	   in	  
transmission,	  as	  is	  common	  for	  dengue.	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  anticipated	  that	  ideal	  testing	  locations	  for	  
GMMs	  will	   be	   chosen	   in	   part	   for	   their	   confinement	   characteristics	   (ecological	   or	   physical	   islands),	  
and	   the	   number	   of	   vector	   species	   present.	   These	   specifications	   will	   limit	   further	   the	   range	   of	  
transmission	  scenarios	  and	  specific	  field	  sites	  that	  are	  available.	  
For	  these	  reasons,	  it	  is	  necessary	  during	  phases	  1	  and	  2	  to	  infer	  reductions	  in	  EIR	  by	  surrogate	  vector	  
indicators	  that	  contribute	  to	  the	  EIR.	  These	  may	  include	  daily	  survival,	  changes	  in	  absolute	  density,	  
altered	  propensity	   for	   feeding	  on	  humans,	   frequency	  of	  anti-­‐pathogen	  effector	  genes	  and	   intrinsic	  
competence	  for	  developing	  infection.	  These	  indicators	  can	  be	  measured	  directly	  or	  calculated	  from	  
measurable	  data,	  e.g.	  the	  realized	  frequency	  of	  an	  anti-­‐pathogen	  effector	  phenotype	  in	  a	  population	  
or	  the	  rate	  of	  spread	  of	  a	  transgene.	  The	  specific	  characteristics	  of	  GMMs	  must	  also	  be	  considered	  in	  
determining	  which	  indicators	  will	  be	  most	  useful	  to	  measure.	  For	  example,	  the	  frequency	  of	  GMMs	  





that	  suppress	  populations	  in	  part	  by	  providing	  larval	  competition	  before	  the	  lethal	  effect	  occurs	  may	  
have	   different	   effects	   on	   adult	   abundance	   from	   GMMs	   that	   produce	   no	   progeny.	   Therefore,	  
monitoring	   larval	   transgene	   frequency	   and	  egg	  number	  have	  predictive	   value	  but	   hatching	   rate	   is	  
less	  diagnostic.	  
Beginning	   in	   Phase	   2,	   feeding	   of	   mosquitoes	   using	   blood	   from	   infected	   persons	   in	   contained	  
conditions	   may	   provide	   a	   useful	   indicator	   if	   the	   GMMs	   are	   expected	   to	   have	   reduced	   intrinsic	  
competence	   to	   support	   pathogen	   replication.	   Such	   tractable	   measures	   then	   can	   be	   used	   to	  
parameterize	  models	   to	  predict	   the	  potential	   effect	  on	  EIR	  under	   various	   transmission	   conditions.	  
Carefully	  measuring	   these	  during	  phases	   1	   and	  2,	   and	   integrating	   the	  outcomes	   into	   transmission	  
models,	   is	   an	   essential	   part	   of	   predicting	   efficacy.	   Use	   of	   surrogate	   efficacy	   measures	   may	   be	  
necessary	   even	   during	   Phase	   3,	   and	   will	   help	   to	   determine	   the	   need	   to	   move	   to	   large	   trials	   for	  
epidemiological	  endpoints.	  
2.2	  Empirical	  measures	  of	  GMM	  efficacy	  
Trials	  must	  be	  designed	  to	  allow	  measurable	  reductions	  in	  the	  incidence	  of	  infection	  	  
The	   measurable	   epidemiological	   outcomes,	   reduction	   in	   the	   incidence	   of	   infection	   or	   disease	   in	  
human	  populations,	  are	   few	  relative	  to	  the	  various	  GMM	  technologies	   that	  may	  be	  undertaken	  to	  
accomplish	   them.	   Therefore,	   considerations	   for	   measuring	   these	   outcomes	   are	   discussed	   before	  
proceeding	  to	  the	  variety	  of	  entomological	  measures	  and	  considerations	  of	  efficacy	  that	  will	  apply	  to	  
population	   suppression	   and	   replacement	   strategies.	   Differences	   in	   detection	   and	   transmission	  
dynamics	   between	   malaria	   and	   dengue	   will	   be	   discussed	   separately	   after	   commonalities	   are	  
described.	  The	  endpoints	  for	  either	  disease	  in	  the	  context	  of	  GMM	  applications	  are	  similar,	  but	  the	  
means	  by	  which	  these	  can	  be	  measured	  differ.	  
A	  statistically	  sound	  epidemiological	  trial	  design	  must	  be	  selected	  
The	   cluster	   randomized	   trial,	   (Hayes	   et	   al.,	   2000),	   in	   which	   groups	   of	   people	   are	   evaluated	   (as	  
opposed	  to	   individuals),	   is	  anticipated	  to	  be	  the	  most	  powerful	  design	  for	  detecting	  the	  efficacy	  of	  
GMM	  applications	  in	  Phase	  3	  trials	  when	  an	  epidemiological	  outcome	  will	  be	  measured	  (Wolbers	  et	  
al.,	   2012).	   Longitudinal	   studies	   with	   enrolled	   cohorts	   are	   recommended	   to	   determine	   infection	  
incidence.	  Passive	  case	  detection	  may	  be	  implemented	  for	  each	  cluster	  to	  determine	  the	  effect	  on	  
clinical	   disease	   incidence;	   however	   active	   case	   detection	   is	   preferred	   whenever	   resources	   are	  
available.	   The	  most	   accepted	  malaria11	   and	   dengue	   fever12	   case	   definitions	   should	   be	   used.	  Good	  
clinical	  practice	  (GCP)	  should	  be	  followed	  (EMA,	  2002).	  
Careful	  site	  selection	  increases	  the	  likelihood	  of	  detecting	  significant	  results	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Centers	  for	  Disease	  Control	  and	  Prevention.	  National	  Notifiable	  Diseases	  Surveillance	  System	  (NNDSS).	  
Malaria	  2010	  case	  definition:	  
http://wwwn.cdc.gov/nndss/script/casedef.aspx?CondYrID=759&DatePub=1/1/2010%2012:00:00%20AM,	  
accessed	  25	  May	  2014.	  
12	  Centers	  for	  Disease	  Control	  and	  Prevention.	  Dengue.	  Clinical	  description	  for	  case	  definitions:	  
http://www.cdc.gov/dengue/clinicalLab/caseDef.html,	  accessed	  25	  May	  2014.	  





Detecting	  statistically	  significant	  reductions	  in	  epidemiological	  measurements	  would	  require	  a	  large	  
number	   of	   clusters	   that	   may	   not	   be	   feasible	   in	   sites	   with	   low	   infection	   or	   incidence	   of	   clinical	  
disease.	  Therefore,	  particularly	   for	  malaria,	  which	  often	  occurs	  at	  high	  EIR,	   trials	   in	  endemic	  areas	  
are	   recommended.	   It	   is	   considered	   likely	   that	  a	  GMM	   intervention	   that	   is	   effective	   in	  an	  endemic	  
area	  will	  also	  be	  effective	  in	  lower	  transmission	  conditions	  although	  the	  reverse	  cannot	  be	  assured.	  
Phase	  2	  and	  3	  trials	  should	  aim	  to	  detect	  an	  effect	  in	  one	  transmission	  season.	  Because	  dengue	  and	  
malaria	  transmission	  vary	  from	  year	  to	  year,	  multi-­‐year	  trials	  may	  be	  necessary	  to	  ensure	  that	  both	  
low-­‐	  and	  high-­‐transmission	  years	  are	  included	  in	  the	  study.	  
Mosquitoes	  disperse	  locally,	  but	  long	  distance	  movement	  by	  malaria	  and	  dengue	  vectors	  unaided	  by	  
human	   activities	   or	   large	   weather	   events	   has	   not	   been	   observed	   (Service,	   1997).	   However,	  
movement	  of	  mosquitoes	   can	   confound	   the	   interpretation	  of	   releases	  and	  prevent	  a	  positive	   trial	  
outcome	  both	  by	  immigration	  of	  wild	  mosquitoes	  and	  emigration	  of	  GMMs.	  When	  wild	  mosquitoes	  
move	   from	   untreated	   areas	   into	   treatment	   areas,	   the	   degree	   of	   sexual	   sterility	   or	   increase	   in	  
transgene	  frequency	  will	  be	  reduced	  relative	  to	  that	  that	  would	  be	  achieved	  in	  closed	  populations.	  In	  
contrast,	   a	   self-­‐sustaining	  drive	  mechanism	  with	   intergenerational	   effects	  may	   spread	  a	   gene	  well	  
beyond	   the	   site	   of	   introduction	   and	   contamination	   of	   control	   areas	   must	   be	   prevented	   or	  
accommodated	   in	   the	   trial	   design.	   Therefore,	   effects	   will	   be	   demonstrated	   most	   easily	   when	  
repopulation	   of	   treatment	   areas	   by	   untreated	   wild	   mosquitoes	   and	   dilution	   of	   the	   GMM	   is	  
minimized	  by	   strong	   isolating	   factors.	   If	   the	  GMM	   is	   a	   rapidly	   self-­‐limiting	  one,	   separation	  by	   two	  
kilometres	  will	  probably	  be	  sufficient	   (Service,	  1997),	  but	   if	  a	   self-­‐sustaining	  GMM	  is	  being	   tested,	  
separation	  distances	  must	  be	  greater	  in	  proportion	  to	  the	  expected	  rate	  of	  drive.	  Thus,	  the	  clusters	  
for	  both	  types	  of	  technologies	  must	  be	  sufficiently	  isolated	  so	  that	  the	  GMMs	  are	  confined	  to,	  and	  
excluded	   from,	   experimental	   and	   control	   clusters,	   respectively.	   Physical	   or	   ecological	   islands,	   or	  
sufficient	  geographical	  distances,	  may	  prevent	  results	  from	  being	  confounded	  by	  inadvertent	  cluster	  
contamination.	   Measurements	   of	   dispersal	   (commonly	   determined	   directly	   by	   mark-­‐release-­‐
recapture	   or	   estimated	   from	   population	   genetic	   studies)	   and	   previous	   studies	   can	   guide	   the	  
selection	   of	   conditions	   that	   provide	   sufficient	   isolation	   for	   various	   GMMs,	   and	   these	   must	   be	  
confirmed	   prior	   to	   trials.	   GMMs	   that	   contain	   genes	   encoding	   visible	  markers	   such	   as	   fluorescent	  
proteins	   can	   be	   distinguished	   easily	   from	   wild-­‐type	   mosquitoes.	   Large-­‐scale	   gene	   amplification	  
technologies	   to	   detect	   a	   molecular	   marker	   are	   also	   feasible.	   Other	   temporary	   markers	   such	   as	  
fluorescent	   powders	   can	   also	   be	   useful	   to	   distinguish	   dispersal	  when	   populations	   already	   include	  
GMMs.	  
Ongoing	  disease	  control	  measures	  must	  be	  considered	  
Phase	  2	   confined-­‐field	   trials	   and	  Phase	  3	  open-­‐field	   trials	  will	   probably	  use	  GMMs	  as	  a	  part	  of	   an	  
integrated	   vector	   management	   (IVM)	   programme.	   Therefore,	   the	   effect	   of	   ongoing	   control	  
measures	   on	   the	   outcomes	   of	   the	   GMM	   trials	   must	   be	   considered.	   It	   is	   neither	   experimentally	  
necessary	  nor	  ethically	  acceptable	  to	  test	  GMMs	  under	  conditions	   in	  which	  ongoing	  vector	  control	  
activities	   are	   not	   continued.	   Therefore,	   site	   evaluation	   should	   include	   entomologically	   and	  
epidemiologically	  similar	  field	  sites	  in	  which	  the	  same	  standard	  of	  care	  is	  being	  applied.	  Likewise,	  it	  
also	  is	  necessary	  to	  continue	  any	  control	  activities	  being	  conducted	  when	  CRTs	  begin	  and	  to	  ensure	  
that	   they	  are	  applied	  uniformly	  across	   sites.	  A	  change	   in	   the	  use	  of	   conventional	   control	  methods	  
during	   testing	   could	   change	   the	   transmission	   dynamics	   on	   which	   trial	   design	   was	   based.	   For	  





example,	   this	   might	   be	   the	   case	   if	   those	   living	   in	   the	   trial	   site	   stop	   practicing	   other	   avoidance	  
measures	   because	   they	   perceive	   a	   diminished	   threat.	   Thus,	   there	   are	   both	   scientific	   and	   ethical	  
reasons	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  trial	  is	  understood	  to	  be	  a	  research	  effort	  with	  no	  guarantee	  of	  protective	  
effect.	  Alternatively,	  such	  a	  change	  could	  occur	  if	  a	  new	  control	  measure	  is	  introduced	  into	  routine	  
use	  at	   the	  trial	   site,	  so	   it	   is	   important	   to	  coordinate	  as	  closely	  as	  possible	  with	  the	  regional	  vector	  
control	  programme	  during	  trial	  planning	  and	  implementation.	  
GMMs	  are	  expected	   to	  be	   compatible	  with	   conventional	   control	  measures	  unless	   those	  measures	  
exploit	   some	  weakness	   peculiar	   to	   the	  GMMs	   (Alphey	   et	   al.,	   2010).	   For	   example,	   if	   high	   levels	   of	  
insecticide	  resistance	  occur	  in	  wild	  populations	  and	  the	  GMMs	  are	  susceptible,	  then	  continued	  use	  
of	   the	  specific	   insecticide(s)	   to	  which	   the	  wild	  population	   is	   resistant	  will	  disproportionately	  affect	  
GMMs	  and	  diminish	  or	  nullify	  their	  effects.	  Therefore,	  considerable	  thought	  should	  be	  given	  to	  the	  
phenotypes	  of	  wild	  mosquitoes	  and	  GMMs,	   the	  control	  measures	   that	  will	  be	  applied	   for	  CRT	  site	  
selection,	  and	  potential	  vector	  control	  mitigation	  before	  making	  final	  choices.	  
Attention	   should	   also	   be	   given	   to	   ensuring	   that	   no	   major	   differences	   exist	   in	   individual	   human	  
behaviour	  between	  clusters	  or	  trial	  sites	  that	  may	  affect	  the	  intervention	  (WHO,	  1997)	  e.g.	  the	  use	  
of	   personal	   protection	   measures	   (including	   mosquito	   nets),	   the	   domestic	   use	   of	   insecticides,	  
occupational	   exposures,	   and	   migration	   and	   human	   movement	   between	   treated	   and	   untreated	  
communities.	  Information	  may	  be	  obtained	  through	  interviews	  that	  may	  be	  supplemented	  by	  direct	  
observation	  (e.g.	  of	  anti-­‐malarials,	  bed	  nets	  or	  insecticides	  available	  in	  the	  home).	  For	  lengthy	  trials,	  
consideration	  must	  be	  given	  to	  the	  potential	  that	  new	  control	  measures	  (e.g.	  vaccines)	  may	  become	  
available,	  and	  decisions	  made	  in	  collaboration	  with	  public	  health	  officials	  about	  how	  such	  a	  situation	  
might	  be	  handled.	  	  
Comparative	  efficacy	  between	  GMM	  and	  conventional	  vector	  control	  	  
Ultimately,	   GMMs	  may	   be	   considered	   as	   a	   substitute	   for	   conventional	   vector	   control	   (e.g.	   insect-­‐
treated	  bed	  nets	  –	  ITNs	  –	  indoor	  residual	  spraying	  –	  IRS	  –	  or	  environmental	  management)	  if	  there	  is	  
evidence	   that	   such	  modification	  may	   be	  more	   cost-­‐effective	   or	  more	   environmentally	   favourable	  
relative	   to	   existing	   control	   measures.	   Alternatively,	   GMMs	   may	   be	   combined	   with	   conventional	  
vector	   control	   if	   the	   methods	   are	   complementary	   and	   synergistic	   effects	   are	   anticipated.	   The	  
synergistic	   effect	   of	   combinations	   of	   two	   vector	   control	   methods	   can	   be	   determined	   if	   one	  
treatment	   area	   is	   subject	   to	   both	  methods	   and	   the	   control	   area	   utilizes	   only	   conventional	   vector	  
control.	  To	  compare	   the	  efficacy	  of	  GMMs	  and	  conventional	  vector	   control,	   a	  Phase	  3	   trial	  design	  
should	   include	   GMMs	   as	   one	   arm	   and	   conventional	   vector	   control	   as	   the	   other	   arm.	   However,	  
design	  of	  such	  comparison	  trials	  must	  be	  considered	  carefully	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  population	  in	  the	  
GMM	  arm	   is	   not	   subjected	   to	  unnecessary	   risk	   in	   the	  absence	  of	   standard	   control	  methods.	   Such	  
trials	  should	  be	  justified	  by	  adequate	  prior	  demonstration	  of	  GMM	  efficacy.	  Phase	  3	  entomological	  
and	   epidemiological	   endpoints	   described	   above	   should	   be	   measured.	   An	   appropriate	   number	   of	  
clusters	  should	  be	  used	  to	  allow	  sufficient	  statistical	  power	  to	  detect	  differences.	  Cost-­‐effectiveness	  
analysis	  of	  GMM	  or	  conventional	  vector	  control,	  or	  a	  combination	  of	   the	   two	  methods,	   should	  be	  
performed.	  
Special	  considerations	  for	  trials	  of	  dengue	  interventions	  





Since	  dengue	  transmission	  is	  highly	  variable,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  trials	  must	  be	  conducted	  on	  large	  spatial	  
and	   temporal	   scales,	  with	   large	  numbers	   of	   clusters,	   in	   order	   to	   detect	   an	   epidemiological	   effect.	  
Large	  reductions	  of	  normally	  high	  transmission	  could	  easily	  be	  measured.	  But,	  more	  typically,	  even	  a	  
GMM	   trial	   that	   completely	   eliminates	   transmission	   might	   need	   to	   extend	   over	   several	   years	   to	  
provide	  sufficient	  statistical	  power	  to	  conclude	  efficacy.	  GMM	  technologies	  are	  designed	  to	  reduce	  
the	   likelihood	   of	   transmission	   for	   people	   within	   the	   area	   under	   management,	   rather	   than	   treat	  
individuals	  within	  it.	  Thus,	  the	  area	  should	  be	  large	  enough	  so	  that	  large	  numbers	  of	  individuals	  are	  
not	   being	   exposed	   routinely	   to	   unknown	   risk	   of	   infection	  when	   travelling	   outside	   their	   respective	  
control	  or	   treated	  area,	  which	   could	   confound	   interpretation	  of	   trial	   results.	   Ideally,	   trial	   planning	  
will	  include	  methods	  to	  allow	  individuals	  becoming	  infected	  outside	  of	  the	  trial	  area	  to	  be	  identified	  
so	   that	   their	   contribution	   to	   incidence	   can	   be	   discounted.	   The	   trial	   plan	   also	   should	   anticipate	  
variation	   in	   transmission	   levels	   that	  may	  necessitate	   changing	   the	   scope	  of	   the	   trial	   (for	   example,	  
Phillips-­‐Howard	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  
A	  reduction	  in	  the	  incidence	  of	  clinical	  disease	  may	  be	  a	  possible	  measure	  of	  efficacy	  when	  dengue	  
transmission	  is	  high.	  An	  alternative	  method,	  which	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  more	  feasible,	  given	  the	  expected	  
heterogeneity	  of	   transmission,	  will	  be	  to	  measure	  the	   frequency	  of	   individuals	  positive	   for	  dengue	  
antibodies	   in	   blood	   samples	   (Endy	   et	   al.,	   2008).	   In	   areas	  where	   the	   incidence	   is	   low,	   reduction	   in	  
dengue	  virus-­‐specific	  IgM13	  and/or	  IgG14	  antibodies	  obtained	  by	  sero-­‐survey	  can	  provide	  an	  effective	  
epidemiological	  endpoint.	  Performance	  of	  serological	  plaque	  reduction	  and	  neutralization	  assays	  in	  
a	  longitudinal	  cohort	  trial,	  accompanied	  with	  active	  surveillance	  for	  virus	  recovery	  on	  a	  subgroup	  of	  
people	  with	  clinically-­‐apparent	  infection,	  may	  allow	  more	  accurate	  information	  on	  dengue	  risk.	  The	  
need	  to	  evaluate	  impact	  on	  the	  four	  different	  dengue	  virus	  serotypes	  must	  be	  kept	  in	  mind.	  	  
Where	   regional	   dengue	   transmission	   is	   due	   to	   a	   single	   vector	   species,	   if	  GMMs	  are	  effective,	   and	  
achieve	  and	  maintain	   local	  elimination	  of	   that	  vector,	   then	   it	  may	  be	  unnecessary	   to	  demonstrate	  
epidemiological	  outcomes	  as	  a	  determinant	  of	  GMM	  efficacy.	  In	  such	  a	  case,	  vector	  elimination	  can	  
be	  used	  as	   the	  efficacy	  measurement.	  However,	   vector	   abundance	   reduction	   does	  not	  necessarily	  
translate	   directly	   into	   reduction	   of	   dengue	   incidence,	   as	   transmission	   has	   been	   observed	   in	   the	  
presence	   of	   low	   apparent	   numbers	   of	   mosquitoes.	   Determination	   of	   the	   threshold	   of	   vector	  
abundance	  reduction	  required	  to	  achieve	  significant	  reduction	  in	  dengue	  disease	  incidence	  requires	  
epidemiological	   modelling	   and	   empirical	   studies,	   and	   such	   threshold	   vector	   densities	   may	   vary	  
between	   geographical	   localities.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   vector	   population	   replacement	   by	   GMMs,	  
measurement	   of	   infection	   or	   disease	   incidence	   reduction	   relative	   to	   untreated	   controls,	   despite	  
being	   costly,	   may	   be	   necessary	   to	   provide	   high	   confidence	   in	   the	   efficacy	   of	   this	   novel	   GMM	  
strategy.	  
Special	  considerations	  for	  trials	  of	  malaria	  interventions	  
The	   high	   levels	   of	   malaria	   transmission	   encountered	   in	   much	   of	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa	   mean	   that	  
measuring	  epidemiological	  outcomes	  may	  be	  relatively	  easier	  for	  malaria	  than	  for	  dengue.	  However,	  
designation	   of	   epidemiological	   endpoints	   for	   malaria	   must	   take	   into	   account	   the	   multiplicity	   of	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vector	   species	   and,	   to	   a	   lesser	   extent,	   parasites.	   Identifying	   appropriate	   trial	   sites	   may	   be	  
challenging.	   Efforts	   should	   be	   made	   to	   find	   sites	   matched	   for	   human	   demographics	   and	   disease	  
patterns,	   and	   to	   ensure	   sufficient	   confinement	   to	   satisfy	   the	   requirements	   of	   RA	   and	   trial	   design.	  
The	   number	   of	   vector	   species	   responsible	   for	   transmission	   and	   their	   ecological	   interactions	  must	  
also	  be	  considered.	  
Several	   methods	   are	   available	   for	   malaria	   diagnosis.15	   Historically,	   the	   “gold	   standard”	   has	   been	  
microscopic	  examination	  of	  blood	  smears.	  However,	  many	  rural	  clinics	   lack	  necessary	  microscopes	  
and	   trained	   personnel	   for	   malaria	   diagnosis.	   Consequently,	   the	   non-­‐microscopic	   rapid	   diagnostic	  
tests	   (RDTs)	   have	   become	   popular	   in	   various	   endemic	   settings.	   Many	  malaria	   RDTs	   are	   available	  
commercially	   from	   several	  manufacturers.16	   The	   specificity	   of	   the	   tests	   is	   variable;	   some	   can	   only	  
detect	   P.	   falciparum,	   while	   others	   also	   can	   detect	   non-­‐P.	   falciparum	   infections.	   For	   applications	  
under	  field	  conditions,	  RDTs	  must	  be	  stable,	  simple	  to	  use,	  easy	  to	  interpret,	  and	  sensitive	  to	  clinical	  
malaria	  cases.	  The	  commonly	  recommended	  lower	  detection	  limit	  for	  P.	  falciparum	  infection	  is	  ~100	  
parasites/µl	  of	  blood.	  The	  specific	  RDT	  for	  malaria	  diagnosis	  used	  in	  a	  trial	  must	  be	  selected	  carefully	  
and	  evaluated	  thoroughly	  according	  to	  WHO	  guidelines.	  
Most	   malarious	   areas	   contain	   one	   or	   two	   dominant	   vector	   species,	   and	   it	   may	   be	   difficult	   or	  
impossible	  to	  restrict	  testing	  of	  GMMs	  to	  sites	  containing	  only	  the	  target	  mosquito.	  If	  single-­‐vector	  
sites	   are	   used	   for	   trials,	   the	   results	   may	   not	   be	   generally	   applicable.	   However,	   it	   is	   clearly	   not	  
feasible	  to	  determine	  epidemiological	  efficacy	  accurately	  during	  phases	  2	  and	  3	  by	  targeting	  a	  single	  
species	  when	  it	   is	  well	  established	  that	  numerous	  other	  vectors	  of	  the	  same	  pathogen	  are	  present	  
and	  are	  sufficiently	  abundant	  to	  maintain	  high	  levels	  of	  transmission.	  
Experiments	  and	  modelling	  should	  be	  conducted	  prior	  to	  GMM	  field	  testing	  to	  determine	  in	  which	  
seasons	  and	  ecological	   contexts	   the	  GMMs	  have	  a	   reasonable	   chance	  of	   affecting	  epidemiological	  
outcomes.	  For	  example,	  preliminary	  experiments	  or	  historical	  records	  may	  reveal	  the	  contributions	  
of	   individual	   vector	   species	   to	   the	   overall	   disease	   transmission	   levels.	   While	   these	   are	   often	  
considered	   additive,	   each	   species’	   contribution	   may	   not	   conform	   to	   such	   a	   simple	   relationship,	  
especially	   when	   the	   efficiency	   (vectorial	   capacity)	   of	   one	   key	   vector	   species	   is	   much	   higher	   than	  
others.	  Furthermore,	  there	  is	  a	  possibility	  that	  suppression	  of	  one	  target	  species	  could	  cause	  niche	  
replacement	  by	  other,	  closely	  related	  vector	  species.	  Interpretation	  of	  epidemiological	  outcomes	  by	  
GMMs	   in	   multi-­‐species	   sites	   requires	   caution.	   These	   issues	   should	   be	   anticipated	   as	   early	   as	  
possible,	  and	  factored	   in	  to	  the	  choice	  of	   target	  species	   in	  GMM	  design	  and	  selection	  of	   trial	  sites	  
when	  entering	  into	  field	  testing.	  	  
Entomological	   efficacy	   must	   be	   determined	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   anticipated	   use	   of	   the	   GMM	  
technology	  
Few	  GMM	  interventions	  will	  be	  implemented	  in	  isolation,	  thus	  their	  performance	  will	  be	  determined	  
best	   in	  the	  presence	  of	  other	  anticipated	  control	  measures.	   Indeed,	   it	   is	  an	  accepted	  procedure	  to	  
conduct	  efficacy	  trials	  for	  new	  products	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  standard	  of	  care	  for	  disease	  control	  in	  
the	   area.	   If	   the	   anticipated	   use	   of	   GMMs	   is	   to	   further	   reduce	   or	   eliminate	   populations	   that	   have	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been	  suppressed	  by	  seasonal	  depression	  or	  conventional	  methods,	   then	  the	  efficacy	  of	   the	  GMMs	  
should	   be	   evaluated	   in	   that	   context.	   If	   the	   intended	   use	   of	   GMMs	   is	   to	   replace	   the	   conventional	  
control	   methods,	   the	   cost-­‐effectiveness	   and	   reliability	   of	   the	   GMMs	   needs	   to	   be	   compared	   with	  
these	  methods.	  The	  reliability	  of	  the	  GMMs	  as	  a	  component	  of	  the	  suite	  of	  interventions	  is	  a	  central	  
consideration.	   Particularly	   for	   developing	   countries,	   GMMs	   that	   are	   highly	   effective	   under	   ideal	  
circumstances	   will	   be	   less	   attractive	   if	   they	   perform	   poorly	   when	   logistical,	   management	   or	  
ecological	   difficulties	   arise	   and	   are	   common.	   The	   ability	   to	   provide	   for	   the	   ongoing	   cost	   of	   an	  
intervention	  should	  be	  a	  consideration.	  
The	   specific	   experimental	   designs	   to	  be	  used	  may	   vary	  widely	   according	   to	   the	   specific	  mosquito,	  
study	   site	   and	   country,	   and	   the	   progression	   of	   experiments	   from	   the	   laboratory	   to	   the	   field	   will	  
require	  reconsideration	  at	  each	  stage.	  When	  possible,	  the	  validity	  of	  a	  specific	  experimental	  design	  
should	   be	   assessed	   during	   the	   process	   of	   peer	   review.	   In	   non-­‐academic	   circumstances	   where	  
funding	   does	   not	   ordinarily	   require	   peer	   review,	   independent	   review	   by	   experts	   is	   highly	  
recommended.	  
Surrogate	  endpoints	  must	  be	  chosen	  for	  early	  phase	  testing	  
GMM	   strains	   are	   built	   for	   specific	   circumstances	  where	   their	   potential	   for	   reducing	   EIR	   has	   been	  
investigated	   and	   predicted	   with	   mathematical	   models.	   These	   models	   highlight	   key	   performance	  
characteristics	   that	   then	   can	   be	  measured	   in	   the	   laboratory	   to	   the	   necessary	   precision	   as	   a	   first	  
approximation	  of	  field	  performance.	  The	  performance	  characteristics	  vary	  with	  the	  specific	  strategy	  
but	   include	  population	  suppression,	  appearance	  of	  sexual	  sterility,	  mating	  competitiveness,	  spread	  
rate	   and	   frequency	   of	   a	   transgene	   in	   a	   population,	   and	   appearance	   of	   a	   particular	   phenotype.	  
Measurement	  of	  entomological	  surrogate	  indicators	  for	  EIR	  requires	  close	  supervision	  and	  dedicated	  
well-­‐trained	  staff.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  self-­‐limiting	  population	  suppression,	  vector	  abundance	  and	  its	  effect	  
on	   EIR	   are	   the	   most	   direct	   measures	   of	   entomological	   efficacy	   and	   there	   are	   standard	   methods	  
available	  to	  determine	  them	  	  (WHO,	  1975;	  Silver,	  2008).	  	  
During	  the	  course	  of	  the	  trials,	  experimental	  outcomes	  should	  be	  used	  to	  redefine	  the	  parameters	  of	  
the	  intervention’s	  computer	  models.	  These	  changes	  may	  require	  alterations	  to	  the	  trial	  design	  or	  the	  
outcomes	  that	  can	  be	  expected.	  Model	  performance	  should	  also	  be	  monitored	  during	  the	  trials	   to	  
determine	  whether	   its	  predictions	  are	  validated	  by	   trial	  observations.	   Stakeholders	  and	   regulators	  
should	   also	   be	   clearly	   informed	   on	   how	   modified	   model	   predictions	   may	   affect	   trial	   conduct	   or	  
continuation.	  
The	  influence	  of	  seasonal	  and	  inter-­‐annual	  variations	  on	  trial	  design	  must	  be	  considered	  
Seasonal	   and	   inter-­‐annual	   variations	   in	   climatic	   conditions	   and	   other	   intervention	   measures	   that	  
affect	   vector	   abundance,	   species	   composition,	   transmission	   intensity	   and	   disease	   incidence	   are	  
common.	  Phase	  2	  GMM	  trials	  that	  involve	  small-­‐scale	  ecologically	  confined	  field	  releases,	  and	  Phase	  
3	  testing	  that	  involves	  large-­‐scale	  open-­‐field	  releases,	  should	  take	  these	  variations	  into	  consideration	  
to	  ensure	  experimental	  success	  and	  to	  enable	  the	  results	  to	  be	  generalized.	  	  
Self-­‐limiting	   population	   reduction	   GMMs	   will	   require	   regularly	   scheduled	   releases,	   and	   within	   a	  
short-­‐term	  trial	  a	   reduction	  of	   the	  population	  size	  could	  be	  a	   fortuitous	  characteristic	  of	  a	  specific	  





season	   alone,	   but	   one	   that	  might	   not	   be	   repeatable.	  Multi-­‐year	   evaluations	   would	   provide	  more	  
robust	  assessments	  of	  both	   the	  climate	  and	  co-­‐intervention	  effects,	  as	  well	  as	  an	   idea	  of	  how	  the	  
intervention	  effect	  varies	  as	  a	  function	  of	  annual	  medium-­‐term	  variations.	  
Population	   replacement	   in	   which	   a	   gene	   drive	   system	   is	   involved	   may	   take	   several	   years	   after	  
repeated	   releases	   to	   increase	   the	   frequency	  of	   refractory	  alleles	   to	  an	  effective	   level.	   In	   this	   case,	  
mathematical	  modelling	  should	  be	  conducted	  to	  predict	  the	  necessary	  trial	  duration	  for	  evaluating	  
efficacy.	   Uncertainties,	   assumptions	   and	   unknowns	   in	   disease	   transmission	   models	   and	   vector	  
bionomics	   should	   be	   transparent,	   and	   a	   variety	   of	   models	   and	   scenarios	   should	   be	   considered,	  
model	  parameter	  uncertainty	  explored,	  assumptions	  tested	  and	  model	  predictions	  validated	  at	  each	  
stage.	  	  
Non-­‐linear	  relationships	  between	  entomological	  and	  epidemiological	  outcomes	  can	  be	  expected	  
The	   simplest	   outcomes	   to	  measure	   when	   GMM	   sterile-­‐male	  methods	   are	   used	   are	   reductions	   in	  
female	  fertility.	  This	   is	  typically	  determined	  by	  a	  direct	  measure	  of	  the	  number	  of	   larvae	  produced	  
per	   female,	   and	   can	  be	   performed	  using	   laboratory-­‐reared	  mosquitoes	   or	   by	   obtaining	   eggs	   from	  
blood-­‐fed	   field-­‐collected	   females.	   While	   it	   may	   seem	   that	   increases	   in	   sterility	   would	   lead	   to	  
reductions	  in	  adult	  populations,	  there	  is	  seldom	  a	  direct	  relationship	  due	  to	  the	  dynamic	  nature	  of	  
larval	   competition.	   Two	   kinds	  of	   effects	   are	   expected:	   (1)	   negative	  density	   dependence17	   (Juliano,	  
2007;	   2009)	   is	   common	   and	  will	   tend	   to	   dampen	   the	   initial	   effects	   of	   reduced	   fecundity	   on	   adult	  
population	  sizes.	  These	  interactions	  mean	  that	  different	  GMM	  self-­‐limiting	  male	  sterility	  approaches	  
will	  perform	  differently	  (Yakob	  &	  Bonsall,	  2009).	  (2)	  Over-­‐compensation18	  under	  some	  circumstances	  
may	  cause	  increases	  in	  the	  adult	  population	  size	  when	  larval	  density	  decreases.	  Both	  of	  these	  effects	  
occur	   due	   to	   competition	   for	   food	   in	   larval	   sites.	   Knowledge	   of	   the	   population	   dynamics	   as	  
determined	   by	   larval	   abundance	  would	   be	   a	   useful	   predictor	   of	   the	   levels	   of	   releases	   and	   sexual	  
sterility	   that	   will	   be	   necessary	   in	   order	   to	   realize	   particular	   levels	   of	   population	   suppression.	  
Ecological	  studies	  prior	  to	  releases	  should	  be	  performed	  to	  determine	  the	  characteristics	  of	  sites	  and	  
predict	  the	  usefulness	  of	  GMM	  interventions.	  
Reductions	   in	   vector	   abundance	   or	   increases	   in	   refractory	   transgenes	   to	   a	   high	   frequency	   should	  
lead	   to	   a	   reduced	   EIR.	   In	   the	   particular	   case	   of	   malaria	   in	   hyperendemic	   areas,	   this	   desirable	  
entomological	   outcome	   is	   expected	   to	   result	   in	   reduction	   of	   disease	   only	  when	   EIR	   falls	   below	   a	  
threshold	   necessary	   to	  maintain	   transmission,	   often	   cited	   as	   one	   infective	   bite	   per	   year	   (Shaukat,	  
Breman	  &	  McKenzie,	  2010).	   In	   such	  areas,	  a	   substantial	   reduction	   in	   transmission	   intensity	  by	   the	  
GMMs	  or	  combination	  of	  interventions	  will	  probably	  be	  needed	  to	  demonstrate	  an	  epidemiological	  
impact.	  
Entomological	  monitoring	  unique	  to	  GMMs	  
Most	  of	   the	   characteristics	  used	   to	  monitor	  GMM	   functionality	   are	  not	  unique	   to	   the	   technology.	  
Methods	   to	   evaluate	   these	   characteristics	   have	   been	   developed	   and	   are	   used	   routinely	   to	   gather	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Population	  regulation	  in	  which	  increased	  population	  density	  reduces	  its	  rate	  of	  increase.	  In	  this	  case,	  adding	  
more	  immature	  individuals	  to	  a	  population	  does	  not	  proportionally	  increase	  the	  number	  of	  adults.	  
18	  Population	  regulation	  in	  which	  reductions	  in	  some	  stage	  of	  the	  population	  actually	  increase	  population	  size,	  
e.g.	  by	  improving	  survival	  to	  adulthood.	  





entomological	  data.	  These	  include	  determining	  adult	  abundance,	  host	  preference	  and/or	  the	  ability	  
to	   develop	   and	   transmit	   parasites	   or	   viruses.	   These	   and	   other	   biological	   characteristics	   should	   be	  
catalogued	   thoroughly	   during	   GMM	   testing.	   GMM	   production	   should	   utilize	   standard	   operating	  
procedures	   (SOPs)	   and	   good	  manufacturing	   practices	   (WHO,	   1992).	   Reproducible	   life	   history	   and	  
phenotype	   can	  only	  be	  expected	   if	   the	  mosquitoes	   are	   reared	  and	  maintained	  using	   standardized	  
procedures.	  
Molecular	  properties	  
A	  thorough	  description	  of	  the	  GMM	  describes	  the	  transgene	  components,	  genetic	  background	  and	  
novel	   phenotypes.	   This	   description	   allows	   preliminary	   assessment	   of	   the	   GMM	   itself	   and	  
observations	  of	  changes	  in	  salient	  features,	  including	  the	  transgene	  sequence,	  its	  insertion	  site	  and	  
strain	  background.	  The	  description	  of	   the	  GMM	  should	   include	   information	  about	   the	   strains	   that	  
contributed	  genetic	  material.	  
Phenotypic	  stability	  
Among	  the	  few	  characteristics	  of	  GMMs	  that	  are	  unlike	  those	  monitored	  for	  typical	  entomological	  
surveys,	   phenotypic	   stability	   is	   paramount	   and	   is	   a	   strong	   determinant	   of	   efficacy.	   This	   can	   be	  
evaluated	  by	   answering	   several	   questions:	   does	   the	  mosquito	   exhibit	   the	  design	   characteristics	   in	  
both	   laboratory	   studies	   and	   field	   simulations?	   	   If	   the	   phenotype	   is	   not	   fully	   penetrant19	   but	   the	  
transgene	  is	  stable,	  what	  effect	  on	  its	  efficacy	  and	  fitness	  do	  models	  predict?	  	  It	  will	  be	  possible	  to	  
measure	   stability	   in	   increasingly	   realistic	   GMM	   trials	   as	   they	   move	   forward	   through	   the	   phases;	  
however,	   the	   process	   should	   begin	   in	   Phase	   1.	   The	   genetic	   diversity	   of	   the	   mosquitoes	   and	  
pathogens	  with	  which	  the	  GMMs	  interact,	  and	  the	  environmental	  variations,	  will	   increase	  and	  may	  
reveal	   novel	   variations	   in	   phenotype	   expression	   as	   advanced	   phases	   of	   testing	   become	   more	  
realistic	   in	   Phase	   2	   and	   Phase	   3	   trials.	   Such	   measurements	   should	   continue	   periodically	   in	   the	  
context	  of	  a	  post-­‐implementation	  surveillance	  (Phase	  4).	  
Variations	   in	  expression	  of	  a	   transgene	  should	  be	  quantified	  so	   that	  significant	  deviations	   in	  novel	  
environments	   can	   be	   detected.	   It	   is	   particularly	   important	   to	   determine	  whether	   the	   phenotypes	  
that	   have	   been	   measured	   in	   stable	   laboratory	   environments	   are	   consistent	   when,	   for	   example,	  
temperature	  variations	  are	  experienced.	  Similarly,	   laboratory	  evaluations	  should	   include	  transgene	  
expression	   in	   aged	   individuals	   and	   in	   a	   variety	   of	   genetic	   backgrounds.	   If	   expression	   of	   the	  
phenotype	  is	  conditional	  on	  some	  environmental	  factor,	  the	  effects	  of	  variation	   in	  the	  presence	  of	  
that	  factor	  should	  be	  examined.	  
Loss	   of	   phenotypic	   expression	   can	   result	   even	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   transgene	   mutation	   and	   can	  
negatively	   affect	   efficacy.	   Evolution	   of	   resistance	   to	   a	   transgene	   effector	   can	   occur	   either	   in	   the	  
GMM	   strain	   itself	   (phenotypic	   drift	   or	   gene	   interaction)	   or	   in	   the	   target	   mosquito	   population	  
following	   lengthy	  exposure.	  As	  with	   resistance	   to	   insecticides,	   this	   is	   extremely	  difficult	   to	  predict	  
with	  high	  certainty	  from	  small	  laboratory	  studies,	  but	  one	  can	  measure	  pre-­‐existing	  resistance	  in	  the	  
target	   population	   and	   then	   monitor	   the	   phenotype	   in	   the	   field	   over	   time.	   As	   is	   evident	   with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  The	  transgene	  phenotype	  is	  predictably	  absent	  in	  some	  proportion	  of	  the	  individuals	  in	  a	  population	  despite	  
the	  transgene	  being	  present	  in	  an	  unmodified	  form	  in	  all	  individuals.	  





insecticide	   resistance,	   it	   is	   not	   the	   appearance	   of	   resistance	   but	   its	   frequency	   that	   mitigates	   the	  
usefulness	   of	   the	   intervention.	   The	   likelihood	   of	   such	   resistance	   and	   its	   consequences	   should	   be	  
considered	   thoroughly	  and	  measures	  put	   in	  place	  as	  part	  of	   the	   trial	  plan	   to	  prevent	   (if	   possible),	  
detect	  and	  respond	  to	   it.	  Preliminary	   laboratory	  examination	  of	  the	   likelihood	  of	  resistance	  arising	  
may	   in	   some	   cases	   be	   possible	   and	   this	   consideration	   should	   be	   part	   of	   the	   early	   RA	   (Section	   3.	  
Biosafety).	  As	  described	  above	  for	   instability	  related	  to	  mutation,	  these	  effects	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  
become	  more	  evident	  during	  phases	  2	  and	  3.	  Measuring	  such	  effects	  should	  be	  intensified	  beginning	  
with	   confined	   Phase	   2	   trials	  while	   unanticipated	   effects	   can	   be	   restricted	   in	   time	   and	   space.	   The	  
pathogen	  also	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  develop	  mechanisms	  for	  evading	  refractoriness	  of	  GMMs	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  population	  replacement.	  Thus,	  during	  phases	  3	  and	  4,	  refractoriness	  of	  GMMs	  to	  pathogen	  
should	  be	  carefully	  monitored.	  
Fitness	  
“Fitness”	  of	  transgenic	  mosquitoes	  has	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  much	  study	  and	  discussion	  (Catteruccia,	  
Godfray	  &	  Crisanti,	  2003;	  Irvin	  et	  al.,	  2004;	  Moreira	  et	  al.,	  2004;	  Marrelli	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  Li	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  
Amenya	   et	   al.,	   2010;	   Isaacs	   et	   al.,	   2012).	   While	   this	   is	   a	   characteristic	   relevant	   to	   long-­‐term	  
population	   trends,	   it	   is	   of	   less	   relevance	   to	   self-­‐limiting	   population	   suppression	   strategies:	   the	  
mosquitoes	  used	  for	  the	  latter	  approaches	  have	  reduced	  fitness	  by	  design.	  What	  is	  relevant	  is	  their	  
ability	  to	  suppress	  wild	  populations	  and,	  for	  GMMs	  intended	  to	  have	  a	  multigenerational	  effect	  (sex-­‐
ratio	   distortion20	   or	   inherited	   sex-­‐specific	   sterility),	   the	   duration	   of	   the	   suppressive	   function.	   One	  
measure	   of	   the	   maximal	   rate	   of	   effect	   on	   population	   suppression	   is	   the	   mating	   competitiveness	  
value	  (Fried,	  1971).	  It	  indicates	  (usually	  on	  a	  0–1	  scale)	  the	  relative	  frequency	  of	  mating	  of	  a	  male	  in	  
question	  (in	  this	  case,	  GMMs)	  when	  in	  competition	  with	  a	  reference	  wild-­‐type	  male.	  However,	  there	  
is	  no	  absolute	  value	  of	  competitiveness	  that	  precludes	  the	  use	  of	  a	  strain	  since	  even	  very	  low-­‐value	  
insects	  (e.g.	  0.2	  for	  Med	  fly)	  can	  effectively	  suppress	  populations	  if	  sufficient	  numbers	  are	  released.	  
Nonetheless,	  measuring	   competitiveness,	   longevity	   and	   the	   duration	   of	   effect	  will	   provide	   indices	  
that	  determine	  the	  necessary	  scale	  of	  releases	  and	  their	  efficiency	  and	  are,	  therefore,	  important	  for	  
strain	  efficacy	  evaluation.	  
In	  contrast,	  the	  fitness	  of	  the	  GMMs	  used	  in	  population	  replacement	  and	  self-­‐sustaining	  approaches	  
is	  critical,	  specifically,	  the	  effect	  on	  fitness	  due	  to	  the	  transgene	  expressing	  the	  desired	  phenotype.	  
The	   designed	   effect	   is	   not	   population	   replacement	   per	   se,	   but	   rather	   the	   introgression	   of	   a	  
transgene	  causing	  a	  phenotypic	  change	   into	  an	  otherwise	  wild	  mosquito	  population.	  After	  release,	  
recombination	  between	  the	  transgene	  and	  the	  wild	  genome	  will	  occur	  at	  rates	  determined	  in	  large	  
part	   by	   the	   presence	   of	   natural	   inversions	   and	   homologous	   pairing.	   Therefore,	   the	   fitness	   of	  
repeatedly	   out-­‐crossed	   mosquitoes	   must	   be	   measured.	   Assuming	   that	   a	   transgene	   is	   in	   a	   drive	  
system,	  the	  loss	  of	  fitness	  and	  reduction	  in	  gene	  frequency	  due	  to	  the	  transgene	  must	  be	  compared	  
to	  hyper-­‐Mendelian	  inheritance	  rates21	  due	  to	  the	  drive	  mechanism.	  Models	  can	  be	  used	  to	  predict	  
the	   ranges	   of	   fitness	   and	   drive	   that	   will	   permit	   transgene	   spread.	   When	   a	   gene	   drive	   system	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Changing	  the	  sex	  ratio	  among	  progeny	  from	  the	  typical	  equal	  numbers	  of	  males	  and	  females	  to	  progeny	  
consisting	  largely	  of	  males.	  
21	  An	  individual	  heterozygous	  for	  a	  transgene	  will	  produce	  progeny	  that	  are	  50%	  transgenic	  in	  a	  normal	  non-­‐
drive	  system.	  Hyper-­‐Mendelian	  inheritance	  is	  expected	  in	  drive	  systems,	  and	  these	  individuals	  produce	  >	  50%	  
transgenic	  progeny.	  





implemented	  to	  achieve	  population	  replacement	  and	  self-­‐sustaining	  strategies,	  the	  frequency	  of	  the	  
functional	   gene	   in	   mosquito	   populations	   into	   which	   the	   GMM	   has	   been	   released	   is	   the	   ultimate	  
measure	  of	  this	  balance.	  While	  such	  measures	  can	  be	  used	  to	  refine	  efficacy	  predictions	  in	  Phase	  1	  
testing,	  Phase	  2	  and	  3	  trials	  are	  necessary	  to	  develop	  final	  measures.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  activity	  of	  
the	  transgene	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  differ	  depending	  on	  the	  genetic	  backgrounds	  in	  which	  it	  occurs.	  
A	   reduction	   in	   the	   EIR	   is	   the	   ultimate	   result	   of	   successful	   self-­‐sustaining	   approaches.	   Even	   these	  
kinds	   of	   GMMs	   are	   likely	   to	   require	   multiple	   releases	   over	   a	   large	   area	   and	   for	   long	   enough	   to	  
establish	  the	  transgene	  at	  a	  frequency	  in	  the	  population	  high	  enough	  to	  achieve	  the	  desired	  effect.	  
When	  a	  GMM	  is	  implemented	  by	  such	  multiple	  releases,	  it	  is	  of	  little	  value	  to	  conclude	  effectiveness	  
based	   on	   more	   limited	   trials.	   For	   some	   interventions,	   this	   will	   necessarily	   increase	   the	   scale	   of	  
testing	  required	  before	  the	  potential	  of	  the	  technology	  can	  be	  assessed	  –	  a	  requirement	  that	  should	  
be	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  RA.	  	  
Independent	  verification	  of	  results	  will	  increase	  confidence	  
All	  novel	  vector	  interventions	  are	  open	  to	  critical	  scrutiny	  until	  their	  value	  has	  been	  demonstrated.	  
Similarly,	   trials	  of	  GMMs	  may	  be	  controversial,	  and	  even	  positive	  results	  may	  be	  questioned	   if	  the	  
research	   team	   involved	   is	   the	   only	   one	   to	   document	   the	   methods	   and	   results.	   Research	   teams	  
should	  strongly	  consider	  establishing	  an	  independent	  monitoring	  body	  to	  validate	  and	  interpret	  the	  
results	  ,	  as	  is	  routinely	  the	  case	  for	  clinical	  trials:	  
An	   independent	  Data	  and	  Safety	  Monitoring	  Board	   (DSMB),	   including	  a	  clinical	  monitor	   should	  be	  
appointed	  for	  the	  trial	  (see	  Smith	  and	  Morrow,	  1996).	  This	  should	  be	  an	  independent	  group	  that	  can	  
testify	   that	   the	   trial	   protocol	   has	   been	   properly	   followed	   and	   that	   relevant	   quality	   control	  
procedures	  have	  been	  operating	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  trial.	  This	  Board	  should	  be	  set	  up	  before	  the	  
trial	  begins	   rather	   than	  once	   it	  has	  started,	  as	  unfortunately	   is	  often	   the	  case	   (also	   trials	   in	  which	  
this	  has	  not	  been	  done	  have	  often	  been	  those	  which	  have	  given	  rise	  to	  greater	  controversy).	  (WHO,	  
1997.)	  
Methods	  to	  ensure	  transparency	  and	  independent	  validation	  of	  results	  should	  be	  considered	  during	  
the	  trial	  design,	  but	  careful	  thought	  should	  be	  given	  to	  whether	  a	  DSMB	  is	  necessary	  for	  trials	  that	  
do	   not	   include	   epidemiological	   outcomes.	   Simpler	   but	   widely	   accepted22	   alternatives	   (i.e.	   an	  
independent	   monitor	   or	   an	   oversight	   panel)	   may	   be	   designed	   for	   entomological	   outcome	   trials,	  
which	   could	   be	   tasked	  with	   particular	   activities	   that	   are	   a	   subset	   of	   the	   full	   trial	   audit	   but	  whose	  
scope	  is	  adequate	  to	  maintain	  independence	  and	  validation.	  The	  expertise	  of	  those	  chosen	  for	  this	  
role	   must	   adequately	   represent	   the	   knowledge	   to	   understand	   and	   analyse	   trial	   conduct	   and	   the	  
appropriate	  trial	  outcomes	  such	  as	  vector	  ecology,	  behaviour,	  and	  population	  genetics	  and	  biology.	  
The	   selection	   of	   individual(s)	   for	   this	   task	   should	   be	   a	   transparent	   process.	   They	   should	   not	   only	  
provide	   the	   appropriate	   expertise,	   but	   should	   also	   be	   free	   of	   conflict	   of	   interest	   on	   the	   trials’	  
outcomes.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  For	  example,	  the	  National	  Institute	  of	  Neurological	  Disorders	  and	  Stroke	  (NINDS)	  guidelines	  for	  data	  and	  
safety	  monitoring	  in	  clinical	  trials:	  
http://www.ninds.nih.gov/research/clinical_research/policies/data_safety_monitoring.htm,	  accessed	  25	  May	  
2014.	  





“Go”	  and	  “no-­‐go”	  criteria	  must	  be	  determined	  prior	  to	  trials	  
Transition	  from	  the	  laboratory	  to	  the	  field	  should	  always	  be	  planned	  with	  clearly	  stated	  performance	  
milestones	   at	   which	   point	   the	   project	   either	   proceeds	   to	   the	   next	   level,	   moves	   sideways	   to	  
determine	  whether	   the	  unmet	  milestone	   is	  due	  to	  an	  artifact	  or	  experimental	  design	   issue,	  or	   the	  
trial	   is	   discontinued.	   For	   cage	   studies	   where	   population	   suppression	   or	   an	   increase	   in	   transgene	  
prevalence	   is	   the	   goal,	   the	   researchers	   must	   establish	   clear	   ranges	   of	   performance	   that	   warrant	  
proceeding.	   The	   oversight	   panel	   should	   independently	   assess	   these	   performance	   standards.	  
Performance	  ranges	  can	  be	  informed	  by	  modelling	  the	  GMM	  performance	  characteristics	  that	  must	  
be	   met	   in	   order	   to	   achieve	   the	   desired	   outcome	   in	   the	   anticipated	   ecological	   and	   geographical	  
context	  at	  the	  next	  (initially	  entomological)	  level	  of	  testing.	  
The	   consequences	   of	   trials	   become	   greater	   as	   they	  move	   from	  physically	   confined	   to	   ecologically	  
confined	   and	   open-­‐field	   release.	  Monitoring	   to	   detect	   adverse	   effects	   must	   increase	   accordingly.	  
Whereas	   under	   physical	   confinement,	   unproductive	   effort	   will	   likely	   be	   the	   only	   “hazard”	   of	  
unnecessarily	  extended	  trials,	  human	  and	  environmental	  hazards	  must	  be	  evaluated	  as	  GMM	  trials	  
move	  to	  field	  release.	  These	  challenges	  are	  discussed	  in	  Section	  3:	  Biosafety.	  
There	  are	  four	  definite	  “no-­‐go”	  points	  relative	  to	  both	  efficacy	  and	  safety	  criteria:	  1)	  unanticipated	  
disease	  transmission	  outcomes	  linked	  to	  the	  experiments;	  2)	  an	  unanticipated	  environmental	  harm	  
results	   from	   the	   experiments;	   3)	   political	   or	   social	   opposition	   or	   unrest	   prevents	   the	   safe	  
continuation	   of	   the	   trials;	   and	   4)	   the	   phenotype	   of	   the	   GMM	  deviates	   significantly	   from	   the	   one	  
intended.	  Depending	  on	   the	   technology,	   the	   fourth	  example	   could	   include:	   loss	  of	   sexual	   sterility,	  
high	   rates	   of	   refractoriness	   failure,	   or	   deviations	   from	  expected	   sex	   ratios.	   In	   addition	   to	   a	   no-­‐go	  
trigger,	  remediation	  plans	  should	  be	  in	  place	  for	  such	  events	  (Section	  3.	  Biosafety).	  	  
If	   no	   negative	   effect	   on	   human	   health	   or	   environmental	   quality	   is	   determined	   to	   result	   from	  
unsuccessful	   trials,	   assessment	   by	   the	   relevant	   national	   authority	   and	   donor	   of	   the	   value	   of	  
proceeding	   will	   determine	   whether	   the	   project	   should	   continue.	   It	   is	   common	   for	   sterile	   insect	  
technique	  programmes	  to	  evolve	  methodologically	  during	  production	  and	  release	  start-­‐up,	  so	  initial	  
failure	  is	  surprising.	  The	  technology	  developers	  may	  make	  a	  persuasive	  case	  that	  failures	  were	  due,	  
for	  example,	   to	  mosquito	  production	   failures,	  or	  unusual	  weather	  or	   implementation	  problems.	   In	  
such	  a	  case,	  lack	  of	  efficacy	  does	  not	  require	  a	  no-­‐go	  decision,	  but	  could	  preclude	  moving	  to	  the	  next	  
phase	  until	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  failure	  is	  clarified	  and	  corrected.	  	  
2.3	  Recommendations	  for	  efficacy	  measurements	  at	  different	  GMM	  testing	  
phases	  
The	  final	  section	  of	   this	  guidance	  presents	  some	  recommended	  experimental	  activities	   for	  efficacy	  
evaluation	  of	  GMMs	  in	  different	  testing	  phases.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  GMMs	  will	  be	  used	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  
other	   control	   methods	   in	   Phase	   1	   and	   large	   out-­‐door	   cage	   testing	   of	   Phase	   2.	   Conventional	  
experimental	  approaches	   involving	  direct	  comparison	  between	  GMM	  cages	  and	  control	  cages	  with	  
random	  treatment	  assignment	  may	  be	  used.	  In	  this	  case,	  only	  entomological	  measurements	  can	  be	  
made	  and,	  thus,	  the	  primary	  objective	  should	  be	  the	  potential	  for	  reducing	  transmission	  intensity	  as	  





indicated	  by	  entomological	   surrogates.	  A	   sufficient	  number	  of	   replicates	   should	  be	  used	   to	  detect	  
the	  expected	  difference	  in	  the	  entomological	  outcomes	  between	  GMM	  and	  control	  cages.	  	  
Efficacy	  measurements	  will	  vary	  depending	  on	  the	   intended	  effects	  of	  GMM	  strategies	  and	  testing	  
phases.	  It	  is	  expected	  that	  measurements	  of	  epidemiological	  outcomes	  will	  not	  be	  undertaken	  until	  
entomological	  outcomes	  clearly	  predict	  a	   reduction	   in	   the	  EIR.	  For	  example,	   transmission	   intensity	  
cannot	   be	  measured	   in	   Phase	   1	   testing	   in	   a	   small-­‐scale	   laboratory	   setting	   or	   in	   larger	   population	  
cages.	   Instead,	   transgene	   phenotype	   stability,	   population	   reduction,	   and	   transgene	   spread	   and	  
frequency	  are	   feasible,	  and	  are	  meaningful	   indicators	  of	  GMM	  efficacy.	  These	  must	  be	  considered	  
within	   the	   context	   of	   the	   disease	   transmission	   setting	   in	   which	   the	   GMMs	  will	   be	   tested	   and/or	  
deployed.	  	  
Initially	  only	  entomological	  outcomes	  will	  be	  possible	  to	  measure:	  many	  of	  these	  must	  be	  monitored	  
throughout	  the	  phases	  of	  development.	  As	  testing	  moves	  to	  settings	   in	  which	  humans	  are,	  or	  may	  
be,	   present,	   increased	   attention	   to	   epidemiological	   outcomes	   must	   be	   added.	   For	   example,	   for	  
GMM	  strategies	  aimed	  only	  at	  population	  suppression,	   including	  self-­‐sustaining	  sex-­‐ratio	  distortion	  
or	  sterility	  factors,	  one	  can	  measure	  vector	  population	  reduction	  or	  sex	  ratio	  during	  phases	  1	  and	  2	  
(physical	  confinement)	  and	   it	  will	  only	  be	  possible	   to	  add	  measures	  of	   transmission	   risk	  after	   field	  
releases	  commence.	  Alternatively,	  initial	  GMM	  strategies	  aiming	  at	  population	  replacement	  will	  only	  
be	  able	  to	  use	  measurements	  such	  as	  transgene	  stability	  and	  frequency	  before	  adding	  EIR	  reduction	  
in	  later	  phases.	  
The	   following	   section	   catalogues	   typical	  measurements	   and	   designs	   that	   should	   be	   considered	   to	  
determine	   efficacy.	   Additional	   recommendations	   for	   conducting	   Phase	   1	   and	   Phase	   2	   physically	  
confined	   trials	   of	   GMMs	  with	   a	   gene	   drive	   system	   have	   already	   been	   published	   (Benedict	   et	   al.,	  
2008).	  The	  priority	  of	  various	  activities	  will	  change	  as	  experience	  and	  knowledge	  about	  performance	  
characteristics	   in	  diverse	  settings	   is	  gained,	  but	  thorough	  strain	  description	  is	  an	   important	  activity	  
to	  begin	  early	  in	  development	  regardless	  of	  the	  GMM	  type.	  
Phase	  1.	  Laboratory	  population	  studies	  
Only	  entomological	  outcomes	  can	  be	  determined	   in	  Phase	  1.	  Pathogen	   interactions	  can,	  however,	  
be	  measured.	  
• Basic	   description	   of	   the	   transgene,	   including	   its	   sequence,	   insertion	   site,	   phenotype	   and	  
inheritance.	   This	   information	   will	   be	   used	   during	   phases	   2	   and	   3	   to	   confirm	   the	   GMM’s	  
characteristics.	  
• Stability	  of	  the	  transgene	  and	  its	  phenotype.	  
• Life-­‐history	  characteristics	  in	  controlled	  environments.	  
• Mating	  competitiveness	  against	  laboratory	  mosquito	  strains.	  
• Frequency	  of	  GMMs	  that	  express	  the	  desired	  characteristic	  and	  the	  level	  of	  expression.	  
• Capability	  to	  host	  and	  transmit	  pathogen	  isolates.	  
• For	  drive	  systems,	  rate	  of	  spread	  of	  a	  transgene	  in	  laboratory	  cage	  populations.	  
• For	  population	  suppression	  strategies,	  rate	  of	  suppression	  in	  laboratory	  cage	  trials.	  





• Mating	   frequencies	   and	   egg	   hatching	   rates	   within	   the	   strain	   and	   in	   crosses	   to	   laboratory	  
strains.	  
• GMM	  release	  simulations	  in	  large	  indoor	  cages.	  
• Modelling	  effects	  anticipated	  in	  wild	  populations.	  
• Establishment	  of	  SOPs	  for	  GMM	  production	  and	  release.	  
Phase	  2.	  Physically	  and	  ecologically	  confined	  field	  trials	  
Physically	   confined,	   or	   “contained,”	   refers	   to	   trials	   performed	   in	   large	   outdoor	   cages	   from	  which	  
escape	   is	   highly	   unlikely	   due	   to	   physical	   barriers	   and	   special	   procedures.	   Such	   trials	   allow	   rapid	  
termination	   and	   simple	   detection	   of	   escapees.	   “Ecologically	   confined”	   refers	   to	   those	   trials	  
conducted	  in	  delimited	  areas	  from	  which	  escape	  is	  unlikely	  due	  to	  some	  ecological	  or	  geographical	  
isolating	  factor.	  These	  include	  ecological	  or	  physical	  islands.	  Regulators	  will	  determine	  whether	  both	  
types	   of	   trials	   are	   necessary,	   a	   decision	   that	   may	   be	   determined	   more	   by	   safety	   rather	   than	   by	  
efficacy	   considerations.	   Epidemiological	   outcomes	  may	   begin	   to	   be	  measured	   in	   confined	   release	  
trials,	  although,	   for	   the	   reasons	  explained	  above,	   this	  will	  be	  uncommon	  due	   to	   the	  small	   scale	  of	  
the	  trials.	  
Entomological	  activities	  in	  physical	  confinement	  
• Mating	  competitiveness	  against	  mosquito	  strains	  having	  a	  wild23	  genetic	  constitution.	  
• Frequency	   of	   GMMs	   that	   express	   the	   desired	   characteristic	   and	   the	   level	   of	   expression	   in	  
strains	  containing	  wild	  genetic	  background.	  
• Capability	   of	   GMMs	   containing	   local	   wild	   genetic	   constitution	   to	   host	   and	   transmit	   local	  
pathogen	  isolates.	  	  
• For	   drive	   systems,	   the	   rate	   of	   spread	   of	   a	   transgene	   in	   cage	   populations	   containing	   wild	  
mosquito	  isolates	  and	  compared	  with	  Phase	  1	  predictions.	  
• For	   population	   suppression	   strategies,	   the	   rate	   of	   suppression	   against	   wild	   mosquitoes	   in	  
cage	  trials.	  
• Egg	  hatching	  rates	  in	  crosses	  to	  wild	  mosquitoes.	  
• GMM	  release	  simulations	  in	  large	  outdoor	  cages.	  
Entomological	  activities	  in	  ecological	  confinement	  
• Establishment	  of	  go	  and	  no-­‐go	  criteria.	  
• Compatibility	  with	  other	  mosquito	  control	  measures.	  	  
• Measures	  of	  GMM	  dispersal.	  
• Baseline	  studies	  of	  vector	  composition	  and	  abundance.	  
• For	  drive	  systems,	  the	  rate	  of	  spread	  of	  a	  transgene	  in	  wild	  populations	  and	  comparison	  with	  
predictions	  from	  Phase	  1	  and	  Phase	  2	  physical	  confinement.	  
• Measures	  of	  transgene	  functionality	  and	  mutation	  rate.	  
• For	  population	  suppression	  strategies,	  the	  rate	  of	  suppression	  against	  wild	  mosquitoes.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  “Wild”	  refers	  here	  to	  a	  colony	  of	  mosquitoes	  isolated	  recently	  from	  the	  target	  population	  or	  a	  sample	  
actually	  collected	  from	  natural	  populations	  and	  used	  without	  colonization.	  Such	  colonies	  are	  genetically	  more	  
similar	  to	  natural	  mosquitoes	  than	  highly	  inbred	  laboratory	  strains.	  





• Randomized	  treatments	  of	  similar	  trial	  sites.	  
• Model	  refinement	  based	  on	  Phase	  2	  entomology	  and	  epidemiology	  observations;	  estimation	  
of	  impact	  on	  EIR.	  
• For	  population	  suppression	  strategies,	  refined	  measures	  of	  relationship	  between	  sterility	  and	  
population	  suppression.	  
Epidemiological	  activities	  in	  ecological	  confinement	  
• Measures	  of	  the	  ability	  to	  sustain	  development	  of	  local	  pathogen	  isolates	  as	  an	  indication	  of	  
potential	  for	  transmission.	  
Phase	  3.	  Staged	  open-­‐field	  releases	  
Phase	  3	  is	  likely	  to	  begin	  with	  limited	  releases	  intended	  to	  understand	  the	  delivery	  requirements	  and	  
functionality	   of	   GMMs	   under	   different	   circumstances,	   such	   as	   different	   ecologies,	   mosquito	  
demographics	  and	  seasons.	  Large	  trials	  to	  determine	  epidemiological	  impact	  should	  only	  be	  planned	  
after	   this	   information	   is	   at	   hand,	   as	   it	   will	   be	   necessary	   for	   trial	   design	   and	   interpretation.	   It	   is	  
recommended	  that	  randomized	  cluster	  trials	  be	  included	  in	  the	  design	  for	  late	  Phase	  3.	  
Entomological	  activities	  
• Compatibility	  with	  other	  mosquito	  control	  measures.	  	  
• Direct	  measures	  of	  EIR	  when	  possible.	  
• Baseline	  studies	  of	  vector	  composition	  and	  abundance.	  
• For	   GMMs	   with	   drive	   systems,	   the	   rate	   of	   spread	   of	   a	   transgene	   in	   wild	   populations	   and	  
comparison	  with	  Phase	  1	  and	  Phase	  2	  model	  predictions.	  
• Measures	  of	  transgene	  functionality,	  phenotypic	  stability	  and	  mutation	  rate.	  
• Measures	  of	  GMM	  dispersal.	  	  
• For	  population	  suppression	  strategies,	  the	  rate	  of	  suppression	  of	  wild	  populations.	  
• Model	   refinement	   and	   validation	   based	   on	   Phase	   2	   entomological	   and	   epidemiological	  
observations.	  
• For	   refractory	   GMMs,	   measures	   of	   native	   pathogen	   development	   and	   transmission	   in	  
progeny	  from	  natural	  matings	  of	  the	  GMMs	  to	  wild	  mosquitoes.	  	  
• Methods	   for	  measuring	  or	  estimating	  GMM	   frequency	  and	   cross-­‐species	   gene	   transfer	   and	  
consideration	  of	  how	  long	  these	  activities	  should	  continue	  (Section	  3.	  Biosafety).	  
Epidemiological	  activities	  
• Disease	  incidence/prevalence	  studies	  during	  intervention	  trials.	  
• Post-­‐treatment	   active	   and/or	   passive	   disease	   incidence/prevalence,	   and	   consideration	   of	  
how	  long	  these	  activities	  should	  continue	  (Section	  3.	  Biosafety).	  
Phase	  4.	  Post-­‐implementation	  surveillance	  
Like	   any	  public	   health	   intervention,	  GMMs	  will	   require	  ongoing	  monitoring	   to	  determine	  whether	  
their	  efficacy	  has	  diminished	  with	  time	  or	  because	  of	  unexpected	  effects	  that	  become	  evident	  when	  





used	   in	   new	   areas.	   Appropriate	   measurement	   of	   the	   entomological	   outcomes	   that	   guided	  
deployment	  of	  the	  GMM	  must	  be	  continued	  after	  the	  trials	  cease.	  Depending	  on	  the	  type	  of	  GMM	  
technology	  and	  the	  deployment	  strategy,	  multi-­‐year	  follow-­‐up	  may	  be	  required.	  	  
GMMs	  that	  reach	  Phase	  4	  will	  have	  undergone	  extensive	  efficacy	  testing.	  Their	  behaviour	  in	  natural	  
settings	   will	   be	   established	   by	   Phase	   3	   activities.	   However,	   it	   cannot	   be	   assumed	   that	   they	   will	  
continue	  to	  behave	  as	  expected.	  By	  analogy	  with	  the	  implementation	  of	  insecticides	  used	  for	  long-­‐
lasting	  insecticide	  treated	  bed	  nets,	  indoor	  residual	  spraying	  and	  larviciding,	  efficacy	  can	  change	  due	  
to	   changes	   in	   the	   genetic	   constitution	  of	   the	  mosquitoes	  or	   external	   factors	   such	   as	  weather	   and	  
human	  activities.	  However,	  the	  intervention	  at	  this	  point	  is	  no	  longer	  experimental,	  but	  is	  a	  control	  
measure	  whose	  ongoing	  effectiveness	  in	  a	  public	  health	  programme	  is	  being	  determined.	  
A	   subset	   of	   the	   epidemiological	   outcomes	   that	   were	   utilized	   during	   Phase	   3	   trials	   should	   be	  
monitored	   in	   order	   to	   determine	   whether	   the	   positive	   effects	   on	   human	   populations	   are	   being	  
sustained.	   It	   is	   likely	   that	   if	   the	   GMMs	  were	   deployed	   over	   large	   areas,	   only	   longitudinal	   passive	  
clinical	   case	   surveillance	   would	   be	   practical.	   In	   case	   a	   loss	   of	   efficacy	   is	   noticed	   –	   similar	   to	   the	  
appearance	  of	  insecticide	  resistance	  with	  conventional	  control	  –	  any	  second	  generation	  GMMs	  that	  
may	  be	  created	  must	  also	  be	  tested	  in	  phases	  1–3,	  and	  monitored	  in	  Phase	  4.	  	  
Entomological	  activities	  
• Direct	  measures	  of	  EIR	  under	  novel	  conditions	  (when	  possible).	  
• For	   GMMs	   with	   drive	   systems,	   the	   rate	   of	   spread	   of	   a	   transgene	   in	   wild	   populations	   and	  
comparison	  with	  model	  and	  Phase	  3	  predictions.	  
• Widespread	  intermittent	  sampling	  of	  transgene	  functionality	  and	  mutation	  rate.	  
• Wide-­‐scale	  intermittent	  measurement	  of	  GMM	  dispersal	  and	  gene	  flow.	  
• For	   population	   suppression	   strategies,	   sampling	   of	   the	   degree	   of	   suppression	   of	   wild	  
populations.	  
• Model	  refinement	  based	  on	  entomological	  and	  epidemiological	  observations.	  
• For	  refractory	  GMMs,	  observation	  of	  native	  pathogen	  development	  in	  mosquitoes	  collected	  
in	  disparate	  settings.	  
Epidemiological	  activities	  
• Longitudinal	  passive	  case	  detection	  of	  targeted	  disease	  and	  other	  mosquito-­‐borne	  diseases.	  
	  
Capacity	  building	  as	  an	  essential	  component	  of	  control	  measure	  durability	  
Durable	   efforts	   to	   conduct	   trials	   and	   to	   implement	   successful	   GMM	   interventions	   require	   strong	  
intellectual	   understanding,	   cultural	   intimacy	   and	   logistical	   capabilities	   in	   locations	   where	  
technologies	   are	   being	   implemented.	   Given	   the	   breadth	   of	   activities	   that	   have	   been	   described	  
above,	   these	   require	   personnel	   and	   laboratories	   prepared	   to	   perform	   regulatory,	   medical,	  
epidemiological,	   social	   and	   entomological	   activities.	   Further	   sub-­‐specializations	   will	   be	   required:	  
medical	  entomology,	  molecular	  biology,	  statistics	  and	  diagnostic	  analysis	  to	  name	  a	  few.	  It	  is	  simply	  
impossible	  for	  these	  capacities	  to	  be	  supplied	  without	  reliance	  upon	  well-­‐trained	  national	  personnel.	  





During	   trial	   design,	   an	   explicit	   personnel	   plan	   for	   the	   project	   should	   include	   the	   specific	   types	   of	  
supporting	  expertise	   that	  will	  be	   required	  and	   the	  degree	   to	  which	   the	  project	  can	  and	  must	   take	  
advantage	  of	  national	  capacities.	  When	  specific	  abilities	  are	  lacking,	  a	  strategy	  for	  training	  national	  
personnel	  to	  satisfy	  these	  needs	  should	  be	  planned	  and	  undertaken.	  Sufficient	  lead-­‐time	  for	  training	  
must	  be	  part	  of	   the	   trial	  design,	  and	  a	  commitment	   to	   retain	   trained	  personnel	   in	   the	   trial	  will	  be	  
important	  to	  ensure	  continuity,	  and	  allow	  for	  deep	  understanding	  of	  and	  involvement	  in	  the	  project.	  
These	  personnel	  will	  play	  vital	  roles	  not	  only	  in	  trial	  conduct,	  but	  also	  in	  regulatory	  interactions	  and	  
long-­‐term	  monitoring	  activities.	  
For	  many	  national	   staff,	   training	  opportunities	  will	  be	  professional	  highlights	   that	  may	  make	   them	  
eligible	   for	   national	   positions	   of	   authority	   and	   responsibility.	   Therefore,	   with	   their	   knowledge	   of	  
personnel,	   technologies,	   and	   national	   regulatory	   and	   political	   avenues,	   they	   constitute	   invaluable	  
long-­‐term	  national	   focal	   points	   for	   future	  potential	   novel	   interventions.	  Commitment	   to	  providing	  
assistance	  for	  training	  lays	  a	  foundation	  for	  future	  strength	  and	  independence	  for	  national	  research	  
activities.	  
Capacity	  includes	  facilities.	  Even	  though	  construction	  of	  major	  facilities	  will	  be	  beyond	  the	  resources	  
of	  most	   trials,	   increases	   in	   the	  capacities	  of	   facilities	  can	   include	  provision	  of	  scientific	  equipment,	  
computers	  and	  software	  required	  for	  the	  trials,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  necessary	  improvements	  in	  biosecurity	  
to	  achieve	  risk	  mitigation	  goals.	  Some	  structures,	  such	  as	  entomological-­‐contained	  trial	  facilities,	  will	  
be	  so	  specialized	  that	  support	   for	  the	  construction	  will	   likely	  come	  from	  the	  trial	  programme	  or	   in	  
combination	  with	  other	  studies	  that	  could	  capitalize	  on	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  multipurpose	  facility	  such	  
as	   the	   “Malaria	   Spheres”	   in	   Kenya.	   These	   kinds	   of	   facilities	   can	   be	   used	   to	   perform	   studies	   on	  
mosquito	   behaviour,	   life	   history	   and	   non-­‐GMM	   interventions.	   Coordinating	   investment	   in	   their	  
construction	  provides	  a	  long-­‐term	  foundation	  for	  wider	  sustained	  trials	  of	  vector	  interventions	  and	  
research	  activities.	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Biosafety	  considerations	  for	  GMMs	  address	  their	  safe	  use	  through	  the	  proper	  assessment	  of	  risks	  to	  
the	   environment	   and	   human	   health,	   and	   the	   proper	   management	   of	   those	   risks.	   Risk	   is	   the	  
combination	  of	   the	  magnitude	  of	   the	  consequences	  of	  a	  hazard	   (an	  unwanted	  event),	   if	   it	  occurs,	  
and	  the	  likelihood	  that	  the	  unwanted	  consequences	  will	  occur.	  Risk	  analysis	  is	  an	  objective	  process	  
to	  identify	  what	  hazards	  are	  relevant,	  how	  significant	  the	  risks	  are,	  how	  they	  can	  be	  managed,	  and	  
how	  both	  the	  risks	  and	  their	  management	  can	  be	  communicated	  effectively	  to	  all	  concerned.	  Risks	  
should	   be	   examined	   and	   responded	   to	   through	   established	   protocols	   within	   a	   risk	   analysis	  
framework	   determined	   by	   a	   national	   policy	   on	   environmental	   and	   human	   health	   risks,	   and	   their	  
Summary:	  Biosafety	  in	  the	  development	  of	  GMMs	  focuses	  on	  reducing	  to	  acceptable	  levels	  any	  potential	  
adverse	  risks	  to	  human	  health	  and	  the	  environment	  that	  might	  be	  posed	  by	  these	  technologies,	  keeping	  in	  
mind	  the	  known	  adverse	  effects	  of	  vector-­‐borne	  disease.	  Risk	  analysis	  contributes	  to	  the	  achievement	  of	  
an	  appropriate	  level	  of	  safety.	  Risk	  analysis	  takes	  into	  account	  that	  an	  event	  may	  occur	  but	  it	  may	  or	  may	  
not	   be	   harmful	   in	   particular	   circumstances.	   Upon	   evaluation,	   some	   risks	   may	   be	   judged	   as	   negligible.	  
Moreover,	   effective	   RM	   can	  make	  many	   risks	   acceptable.	   	   Overall	   biosafety	   RA	   should	   determine:	   the	  
potential	  hazards	  and	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  impact	  for	  GMMs	  on	  wild	  populations	  of	  target	  and	  non-­‐target	  
organisms;	   the	   likelihood	  and	  magnitude	  of	  any	  harmful	   impact	  on	   the	   receiving	  environment;	  and,	   the	  
levels	   and	   consequences	   of	   uncertainty	   associated	   with	   these	   effects.	   RM	   should	   provide	   appropriate	  
measures	  to	  mitigate	  harm	  or	  uncertainty	  associated	  with	  changes	  to	  target	  organism	  populations	  or	  the	  
wider	   receiving	   environment.	   Thus,	   RA	   allows	   researchers	   and	   regulators	   to	   determine	   the	   appropriate	  
types	  and	   levels	  of	  GMM	  testing	   that	  will	   contribute	   to	  effective	  RM.	  Risk	   communication	  ensures	   that	  
there	  is	  a	  well-­‐documented	  explanation	  of	  what	  risks	  have	  been	  identified,	  how	  they	  have	  been	  assessed,	  
what	  the	  acceptable	  level	  of	  risk	  is,	  and	  how	  RM	  may	  be	  able	  to	  achieve	  acceptable	  levels	  of	  risk.	  
	  
The	  development	  and	  testing	  pathway	  for	  GMMs	  should	  be	  phased,	  with	  RM	  measures	  proportionate	  to	  
the	  level	  of	  risk	  to	  humans	  and	  the	  environment	  at	  each	  phase.	  For	  example,	  confinement	  in	  early	  phase	  
trials	  mitigates	  concern	  about	  long-­‐term	  or	  large-­‐scale	  spread	  and	  provides	  an	  opportunity	  to	  assess	  the	  
likelihood	   and	   impact	   of	   hazards	   for	   which	   little	   or	   no	   empirical	   data	   exist	   at	   that	   stage.	   As	   more	  
information	  becomes	  available,	  later	  stages	  of	  testing	  may	  need	  a	  less	  precautionary	  approach.	  
	  
Studies	  in	  Phase	  1	  can	  provide	  data	  on	  risks	  that	  can	  be	  addressed	  by	  observing	  changes	  in	  behaviour	  and	  
ecologically	  relevant	  characteristics	  of	  mosquito	  populations	   in	  small-­‐scale	   laboratory	  experiments.	  With	  
respect	   to	   biosafety	   testing,	   this	   Phase	   primarily	   focuses	   on	   the	   relevant	   characteristics	   of	   the	   GMOs	  
themselves,	  and	  on	  laboratory	  experiments	  that	  can	  assess	  pathways	  that	  might	  lead	  to	  harm.	  	  In	  Phase	  2,	  
RA	  data	  are	  obtained	  in	  trials	  conducted	  under	  physically	  or	  ecologically	  confined	  conditions.	  This	  phase	  
gathers	  RA	  data	   to	   reduce	  uncertainty	   regarding	  effects	   identified	   in	  Phase	  1	  and	  allows	  assessment	  of	  
health	  and	  ecological	  effects	  under	  more	  realistic	  levels	  of	  exposure.	  Staged	  open	  field	  trials	  under	  Phase	  
3	   can	   gather	   data	   under	   even	  more	   realistic	   conditions	   and	   using	   less	   confined	  measures	   than	   in	   the	  
previous	   phases.	   	   In	   preparation	   for	   Phase	   4,	   RA	   should	   include	   issues	   such	   as	   the	   potential	   for	   the	  
movement	  of	  GMMs	  beyond	   the	  boundaries	  of	  a	   release	  area	  and	   the	  evolution	  of	   resistance,	   and	  will	  
determine	  the	  necessary	  scope	  of	  post-­‐implementation	  monitoring	  and	  management.	  	  The	  choice	  of	  risk	  
comparators	  changes	  in	  its	  emphasis	  as	  testing	  moves	  through	  the	  various	  phases.	  	  At	  each	  stage	  a	  range	  
of	  comparators	  may	  be	  needed	  to	  evaluate	  risks	  and	  performance	  across	  different	  dimensions.	  
	  
Risk	  analysis	  that	  focuses	  on	  the	  phenotype	  (rather	  than	  the	  individual	  molecular	  modifications)	  provides	  
a	   robust	   and	   appropriate	   approach	   to	   the	   assessment	   of	   GMMs.	   	   Risk	   analysis	   for	   GMM	   should	   be	  
embedded	  in	  a	  broader	  benefit-­‐risk	  analysis	  before	  decisions	  are	  made	  on	  large-­‐scale	  implementation	  for	  
public	  health	  purposes.	  
	  





acceptance	  or	  management	  (US-­‐EPA,	  1998;	  EFSA,	  2006,	  2013;	  CBD,	  2012).24,25	  Risk	  analysis	  may	  also	  
take	   into	   account	   other	   types	   of	   concerns	   in	   addition	   to	   those	   related	   to	   human	   health	   and	   the	  
environment	   (such	  as	   social	  or	  economic	  hazards,	  or	  hazards	   that	  would	   jeopardize	   the	  successful	  
completion	  of	  the	  trial),	  but	  this	  section	  only	  deals	  with	  biosafety	  concerns.	  
Various	  examples	  of	  risk	  analysis	  processes	  are	  available	  including:	  a	  broad	  international	  standard;26	  
national	   environmental	   guidelines;27	   and	   GM	   biosafety	   and	   risk	   frameworks	   referred	   to	   above.	  
Across	   this	   range	   of	   guidelines,	   risk	   assessment	   (RA)	   is	   defined	   as	   a	  methodological	   approach	   to	  
define	  and	  characterize	  hazards,	  and	  to	  estimate	  the	  exposure	  or	  likelihood	  of	  each	  hazard	  occurring	  
as	  well	  as	  the	  potential	  adverse	  impact	  of	  the	  hazard	  (harm).	   In	  a	  phased	  series	  of	  testing,	  specific	  
hazards	  would	  be	  addressed	  at	  each	  relevant	  phase.	  RA	  includes	  identifying	  hazards	  (those	  for	  which	  
some	   direct	   or	   relevant	   evidence	   has	   been	   demonstrated),	  weighing	   the	   strength	   of	   evidence	   for	  
such	   hazards,	   characterizing	   the	   risk	   and	   developing	   risk	   management	   (RM)	   strategies	   (through	  
procedures,	   guidelines	   and	   regulation)	   to	   accept,	   avoid	   or	   reduce	   risk.	   The	   RA	   and	   RM	   strategies	  
developed	  during	  laboratory	  testing	  and	  pre-­‐release	  confined	  studies	  of	  any	  GMMs	  need	  to	  address	  
two	  concerns:	  the	  effects	  of	  an	  escape	  or	  accidental	  release	  on	  a	  receiving	  (open)	  environment;	  and	  
the	  effects	  of	  testing	  or	  release	  on	  human	  health.	  
RM	  of	  GMMs	  should	  be	  proportionate	  to	  the	  likelihood	  and	  magnitude	  of	  any	  potential	  hazards	  for	  
which	  there	  is	  evidence.	  In	  countries	  with	  defined	  environmental	  policies	  and	  protection	  goals,	  these	  
national	   policies	   provide	   the	   framework	   for	   determining	   acceptable	   risk	   levels.	   Observations	   of	  
significant	  environmental	  effects	  at	  the	  various	  stages	  of	  GMM	  trials	  and	  implementation	  do	  not	  in	  
themselves	  demonstrate	  a	  risk	  unless	  the	  outcomes	  are	  harmful.	  The	  impact	  of	  the	  effects	  must	  be	  
evaluated,	  and	   the	  acceptability	  of	   risk	   is	   a	  policy	  decision	   that	   reflects	   the	  overall	   impact.	  During	  
testing	  of	  phases	  1–3	  for	  GMMs,	  biosafety	  is	  the	  main	  decision-­‐making	  determinant	  related	  to	  risk,	  
but	  at	  the	  operational	  stage	  (Phase	  4)	  decisions	  would	  also	  consider	  benefits	  and	  costs	  (including	  RM	  
measures	   and	   any	   unmanaged	   residual	   risks).	   It	   is	   essential	   that	   potential	   risks	   be	   assessed	   and	  
managed	   to	   ensure	   that	   modified	   mosquitoes	   are	   not	   more	   detrimental	   to	   human	   health	   (by	  
increasing	   disease	   burden	   or	   severity)	   or	   to	   wider	   biodiversity	   (by	   adversely	   altering	   ecosystem	  
structure	   and	   function).	  A	   reasonable	  overall	   standard	   in	   a	  RA	  would	  be	  whether	   a	   specific	  GMM	  
implementation	  “causes	  more	  harm”	  than	  populations	  of	  wild	  mosquitoes	  managed	  under	  current	  
practice,	   as	   has	   been	   used	   in	   Australia	   (Murphy	   et	   al.,	   2010).	   This	   standard	   is	   defined	   by	   specific	  
endpoints	  that	  address	  harm	  to	  human	  health	  and	  particular	  qualities	  of	  the	  environment,	  and	  the	  
elaboration	  of	   these	  endpoints	  would	  be	  the	  basis	   for	  studies	  to	  gather	  data	  to	  enable	  a	  RA	  to	  be	  
conducted.	  At	   each	   level,	   risks	   specific	   to	   the	   genetic	  modification	   should	  be	  distinguished	   clearly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  The	  Cartagena	  Protocol	  on	  Biosafety	  to	  the	  Convention	  on	  Biological	  Diversity:	  http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/,	  
accessed	  25	  May	  2014.	  	  
25	  Australian	  Office	  of	  the	  Gene	  Technology	  Regulator.	  Risk	  analysis	  
framework:http://www.ogtr.gov.au/internet/ogtr/publishing.nsf/content/riskassessments-­‐1,	  accessed	  25	  May	  
2014.	  
26	  ISO	  31000:2009	  risk	  management	  –	  principles	  and	  guidelines:	  
http://www.iso.org/iso/news.htm?refid=Ref1266,	  accessed	  25	  May	  2014.	  
27	  United	  Kingdom	  guidelines	  for	  environmental	  risk	  assessment	  and	  management:	  Green	  leaves	  III:	  
http://www.defra.gov.uk/publications/2011/11/07/green-­‐leaves-­‐iii-­‐pb13670/,	  accessed	  25	  May	  2014.	  





from	   those	   generic	   risks	   associated	  with	   the	   release	   of	   conventional	   laboratory	   or	   factory-­‐reared	  
insects.	  
The	   earlier	   development	   of	   GM	   technologies,	   principally	   for	   plants,	   provides	   a	   baseline	   for	  
comparison	   of	   the	   differences	   between	   GMMs	   and	   wild-­‐type	   mosquitoes	   that	   might	   result	   in	  
environmental	  risk	  posed	  by	  the	  former.	  ERAs	  for	  GM	  plants	  are	  mandated	  for	  national	  regulatory	  
agencies	  in	  many	  countries,	  for	  example,	  by	  the	  European	  Food	  Safety	  Authority	  (EFSA,	  2010).	  These	  
regulations	  follow	  a	  standard	  procedure	  to	  assess	  the	  risk	  of	  the	  technology	  to	  the	  environment	  (as	  
set	   out	   in	   the	   CPB),24	   as	   well	   as	   to	   human	   health.	   Principally,	   this	   involves	   assessing	   the	  
characteristics	   of	   the	   modification	   at	   the	   molecular,	   ecological	   and	   environmental	   scale,	   taking	  
account	   of	   appropriate	   scientific	   evidence	   and	   uncertainty.	  While	   some	   of	   the	   goals	   and	   specific	  
details	   will	   differ	   (such	   as	   the	   intended	   purpose	   of	   managed	   GMM	   release	   in	   alleviating	   disease	  
burden,	  and	  the	  mobility	  of	  mosquitoes),	  the	  basis	  of	  biosafety	  guidance	  for	  GMMs	  will	  be	  built	  and	  
adapted	   from	   existing	   frameworks	   for	   GM	   plants.	   Other	   useful	   precedents	   are	   provided	   from	  
experience	   with	   biological	   control	   agents	   and	   GM	   vaccines.	   Each	   of	   these	   technologies	   exhibits	  
unique	  features,	  but	  it	  is	  important	  that	  risk	  analysis	  frameworks	  are	  consistent	  wherever	  possible.	  
3.1	  Considerations	  for	  risk	  analysis	  
Risk	   analysis	   is	   described	   in	   terms	   of	   risk	   concern,	   RA,	   RM	   and	   risk	   communication.	   Risk	   concern	  
relates	   to	   awareness	   about	   issues	   related	   to	   both	   technology	   and	   social	   values,	   and	   in	   each	   case	  
needs	  to	  be	  supported	  by	  evidence	  that	  demonstrates	  a	  concern	  has	  a	  plausible	  mechanism.	  RA	  and	  
RM	  of	  GMMs	   require	   the	   development	   of	   risk	   frameworks	   in	  which	   scientific	   evidence	   is	   used	   to	  
assess	   the	   probability	   that	   an	   adverse	   event	   (a	   hazard)	   will	   occur	   and	   the	   extent	   of	   harmful	  
consequences	  associated,	  with	  and	  without	  mitigation.	  
Both	   quantitative	   and	   qualitative	   risk	   analyses	   may	   be	   considered	   for	   GMMs.	   Quantitative	   risk	  
analysis	  attempts	  to	  assign	  numeric	  values	  for	  the	  probabilities	  of	  various	  adverse	  events	  and	  to	  the	  
assessment	  of	  the	  potential	  loss.	  Qualitative	  risk	  analysis	  assigns	  categories	  of	  risks,	  sometimes	  with	  
relative	   scores	   reflecting	   the	   range	  of	  outcomes.	  Quantitative	   frameworks	  allow	   the	  expression	  of	  
risk	  as	  probability	  distributions	  of	  adverse	  outcomes.	  Definitions	  and	  uncertainties	  in	  qualitative	  risk	  
analysis	  can	  be	  expressed	  in	  scales	  that	  allow	  some	  approximate	  quantification	  (e.g.	  high,	  medium,	  
low	  or	  negligible).	  Once	  risk	  is	  assessed,	  appropriate	  RM	  strategies	  can	  be	  devised	  and	  their	  efficacy	  
also	  may	  be	  quantified	   in	  some	  cases.	  The	  wider	  environmental	  RA	  and	  RM	  guidelines	   referred	  to	  
earlier	   from	   the	   United	   Kingdom27	   give	   useful	   guidance	   on	   how	   to	   assess	   the	   credibility	   or	  
uncertainty	   of	   evidence	   in	   risk	   analysis,	   as	   does	   the	  Australian	  GM	   risk	   framework.25	  Quantitative	  
risk	  analysis	  frameworks	  based	  on	  probabilistic	  and	  subjective	  estimates	  of	  social	  outcomes,	  such	  as	  
that	   used	   for	   releases	   of	  Wolbachia	   infected	   mosquitoes	   in	   Australia	   (Murphy	   et	   al.,	   2010)	   may	  
become	  useful	   in	  developing	  appropriate	  guidelines	   for	   the	   release	  of	   transgenic	  mosquitoes.	  This	  
approach	   to	   belief	   networks	   can	   provide	   a	   robust	   quantitative	   framework	   for	   risk	   analysis	   that	  
incorporates	  subjective	  evidence.	  	  
Risk	   analyses	   must	   be	   undertaken	   on	   a	   case-­‐by-­‐case	   basis	   to	   identify	   and	   manage	   any	   adverse	  
effects	   to	   the	   environment	   and/or	   human	   health.	   The	   components	   of	   risk	   analysis	   have	   been	  
described	   thoroughly	   in	   several	   venues,	   for	   example	  by	  Australia’s	  Office	  of	   the	  Gene	  Technology	  





Regulator	   (OGTR),25	   the	   Convention	   on	   Biological	   Diversity	   (CBD,	   2012),	   the	   EFSA	   (2006,	   2013),	  
United	   Kingdom’s	   Department	   of	   Environment,	   Food	   and	   Rural	   Affairs	   (Defra)27	   and	   the	   USA’s	  
Environmental	   Protection	   Agency	   (EPA,	   1998).	   Environmental	   risk	   assessment	   (ERA)	   for	   GMOs	  
usually	  follows	  a	  multi-­‐step	  process.	  	  
1. Problem	  formulation,	  which	  begins	  by	  considering	  concerns	  about	  risks	  arising	  from	  technical,	  
social	   and	  other	  perspectives;	   it	   involves	   identifying	   the	   characteristics	   of	   the	  GM	  organism	  
that	  might,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  practical	  or	  theoretical	  evidence,	  cause	  harm	  to	  the	  environment	  
and/or	  human	  health,	  and	  determining	  how	  this	  harm	  might	  manifest	  and	  what/who	  is	  at	  risk	  
of	  this	  harm,	  along	  with	  an	  appropriate	  comparator	  for	  the	  risk.	  	  	  
2. Hazard	  characterization,	  determining	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  harm	  if	  it	  were	  to	  arise.	  
3. Exposure	  characterization,	  determining	  the	  likelihood	  of	  the	  hazard	  occurring.	  
4. Risk	   characterization,	   determining	   the	   level	   of	   risk,	   the	   product	   of	   the	   hazard	   and	   the	  
exposure.	  
5. Risk	   management,	   selection	   of	   management	   strategies	   to	   alleviate/mitigate	   any	   identified	  
unacceptable	  risks.	  
6. Risk	  conclusion,	  which	   is	   the	  outcome	  of	   the	  risk	  evaluation	  taking	   into	  account	  the	  residual	  
risk	   remaining	   after	   feasible	   RM	   and	   the	   acceptability	   of	   that	   risk;	   it	   is	   important	   that	   the	  
nature	   of	   the	   risk	   and	   its	   effective	   management	   or	   acceptance	   can	   be	   communicated	  
effectively	   to	   those	   who	   have	   expressed	   risk	   concerns	   leading	   to	   the	   original	   problem	  
formulation.	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*Although	   portrayed	   as	   a	   linear	   process	   where	   knowledge	   and	   conclusiveness	   increase	   at	   each	   step,	   some	   of	   the	  
components	  may	  flow	  in	  parallel	  or	  loop	  back	  to	  previous	  steps.	  
The	  problem	   formulation	   for	  an	  environmental	   risk	  begins	  with	   the	  planned	  actions	   for	   release	  of	  
GMM	   and	   the	   identification	   of	   any	   potential	   hazards	   that	  may	   arise	   through	   plausible	   pathways.	  
Examples	  of	  general	  hazards	  related	  to	  the	  release	  of	  GMMs	  include:	  
• release	  of	  the	  GMMs	  might	  increase	  transmission	  of	  the	  target	  or	  other	  diseases;	  
• release	  of	  the	  GMMs	  might	  cause	  a	  significant	  biting	  nuisance;	  
• release	  of	  the	  GMMs	  might	  result	  in	  disruption	  to	  valued	  ecosystem	  components.	  
However,	  it	  is	  important	  during	  the	  problem	  formulation	  process	  to	  identify	  any	  specific	  hazards	  of	  
concern	  regarding	  the	  particular	  GMM	  technology	  being	  tested	  and/or	  the	  environment	  in	  which	  it	  
will	   be	   tested.	  Harm	  may	  be	   specified	   in	   some	  national	   environmental	   regulation,	   for	   example,	   in	  
terms	  of	  threats	  to	  particular	  endangered	  species	  or	  habitats.	  	  
An	   important	   concept	   of	   risk	   analysis	   is	   that	   while	   an	   event	   theoretically	   may	   occur,	   it	   will	   not	  
necessarily	  be	  harmful,	  because	  either	   it	  does	  not	  have	  a	  perceived	  negative	  effect	  or	   it	  does	  not	  





have	  an	  effect	  specified	  as	  harmful	  in	  regulations.	  Many	  risks	  may	  be	  judged	  to	  be	  negligible,	  such	  as	  
when	  the	  probability	  that	  the	  event	  will	  occur	  is	  extremely	  low	  or	  the	  potential	  harm	  resulting	  from	  
the	  event	  is	  minimal.	  Even	  when	  potentially	  harmful	  events	  are	  identified,	  the	  practical	  level	  of	  risk	  
to	   which	   the	   public	   is	   exposed	   in	   many	   cases	   can	   be	   reduced	   to	   acceptable	   levels	   by	   effective	  
management.	  	  
3.2	  Site	  characteristics	  
Baseline	  information	  on	  key	  ecological,	  environmental	  and	  site	  characteristics	  is	  important	  to	  ensure	  
that	   field	   trials	   can	   be	   adequately	   planned	   and	   interpreted.	   Selection	   criteria	   might	   include	   the	  
distribution	   of	   principal	   vectors	   in	   the	   release	   area,	   the	   location	   of	  mosquito	   larval	   sites,	   climatic	  
conditions,	   knowledge	   of	   active	   transmission	   (if	   any)	   of	   the	   target	   disease	   pathogen	   at	   the	   site,	  
geographical	  isolation	  of	  the	  site	  for	  confined	  trials	  so	  that	  there	  is	  a	  negligible	  chance	  of	  any	  impact	  
outside	   the	   trial	   area,	   existing	   data	   on	   the	   transmission	   dynamics	   of	   the	   target	   disease,	   existing	  
surveillance	  and	  control	  systems	  for	  both	  vectors	  and	  disease,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  obtaining	  regulatory,	  
social	  and	  political	  approval	  for	  research	  on	  GMMs	  in	  the	  study	  community	  and	  surrounding	  areas	  
(Sections	  4.	  Ethics	  and	  public	  engagement	  and	  Section	  5.	  Regulatory	  frameworks),	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  
continue	  existing	  vector	  control	  practices.	  
3.3	  Appropriate	  comparators	  
The	  choice	  of	  non-­‐modified	  mosquito	  comparators	  will	  be	  essential	  in	  RA	  of	  any	  hazards	  associated	  
with	  the	  transgenic	  modification.	   In	  some	  phases,	  such	  as	   in	  Phase	  1,	   the	  ancestral	   laboratory	   line	  
from	  which	  the	  transgenic	  mosquito	  line	  was	  derived	  is	  a	  logical	  comparator.	  A	  potential	  benefit	  for	  
this	  as	  a	  comparator	   is	   that	  genetic	  similarity	  could	  be	  maintained	  allowing	  precise	  scrutiny	  of	   the	  
molecular	  modification	  in	  terms	  of	  genetic	  and	  phenotypic	  viability	  and	  variability.	  A	  disadvantage	  of	  
using	  ancestral	  laboratory	  lines	  is	  that	  the	  loss	  of	  fitness	  (due	  to	  intensive	  rearing	  in	  the	  laboratory)	  
may	  lead	  to	  a	  less	  precise	  RA	  relevant	  to	  the	  characterization	  of	  the	  genetic	  modification	  compared	  
to	  wild	  populations.	  Choice	  of	  alternative	  non-­‐modified	  comparators	  (such	  as	  field-­‐derived	  strains	  of	  
the	   modified	   species)	   will	   require	   careful	   scrutiny	   of	   the	   genetic	   background	   together	   with	  
physiological	  and	  behavioural	  characteristics.	  Such	  comparators	  may	  be	  more	  appropriate	   for	   field	  
comparisons	   in	   later	   stages.	   For	   example,	   under	   self-­‐limiting	   approaches,	   mosquitoes	   sterilized	  
through	   more	   conventional	   irradiation	   methods	   may	   provide	   an	   appropriate	   counterpart	   for	   RA.	  
Defining	   clear	   points	   for	   comparison,	   for	   example,	   a	   phenotypic	   characteristic	   such	   as	   adult	  
longevity,	  will	  ensure	  that	  the	  risk	  evaluation	  remains	  credible,	  proportionate	  and	  focused.	  
The	  comparator	  for	  GMM	  in	  field	  trial	  phases	  would	  be	  the	  wild-­‐type	  mosquito	  in	  that	  location,	  and	  
the	   comparisons	   at	   this	   stage	   relate	   specifically	   to	   the	   types	   of	   mosquitoes.	   However,	   at	   a	   field	  
implementation	   scale,	   the	   novel	  mosquito	   control	   system	   incorporating	  GMMs	  may	  be	   compared	  
with	  a	  conventional	  control	  system.	  The	  comparison	  is	  related	  to	  the	  scale	  and	  purpose	  at	  this	  phase	  
and	  addresses	  the	  risks	  arising	  across	  the	  integrated	  systems	  of	  control.	  





3.4	  GMM	  characterization	  
The	  parental	   background	  of	   the	  GMMs	   should	   be	   described,	   including	   the	   species	   and	   strain,	   the	  
geographical	   source,	   the	   number	   of	   generations	   rearing	   colonies	   have	   been	   maintained	   and	   the	  
extent	   of	   replenishment	   with	   wild	   stock.	   These	   characteristics	   permit	   an	   assessment	   of	   the	  
differences,	   and	   their	   potential	   effects,	   between	   the	   GMM	   and	   the	   wild-­‐type	   comparator.	   The	  
genetic	  modification	  should	  be	  described,	  including	  molecular	  characterization,	  insertion	  sequences	  
and	   location.	   The	   stability	   of	   the	   transgene	   is	   an	   important	   issue	   in	   determining	   if	   the	  
characterization	  of	  the	  GMM	  remains	  valid	  over	  successive	  generations,	  which	  may	  be	  an	  important	  
objective	  of	  Phase	  1	  laboratory	  studies.	  
In	  RA,	   statements	  on	   the	  modification	  undertaken,	   its	  original	   derivation	  and	   the	  effect	   it	   confers	  
should	  be	  stated	  clearly.	  The	  methods	  used	  to	  generate	  the	  GMM	  lines	  and	  the	  sequences,	  genomic	  
locations	   and	   schematic	   maps	   may	   be	   required.	   Information	   on	   the	   flanking	   sequences	   may	   be	  
required	   to	   identify	   whether	   new	   open-­‐reading	   frames	   are	   generated	   from	   an	   insertion.	   Original	  
sources	  of	  vectors	  used	  for	  the	  molecular	  transformations,	  the	  source	  of	  donor	  genetic	  material,	  its	  
size	  and	   intended	   function	   should	  be	  described.	   Information	  on	   the	  actual	   sequences	   inserted	   (or	  
deleted),	   the	   size	   and	   copy	   number	   of	   detectable	   inserts,	   and	   the	   functional	   organization	   of	   the	  
genetic	  material	  is	  necessary	  core	  information	  on	  the	  transgene.	  Details	  should	  be	  provided	  on	  the	  
developmental	  expression	  of	  the	  transgene	  insert	  (or	  modification	  through	  knockout	  deletion	  based	  
on	  transgenic	  technologies)	  during	  the	  life	  cycle	  of	  the	  mosquito.	  The	  RA	  should	  account	  thoroughly	  
for	   the	   molecular	   characterization	   and	   consider	   the	   risk	   associated	   with	   the	   incorporation	   of	  
molecular	   constructs	   or	   insertion	  mechanisms	   (for	   example,	   plasmids	   and	   transposable	   elements)	  
into	  the	  modified	  mosquito.	  	  
A	   further	  aspect	  of	   characterization	   is	   the	  description	  of	   the	  GMM	  use	  or	  application.	  This	   should	  
include	  an	   indication	  of	   the	  expected	   release	   rates,	  duration	  and	  spatial	  distribution	  of	   the	  GMM,	  
along	   with	   any	   other	   measures	   that	   may	   be	   taken	   as	   part	   of	   the	   integrated	   control	   system	   (for	  
example,	  the	  suppression	  of	  wild	  populations	  with	  insecticides	  before	  GMM	  release).	  
3.5	  Hazard	  characterization	  
Hazard	  characterization	  will	  normally	  be	  specific	  to	  a	  particular	  GMM	  technology	  and	  scope	  of	  use,	  
but	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   describe	   some	   of	   the	  more	   general	   possibilities	   that	   should	   be	   considered.	  A	  
hazard	  may	   derive	   either	   directly	   from	   the	   intended	   effect	   of	   a	   genetic	  modification	   or	   indirectly	  
through	   an	   unintended	   deviation	   from	   that	   intended	   effect.	   For	   example,	   the	   breakdown	   of	   the	  
molecular	  function	  could	  lead	  to	  a	  loss	  of	  GMM	  efficacy	  and	  to	  potential	  changes	  in	  the	  impact	  on	  
the	  environment	   and/or	  human	  health.	   To	   assess	   this,	   under	  both	   self-­‐limiting	   and	   self-­‐sustaining	  
approaches,	  the	  RA	  should	  be	  associated	  primarily	  with	  the	  genetic	  modification.	  
Alterations	  to	  the	  biological	  characteristics	  of	   the	  GMMs	  may	   lead	  to	  new	   interactions	  with	  target	  
mosquito	  populations.	  Examples	  of	  such	  potentially	  harmful	  alterations	  could	  include	  altered	  larval	  
competition	   and	   accelerated	  maturation.	   Biological	   alterations	   such	   as	   those	   leading	   to	   increased	  
insecticide	   resistance	   or	   human	   feeding	   might	   change	   vectorial	   capacity	   relative	   to	   wild-­‐type	  
populations.	   To	   predict	   the	   effects	   of	   a	   particular	   GMM	   release	   on	   the	   target	   population,	   it	   is	  





essential	   that	   appropriate	   phenotypic,	   behavioural	   and	   population	   level	   characteristics	   of	   the	  
modified	   mosquito	   be	   assessed	   through	   laboratory	   experiments	   and	   trials.	   Although	   Table	   3.1	  
provides	  a	  set	  of	  characteristics	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  important	  in	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  
a	   GMM	   on	   the	   target	   population,	   the	   most	   important	   and	   relevant	   characteristics	   should	   be	  
identified	   and	   assessed	   on	   a	   case-­‐by-­‐case	   basis.	   This	   will	   ensure	   that	   appropriate	   RA	   criteria	   are	  
established	  and	  thorough	  RM	  strategies	  are	  in	  place.	  
Under	   self-­‐sustaining	   approaches,	   molecular	   characterizations	   must	   show	   that	   the	   transgene	   is	  
sufficiently	   effective	   and	   the	  molecular	   construct	   linking	   effector	   transgenes	   to	   a	   drive	   system	   is	  
sufficiently	  robust	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  release	  of	  the	  GMM	  results	  in	  introgression	  of	  the	  genes	  into	  
wild	  mosquito	   populations	   (James,	   2005).	   Appropriate	   drive	   systems	   are	   crucial	   to	   ensure	   that	   a	  
faster	   rate	   of	   spread	   of	   the	   genetic	   construct	   occurs	   than	   would	   be	   expected	   under	   standard	  
Mendelian	  inheritance	  (Burt	  &	  Trivers,	  2006).	  It	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  the	  essential	  aspects	  of	  
the	   population	   genetics	   of	   the	   transgenic	   modification	   as	   some	   gene	   drive	   systems	   might	   be	  
expected	  to	  cycle	  to	  and	  from	  fixation	  in	  populations.	  Similarly,	  molecular	  characterizations	  for	  self-­‐
limiting	   approaches	   need	   to	   consider	   the	   expression	   patterns	   of	   the	   effector	   gene,	   including	  
whether	   expression	   is	   under	   appropriate	   gene	   control	   and	   stable	  within	   the	   genome.	   The	   RA	   for	  
GMM	   should	   consider	   the	   stability	   and	   specificity,	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   intended	   effect,	   of	   the	  
transgenic	  material	  at	  the	  population	  level	  and	  the	  consequences	  of	  incomplete	  or	  partial	  transgene	  
function.	  	  
Identifying	   the	   risks	   associated	   with	   incomplete	   transgene	   function	   in	   individual	   mosquitoes	   will	  
have	   implications	   at	   different	   phases	   of	   testing,	   including	   at	   the	   population	   level	   and	   in	   confined	  
field	  trials.	  Reduced	  penetrance	  (the	  proportion	  of	  a	  given	  genotype	  that	  expresses	  the	  phenotype)	  
of	  a	  transgene	  in	  a	  population	  may	  pose	  a	  risk	  to	  the	  receiving	  environment	  and/or	  human	  health	  if	  
it	  affects	  the	  ability	  to	  detect	  transgenic	   individuals	  or	  reduces	  the	  anticipated	  control	  benefit.	  For	  
self-­‐limiting	   strategies,	   low	   penetrance	   at	   the	   population	   level	  will	   affect	   efficacy,	   and	   population	  
trials	  should	  aim	  to	  quantify	  any	  human	  health	  risk	  associated	  with	  this	   in	  a	  disease	  vector	  control	  
system,	  for	  example,	  if	  the	  capacity	  for	  pathogen	  transmission	  is	  not	  sufficiently	  blocked.	  Such	  risks	  
might	   be	   managed	   with	   core	   quality	   control	   measures	   (such	   as	   genetic	   markers).	   With	   self-­‐
sustaining	  strategies,	  incomplete	  penetrance	  of	  a	  transgene	  may	  not	  influence	  the	  outcome	  of	  long-­‐
term	  control	  but	  might	  affect	  the	  initial	  success/spread	  of	  the	  transgene.	  Methods	  must	  be	  provided	  
to	   allow	   for	   discrimination	   of	   GMM	  within	   the	   environment	   and	   to	  monitor	   the	  maintenance	   of	  
transgene	  integrity.	  This	  will	  also	  be	  important	  for	  assessing	  GMM	  efficacy	  in	  later	  phases	  of	  testing.	  
Further	   possible	   hazards	   could	   arise	   from	   random	   integration	   of	   the	   effector	   gene,	   such	   as	   low	  
efficiency	   and	   position	   effects	   on	   transgene	   expression	   and	   the	   potential	   for	   insertional	  
mutagenesis.	   It	   is	   likely	   that	   transgenic	   strains	   exhibiting	   these	   effects	   would	   not	   be	   considered	  
suitable	   for	   eventual	   deployment.	   It	   is	   expected,	   therefore,	   that	   most	   of	   the	   potential	   hazards	  
resulting	   from	  random	  integrations	  would	  be	  eliminated	  during	  the	  product	  development	  process.	  
Specific	  strategies	  to	  reduce	  random	  integration	  might	  be	  employed.	  An	  example	  of	  such	  a	  strategy	  
is	  provided	  by	  the	  two-­‐tiered	  approach	  to	   the	  molecular	  modification	  of	  mosquitoes,	  which	   in	   the	  
first	   stage	   involves	   inserting	   a	   target	   at	   a	   suitable	   chromosomal	   site,	   and	   in	   the	   second	   involves	  
recombining	   the	   effector	   gene	   into	   the	   target	   site	   (Nimmo	   et	   al.,	   2006;	   Sethuraman	   et	   al.,	   2007;	  
Isaacs	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  





It	   is	  conceivable	  that	  multiple	  transgenes	  might	  be	  used	  to	  achieve	  the	  desired	  effects.	  Synergistic	  
genetic	  interactions	  and	  unexpected	  phenotypic	  consequences	  of	  multiple	  genes	  should	  be	  assessed	  
to	   determine	   if	   they	   pose	   a	   potential	   risk	   to	   the	   receiving	   environment,	   and	   thus	   require	   RM	  
strategies.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  consider	  how	  to	  approach	  the	  RA	  and	  RM	  of	  ‘stacked’	  events	  (multiple	  
transgenic	  modifications)	  to	  ensure	  the	  efficacy	  of	  these	  transgenic	  modifications	  and	  manage	  any	  
risk	  associated	  with	  the	  evolution	  of	  resistance.	  Characterization	  of	  stacked	  events	  should	  consider	  
the	   stability	   of	   the	   inserts,	   the	   expression	   of	   the	   events	   and	   potential	   synergistic	   or	   antagonistic	  
effects	   arising	   from	   the	   combination	   of	   the	   transgenic	   modification	   and	   the	   phenotypic	  
characterization	   of	   the	   effects	   through	   life-­‐table,	   behavioural,	   and/or	   population	  
observations/experiments.	   Appropriate	   comparators	   for	   laboratory	   studies	   might	   include	   the	  
conventional	   parental	   strains	   or	   the	   equivalent	   wild	   mosquitoes,	   the	   lower	   stacked	   event	   lines	  
(provided	  appropriate	  RA/RM	  advice	  exists)	  and	  wild-­‐type	  mosquitoes.	  Characteristics	  based	  on	  the	  
phenotype	   (rather	   than	   the	   individual	   modifications),	   and	   their	   interpretation	   from	   available	  
baseline	   data,	   provide	   a	   robust	   and	   appropriate	   alternative	   to	   the	   full	   RA	   on	   every	   individual	  
molecular	  modification	  in	  a	  stacked	  GMM.	  Therefore,	  RA	  should	  assess	  the	  impact	  of	  GMM	  in	  terms	  
of	  phenotypes	  rather	  than	  individual	  modifications	  in	  stacked,	  multiple	  transgenic	  modifications.	  
Some	  interactions	  of	  GMMs	  with	  other	  organisms	  in	  the	  environment	  may	  result	  in	  hazards	  and	  may	  
therefore	   pose	   risks	   to	   the	   receiving	   environment.	   As	   mentioned	   above,	   hazards	   might	   include	  
undesirable	   changes	   in	   populations	   of	   interacting	   organisms,	   physiological	   or	   behavioural	  
differences	  in	  the	  GMMs	  that	  affect	  nuisance	  impacts,	  or	  increased	  opportunities	  for	  transmission	  of	  
non-­‐target	   diseases.	   Preliminary	   ecological	   or	   behavioural	   patterns	   associated	   with	   modification	  
related	   to	   such	   potential	   hazards	   should	   be	   assessed	   through	   longitudinal,	   population-­‐level	   cage	  
trials	  of	  both	  GMM	  and	  non-­‐modified	  comparators	  over	  time	  scales	  relevant	  to	  the	  patterns	  being	  
observed.	  The	  use	  of	  semi-­‐artificial	  microcosm	  and	  mesocosm	  systems	  (Lawton,	  1995)	  in	  trials	  that	  
aim	   to	  mimic	   the	   key	   aspects	   of	   the	   receiving	   environment	  would	   allow	   the	  population	  dynamics	  
and	  population-­‐level	   characteristics	   of	   the	  GMM	   to	  be	   characterized	  more	   accurately	   than	   simple	  
laboratory	  population	  cage	  studies.	  These	  small-­‐scale	  laboratory	  or	  caged	  environments	  attempt	  to	  
provide	  potential	  for	  interactions	  with	  a	  limited	  range	  of	  ecological	  complexity,	  which	  would	  provide	  
a	  bridge	  into	  more	  comprehensive	  physically	  and/or	  ecologically	  confined	  field	  trials.	  Careful	  choice	  
of	   experimental	   design	   and	   planning	  may	   allow	   a	   range	   of	   potential	   ecological	   characterizations,	  
which	  might	  include	  those	  below.	  	  
• The	   role	   of	   density	   dependence	   in	   the	   population	   dynamics.	   The	   timing	   of	   density-­‐driven	  
events	   that	   affect	   survival,	   development	   rate	   and/or	   fecundity	   can	   be	   explored	   using	  
population	   cage	   and	   semi-­‐artificial	   microcosm	   and	  mesocosm	   trials,	   appropriate	   statistical	  
analysis	  and	  mathematical	  modelling.	  
• Comparison	   of	   discrete	   dynamics,	   for	   example,	   seasonal	   factors	   such	   as	   rainfall,	   versus	  
continuous	   dynamics,	   such	   as	   competition	   for	   host	   finding,	   under	   semi-­‐artificial	   conditions	  
allows	  estimates	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  seasonal	  versus	  aseasonal	  effects	  to	  be	  discriminated.	  
• Exploring	   preliminary	   release	   numbers/schemes	   (for	   self-­‐limiting	   approaches)	   or	   invasion	  
potential	  (for	  self-­‐sustaining	  approaches)	  of	  transgenic	  lines.	  
Novel	   interactions	   of	   the	   GMMs	   with	   non-­‐target	   organisms	   (NTOs)	   could	   have	   important	  
consequences	   for	   ecosystem	   function	   and	   services	   (EFSA,	   2010).	   An	   example	   might	   be	   if	   the	  





abundance	  of	  the	  NTO	  species	  was	  reduced	  and	  was	  an	  important	  seasonal	  part	  of	  a	  food	  web	  for	  
predators.	   The	   direct	   exposure	   of	   non-­‐target	   species	   to	   the	   GMMs,	   or	   to	   transgene	   products,	  
requires	  careful	  assessment	  in	  order	  to	  identify	  risks	  and,	   if	  they	  exist,	  manage	  and	  mitigate	  them.	  
Population-­‐level	  microcosm	  or	  mesocosm	  trials	  could	  evaluate	  the	  specific	  effects	  of	  the	  GMMs	  on	  
NTOs,	   where	   these	   have	   been	   identified.	   The	   choice	   of	   appropriate	   NTOs	   (such	   as	   predators	   or	  
competitors,	   decomposers)	   is	   a	   complex	   decision	   but	   could	   allow	   the	   preliminary	   effects	   of	  
particular	  high-­‐value	   inter-­‐specific	  and	  trophic	  effects	  to	  be	  evaluated.	  The	  EFSA’s	  guidance	  (2013)	  
for	   the	   choice	   of	   NTO	   in	   the	   environmental	   RA	   of	   GM	   insects	   suggests	   that	   these	   should	   include	  
natural	   enemies,	   competitors,	   pollinators,	   species	   of	   conservation,	   cultural	   or	   food	   chain	   value,	  
decomposers	  and	  host	  animals.	  Similar	  approaches	  might	  translate	  to	  appropriate	  choice	  of	  NTO	  in	  
small	   population-­‐level	   studies	   with	   GMMs.	   With	   appropriate	   controls	   (with/without	  
competitors/natural	   enemies/decomposers)	   the	   preliminary	   criteria	   of	   the	   RA	   on	   NTOs	   can	   be	  
established.	  	  
An	  alternative	  scenario	  that	  has	  been	  proposed	  for	  GMM	  population	  suppression	  approaches	  is	  the	  
possibility	  that	  a	  resulting	  empty	  ecological	  niche	  may	  be	  filled	  by	  alternative	  unwanted	  species.	  For	  
example,	  laboratory	  studies	  of	  competitive	  interactions	  on	  (non-­‐modified)	  Aedes	  aegypti	  and	  Aedes	  
albopictus	  demonstrate	  that	  A.	  albopictus	   larvae	  are	  superior	  competitors	   for	  resources	  compared	  
to	  A.	   aegypti	   over	  much	   of	   their	   range	   (Juliano,	   1998;	   Daugherty,	   Alto	  &	   Juliano,	   2000).	   This	   has	  
implications	   for	   the	   invasion	  and	  establishment	  of	  A.	  albopictus	   after	   suppression	  of	  A.	  aegypti	   to	  
inhibit	  dengue	  transmission.	  Available	   information	   from	   laboratory	  and	  field	  ecological	  studies	  will	  
help	  to	  assess	  the	  ecological	  and	  health	  implications	  of	  the	  empty	  niche	  hazard.	  For	  instance,	  in	  the	  
case	  cited,	  available	  evidence	  indicates	  that	  A.	  albopictus	  plays	  a	  minor	  role	  in	  dengue	  transmission	  
due	   in	   part	   to	   different	   host	   preferences	   and	   reduced	   vector	   competence	   (Lambrechts,	   Scott	   &	  
Gubler,	  2010).	  
There	  may	   be	   additional	   concerns	   about	   hazards	   related	   to	   possible	   direct	   human	   health	   effects	  
arising	   from	  GMMs,	   such	   as	   nuisance	  biting	   or	   allergic	   reactions.	   In	   this	   regard,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  
keep	  in	  mind	  that	  only	  female	  mosquitoes	  bite	  humans	  or	  animals.	  Nuisance	  biting	  would	  increase	  if	  
female	  mosquito	   abundance	   increases,	   but	  would	   not	   be	   expected	   to	  pose	   a	   disease	  hazard	  with	  
GMM	  applications	   intended	   to	   either	   reduce	   populations	   or	   replace	  wild	   populations	  with	   similar	  
numbers	   of	   refractory	   mosquitoes.	   Increased	   allergenicity	   of	   GMMs	   has	   been	   proposed	   as	   a	  
speculative	  risk	  to	  humans,	  though	  no	  supporting	  information	  is	  available.	  While	  ingestion	  has	  been	  
suggested	  as	  a	  possible	  route	  of	  exposure,	  this	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  quite	  rare	  and	  thus	  unlikely	  to	  pose	  a	  
significant	   hazard.	   The	   most	   likely	   route	   of	   exposure	   to	   GMMs	   is	   via	   biting.	   The	   saliva	   of	   all	  
mosquitoes	   naturally	   stimulates	   an	   immunological	   response	   in	  most	   persons	   and	   a	   strong	   allergic	  
response	  in	  some	  (Peng	  &	  Simons,	  2007),	  and	  there	  is	  considerable	  cross-­‐sensitivity	  to	  the	  salivary	  
proteins	  from	  wild	  populations	  of	  mosquitoes.	  Therefore,	  determining	  a	  GMM-­‐specific	  response	   in	  
the	   context	  of	   such	  natural	   variability	  will	   be	  difficult.	  However,	  with	  GMM	  technologies	   in	  which	  
female	   mosquitoes	   will	   be	   released	   or	   transgenes	   will	   be	   expressed	   by	   female	   progeny,	   it	   is	  
appropriate	  for	  an	  RA	  to	  consider	  whether	  a	  transgene	  product	  is	  expressed	  in	  the	  saliva	  and,	  if	  so,	  
whether	  this	  protein	   is	  significantly	  similar	  to	  a	  recognized	  allergen.	   In	  such	  a	  case,	   further	  studies	  
may	   be	   warranted	   and	   established;	   validated	   protocols	   for	   assessing	   allergenicity	   of	   proteins	   by	  
dermal	  exposure	  should	  be	  followed.	  





The	  efficiency	  of	  quality	  control	  for	  effective	  management	  of	  the	  modification	  of	  mosquitoes,	  such	  
as	  the	  operational	  ability	  to	  derive	  only	  certain	  types	  (for	  example,	  one	  sex	  in	  male-­‐only	  releases)	  of	  
transgenic	   insects	   for	   release,	  may	   be	   relevant	   to	   an	   RA.	   The	  methods	   and	   degree	   of	   separation	  
necessary	   depend	   on	   the	   scale	   of	   the	   trial	   or	   planned	   release	   and	   the	   GMM	   technology	   under	  
consideration.	   Achieving	   the	   desired	   sex	   ratio	   and	   levels	   of	   separation	   require	   appropriate	  
operational	   protocols.	   In	   laboratory	   trials	   and	   population	   cage	   experiments,	   the	   ability	   to	  
discriminate	   and	   separate	   relevant	   strains	   of	   transgenic	   mosquitoes	   should	   be	   evaluated.	   RM	  
options	  should	  focus	  on	  how	  necessary	  it	  is	  to	  obtain	  absolute	  (100%)	  separation	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  
safety	  and	  efficacy	  endpoints	  in	  the	  trial/release.	  Control	  may	  be	  achieved	  even	  when	  some	  females,	  
which	  do	  not	  contribute	  to	  control	  in	  sterile	  male	  release	  programmes,	  are	  released.	  For	  example,	  in	  
the	  use	  of	  a	  conventional	  radiation	  SIT	  method,	  the	  local	  elimination	  of	  An.	  albimanus	  in	  El	  Salvador	  
was	  achieved	  with	  the	  release	  of	  sterile	  insects	  of	  which	  approximately	  14%	  were	  females	  (Lofgren	  
et	   al.,	   1974).	   The	   quality	   and	   numbers	   of	   released	   GMM	   needed	   to	   achieve	   intended	   vector	   or	  
disease	  outcomes	  should	  be	  specified	  and	  explained	   in	  the	  release	  plan.	  The	  risks	  arising	  from	  not	  
achieving	  that	  level	  of	  quality	  or	  numbers	  in	  releases	  should	  be	  assessed	  and	  managed.	  
3.6	  Utility	  of	  mathematical	  modelling	  for	  RA	  
RA	   can	   be	   enhanced	   by	   coupling	   experiments	   and/or	   observations	   with	  mathematical	   modelling.	  
Mathematical	  modelling	  can	  highlight	  the	  range	  of	  parameters	  necessary	  for	  RA.	  The	  overall	  aim	  of	  
mathematical	   modelling	   within	   the	   RA	   context	   is	   to	   predict	   behaviour	   based	   on	   properties	   and	  
assumptions	  of	  transgenic	  modification	  that	  may	  be	  helpful	  in	  assessing	  the	  likelihood	  of	  events.	  For	  
example,	   given	   a	   specific	   set	   of	  molecular	  modifications,	   mathematical	   models	  might	   be	   used	   to	  
predict	   whether	   or	   not	   the	   fitness	   of	   the	   GM	   mosquito	   will	   be	   enhanced	   by	   the	   molecular	  
modification	  (Box	  3.1).	  
	  
Mathematical	  modelling	  of	   inter-­‐specific	   interactions	  might	  be	  useful	   to	  reveal	  potential	   structural	  
alteration	   to	   the	   ecological	   (biotic)	   effects.	   For	   example,	   self-­‐limiting	   strategies	  where	   population	  
suppression	   is	   the	   goal	   are	   expected	   to	   lead	   to	   non-­‐uniform	   competitive	   effects,	   as	   population	  
interaction	   strengths	  with	  other	   species	  will	  differ	  at	  high	  and	   low	  densities.	  Under	   self-­‐sustaining	  
strategies,	   assessing	   whether	   the	   heritable	   modification	   will	   have	   an	   impact	   on	   the	   ecological	  
Box	  3.1	  Modelling	  to	  determine	  the	  net	  effect	  of	  altered	  fitness	  
In	  a	  model	  system	  where	  GMM	  containing	  a	  particular	  anti-­‐pathogen	  effector	  gene	  were	  continually	  fed	  on	  
mice	  with	   a	   high	   level	   of	   parasites,	   increased	   fitness	   of	   the	  malaria-­‐resistant	  mosquitoes	  was	   observed	  
(Marelli,	  Rasgon	  &	  Jacobs-­‐Lorena	  2007;	  Smith	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  Given	  such	  an	  observation,	  modelling	  might	  be	  
used	  to	  determine	  the	  net	  effect	  of	  increased	  fitness,	  the	  expected	  frequency	  of	  infected	  mosquitoes	  and	  
possible	  effects	  on	  transmission.	  The	  appropriate	  theoretical	  framework	  to	  undertake	  this	  RA	  would	  be	  a	  
full	   analysis	   of	   the	   life	   history	   combined	   with	   competition	   experiments.	   Essentially,	   this	   consists	   of	  
determining	   both	   aspects	   of	   fitness	   associated	   with	   survival	   and	   aspects	   of	   fitness	   associated	   with	  
fecundity	   and	   reproductive	   success	   (Stearns,	   1992;	   Roff,	   2002;	   Godfray,	   2013).	   This	   could	   involve	  
laboratory	  studies	  that	  focus	  on	  a	  selected	  set	  of	  core	  parameters	  (Table	  3.1)	  associated	  with	  the	  specific	  
genetic	  modification	  coupling	   life-­‐table	  experiments,	  experiments	  on	  small	  batches	  of	  modified	  and	  non-­‐
modified	   mosquitoes	   (such	   as	   split	   by	   age,	   sex	   or	   strain)	   in	   cohort	   experiments,	   and	   mathematical	  
modelling.	  
	  





competitive	   ability	   of	   the	   GMM	   and/or	   ecological	   interactions	   could	   be	   accomplished	   using	   data	  
from	  small-­‐scale	  semi-­‐artificial	  population	  trials	  in	  the	  laboratory.	  	  
3.7	  RA	  and	  RM	  considerations	  at	  different	  testing	  phases	  
As	  explained	  above,	  given	  the	  various	  potential	  hazards	  that	  might	  be	  enumerated,	  RA	  and	  RM	  must	  
be	  focuson	  the	  particular	  GMM	  application	  under	  examination	  and	  its	  objectives	  within	  the	  phase	  of	  
testing	   under	   evaluation.	   Specific	   RA	   and	   RM	   considerations	   will	   differ	   between	   various	   GMM	  
technologies	   and	   in	   different	   phases	   of	   testing.	   For	   example,	   the	   level	   of	   exposure	  will	   be	   less	   in	  
contained	  trials	  than	  open	  releases,	  and	  with	  sterile	  GMMs	  versus	  those	  that	  are	  self-­‐sustaining.	  At	  
each	   level	   of	   testing,	   from	   laboratory	   through	   to	   field	   trials,	   the	   aim	   of	   specific	   RA	   and	   RM	  
approaches	   should	   be	   to	   ensure	   safety	   and	   to	   quantify	   or	   provide	   a	   qualitative	   rank	   of	   risks	  
associated	  with	  the	  eventual	  deployment	  of	  the	  GMMs.	  	  
Transition	  from	  each	  phase	  of	  testing	  to	  the	  next	  should	   involve	  both	  a	  retrospective	  validation	  of	  
the	  RA/RM	  that	  was	  put	   in	  place	  at	   the	  beginning	  of	   the	  phase	  and	  an	  evaluation	  of	  whether	   the	  
performance	   characteristics	   that	  were	  measured	  warrant	   progressing	   to	   larger	   trials	   according	   to	  
previously	  designated	  efficacy	  and	  safety	  endpoints.	  In	  addition,	  any	  hazards	  that	  were	  unforeseen	  
before	   starting	   the	   previous	   phase	   should	   be	   considered	   in	   the	   decision	   along	   with	   additional	  
management	   measures.	   The	   decision	   to	   move	   forward	   with	   further	   testing	   will	   require	   approval	  
from	   the	   appropriate	   oversight	   and	   regulatory	   bodies	   at	   each	   phase	   (Section	   5.	   Regulatory	  
frameworks).	  	  
3.7.1	  Phase	  1	  –	  Laboratory	  studies	  including	  Laboratory	  Population	  Cages	  
RA	  for	  Phase	  1	  
Phase	  1	  testing	  will	  be	  conducted	  in	  a	  laboratory	  or	  insectary	  under	  physically	  confined	  conditions.	  
Because	   this	   is	   an	   early	   stage	  of	   development,	   there	  will	   inevitably	   be	   limited	   information	  on	   the	  
stability	   and	  effect	  of	   genetic	  modifications	   and	  a	   cautious	   approach	   is	   essential,	   primarily	  due	   to	  
uncertainty	   rather	   than	   any	   established	   hazard.	   RA	   in	   preparation	   for	   Phase	   1	  will	   determine	   the	  
conditions	   under	   which	   laboratory	   studies	   can	   be	   conducted,	   including	   the	   acceptable	   level	   of	  
exposure	   to	   GMMs	   by	   research	   personnel,	   acceptable	   security	  measures	   to	   prevent	   GMMs	   from	  
escaping,	  and	  appropriate	  methods	  for	  disposing	  of	  waste	  materials.	  	  
Risk	  management	  
RM	  measures	   for	  environmental	   impact	  will	   include	  appropriate	   containment11	  of	   live	  mosquitoes	  
and	  destruction	  of	  dead	  mosquitoes	  and	  waste	  materials	   (if	   there	   is	  evidence	  that	  these	  may	  be	  a	  
hazard)	   (Benedict,	   Tabachnyk	   &	   Higgs,	   2003).	   RM	   measures	   for	   human	   health	   would	   include	  
ensuring	  GMM	  colonies	  and	  feed	  sources	  are	  free	  of	  human	  pathogens,	  ensuring	  laboratory	  staff	  are	  
not	  carrying	  mosquito-­‐transmissible	  diseases,	  and	  limiting	  unintended	  biting	  opportunities	  (to	  guard	  
against	  disease	   transmission)	  by	  preventing	  and	   removing	  mosquitoes	   flying	  outside	   cages	  and	  by	  
ensuring	  that	  laboratory	  staff	  wear	  suitable	  protective	  clothing.	  RM	  to	  respond	  to	  escapes	  from	  the	  
laboratory	  would	  include	  escape	  detection	  systems	  and	  standby	  mosquito	  control	  capacity	  sufficient	  
to	   control	   adults	  within	   the	   dispersal	   range	   of	   the	  mosquitoes	   and/or	   conducting	   experiments	   in	  





seasons	  when	   adult	   dispersion	   and	  mosquito	   larval	   sites	  will	   be	   limited.	  Where	   testing	   of	   disease	  
transmission	  or	   infection	  cycles	   in	  GMMs	   is	  undertaken,	  particular	  care	  should	  be	   taken	  to	  ensure	  
the	  safety	  of	  laboratory	  staff.	  All	  of	  the	  above	  are	  also	  good	  practices	  in	  rearing	  non-­‐GM	  mosquitoes,	  
particularly	   when	   they	   are	   being	   handled	   in	   areas	   where	   they	   are	   exotic	   and	   could	   establish	  
following	  escape,	  and	  build	  upon	  standard	  precautions.	  
Studies	  to	  gather	  data	  for	  deployment	  RA	  
This	  early	  phase	  of	  the	  development	  of	  a	  transgenic	  mosquito	  focuses	  primarily	  on	  the	  biology	  of	  the	  
target	   species	   and	   integrates	   molecular,	   genotypic,	   phenotypic,	   behavioural	   and	   population-­‐level	  
characteristics	  (Section	  2.	  Efficacy	  evaluation).	  The	  data	  collected	  at	  this	  phase	  to	  address	  identified	  
risks	  will	   focus	  primarily	  on	   the	  genetic	  modification	  of	   the	  mosquito	  and	   its	   interaction	  with	  and	  
distinctions	   from	   the	   comparator	  mosquitoes	   in	   the	   laboratory.	   Alterations	   to	   target	   populations	  
through	  changes	  in	  the	  demographic	  size,	  structure	  or	  behaviour	  may	  have	  a	  detrimental	  impact	  on	  
the	  wider	  environment	  and/or	  human	  health.	  Experiments	  to	  determine	  whether	  these	  alterations	  
may	  lead	  to	  specific	  harms	  can	  begin	  to	  be	  addressed	  at	  this	  stage.	  Examples	  of	  Phase	  1	  studies	  that	  
characterize	  those	  aspects	  of	  the	  biology	  of	  the	  modified	  mosquitoes	  and	  inform	  the	  RA	  associated	  
with	  the	  eventual	  deployment	  of	  GMMs	  have	  been	  previously	  described	  (Benedict	  et	  al.,	  2008)	  and	  
are	  additionally	  detailed	  in	  Table	  3.1.	  
Results	  of	  Phase	  1	  testing	  will	  determine	  whether	  trials	  may	  proceed	  safely	  to	  Phase	  2	  ecologically	  
confined	  trials	  or	  whether	  physical	  confinement	  is	  a	  necessary	  intermediate	  step	  to	  obtain	  additional	  
safety	  information.	  
3.7.2	  Phase	  2	  –	  physically	  and/or	  ecologically	  confined	  field	  trials	  
RA	  for	  Phase	  2	  	  
Physically	  confined	  (contained)	  and	  ecologically	  confined	  field	  trials	  conducted	  under	  Phase	  2	  allow	  
data	  to	  be	  collected	  that	  require	  a	  larger	  scale	  or	  more	  natural	  conditions	  in	  order	  to	  be	  detected.	  
RA	  will	  determine	  the	  level	  of	  confinement	  required	  in	  Phase	  2.	  For	  some	  GMM	  technologies,	  it	  may	  
be	   decided	   that	   physical	   confinement	   is	   not	   a	   necessary	   step	   in	   the	   testing	   pathway	   and	   that	  
conditions	   of	   genetic	   or	   ecological	   confinement	   allow	   for	   sufficient	   risk	   reduction.	   For	   example,	   a	  
regional	  standard	  in	  North	  America	  accepts	  biological	  confinement	  for	  sterile	  transgenic	  arthropods,	  
provided	  there	  is	  data	  on	  the	  efficacy	  of	  sterility	  (NAPPO,	  2007).	  Physical	  confinement	  may	  be	  less	  
important	   in	   cases	   where	   Phase	   1	   results	   have	   demonstrated	   that	   there	   is	   limited	   potential	   for	  
dispersal,	   for	  example,	  for	  trials	  where	  the	  GMM’s	  progeny	  do	  not	  mature	  to	  adults,	  or	  where	  the	  
GMM	   is	   not	   expected	   to	   persist	   (for	   example,	   transgenically	   marked	   laboratory	   strains	   with	  
intrinsically	  low	  fitness	  in	  the	  wild).	  Previous	  evidence	  from	  laboratory	  or	  other	  confined	  trials	  may	  
demonstrate	  that	  protocols	  to	  discriminate	  the	  sex	  of	  the	  released	  mosquitoes,	  and	  their	  phenotypic	  
properties,	  are	  sufficient	  to	  ensure	  safety	  in	  an	  ecologically	  confined	  trial.	  Regulatory	  requirements	  
will	  likely	  differ	  for	  physically	  confined	  versus	  ecologically	  confined	  trials.	  
Understanding	   the	   risk	   associated	   with	   a	   breach	   of	   physical/ecological	   confinement	   requires	  
appropriate	   consideration.	   A	   breach	   of	   physical	   confinement	   may	   lead	   to	   the	   loss	   of	   transgenic	  
mosquitoes	  or	   loss	  of	   genetic	  material	   into	   the	  wider	   receiving	  environment.	  Breaches	  of	  physical	  





confinement	  might	  be	  classified	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  potential	  magnitude	  and	  type	  (Benedict	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  
Breaches	  might	   be	   caused	   through	  natural	   disasters,	   structural	   failures,	   human	  error/accidents	   or	  
deliberate	  actions.	  The	  RA	  should	  take	  into	  account	  cage	  designs,	  experimental	  planning,	  emergency	  
preparation,	  training,	  and	  site	  security.	  	  
RA	   should	   ensure	   that	   a	   mechanism	   for	   practical	   and	   reliable	   discrimination	   of	   GMMs	   and	   wild	  
mosquitoes	   is	   available	   (for	   example,	   through	   the	   use	   of	   fluorescent	   dyes	   or	   dusts	   and/or	  
phenotypic	  or	  genetic	  markers).	  Where	  release	  of	  male-­‐only	  GMMs	  is	  part	  of	  the	  system,	  methods	  
for	   reliable	   sex-­‐selection	   prior	   to	   release	   will	   be	   necessary	   to	   ensure	   an	   acceptable	   sex	   ratio	   is	  
achieved.	  Other	   biological	   considerations	   for	   RA	   in	   preparation	   for	   Phase	   2	   testing	  would	   include	  
what	   is	   known	   about	   the	   local	   dispersal	   and	   gene	   flow	   patterns	   for	   target	  mosquitoes	   and	  what	  
pathogens	  they	  transmit	  in	  the	  receiving	  environment	  (Benedict	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  	  
Risk	  management	  
In	   confined	   field	   trials,	   risk	   will	   extend	   to	   greater	   varieties	   of	   environmental	   and	   target	   species	  
effects.	  Risk	  associated	  with	   these	   trials	  must	  be	  managed	  by	   limiting	   the	  spatial	  and/or	   temporal	  
scale	   of	   the	   planned	   release	   activity.	   Documenting	   the	   hazard/differences	   associated	   with	   the	  
escape	  of	  self-­‐limiting	  or	  self-­‐sustaining	  transgenic	  lines	  through	  breaches	  will	  be	  an	  essential	  aspect	  
to	  RM,	  including	  the	  containment	  requirements	  for	  cage	  design.	  It	  is	  anticipated	  that	  the	  risk	  will	  be	  
lower	  with	  self-­‐limiting	  GMM	  due	  to	  their	  lack	  of	  potential	  for	  persistence	  in	  the	  environment.	  
Physically	   confined	   field	   trials	   should	   give	   particular	   attention	   to	   cage	   designs	   and	   local	  
environmental	   conditions	   at	   the	   chosen	   field	   site.	   Aspects	   of	   local	   geological,	   ecological	   and	  
regulatory	   criteria	   will	   underpin	   the	   design	   of	   physically	   confined	   field	   cages	   and	   trial	  
implementation	   (Facchinelli	   et	   al.,	   2011;	  Ritchie	  et	  al.,	   2011).	   Ecologically	   confined	   field	   trials	  may	  
take	   place	   in	   locations	   that	   do	   not	   favour	   the	   long-­‐term	   survival	   of	   the	   GMMs,	   or	   in	   ecologically	  
isolated	   locations	   (such	   as	   an	   area	   surrounded	   by	  water,	   deserts	   or	  mountains).	   Combinations	   of	  
physically	  and	  ecologically	  confined	  trials	  are	  possible.	  	  
Further	   simple	   RM	   measures,	   including	   restricted	   access,	   clear	   and	   well	   managed	   SOPs	   and	  
appropriate	   ethical/cultural	   considerations	   (Section	   4.	   Ethics	   and	   public	   engagement)	   could	   all	   be	  
used	   to	  mitigate	   hazards	   associated	  with	   confined	   trials.	  While	   clear	   research	  protocols	  would	  be	  
necessary	  beginning	  at	  the	  Phase	  1	  laboratory	  population	  trials,	  SOPs	  become	  increasingly	  important	  
as	   testing	   through	   the	   tiered	   phases	   moves	   forward.	   An	   SOP	   is	   a	   written	   plan	   describing	   the	  
procedures	  to	  be	  carried	  out	  during	  the	   field	  trial	  evaluation	  of	  GMMs.	  For	  example,	  a	  SOP	  would	  
document	   how	   transgenic	   material	   should	   be	   moved	   from	   the	   laboratory	   to	   the	   field	   prior	   to	  
release,	   the	  protocols	   for	  ensuring	  site	  security	  and	  cage	  suitability	   (Benedict	  et	  al.,	  2008),	  criteria	  
for	  release	  strategies,	  surveillance	  during	  the	  trial	  and	  the	  post-­‐trial	  removal	  of	  material	  and	  cages.	  
SOPs	   should	   describe	   the	   lines	   of	   responsibility	   and	   the	   RM	   strategies	   and	   options	   for	   the	   trial.	  	  
Monitoring	   the	   performance	   of	   containment	  measures,	   such	   as	   physical	   integrity	   of	   screens,	   the	  
operation	  of	  entryways	  and	  adherence	  to	  SOPs	  will	  minimize	  risk	  from	  unintended	  release.	  	  	  
RM	   should	   include	   the	   monitoring	   of	   GMM	   populations	   within	   the	   trial	   area	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	  
technology	   is	  having	   the	   intended	  effect	  on	   the	   target	  population.	  Periodic	   sampling	  of	   the	  GMM	  
population	   in	   the	   trial	   should	   be	   undertaken	   to	   determine	   the	   stability	   of	   the	   transgene	   and	   any	  





recognizable	  change	  in	  the	  genetics	  of	  the	  population	  that	  may	  affect	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  technology.	  
Key	  interactions	  with	  other	  species	   in	  the	  trial,	  which	  might	   indicate	  wider	  environmental	   impacts,	  
should	  also	  be	  monitored	  in	  order	  to	  identify	  and	  characterize	  any	  unexpected	  harmful	  effects,	  and	  
identify	  representative	  “sentinel”	  species.	  	  
There	  should	  be	  sufficient	  monitoring	  for	  the	  detection	  of	  any	  GMMs	  that	  escape	  confinement	  and	  
establish	  unintended	  self-­‐replicating	  populations	  in	  the	  wild.	  Control	  capacity	  that	  is	  proportional	  to	  
the	   risk	   should	   be	  maintained	   to	   ensure	   that	   escaped	   GMMs	   do	   not	   persist	   in	   the	   environment.	  
Where	   practical,	  measures	  may	   need	   to	   be	   taken	   to	   limit	   the	   establishment	   of	  GMMs	  within	   the	  
potential	  dispersal	  zones,	  such	  as	  controlling	  wild	  mosquitoes	  and	  limiting	  available	  larval	  breeding	  
sites.	  Standby	  control	  measures	  should	  take	  into	  account	  any	  behavioural	  attributes	  of	  GMMs	  that	  
may	  differ	  from	  wild	  mosquitoes.	  Monitoring	  and	  control	  capacity	  should	  continue	  after	  the	  trial	   is	  
completed	  for	  a	  period	  sufficient	  to	  ensure	  that	  there	  is	  no	  unintended	  persistence	  of	  the	  GMM	  or	  
manifestation	  of	  unintended	  effects	  (Benedict	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  
Plans	  would	  need	  to	  indicate	  how	  residual	  populations	  in	  cages	  would	  be	  eliminated	  after	  a	  trial;	  in	  
the	  case	  that	  the	  risk	  is	  determined	  to	  be	  negligible,	  this	  might	  simply	  involve	  allowing	  the	  material	  
to	  enter	  the	  decomposer	  food	  chain.	  However,	  if	  such	  residual	  material	  were	  identified	  to	  constitute	  
a	  hazard,	  more	  aggressive	  RM	  of	  residual	  dead	  material	  would	  need	  to	  be	  considered.	  	  
Studies	  to	  gather	  data	  for	  deployment	  RA	  
Because	  of	  the	  higher	  degree	  of	  influence	  of	  the	  environment	  on	  these	  trials,	  and	  the	  more	  limited	  
ability	   to	   control	   levels	   of	   exposure	   to	   some	   environmental	   stressors,	   a	   greater	   number	   of	  
experimental	   replications	   may	   be	   needed	   for	   sufficient	   statistical	   power	   compared	   to	   Phase	   1	  
laboratory	   studies.	   Phase	   2	   allows	   evidence	   on	   GMM	   performance	   to	   be	   gathered	   under	   more	  
natural	  conditions	  to	  provide	  an	  appropriate	  level	  of	  RA	  and	  RM	  before	  full	  implementation	  of	  open-­‐
field	   trials	   in	   Phase	   3	   (which	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   conducted	   in	   a	   location	  where	   the	   target	   disease	   is	  
endemic).	   However,	   confinement	   in	   Phase	   2	   trials	   introduces	   differences	   from	   the	   natural	  
environment	  that	  may	  affect	  the	  performance	  of	  GMMs	  and	  other	  organisms	  within	  the	  trial,	  so	   it	  
will	  be	  important	  to	  be	  clear	  about	  the	  most	  relevant	  information	  needed	  to	  make	  decisions	  about	  
moving	  forward.	  	  
Consideration	  should	  be	  given	  to	  whether	  the	  release	  of	  GMMs	  poses	  a	  risk	  through	  the	  persistence	  
of	   functional	   genetic	   material	   within	   the	   GMM	   species	   and	   whether	   the	   transfer	   of	   the	   genetic	  
material	   can	  occur	  between	  species.	  The	   transfer	  of	   stable	  genetic	  material	   from	  one	  organism	  to	  
another	  without	  reproduction	  is	  called	  horizontal	  gene	  transfer	  (HGT).	  The	  risk	  posed	  by	  HGT	  from	  
GM	  organisms	  is	  generally	  believed	  to	  be	  negligible	  (reviewed	  by	  Keese,	  2008).	  No	  evidence	  of	  HGT	  
from	   transgenic	   plants	   to	   microorganisms	   has	   been	   detected	   in	   the	   field	   over	   decades	   of	  
observation	   and	  millions	   of	   hectares	   of	   planting	   (Keese,	   2008),	   and	   occurrence	   of	   HGT	   from	   the	  
relatively	   less	  abundant	  GMMs	  may	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  even	  more	  rare.	  Considerations	  relevant	  to	  
RA	  for	  transgenic	  organisms,	  including	  GMMs,	  are	  whether	  the	  transgenes	  contain	  components	  that	  
could	  plausibly	  confer	  a	  selective	  advantage	  to	  microorganisms	  with	  which	  the	  GMMs	  will	  interact,	  
and	  whether	  acquisition	  of	  this	  trait	  would	  be	  harmful.	  RA	  would	  need	  to	  consider	  this	  on	  the	  basis	  
of	  the	  known	  function	  of	  the	  transgene	  and	  whether	  that	  function	  is	  preserved	  in	  microorganisms.	  	  





Identification	   of	   clear	   endpoints	   to	   the	   Phase	   2	   field	   evaluation	   will	   require	   basic	   ecological,	  
entomological	   and	   epidemiological	   information.	   Ecological	   processes	   such	   as	   density	   dependence	  
and	   age	   structure	   affect	   the	   design	   of	   measures	   to	   mitigate	   risk	   to	   the	   wider	   environment,	  
biodiversity	   and	   human	   health.	   This	   assessment	   should	   be	   considered	   in	   Phase	   2.	   Density	  
dependence	   is	   a	   process	   that	   leads	   to	   increased	   mortality,	   reduced	   development	   rate,	   and	  
decreased	   fecundity	   or	   longevity	   as	   density	   increases.	   It	   is	   an	   important	   ecological	   process	   in	   the	  
dynamics	   of	  most	   populations	   and	   evaluating	   its	   timing	   and	   effect	   in	   wild-­‐type	   versus	   transgenic	  
mosquito	  populations	  is	  of	  potential	  importance	  to	  the	  RA	  of	  modified	  mosquitoes	  (Yakob	  &	  Bonsall,	  
2009).	  The	  timing	  of	   important	  density-­‐dependent	  processes	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  expression	  of	  the	  
effector	   gene	   has	   substantive	   implications	   for	   the	   impact	   of	   some	   proposed	   genetic	   control	  
suppression	   strategies.	   Under	   both	   self-­‐limiting	   and	   self-­‐sustaining	   approaches,	   timing	   the	  
expression	   of	   the	   effector	   gene	   after	   the	   stage	   at	   which	   density-­‐dependent	   effects	   are	   greatest	  
(such	  as	   the	   larval	  stage	  of	  Aedes	  aegypti	   (Phuc	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Legros	  et	  al.,	  2009)	  can	   lead	  to	  more	  
effective	   suppression.	   Phase	   2	   trials	   should	   be	   structured	   to	   provide	   relevant	   information	   on	   the	  
ecological	  processes	  critical	  to	  the	  evaluation,	  efficacy	  and	  success	  of	  the	  GMMs.	  Age	  structure	  can	  
affect	  density	  dependence	  where	  different	  stages	  and	  ages	  within	  stages	  do	  not	  compete	  with	  each	  
other.	  
Additional	  considerations	   for	  biological	   information	  to	  be	  acquired	   in	  Phase	  2	  testing	  will	   relate	  to	  
the	   specific	   GMM	   approach	   under	   consideration.	   Suggestions	   for	   Phase	   2	   testing	   of	   mosquitoes	  
containing	  a	  gene	  drive	  system	  have	  been	  described	  previously	  (Benedict	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  
3.7.3	  Phase	  3	  –	  staged	  open-­‐field	  releases	  
RA	  for	  Phase	  3	  
The	  RA	  associated	  with	  site	  selection	  for	  open	  releases	  should	  consider	  the	  isolation	  of	  the	  site,	  the	  
structure	  and	  knowledge	  of	  the	  vector	  population,	  the	  disease	  dynamics	  and	  the	  implications	  of	  any	  
differential	   impacts	   among	   local	   communities.	   It	   should	   also	   consider	   the	   size	   of	   the	   open-­‐field	  
release	  site,	  which	  will	  dictate	  the	  site	  characteristics.	  When	  selecting	  the	  site,	  RA	  could	  make	  use	  of	  
the	   substantial	   advances	   in	   technology	   and	   knowledge	   of	   geographical	   surveys	   (e.g.	   global	  
positioning	   systems,	   geographical	   information	   systems	   and	   high	   resolution	   satellite	   images),	   and	  
predictive	  models	  of	  habitat	  suitability.	  These	  methodological	  advances	  allow	  thorough	  analysis	  of	  
temporally	   and	   spatially	   referenced	   data	   relevant	   to	   both	  mosquito	   ecology	   (Thomson	  &	   Connor,	  
2000;	  Malcolm	  et	  al.,	  2009)	  and	  disease	  burden	  (Gething	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  
Choice	  of	  appropriate	   site	   size	  and	   layout	   (randomized	  block,	   Latin	   square,	  Cox	  &	  Reid,	  2000)	  will	  
enhance	  both	  the	  biological	  and	  statistical	  validity	  of	  the	  open-­‐field	  release.	  Cluster	  size	  and	  number	  
should	   be	   predicated	   on	   the	   focused	   aims	   and	   endpoints	   of	   the	   staged	   open	   release	   (Section	   2.	  
Efficacy	  evaluation).	  Plans	  for	  open-­‐field	  releases	  to	  assess	  efficacy	  of	  spread	  (e.g.	  competitiveness,	  
longevity,	   dispersal)	   should	   consider	   the	   need	   for	   well-­‐designed	   and	   replicated	   experiments	   at	   a	  
spatial	  scale	  that	   limits	  the	  effects	  of	   immigration	  and	  other	  spatially	  dynamic	  processes.	  Similarly,	  
RA	   and	   RM	   for	   open	   releases	   designed	   to	   demonstrate	   suppression	   and	   replacement	   potential	  
should	   consider	   the	   measurable	   parameters	   (such	   as	   population	   density	   or	   the	   proportion	   of	   a	  
genotype	  in	  the	  field	  population)	  needed	  to	  demonstrate	  conclusively	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  release.	  If	  the	  
endpoints	   are	   focused	   on	   disease	   control	   then	   appropriate	   knowledge	   of	   the	   size	   of	   the	   human	  





population,	   level	   of	   disease	   burden	   and	   ethical	   issues	   related	   to	   testing	   of	   disease	   interventions	  
(Section	   4.	   Ethics	   and	   public	   engagement)	   should	   be	   incorporated	   into	   the	   RA.	   The	   evaluation	   of	  
GMM	   effects	   on	   the	   incidence	   of	   the	   target	   infection	   will	   be	   part	   of	   efficacy	   testing	   (Section	   2.	  
Efficacy	  evaluation),	  but	  based	  on	  studies	  of	  vector	  capacity	  in	  phases	  1	  and	  2,	  consideration	  should	  
be	  given	  to	  the	  need	  for	  monitoring	  other	  vector-­‐borne	  diseases.	  
The	   spatial	   scale	   of	   a	   proposed	   field	   trial	   may	   have	   environmental	   consequences	   through	   NTO	  
effects	   within	   or	   outside	   the	   planned	   boundaries	   of	   the	   trial	   site.	   Risks	   associated	  with	   potential	  
transgenic	  releases	  should	  consider	  the	  spatial	  pattern	  and	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  entomological/ecological	  
risk	   (Getis	   et	   al.,	   2003).	   The	   effects	   of	  modified	  mosquitoes	  may	   extend	   to	   neighbouring	   areas	   if	  
migration	  between	  populations	  can	  occur	  (Yakob	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  Determining	  the	  appropriate	  scale	  for	  
a	  release	  strategy	  and	  the	   implications	   for	  adjacent	  non-­‐target	  regions	  requires	  an	  appreciation	  of	  
the	   relationship	   between	   ecological	   processes	   such	   as	   the	   timing	   of	   density	   dependence,	  
demographic	  processes	  (Table	  3.1)	  and	  spatial	  aspects	  (Lee	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  This	  can	  only	  be	  evaluated	  
realistically	  during	  field	  trials.	  Assessing	  the	  different	  types	  of	  release	  strategy	  for	  both	  self-­‐limiting	  
and	   self-­‐sustaining	   approaches	   is	   important,	   as	   knowledge	   of	   the	   connectivity	   between	   the	  
population	  within	   the	   target	   zone	  and	   the	  surrounding	  populations	   is	   important	   in	  preventing	  any	  
adverse	   increase	   in	   the	   entomological	   or	   epidemiological	   burden	   associated	   with	   the	   target	  
mosquito.	  
Unintended	  transboundary	  movement	  becomes	  a	  potential	   risk	  with	  field	  testing	  and	  release.	  This	  
could	  occur	  through	  natural	  dispersal	  or	  through	  human-­‐assisted	  movement,	  either	  accidentally	  or	  
through	   deliberate	   unauthorized	   transfer.	   Natural	   dispersal	   is	   a	   slow	   process	   for	  most	   species	   of	  
mosquitoes,	  which	  normally	  remain	  within	  a	  few	  hundred	  meters	  over	  their	  life,	  unless	  transported	  
by	  man	  or	  strong	  winds	  (Service,	  1997;	  Getis	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  Areas	  that	  are	  unsuitable	  for	  host	  finding	  
or	  breeding	  often	  further	   limit	  movement.	  Natural	  movement	  over	  substantial	  distances,	   including	  
transboundary	  movement,	  would	  normally	  take	  many	  generations,	  which	  would	  be	  a	  far	  more	  likely	  
occurrence	   of	   expanding	   self-­‐sustaining	   populations.	   The	   proximity	   to	   borders,	   geographical	  
barriers,	   prevailing	   winds	   and	   water	   flows,	   and	   vehicle	   traffic	   would	   affect	   the	   likelihood	   of	  
transboundary	  movement.	   The	   presence	   of	   suitable	   habitats	   and	   hosts,	   and	   vulnerable	   ecological	  
and	   social	   systems	   across	   a	   border	   where	   GMM	   might	   move	   would	   increase	   the	   potential	   for	  
establishment	  and	  impact.	  
Risk	  management	  	  
RM	  in	  Phase	  3	  will	  be	  similar	  to	  Phase	  2	  above	  but	  will	  need	  to	  be	  expanded	  in	  scale	  to	  account	  for	  
the	   lack	  of	  confinement.	  The	  evaluation	  of	   surveillance	  data	  would	  benefit	   from	  the	  availability	  of	  
appropriate	  baselines	  before	  release	  (such	  as	  the	  level	  and	  seasonal	  pattern	  of	  disease	  burden,	  the	  
past	   levels	   of	   the	   vector	   population,	   effects	   of	   conventional	   vector-­‐control	   methods).	   A	   recall	   or	  
control	  plan	  of	  sufficient	  scale	  to	   limit	  spread	  should	  be	  agreed	  upon	  and	  be	  available	  before	  field	  
release,	  if	  there	  is	  ongoing	  concern	  about	  risk.	  At	  a	  minimum,	  an	  additional	  risk	  RM	  measure	  would	  
be	  to	  stop	  GMM	  releases	  in	  the	  event	  that	  monitoring	  detects	  that	  an	  otherwise	  unmanageable	  and	  
unacceptable	   hazard	   has	   developed.	   In	   such	   a	   case,	   a	  more	   extensive	   and	   intensive	   conventional	  
control	   capacity	  may	  be	   required	   to	  eliminate	  any	   residual	  population	  of	  GMMs	  after	   release	  and	  
dispersal.	  





There	  should	  be	  a	  procedure	  to	  monitor	  any	  degradation	  of	  efficacy	  in	  the	  GMM	  control	  system	  that	  
may	   indicate	   that	   resistance	   to	   the	   effector	   has	   developed.	   The	   degree	   of	   resistance,	   its	   rate	   of	  
increase	   and	  possible	   attendant	  hazards	  must	  be	  evaluated.	  Regular	   sampling	  of	  wild	  populations	  
should	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  method	  to	  detect	  resistance.	  
Management	   should	   be	   put	   in	   place	   to	   avoid	   and	   detect	   transboundary	   movement	   in	   case	  
neighbouring	   countries	  have	  not	   approved	   release	   for	   testing	   (Section	  5.	   Regulatory	   frameworks).	  
Field	  testing	  should	  be	  carried	  out	  at	  some	  distance	  from	  borders	  to	  avoid	  natural	  wind	  and	  water	  
flows	  to	  other	  countries.	  Released	  GMMs	  should	  carry	  markers	  that	  ensure	  discrimination	  from	  wild	  
mosquitoes.	   Monitoring	   between	   a	   release	   site	   and	   a	   border	   could	   indicate	   if	   there	   is	   any	  
movement.	   In	   small	   trials,	   a	   treated	   barrier	   area	   downwind	  may	   reduce	   the	   chance	   of	   successful	  
movement	  towards	  a	  border.	  Staff	  working	  on	  field-­‐testing	  sites	  should	  be	  trained	  about	  the	  risks	  of	  
moving	   living	   specimens	  and	  should	  observe	   transport	  protocols	  when	  moving	  any	  material.	  Post-­‐
trial	  monitoring	  should	  take	  into	  account	  the	  numbers	  of	  GMMs	  released,	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  achieving	  
an	  appropriate	  level	  of	  sampling	  efficiency.	  
Studies	  to	  gather	  data	  for	  deployment	  RA	  
Phase	  3,	  which	  is	  likely	  to	  involve	  a	  series	  of	  open	  trials	  of	  increasing	  size,	  duration	  and	  complexity,	  
should	   provide	   the	   safety	   data	   that	   will	   be	   factored	   into	   decisions	   about	   the	   broad-­‐scale	  
implementation	   of	   the	   GMM	   technology.	   Open	   testing	   in	   Phase	   3	  will	   introduce	   opportunities	   to	  
gather	   data	   on	   potential	   hazards	   in	   the	   risk	   analysis	   (Table	   3.2)	   where	   these	   data	   can	   only	   be	  
acquired	   under	   more	   natural	   conditions.	   It	   also	   provides	   an	   opportunity	   to	   evaluate	   the	  
performance	   of	   GMMs	   integrated	   within	   complementary	   conventional	   control	   actions.	   However,	  
considerations	   of	   environmental	   variability,	   reduced	   control	   of	   experimental	   variables,	   and	   the	  
impact	  of	  these	  on	  proper	  experimental	  design	  and	  statistical	  power	  are	  even	  more	  influential	  at	  this	  
stage.	  RA	  under	  field	  trials	  may	  provide	  information	  on	  whether	  the	  transgenic	  modification	  has	  any	  
chance	  to	  increase	  vectorial	  capacity	  (the	  efficiency	  of	  vector-­‐borne	  disease	  transmission)	  or	  vector	  
competence	  (the	  capability	  of	  a	  vector	  to	  support	  the	  development	  of	  a	  pathogen)	  under	  particular	  
circumstances	  (Table	  3.1).	  Monitoring	  for	  changes	  in	  the	  incidence	  of	  the	  target	  infection	  or	  disease	  
is	   addressed	   in	   Section	   2.	   Efficacy	   evaluation.	   A	   failure	   to	   decrease	   vectorial	   capacity	   under	   self-­‐
sustaining	   approaches	  may	   result	   from	   a	   decoupling	   of	   the	   effector	   gene	   from	   the	   drive	   system.	  
Vectorial	   capacity	   under	   self-­‐limiting	   approaches	   is	   also	   associated	   with	   the	   quality	   control	   of	  
transgenic	   releases.	   For	   example,	   incomplete	   penetrance	   of	   the	  modification	  may	   influence	   both	  
vector	   capacity	   and	   potential	   disease	   burden.	   Phase	   3	   also	  may	   provide	   an	   opportunity	   to	   detect	  
whether	  changes	   in	  the	  pathogen	  develop	  that	  decrease	  the	  efficacy	  of	  GMMs,	  an	  effect	  that	  may	  
be	  difficult	  to	  determine	  in	  short-­‐term	  trials.	  
Understanding	   endpoints	   and	   intended	   consequences	   of	   GMMs	   necessitates	   understanding	   the	  
relevant	  aspects	  of	  mosquito	  biology	  and	  ecology.	  Basic	  ecological	  knowledge	  of	  mosquito	  vectors	  in	  
receiving	  environments	  must	  be	  available	  to	  evaluate	  the	  benefits	  of	  transgenic	  mosquito	  releases	  
and	  should	  be	  part	  of	   the	  overall	   research	  plan.	  For	  example,	  while	  population	  genetic	   studies	  on	  
mosquitoes	  are	  common	  (Touré	  et	  al.,	  1994),	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  there	  have	  been	  practically	  no	  
ecological	  studies	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  seasonality	  in	  West	  Africa	  on	  An.	  gambiae	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  forms	  
that	   are	   present	   and	   how	   they	   are	   distributed	   in	   space;	   basic	   information	   such	   as	   whether	   An.	  





gambiae	   is	   resident	   in	   or	   repopulates	   disease-­‐endemic	   areas	   remains	   unclear.	   The	   ecological	  
difference	   between	   intrinsic	   population	   growth	   and	   immigration	   is	   substantial	   and	   requires	  
assessment	   in	   order	   to	   validate	   risk	   estimates,	   define	   RM	   and	   determine	   appropriate	   endpoints.	  
While	   extensive	   information	   on	   direct	   and	   indirect	   interactions	   through	   purpose-­‐designed	  
experiments	   would	   be	   desirable	   in	   any	   ecological	   field	   study	   (Bender,	   Case	   &	   Gilpin,	   1984),	   key	  
information	   for	   the	   RA	   of	   undertaking	   transgenic	   releases	   under	   open-­‐field	   conditions	   should	   be	  
proportionate	  and	  focused,	  requiring	  the	  development	  of	  sampling	  programmes	  (Silver,	  2008).	  The	  
impacts	  on	  human	  health	  and	  the	  wider	  receiving	  environment	  cannot	  be	  evaluated	  appropriately	  
without	  this	  assessment.	  
Assessment	   of	  wild-­‐type	  mosquito	   population	   size	   and	   dynamics	   is	   essential	   for	   both	   self-­‐limiting	  
and	  self-­‐sustaining	  approaches.	  Mark-­‐release-­‐recapture	  measurements	  of	  wild-­‐type	  mosquitoes	  can	  
provide	  a	  baseline	  for	  assessing	  the	  necessary	  release	  ratio	  and	  the	  risks	  associated	  with	  releasing	  
large	  numbers	   of	   transgenic	  mosquitoes.	   Assessment	   of	   population	   size,	   age	   structure	   and/or	   sex	  
ratio	  post	  release	  should	  take	  into	  account	  sufficient	  time	  for	  a	  new	  equilibrium	  to	  be	  established.	  
The	  fitness	  of	  a	  population	  should	  be	  assessed	  to	  determine	  if	  there	  is	  a	  risk	  of	  population	  increase	  
in	  the	  longer	  term.	  	  
At	  the	  end	  of	  Phase	  3,	  the	  GMM	  stands	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  routine	  use	  as	  a	  public	  health	  intervention.	  
Sufficient	   data	   should	   have	   been	   collected	   to	   understand	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   GMM	   on	   disease	  
transmission,	   ecological	   interactions	   and	   the	   spatial	   characteristics	   of	   dispersal	   and	   transgene	  
persistence.	   This	  will	   have	   involved	   extensive	   post-­‐release	  monitoring	   of	  wild	   populations	   for	   the	  
transgene,	  widespread	  assays	  of	  the	  GMM	  for	  phenotypic	  and	  marker	  stability,	  and	  an	  assessment	  
of	   the	  performance	  of	   the	  RA	  and	  RM	  strategies.	  These	  considerations	  will	   compose	  an	   important	  
part	  of	  any	  decision	  to	  move	  forward	  with	  deployment,	  a	  decision	  that	  will	  necessarily	  also	  take	  into	  
account	  broader	  cost-­‐benefit,	  acceptance	  and	  national	  public	  health	  goals.	  
3.7.4	  Phase	  4	  –	  post	  implementation	  	  
National	  regulatory	  authorities	  will	   take	  the	  results	  of	  risk	  analysis	  at	  this	  stage	   into	  account	  when	  
making	  decisions	  about	  whether	  and	  how	  to	  allow	  large	  scale	  GMM	  deployment	  in	  their	  countries.	  
National	  public	  health	  agencies	  would	  also	  consider	  the	  results	  of	  risk	  analysis	   in	  deciding	  whether	  
to	   adopt	  GMMs	   as	   a	   component	   of	   their	   national	   disease-­‐control	   programmes.	   The	   evaluation	   of	  
risk,	   in	   the	   context	   of	   implementation,	   should	   be	   set	   against	   the	   benefits	   of	   GMMs	   in	   improving	  
human	   health.	   Benefit-­‐cost	   analyses	   provide	   the	   framework	   under	   which	   the	   appropriate	  
(economic,	  health)	  returns	  of	  a	  GMM	  release	  programme	  can	  be	  quantified.	  Such	  analyses	  might	  be	  
done	  during	  or	  after	  Phase	  3,	  at	  a	  point	  where	  sufficiently	  reliable	   information	  about	  the	  utility	  of	  
the	  GMM	  is	  available	  to	  allow	  projections	  of	  cost	  and	  benefit.	  	  
RA	  for	  implementation	  
During	  RA	  for	  implementation,	  it	  will	  be	  important	  to	  review	  the	  cumulative	  RA	  from	  earlier	  phases	  
–	  were	  hazards	  identified	  fully,	  were	  risks	  characterized	  accurately	  and	  were	  relevant	  management	  
measures	  effective?	  	  





The	  release	  of	  transgenic	  mosquitoes	  is	  expected	  to	  have	  effects	  on	  target	  organisms	  through	  either	  
the	  suppression	  or	  replacement	  of	  local	  mosquito	  populations.	  Failure	  of	  intended	  effects	  may	  pose	  
a	   risk,	   particularly	   to	   human	   health	   if	   the	   GMM	   vector	   control	   system	   fails	   after	   a	   release	  
programme	   is	  well	   advanced.	   By	   the	   time	   a	  GMM	  approach	   is	   contemplated	   for	   implementation,	  
substantial	   efficacy	   and	   biosafety	   performance	   data	   will	   be	   available.	   However,	   a	   remaining	  
uncertainty	   may	   be	   related	   to	   long-­‐term	   performance.	   The	   potential	   for	   evolution	   and	   adaptive	  
processes	   could,	   for	   example,	   encompass	   the	   evolution	  within	   the	   target	  mosquito	   population	   of	  
resistance	   to	   the	   transgene	   function,	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   disease	   pathogen	   to	   resist	   transgene	  
function	   or	   changes	   in	   host	   range	   of	   the	   target	  mosquito	   species.	   RA	   for	   Phase	   4	  must	   take	   into	  
account	  whether	  any	  specific	   surveillance	  plans	  need	  to	  be	  put	   in	  place	   for	  ongoing	  monitoring	  of	  
GMM	   effects.	   In	   this	   regard,	   plans	   for	   ongoing	  monitoring	   of	   GMM	   efficacy	   in	   Phase	   4,	   which	   is	  
relevant	  to	  safety	  for	  human	  health,	  have	  been	  discussed	  in	  Section	  2.	  Efficacy	  evaluation.	  
RA	  should	  include	  predicting	  the	  likely	  manifestation	  of	  any	  potential	  resistance	  (Alphey,	  Bonsall	  &	  
Alphey,	   2011).	   This	   will	   be	   highly	   dependent	   upon	   the	   particular	   GMM	   technology	   under	  
assessment.	  For	  example,	  while	  a	  small	  number	  of	  selectively	  advantageous	  genes	  released	  into	  an	  
environment	  might	  not	  be	  expected	   to	  persist	  due	   to	   chance	   (Fisher,	  1922;	  Kimura,	  1962),	  RA	   for	  
self-­‐limiting	  approaches	  should	  consider	  whether	  the	  mass	  release	  under	  Phase	  4	  might	  introduce	  a	  
selection	   pressure	   into	   an	   environment	   that	   could	   drive	   the	   evolution	   of	   novel	   biochemical	   or	  
behavioural	  resistance	  to	  the	  GMM	  effect.	  Mutations	  that	  confer	  resistance	  to	  insecticides	  are	  well	  
known,	   and	   it	   has	   been	   demonstrated	   that	   mutations	   favouring	   resistance	   can	   be	   present	   in	  
populations	  before	  the	  start	  of	  a	  control	  intervention	  programme	  (ffrench-­‐Constant,	  2007).	  It	  should	  
be	  noted	  that,	   in	  many	  locations,	  the	  risk	  posed	  by	  the	  development	  of	  resistance	  to	  GMMs	  might	  
be	  evaluated	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  known	  risk	  of	  insecticide	  resistance.	  	  
Although	  the	  possible	  secondary	  effects	  of	  GMMs	  may	  theoretically	  be	  extremely	  broad,	  RA	  and	  RM	  
need	  to	  be	  science-­‐based,	  proportionate	  and	  directed	  at	  specific	  hazards.	   In	  particular,	   the	  effects	  
on	   the	   phenotypic,	   behavioural	   and	   population-­‐level	   characteristics	   of	   the	   modified	   mosquito	  
(tables	   3.1	   and	   3.2)	   on	   the	   target	   population	   should	   be	   reassessed	   within	   the	   scope	   of	   risks	  
associated	  with	   full	   public	   health	   implementations.	   The	  RA	   for	   Phase	   4	   also	   should	   identify	  GMM	  
characteristics	  that	  might	  change	  as	  a	  result	  of	  mass	  production	  and	  impair	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  GMMs,	  
including	  selection	  for	  altered	  development	  rates,	  size	  and	  marker	  expression.	  Consideration	  should	  
be	  given	  to	  the	  quality	  control	  standards	   for	  GMM	  characteristics	  and	  procedures	   (for	  example,	   in	  
rearing	  mosquitoes	  for	  release	  programmes,	  determining	  sex	  ratios	  for	  release,	  etc.)	  to	  ensure	  that	  
processes	  remain	  relevant	  to	  the	  RA	  assumptions	  throughout	  the	  release	  programme.	  
Extending	  the	  assessment	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  transgenic	  mosquito	  on	  NTO	  should	  be	  considered	  in	  
preparation	  for	   implementation.	  GMM	  releases	  could	   lead	  to	  altered	  ecosystem	  functions	  through	  
trophic	  effects,	  such	  as	  the	  role	  of	  mosquito	  larvae	  as	  food	  for	  predators.	  Under	  releases	  of	  GMMs	  
aimed	  at	  population	  suppression,	  alterations	  (reduction)	  in	  target	  population	  sizes	  are	  expected	  and,	  
hence,	   potential	   alterations	   in	   species	   interaction	   strengths	   would	   be	   anticipated.	   In	   contrast,	  
population	  sizes	  might	  not	  necessarily	  be	  altered	  under	  population	  replacement	  strategies	  although	  
the	  transgenic	  modification	  might	  affect	  mosquito	  behaviour	  or	  phenotype.	  	  





As	   noted	   under	   Phase	   3,	   the	   likelihood	   and	   potential	   impact	   of	   unintended	   transboundary	  
movement	   should	   be	   assessed.	   In	   cases	   where	   there	   is	   reasonable	   potential	   for	   transboundary	  
movement	  through	  either	  natural	  or	  human-­‐assisted	  mechanisms,	   it	  would	  be	  appropriate	  to	  seek	  
the	  views	  of	  authorities	  in	  neighbouring	  countries	  on	  hazards	  to	  include	  in	  the	  RA.	  	  
Several	   potential	   risks	  with	   regard	   to	   human	   health	   should	   be	   considered	   in	   RA	   for	   Phase	   4.	   The	  
release	   of	   transgenic	   mosquitoes	   may	   lead	   to	   a	   concern	   that	   existing	   control	   measures	   may	   be	  
reduced,	  either	  as	  people	  become	  more	  lax	  about	  personal	  and	  household	  mosquito	  control	  efforts	  
or	  as	  governments	   look	   for	   cost	   savings.	   The	   implications	  of	   a	  potential	   reduction	   in	   conventional	  
vector	   control	   to	   mosquito	   population	   dynamics,	   human	   health	   and	   to	   the	   wider	   receiving	  
environment	  require	  appropriate	  RA	  and	  RM.	  
The	   possibility	   of	   resurgence	   of	   disease	   when	   immunologically	   naïve	   human	   populations	   are	  
exposed	  to	  disease	  after	  a	  prolonged	  period	  of	  low	  incidence	  is	  a	  concern	  that	  should	  be	  assessed	  in	  
post-­‐implementation	  monitoring.	  This	   is	  not	  unique	  to	  GMMs.	  For	  example,	  concerns	  were	  initially	  
raised	  about	  the	  possibility	  that	  insecticide-­‐treated	  bed	  nets	  (ITNs)	  might	  increase	  mortality	  in	  older	  
children	  through	  delayed	  acquisition	  of	  immunity	  to	  malaria.	  Empirical	  evidence	  from	  a	  community-­‐
randomized	   controlled	   ITN	   trial	   in	   malaria	   holoendemic	   western	   Kenya	   found	   no	   evidence	   of	  
compromises	   in	  human	   immunity	  to	  blood-­‐stage	  antigens	   in	  young	  children	  after	  two	  years	  of	   ITN	  
use	  (Kariuki	  et	  al.,	  2003)	  and	  no	  evidence	  of	  increased	  all-­‐cause	  mortality	  in	  older	  children	  six	  years	  
after	   ITNs	  were	   provided	   to	   children	   (Lindblade	   et	   al.,	  2004).	   However,	   observations	   of	   increased	  
susceptibility	  in	  older	  children	  and	  adults	  following	  long-­‐term	  use	  of	  ITNs	  have	  once	  again	  raised	  this	  
question	  (Trape	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  	  
Risk	  management	  
RA	  will	  determine	   the	  need	   for	  RM,	  and,	  as	  mentioned	  above,	   it	  may	  be	  determined	   that	  RM	  will	  
require	   tracking	   of	  metrics	   that	  would	   trigger	   a	  mitigation	   plan.	   Post-­‐implementation	   surveillance	  
may	  be	   considered	   to	   address	   remaining	  uncertainties	   identified	   in	   the	  RA	  or	   to	   confirm	   that	   the	  
conclusions	  of	  the	  earlier	  RA	  were	  accurate	  once	  large-­‐scale	  and	  long-­‐term	  open	  release	  had	  taken	  
place.	  Thus,	  monitoring	  and	  surveillance	  activities	  may	  comprise	  a	  key	  component	  of	  the	  RM	  plan	  in	  
Phase	  4.	  By	  this	  phase,	  necessary	  monitoring	  methods	  will	  need	  to	  be	  easily	  scaled	  up	  and	  applicable	  
in	  the	  field.	  
Post-­‐implementation	  monitoring	   should	   focus	   on	   the	   appropriate	   effects	   and	   variables	   (based	   on	  
data	  from	  prior	  RAs),	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  surveillance,	  the	  geographical	  limits	  to	  surveillance	  and	  the	  
methods	   by	   which	   to	   measure	   the	   effects.	   Plans	   should	   incorporate	   appropriately	   designed	  
surveillance	  procedures	   to	   allow	  effective	   risk	  mitigation	  decisions	   to	  be	   taken	  when	  needed,	   but	  
must	   take	   into	   consideration	   whether	   and	   when	   it	   will	   become	   impractical	   to	   maintain	   active	  
surveillance	   as	   the	   GMM	   become	   ubiquitous	   under	   self-­‐sustaining	   approaches.	   The	   RA	   should	  
establish	  and	  delimit	  appropriate	  time	  intervals	  when	  the	  impact	  and	  continued	  safety	  of	  the	  GMM	  
technologies	  should	  be	  reviewed.	  The	  post-­‐implementation	  surveillance	  method	  and	  risk	  mitigation	  
measures	  should	  also	  be	  reviewed	  at	  appropriate	  intervals	  as	  population	  levels	  change.	  
Mitigation	   strategies	  will	   depend	  on	   specific	   conditions,	   but	  might	   include	  options	   such	  as	  halting	  
releases	   in	   the	   case	   of	   self-­‐limiting	  GMMs,	  maintaining	   public	   access	   to	   conventional	   disease	   and	  





vector-­‐	   control	  methods,	   or	  designing	   stopping	  or	   recall	  mechanisms	   into	   the	   technology,	   such	  as	  
greater	   insecticide	   susceptibility	   than	   present	   in	   local	   mosquitoes.	   The	   appropriate	   regulatory	  
structures,	  mechanisms	  and	  methods	  need	  to	  be	  in	  place	  as	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  RA	  to	  ensure	  that	  
clear	   lines	  of	  responsibility	  are	  delineated	  on	  post-­‐implementation	  surveillance	  and	  risk	  mitigation,	  
should	  these	  be	  required.	  	  
If	  indicated	  by	  RA,	  implementation	  programmes	  should	  plan	  for	  the	  potential	  of	  adaptive	  processes	  
in	   the	   GMM	   or	   target	   population,	   and	   management	   plans	   should	   describe	   the	   conditions	   under	  
which	  mitigation	  will	  be	  undertaken.	  Quality	  control	  in	  rearing	  facilities	  should	  continually	  check	  for	  
any	   signs	  of	   the	   failure	  of	  mechanisms	   integral	   to	   the	  efficacy	  of	   the	  GMMs	  or	   factors	   that	   could	  
make	  control	  more	  difficult.	  RM	  should	  include	  any	  additional	  case-­‐specific	  surveillance	  methods	  to	  
monitor	  transgene	  activity	  within	  the	  GMMs	  that	  were	  identified	  by	  RA	  as	  necessary	  to	  the	  decision	  
process	  for	  risk	  mitigation.	  	  
RM	  plans	  should	  draw	  on	  the	  results	  of	  the	  RA	  to	  determine	  the	  need	  for	  and	  design	  of	  monitoring	  
to	  observe	  the	  key	  environmental	  impacts	  identified	  by	  the	  CBD	  (2012):	  
• effects	  on	  biological	  diversity	  
• vertical	  gene	  transfer	  	  
• horizontal	  gene	  transfer	  	  
• persistence	  of	  the	  transgene	  in	  the	  ecosystem	  	  
• evolutionary	  responses	  (especially	  in	  target	  mosquito	  vectors	  or	  pathogens)	  	  
• unintentional	  transboundary	  movement.	  
However,	   there	   should	  be	  a	   rationale	   in	  each	  of	   these	  cases	  whereby	  monitoring	   focuses	  on	  valid	  
concerns	   arising	   from	   the	   RA.	   A	   plan	   for	   case-­‐specific	   post-­‐implementation	   surveillance	   of	   GMMs	  
should	  take	  into	  consideration	  any	  key	  species	  for	  which	  there	  is	  evidence	  of	  harmful	  interactions	  in	  
order	  to	  assess	  the	  impact,	  risks	  and	  benefits	  once	  a	  GMM-­‐based	  control	  programme	  is	  underway.	  
Key	  species	  may	  include	  those	  in	  the	  main	  food	  web	  interactions	  and	  any	  endangered	  species	  listed	  
in	  national	  regulations.	  General	  surveillance	  approaches	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  effective	  or	  informative	  in	  
determining	  the	  need	  for	  risk	  mitigation.	  	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  GMMs,	  the	  public	  health	  implications	  impose	  an	  additional	  obligation	  to	  ensure	  that	  
the	  transgenic	  technology	  remains	  efficacious	  and	  poses	  no	  additional	  risks,	  so	  health	  monitoring	  of	  
human	   populations	   in	   the	   release	   area	   should	   be	   carried	   out	   to	   ensure	   the	   expected	   levels	   of	  
efficacy	  have	  been	  achieved.	   It	   is	   anticipated	   that	   an	  appropriate	  disease	   surveillance	  programme	  
could	  be	  provided	  in	  the	  context	  of	  ongoing	  national	  disease	  control	  programmes	  (Section	  2.	  Efficacy	  
evaluation).	  RM	  may	  require	  that	  certain	  conventional	  disease	  control	  practices	  continue	  and	  it	  may	  
be	  necessary	  to	  integrate	  the	  GMM	  technology	  into	  these	  conventional	  strategies.	  	  
The	   release	   of	   GMMs	   provides	   different,	   but	   not	   entirely	   novel,	   issues	   to	   those	   for	   GM	   plants.	  
Arguably,	   the	   most	   important	   biological	   difference	   is	   the	   possibility	   for	   autonomous	   dispersal.	  





However,	  appropriate	  biosafety	  assessment	  (Table	  3.1)	  will	  provide	  the	  fundamental	  information	  for	  
appropriate	  RM	  options.	  Precedents	  dealing	  with	  biological	  control	  and	  conservation	  of	  biodiversity	  
provide	   additional	   relevant	   insights	   into	   how	   the	   potential	   for	   transboundary	  movement	  may	   be	  
managed	   (Section	   5:	   Regulatory	   frameworks).	   Further,	   there	   are	   analogies	   with	   biosafety	  
management	   associated	   with	   the	   release	   and	   use	   of	   vaccines	   based	   on	   GM	   viruses	   or	   bacteria,	  
where	  individuals	  are	  inoculated	  with	  a	  vaccine	  and	  disperse	  into	  the	  wider	  receiving	  environment.	  
Establishing	  the	  broader	  environmental	  risks	  of	  GM	  vaccine	  shedding	  rates	  is	  of	  particular	  relevance.	  
The	  equivalent	  for	  GMMs	  would	  be	  the	  assessment	  of	  dispersal	  and	  replication	  rates	  (Table	  3.1)	  in	  
the	  wider	  environment	  following	  an	  open	  release	  (Table	  3.2).	  	  
The	   mass	   rearing	   and	   release	   of	   transgenic	   mosquitoes	   may	   have	   consequences	   (and	   associated	  
risks)	   related	   to	   cross-­‐border	   movements	   and	   spread.	   RA	   of	   open	   release	   trials	   and	   post-­‐release	  
implementation	  of	  GMMs	  must	  consider	  surveillance	  to	  establish	  the	   likelihood	  and	  consequences	  
of	  mosquitoes	  spreading	  across	  international	  borders.	  This	  could	  have	  ecological	  consequences,	  but	  
since	   most	   management	   activities	   would	   be	   national	   responsibilities,	   it	   would	   be	   important	   to	  
consider	  how	  neighbouring	  national	  authorities	  would	  plan	  and	  carry	  out	  RM	  actions,	  including	  the	  
appropriate	   surveillance	   that	   might	   be	   needed.	   The	   movement	   of	   transgenic	   material	   across	  
national/international	  borders	   is	   governed	  by	  well	   established	  RA	  and	  RM	  procedures,	   (under	   the	  
Cartagena	  Protocol	  on	  Biodiversity).	  Parties	  bound	  by	  the	  Cartagena	  Protocol	  (and	   its	   instruments)	  
are	  expected	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  movement	  of	  transgenic	  material	  (to	  both	  Parties	  and	  Non-­‐Parties	  to	  
the	  Protocol)	   in	  accordance	  with	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  Protocol	  (Section	  5.	  Regulatory	  frameworks)	  
and	   other	   regional	   agreements,	   such	   as	   the	   RSPM	   27	   of	   the	   North	   American	   Plant	   Organization	  
(NAPPO,	  2007).	  	  
3.8	  Consider	  the	  need	  for	  independent	  safety	  review	  
The	   establishment	   of	   independent	   safety	   review	   groups	   or	   the	   formulation	   of	   GMM	   biosafety	  
regulations	  for	  consideration	  by	  existing	  review	  groups	  (local	  bodies	  such	  as	   Institutional	  Biosafety	  
Committees,28	  national	  scientific,	  environmental	  and	  public	  health	  advisory	  bodies,	  and	  regional	  or	  
supranational	   agencies)	   is	   recommended.	   Such	   groups	   can	   provide	   oversight	   of	   the	   RA	   and	   RM	  
within	   each	   phase	   of	   testing	   and	   provide	   independent	   scientific	   advice	   on	   the	   risks	   of	   GMMs	   to	  
human	  health	  and	  the	  environment.	  
3.9	  Biosafety	  capacity	  	  
The	  successful	   implementation	  of	  GMM	  interventions	  requires	  transparent,	  focused,	  proportionate	  
and	  credible	  biosafety	  assessments.	  National	  safety	  review	  groups,	  capable	  of	  providing	  appropriate	  
independent	  guidance	  and	  overseeing	  all	  facets	  of	  testing	  and	  implementation,	  will	  be	  important	  for	  
biosafety	   assessments	   of	   GMMs	   and	   for	   decisions	   on	   appropriate	   levels	   of	   RM.	   National-­‐level	  
biosafety	  boards	  should	  draw	  on	  available	  expertise	  across	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  scientific,	  environmental	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  NIH	  Office	  of	  Biotechnology	  Activities	  Institutional	  Biosafety	  Committees:	  
http://oba.od.nih.gov/rdna_ibc/ibc.html,	  accessed	  25	  May	  2014.	  





and	  economic	  disciplines,	  for	  example,	  as	  provided	  in	  the	  CTNBio	  in	  Brazil29	  or	  CIBIOGEM30	  in	  Mexico	  
(Ramsey	   et	   al.,	   2014),	   to	   assess	   the	   risks	   of	   GMM	   technologies.	   Stakeholder	   groups	   affected	   by	  
releases	  provide	  the	  key	  to	  community	  values	  and	  concerns	  relevant	  to	  potential	  releases	  of	  GMM	  
and	   they	   should	   have	   a	   consistent	   and	   strong	   voice	   within	   both	   biosafety	   and	   benefit	   analyses	  
associated	  with	  the	  testing	  and	  implementation	  of	  GMMs.	  
The	  decision-­‐making	  bodies	  approving	  biosafety	   testing	  should	  have	   the	  capacity	   to	   formulate	   the	  
risk	  problem,	  to	  define	  appropriate	  endpoints	  for	  risk,	  to	  interpret	  the	  character	  of	  the	  component	  
sources	  of	  risks,	  to	   interpret	  the	  quantification	  of	  risk	  components,	  and	  to	  understand	  the	  efficacy	  
and	  uncertainty	  related	  to	  proposed	  RM	  measures.	  Where	  this	  capacity	  is	  not	  available	  at	  a	  national	  
level,	  efforts	  should	  be	  made	  to	  obtain	  independent	  international	  expertise,	  and	  to	  strengthen	  the	  
necessary	  national	  expertise	  in	  the	  longer	  term.	  
3.10	  Conclusions	  
The	   assessment	   of	   the	   safety	   of	   GMMs	   for	   human	   health	   and	   the	   environment	   should	   follow	   a	  
phased	  approach	  moving	  from	  laboratory	  and	  cage	  experiments	  through	  to	  open-­‐field	  releases.	  RA	  
and	  RM	  at	  each	  stage	  should	  provide	  sufficient	  information	  to	  determine	  whether	  a	  decision	  can	  be	  
justified	  to	  allow	  trials	  to	  move	  on	  to	  the	  next	  stage.	  This	  ensures	  a	  workable	  and	  defined	  protocol	  
to	   follow	   in	   the	   development	   of	   appropriate	   decisions	   for	   each	   further	   testing	   stage.	   National	  
regulations	   governing	   biosafety,	   RA	   and	   RM	   must	   always	   be	   followed.	   Broader	   international	  
guidelines	   may	   suggest	   some	   additional	   aspects	   of	   risk	   analysis	   that	   could	   also	   be	   useful,	   and	  
international	   obligations	   on	   biosafety	   may	   also	   apply	   in	   many	   countries	   (Section	   5.	   Regulatory	  
frameworks).	   The	   decision	   to	   move	   forward	   with	   further	   testing	   will	   involve	   the	   appropriate	  
oversight	  and	  regulatory	  bodies	  at	  each	  phase.	  
Not	   all	   the	   considerations	   described	   above	  will	   be	   universally	   relevant	   to	   all	   types	   of	  GMMs.	   It	   is	  
important	   to	  emphasize	   that	  RAs	  should	  proceed	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis	  and	  be	  proportionate	   to	  
the	  particular	  phase	  of	   testing.	  Defining	   the	  potential	   extent	  of	  harm	   that	   could	  be	   caused	   to	   the	  
environment	   or	   human	   health	   by	   GMMs,	   identifying	   the	   risk	   level	   (hazard	   by	   exposure)	   and	  
developing	  risk	  mitigation	  plans	  provide	  the	  framework	   in	  which	  to	  undertake	  the	  RA.	  RA	  of	  novel	  
GMM	  technologies	  should	  be	  set	  against	  the	  risk	  of	  a	  relevant	  alternative	  comparator.	  The	  range	  of	  
comparators	   for	   GMMs	   at	   the	   various	   testing	   phases	   should	   reflect	   the	   range	   of	   dimensions	   of	  
mosquitoes	   individually,	   and	   in	   populations	   and	   control	   systems,	   which	   may	   give	   rise	   to	   risk	  
concerns	   at	   each	   phase.	   Comprehensive	   evaluation	   of	   GMM	   implementation,	   following	   trials	  
focusing	  on	  safety,	  should	  be	  considered	  in	  a	  broader	  benefit-­‐risk	  analysis,	  and	  the	  RA	  and	  RM	  plans	  
form	   only	   one	   component	   of	   this	   broader	   analysis.	   Ultimately,	   decisions	   must	   be	   made	   on	   the	  
acceptability	  of	  the	  overall	  risk,	  taking	  account	  of	  available	  and	  practical	  RM	  actions.	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Table	  3.1	  Example	  parameters	  that	  may	  be	  relevant	  in	  laboratory	  studies	  (phases	  1	  and	  2)	  as	  part	  of	  the	  RA	  
for	  transgenic	  mosquitoesa	  




Cohort	  experiment;	  life	  
table	  analysis	  
Is	  it	  limited	  by	  population	  density	  
and/or	  individual	  physiology?	  	  Is	  
there	  a	  significance	  difference?	  Oviposition	  rate	  
Egg	  development	  
rate	   	  
Increased	  growth	  potential;	  
reduced	  predation	  
	  
Cohort	  experiment;	  life	  








Cohort	  experiment;	  life	  
table	  analysis;	  population	  
level	  modelling	  
Is	  it	  density-­‐dependent?	  What	  is	  the	  
type	  of	  density-­‐dependence?	  Is	  it	  







Cohort	  experiment;	  life	  
table	  analysis	  
Does	  the	  timing	  of	  adult	  emergence	  
differ	  significantly?	  
Adult	  size	   Increased	  vector	  fitness	   Cohort	  experiment;	  life	  table	  analysis;	   Is	  adult	  size	  significantly	  different?	  
Adult	  survival	  
Increased	  vector	  activity;	  
more	  effective	  mating	  
potential;	  increased	  biting	  
efficiency	  for	  females	  
Cohort	  experiment;	  life	  
table	  analysis;	  population	  
level	  modelling	  
Is	  it	  density-­‐dependent?	  Is	  it	  
significantly	  enhanced/diminished	  
by	  the	  modification?	  
Mating	  strategy	  
Increased	  vector	  
abundance;	  separation	  of	  
GM	  and	  wild	  types	  
Cohort	  experiment	  
Is	  there	  assortative	  mating?	  Are	  
there	  costs	  to	  male/female	  
gametes?	  Does	  the	  modification	  




biting	  potential	  if	  more	  
females	  
Cohort	  experiment;	  life	  
table	  analysis	  
Is	  the	  sex	  ratio	  substantial	  different	  
from	  the	  null	  expectation?	  
Flight	  ability	  
Increased	  vector	  activity;	  
more	  effective	  mating	  
potential;	  increased	  biting	  
efficiency	  for	  females	  
Cohort	  experiment;	  
physiological	  experiment	  





















Standard	  insecticide	  dose	  
response	  testing	  
procedures	  
Is	  it	  expected	  to	  alter	  the	  
competitive	  status	  of	  transgenic	  
lines	  significantly?	  Does	  it	  make	  
transgenic	  lines	  significantly	  less	  
amenable	  to	  conventional	  control?	  
a	   The	   RA	   should	   focus	   on	   the	   hazards	   (changes	   that	   may	   lead	   to	   harm	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   genetic	   modification),	   the	  
(experimental)	   methods	   to	   measure	   this	   and	   the	   exposure	   assessment.	   References	   to	   ‘differences’	   mean	   differences	  
between	  the	  transgenic	  strain	  being	  tested	  and	  the	  appropriate	  comparator.	  
	  





Table	   3.2	   Example	   parameters	   that	  may	  be	   relevant	   in	   open-­‐field	   studies	   as	   part	   of	   the	  RA	  of	   transgenic	  
mosquitoesa	  	  
Parameters	   Example	  hazards	   Assessment	  methods	   Assessment	  endpoints	  
Population	  size	  






What	  is	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  
release?	  Relationship	  
between	  release	  rate,	  timing,	  





Comparator	  studies	  at	  
range	  of	  densities	  in	  
laboratory;	  field	  population	  
monitoring;	  population-­‐
level	  modelling	  
Does	  the	  transgenic	  strain	  
differ	  significantly	  in	  the	  role	  




ecosystem	  disruption	  	  
Field	  population	  
monitoring;	  population-­‐
level	  modelling;	  life-­‐table	  
experiments	  
Limits	  to	  the	  spread	  of	  the	  
transgenic	  organism?	  Rate	  of	  
spread	  of	  the	  transgenic	  




transmission	  per	  bite;	  
increased	  biting	  rate	  
Comparator	  studies;	  post-­‐
release	  monitoring	  





Change	  in	  behaviour	  
that	  avoids,	  or	  




cohort	  studies	  on	  
behavioural	  changes	  in	  
different	  life	  stages;	  post-­‐
release	  surveillance;	  
population-­‐level	  modelling	  
Under	  field	  conditions,	  what	  
limits	  the	  appearance	  and	  
spread	  of	  resistance	  due	  to	  
mosquito	  behaviours?	  Is	  there	  
potential	  for	  assortative	  
mating	  in	  the	  field?	  
Biochemical	  
resistance	  
Change	  in	  physiology	  
that	  avoids,	  or	  




cohort	  studies	  on	  
physiological	  changes	  in	  
different	  life	  stages;	  post-­‐
release	  surveillance;	  
population-­‐level	  modelling	  	  
Is	  the	  likelihood	  or	  rate	  of	  
resistance	  development	  
enhanced	  in	  transgenic	  
mosquito	  strains?	  
Mass	  rearing	  quality	  
indices	  
Quality	  of	  released	  





comparator	  studies	  before	  
release;	  operational	  design	  
and	  audit;	  pre-­‐release	  
monitoring;	  post-­‐release	  
monitoring	  
Do	  specific	  aspects	  of	  
released	  mosquito	  quality	  
affect	  mosquito	  densities,	  
pathogen	  transmission	  and	  
transgene	  stability?	  
a	   RA	   should	   build	   on	   evidence	   regarding	  potential	   hazards	   obtained	  during	   Phase	   1	   and	   Phase	   2	   trials,	   the	  methods	   to	  
measure	   these	   hazards	   and	   exposure	   assessments.	   Comparator	   studies	   aim	   to	   compare	   the	   GM	   mosquito	   with	   a	  
conventional	  (non-­‐modified)	  counterpart.	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The	  success	  of	  scientific	  and	  public	  health	  endeavours	  can	  depend	  upon	  good	  will,	  cooperation	  and	  
support	  from	  diverse	  sectors	  of	  the	  observing	  public.	  Compliance	  with	  regulatory	  requirements	  that	  
govern	  the	  conduct	  of	   research,	   including	  those	  concerning	  human	  subjects	   (Section	  5.	  Regulatory	  
frameworks),	  is	  mandatory.	  However,	  there	  is	  ample	  evidence	  that	  simply	  conforming	  to	  regulations	  
and	   institutional	   policies	   does	   not	   always	   satisfy	   public	   expectations	   and	   researchers’	   obligations.	  
Beyond	  the	  context	  of	  regulatory	  review,	  the	  word	  “ethics”	  calls	  attention	  to	  concepts	  of	  right	  and	  
wrong,	  and	  can	  imply	  a	  standard	  higher	  and	  more	  rigorous	  than	  that	  of	  civil	  authority.	  Regulations,	  
Summary:	  	  Respect	  for	  communities	  should	  be	  an	  overarching	  ethical	  goal	  in	  GMM	  trials.	  Individuals	  who	  
satisfy	   the	   criteria	   of	   “human	   subjects”	   must	   be	   protected	   according	   to	   internationally	   recognized	  
standards	  (Section	  5.	  Regulatory	  frameworks).	  GMM	  research	  also	  should	  recognize	  ethical	  responsibilities	  
that	   extend	   beyond	   these	   standard	   compliance	   criteria.	   Public	   dialogue	   and	   outreach	   are	   important	   for	  
realizing	   research	  goals,	   especially	   in	   the	  development	  of	  new	   technologies.	   Sincere	  and	  well-­‐developed	  
engagement	   can	  help	   to	  direct	   technical	   goals,	   reduce	   the	   chance	  of	   a	  misunderstanding	  of	   the	   science	  
needed	   to	  meet	   the	   goals,	   and	   improve	   the	   performance	   of	   the	   research	   project	   in	   both	   technical	   and	  
social	  contexts.	  	  
Researchers	   will	   interact	   in	   the	   course	   of	   field	   testing	  with	   different	   public	   groups,	   ranging	   from	   those	  
living	  within	  the	  trial	  site	  and	  directly	  affected	  by	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  project	  to	  third	  parties	  interested	  in	  
the	   research	  activities.	  GMM	  projects	  will	  have	  ethical	   responsibilities	   to	  people	   living	  within	  a	   trial	   site,	  
even	   when	   these	   people	   are	   not,	   in	   a	   traditional	   sense,	   subjects	   of	   the	   research	   at	   hand.	   Researchers	  
should	  initiate	  ethics	  and	  engagement	  efforts	  during	  phases	  1	  and	  2,	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  goals	  and	  
methods	   of	   the	   project	   are	   well	   defined	   and	   communicated	   and	   meet	   genuine	   stakeholder	   needs.	  
Internationally	   accepted	   standards	   for	   the	  participation	  of	   human	   subjects	   in	   research	  may	   apply	   under	  
certain	  conditions	  in	  small	  trials	  with	  entomological	  endpoints	  in	  Phase	  2,	  but	  will	  become	  more	  prominent	  
in	   Phase	   3	   trials	   with	   epidemiological	   endpoints.	   Beginning	   in	   Phase	   2	   and	   expanding	   in	   Phase	   3,	  
community	   engagement	   activities	   are	   intended	   to	   address	   ethical	   responsibilities	   beyond	   the	   formal	  
permissions	   required	   at	   the	   individual	   level	   (informed	   consent)	   and	   the	   governmental	   level	   (regulatory	  
compliance).	  The	  concept	  of	  “community	  authorization”	  entails	  providing	  those	  living	  in	  the	  trial	  site	  with	  
methods	  to	  give	  or	  withhold	  agreement	  for	  trial	  activities,	  and	  to	  identify	  elements	  that	  they	  believe	  to	  be	  
important	  for	  the	  research	  to	  continue.	  During	  field	  testing,	  scientists	  also	  should	  expect	  to	  interact	  with	  
third	  parties	  who	  express	  interest	  in	  the	  activity	  and	  its	  outcomes,	  both	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  project	  is	  well	  
understood	  and	   to	  avail	   the	  project	   team	  of	   information	  and	   insights	   that	   such	   interested	  parties	  might	  
provide.	  However,	  given	  the	  diverse	  range	  and	  varied	  degrees	  of	  interest	  of	  third	  parties,	  there	  is	  not	  the	  
same	  level	  of	  obligation	  to	  seek	  them	  out	  proactively	  to	  ensure	  that	  they	  are	  informed	  about	  the	  project,	  
as	   is	   the	   case	   with	   those	   directly	   affected.	   In	   Phase	   4,	   the	   responsibilities	   for	   implementing	   GMM	  
technologies	  and	  interacting	  with	  affected	  individuals	  will	  most	  likely	  shift	  to	  the	  relevant	  local,	  regional	  or	  
national	  public	  health	  authorities.	  
There	  are	  aspects	  of	  ethics	  and	  engagement	  that	  may	  require	  special	  skills	  and	  training	  which	  biologists,	  
medical	  personnel	  or	  public	  health	  specialists	  would	  not	  normally	  be	  expected	  to	  have.	  Engagement	  with	  
people	   living	  within	  the	   field	  sites	  may	  require	  specialized	  knowledge	  of	   local	  culture	  and	   institutions.	   In	  
addition,	   engagement	   with	   third	   parties	   may	   require	   broader	   communications	   and	   negotiation	   skills.	  
Adequate	  time	  and	  resources	  must	  be	  allocated	  within	  the	  project	  plan	  to	  support	  these	  activities.	  	  





laws	   and	   organizational	   policies	   dictate	   standards	   and	   procedures	   with	   which	   individuals	   and	  
organizations	  must	  either	  comply	  or	  face	  sanctions	  that	  can	  range	  from	  warnings	  or	  admonishments	  
to	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  funding,	  fines,	  withdrawal	  of	  permission	  to	  operate	  or	  even	  prison.	  In	  contrast	  
to	   regulatory	   emphasis	   on	   compulsion	   and	   compliance,	   ethics	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   activity	   or	  
inquiry	  whose	  purpose	   is	   to	   shed	   light	   on	   the	   correctness	   or	   justifiability	   of	   some	   conduct.	   In	   the	  
context	   of	   GMM	   trials,	   ethics	   aims	   to	   understand	   the	   interests	   of	   stakeholders	   and	   their	   various	  
entitlements,	   rights,	   other	   types	  of	   claims	   and	  obligations,	   including	  what	   actions	  or	   activities	   are	  
required	  by	   the	  principle	  of	   respect	   for	   communities	  hosting	   the	   trials.	   Relevant	   ethical	   questions	  
include:	  How	  should	  these	  rights	  and	  interests	  be	  recognized	  in	  a	  decision	  for	  trials	  to	  proceed?	  How	  
can	  researchers	  strike	  an	  ethically	  robust	  balance	  between	  the	  interests	  and	  rights	  of	  individuals,	  the	  
collective	   interests	   of	   the	   host	   communities	   and	   the	   properly	   mandated	   activities	   of	   their	   public	  
institutions?	   What	   is	   the	   appropriate	   role	   for	   communication	   and	   engagement	   with	   media,	   civil	  
society	  organizations	  (CSOs)	  and	  others	  that	  take	  an	  interest	  in	  the	  research?	  	  	  
It	   is	  not	  always	  easy	  to	  maintain	  a	  clear	  distinction	  between	  the	  activities	  of	  ethical	   reflection	  and	  
engagement	  and	  those	  related	  to	  regulatory	  compliance,	  which	  have	  come	  to	  dominate	  the	  ethics	  of	  
research	  with	   human	   subjects	   (Hagerty,	   2004;	   Rollin,	   2008).	   The	  major	   global	   agencies	   that	   fund	  
GMM	   trials	   require	   compliance	   with	   international	   standards	   for	   research	   conduct,	   including	  
submission	  of	  protocols	  for	  the	  use	  of	  human	  subjects,	  as	  well	  as	  biosafety	  and	  the	  use	  of	  animals,	  
to	   appropriate	   regulatory	   oversight	   committees,	   usually	   as	   a	   requirement	   of	   their	   own	   domestic	  
laws	   and	   regulations	   (Section	   5.	   Regulatory	   frameworks).	   This	   may	   cause	   confusion,	   since	   it	   is	  
common	  practice	  to	  refer	  to	  these	  obligatory	  requirements	  as	  “ethics”	  requirements	  and	  to	  various	  
regulatory	   compliance	  bodies	   as	   “ethics”	   committees	  or	   boards.	  However,	   researchers	   should	  not	  
assume	   that	   regulatory	   compliance	   also	   implies	   that	   ethical	   responsibilities	   have	  been	  adequately	  
addressed.	  Broader	  ethical	   issues	  and	  responsibilities	  are	  expected	  to	  arise	   in	  the	  context	  of	  GMM	  
trials	  that	  are	  not	  specifically	  mandated	  by	  administrative	  law	  or	  organizational	  policies.	  	  
4.1	  The	  role	  of	  ethics	  and	  engagement	  in	  science	  and	  technology	  
Scientists	   have	   long	   appreciated	   the	   importance	   of	   public	   dialogue	   and	   outreach	   to	   realize	   the	  
envisioned	  results	  of	  their	  research.	  However,	  events	  and	  developments	  over	  the	  last	  three	  decades	  
have	  led	  to	  a	  renewed	  interest	  into	  ways	  and	  means	  of	  interacting	  with	  scientists	  and	  a	  number	  of	  
distinct	   public	   groups	  with	  different	   attitudes	   and	   interests	   as	   regards	   to	   scientific	  work.	   Some	  of	  
these	   events	   have	   cast	   science	   and	   technology	   in	   a	   heroic	   light,	  while	   others	   portrayed	  people	   in	  
scientific	   and	   technical	  walks	   of	   life	   as	   lacking	   in	  moral	   sensibility	   or	   fellow	   feeling.	  Others	   simply	  
testify	   to	   the	   way	   that	   developments	   in	   science	   and	   technology	   can	   grip	   public	   attention,	  
occasionally	  sparking	  reactions	  and	  consequences	  that	  the	  scientists	  involved	  never	  imagined.	  	  
The	   social	   phenomenon	   of	   public	   reaction	   to	   scientific	   developments	   has	   been	   the	   subject	   of	  
numerous	   historical,	   philosophical	   and	   sociological	   studies.	   Ulrich	   Beck	   has	   argued	   that	   general	  
public	  literacy	  in	  scientific	  matters	  has	  created	  a	  more	  sophisticated	  understanding	  of	  how	  advances	  
in	   the	  sciences	  are	  accompanied	  by	  both	  benefits	  and	   risks	   (Beck,	  1992).	  As	  a	   result,	  citizens	  have	  
become	   more	   aware	   of	   scientific	   or	   technical	   breakthroughs	   as	   potentially	   controversial.	   This	  
awareness	   has	   been	   accompanied	   by	   the	   rise	   of	   numerous	   CSOs	   dedicated	   to	   promoting	   specific	  
causes.	   The	   result	   is	   a	   greater	   willingness	   for	   citizens	   to	   become	   involved	   in	   promoting	   those	  





scientific	  activities	  that	  they	  see	  as	  consistent	  with	  their	  values	  or	  opposing	  technologies	  that	  they	  
perceive	  to	  be	  against	  their	  values.	  Public	  resistance	  to	  certain	  agricultural	  and	  food	  applications	  of	  
biotechnology,	  and	  to	  some	  specific	  applications	  of	  nanotechnologies,	   is	  seen	  as	  exemplary	  of	   this	  
new	  awareness	  (Mcnaghten,	  Kearnes	  &	  Wynn,	  2008).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  scientists	  themselves	  have	  
become	   cognizant	   of	   new	   ways	   that	   involving	   non-­‐scientists	   in	   their	   work	   can	   be	   beneficial.	  
Exceedingly	   complex	   problems	   may	   require	   planned	   activities	   that	   engage	   non-­‐scientists	   in	  
collaborative	  or	  problem-­‐solving	  roles,	  rather	  than	  considering	  them	  solely	  as	  subjects.	  This	  has	  led	  
many	   to	  envision	  a	  new	  era	  of	   science	   in	  which	  many	  people	  can	  become	  enrolled	   in	  cooperative	  
projects	  as	  “co-­‐producers”	  of	  new	  knowledge	  (Haraway,	  1989;	  Wexler,	  2004).	  	  
Scientists	  undertaking	  work	  on	   the	  cutting	  edge	  of	  discovery	  or	   technological	  capability	  have	  both	  
“positive”	  and	  “negative”	  motivations	  for	  paying	  attention	  to	  the	  reaction	  and	  receptiveness	  of	  the	  
broader	  public.	  On	  the	  positive	  side,	  engagement	  with	  people	  not	  generally	  considered	  to	  be	  part	  of	  
the	   research	   community	   can	  both	  enrich	   the	   research	  process,	   and	  provide	   access	   to	   information	  
and	  perspectives	  that	  would	  otherwise	  have	  been	  unavailable	  to	  people	  within	  the	  research	  group.	  
It	  can	  also	  be	  instrumental	  in	  achieving	  the	  broader	  impacts	  that	  researchers	  seek.	  On	  the	  negative	  
side,	  research	  that	  comes	  under	  public	  scrutiny	  can	  become	  the	  target	  of	  organized	  opposition	  that	  
has	  the	  potential	  to	  frustrate	  not	  only	  the	  application	  of	  the	  science,	  but	  even	  the	  research	  process	  
itself.	  It	  will	  not	  be	  possible	  to	  avoid	  such	  opposition	  in	  every	  case.	  Sometimes	  opponents	  of	  science	  
and	  technology	  are	  simply	  pursuing	   interests	   that	  are	  genuinely	  contrary	  to	  the	  advancement	  of	  a	  
given	   technical	   project.	   Sincere	   and	   well-­‐developed	   engagement	   that	   acknowledges	   and	  
demonstrates	  respect	   for	   these	  perspectives	  may	  reduce	  the	  chance	  that	  opposition	   is	  based	  on	  a	  
misunderstanding	  of	  the	  science	  or	  of	  its	  technical	  goals.	  In	  a	  more	  positive	  spirit,	  it	  can	  demonstrate	  
respect	  for	  the	  communities	  involved	  in	  testing	  the	  new	  technologies	  and	  may	  sometimes	  result	  in	  
changes	  or	  modifications	  to	  a	  research	  project	  that	  researchers	  view	  as	  beneficial.	  	  
It	   is	  especially	   important	  for	  scientists	  conducting	  studies	  likely	  to	  attract	  significant	  coverage	  from	  
the	  media	  to	  consider	  how	  their	  work	  might	  be	  beneficially	  or	  detrimentally	  affected	  by	  rapid	  and	  
broad	   engagement	   and	   interaction	   with	   members	   of	   the	   public	   who	   have	   no	   training	   in	   their	  
disciplines	   or	   methods.	   Stories	   may	   be	   disseminated	   either	   through	   traditional	   media	   such	   as	  
newspapers,	  television	  and	  radio,	  or	  through	  new	  outlets	  on	  the	  Internet	  and	  social	  media.	  Ordinary	  
word	  of	  mouth	  can	  also	  effectively	   spread	  a	  widely	   shared	   impression	  of	   research	  goals,	   intended	  
applications	  and	  methods,	  especially	  within	  village	  or	  urban	  settings.	  Such	  broad	  representations	  of	  
science	   can	   have	   the	   beneficial	   effect	   of	   expanding	   opportunities	   to	   obtain	   key	   informants,	  
participants	  and	  partners.	  However,	  they	  also	  can	  spread	  misrepresentations,	  suspicion,	  distrust	  and	  
antagonism	  to	  a	  scientific	  research	  project.	  	  
4.2	  A	  strategy	  for	  ethical	  engagement	  	  
Respect	  for	  communities	  should	  be	  an	  overarching	  ethical	  goal	  in	  GMM	  trials.	  Although	  there	  is	  no	  
consensus	  among	  research	  ethicists	  about	  what	  this	  requires	  in	  practice,	  the	  activities	  of	  community	  
or	  public	  engagement	  may	  best	  be	  understood	  as	  opportunities	   for	  demonstrating	   respect	   for	   the	  
communities	   in	   question.	   A	   broad	   strategy	   for	   helping	   research	   teams	   to	   meet	   ethical	  
responsibilities,	   and	   conduct	   public	   and	   community	   engagement	   activities	   will	   involve	   ethical	  
reflection,	   interaction	  with	   the	  host	   community	  and	  a	  wide	   range	  of	  other	   interested	  parties,	   and	  





iterative	   integration	   of	   findings	   from	   these	   activities	   into	   the	   ongoing	   planning	   and	   conduct	   of	  
research.	   The	   strategy	   presented	   here	   	   	   should	   be	   interpreted	   as	   a	   description	   of	   processes	   and	  
goals,	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  prescriptive	  formula.	  As	  noted	  by	  others,	  when	  “research	  ethics”	  becomes	  an	  
activity	  of	  ticking	  boxes	  for	  compliance,	  or	  slavish	  adherence	  to	  rules,	  rather	  than	  one	  of	  thoughtful	  
consideration,	  the	  real	  goals	  of	  ethical	  respect	  and	  responsiveness	  may	  well	  be	  lost	  (Hagerty,	  2004;	  
Rollin,	  2008).	  	  
The	  ethics	  and	  engagement	  component	  of	  a	  research	  programme	  can	  be	  visualized	  at	   three	   levels	  
(Figure	  4.1).	  	  	  
• At	  the	  project	  level,	  there	  are	  reflective	  tasks	  concerning	  the	  broader	  social	  and	  ethical	  issues	  
raised	  by	  GMM	  trials	  that	  shape	  specific	  management	  goals	  and	  elucidate	  important	  learning	  
and	  evaluation	  opportunities	  for	  the	  research.	  Such	  tasks	  are	  by	  no	  means	  unique	  to	  research	  
on	  GMMs;	  an	  explicit	  recognition	  and	  articulation	  of	  the	  ethical	  purposes	  of	  a	  scientific	  project	  
is	  especially	  useful	  when	  the	  research	  is	  likely	  to	  attract	  public	  interest	  and	  scrutiny,	  as	  is	  often	  
the	  case	  with	  a	  new	  technology.	  
Scientists	  involved	  in	  projects	  moving	  to	  field	  trials	  should	  plan	  to	  devote	  time	  and	  resources	  
to	   critical	   deliberative	   team	   activities	   dedicated	   to	   reaching	   and	   describing	   a	   common	  
understanding	  of	  the	  ethical	  purpose	  and	  rationale	  of	  the	  research	  as	  an	  iterative	  component	  
of	   the	  project	  plan.	  Over	   the	  course	  of	   the	   research,	   this	   task	  may	   include	   interactions	  with	  
advisory	   committees	   and	   consultants,	   as	  well	   as	  other	   scientists	  whose	  opinions,	   views	  and	  
reflections	  are	  sought	  on	  an	  ad	  hoc	  basis.	  As	  the	  project	   identifies	  candidate	  field	  trial	  sites,	  
these	   reflective	   activities	   should	   be	   expanded	   to	   include	   critical	   deliberations	   with	  
representatives	   from	   the	   host	   communities	   where	   the	   research	   may	   take	   place,	   and	   may	  
include	  people	  from	  other	  interested	  groups	  in	  an	  advisory	  or	  consulting	  capacity.	  The	  results	  
of	  these	  considerations	  will	  form	  a	  basis	  for	  project	  communications	  materials,	  which	  should	  
be	  tailored	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  interests	  and	  concerns	  of	  key	  stakeholder	  groups.	  	  
Developing	  a	  set	  of	  criteria	  for	  identifying	  and	  discriminating	  between	  those	  who	  are	  affected	  
by	   the	   research	   activities	   through	   specific	   interventions	   or	   interactions,	   other	   members	   of	  
host	  communities	  who	  have	  a	  stake	  in	  the	  trial,	  and	  those	  who	  may	  have	  legitimate	  but	  more	  
distant	  interests	  at	  stake,	  and	  determining	  how	  to	  respond	  to	  ethical	  obligations	  in	  each	  case,	  
will	  be	  a	  component	  of	  the	  broader	  ethical	  reflection	  needed	  by	  the	  project.	  	  
	  
• The	  researchers	  need	  to	  anticipate	  a	  set	  of	  tasks	  that	  arise	  from	  interactions	  and	  effects	  at	  the	  
site(s)	   where	   field	   studies	   are	   conducted.	   Conducting	   research	   in	   host	   communities	   brings	  
scientists	  into	  direct	  contact	  with	  a	  number	  of	  people,	  including,	  but	  not	  limited	  to,	  those	  who	  
are	  research	  subjects	  or	  whose	  cooperation	  is	  necessary	  for	  successful	  completion	  of	  research	  
tasks.	   Within	   the	   biomedical	   research	   model,	   individuals	   who	   are	   the	   subjects	   of	   specific	  
interventions	  or	  interactions,	  or	  from	  whom	  identifiable	  information,	  specimens	  or	  materials	  
are	  collected	  are	  classified	  as	  “human	  research	  subjects”	  (see	  discussion	  below	  and	  in	  Section	  
5.	   Regulatory	   frameworks).	   However,	   within	   GMM	   trials,	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   there	   will	   be	  
additional	  individuals	  who	  do	  not	  fall	  within	  the	  typical	  definition	  of	  human	  subjects	  but	  who	  
might	   still	   be	   affected	  by	   the	   conduct	   of	   the	   research.	   This	  may	   include	   those	   living	   near	   a	  
research	   project	   whose	   daily	   pursuits	   and/or	   livelihood	   could	   be	   influenced	   by	   research	  





activities.	   Thus,	   tasks	  at	   the	   community	   level	  overlap	  with,	  but	  are	  distinct	   from,	   regulatory	  
requirements	  for	  securing	  appropriate	  informed	  consent	  and	  other	  relevant	  protections,	  and	  
may	   also	   include	   involving	   and	   empowering	   local	   populations	   in	   key	   elements	   of	   research	  
planning	  and	   implementation	  as	  well	  as	  addressing	  both	   real	  and	  perceived	   issues	   that	  may	  
arise	   in	   connection	   with	   the	   project,	   including	   broader	   socioeconomic	   impact.	   These	   tasks	  
may	  be	  thought	  of,	  collectively,	  as	  “community	  engagement”.	  	  
The	   distinction	   between	   people	   who	   are	   affected	   directly	   by	   research	   and	   others	   who	   are	  
more	  indirectly	  interested	  in	  its	  conduct	  may	  be	  operationalized	  in	  the	  way	  that	  the	  relevant	  
ethical	  obligations	  are	  understood.	  For	  example,	  when	  research	  involves	  risks	  associated	  with	  
organisms	   or	   substances	   released	   into	   the	   environment,	   as	   opposed	   to	   contained	   within	  
experimental	   facilities,	  geographical	  proximity	   to	   the	  site	  of	   research	  becomes	  an	   important	  
ethical	  indicator.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  some	  GMM	  trials,	  defining	  the	  limits	  of	  potential	  effects	  may	  
be	  complicated	  by	  the	  geographical	  mobility	  of	  both	  people	  and	  mosquitoes	  over	  time.	  Such	  
considerations	  should	  have	  been	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  a	  RA	  (Section	  3.	  Biosafety),	  which	  will	  
be	  helpful	  in	  guiding	  identification	  of	  community	  stakeholders.	  
• There	   will	   be	   tasks	   related	   to	   the	   involvement	   of	   individuals	   and	   groups	   who	   are	   not	  
immediately	  affected	  by	  the	  research,	  including	  CSOs,	  the	  press	  and	  the	  general	  public.	  People	  
living	  at	  a	  distance	   from	  the	  trial	  may	  have	   friends	  and	  relatives	  or	  even	  economic	   interests	  
that	   they	   fear	   could	   be	   affected	   by	   the	   conduct	   of	   a	   research	   project	   and,	   thus,	   may	   also	  
perceive	  themselves	  to	  be	  affected	  by	  it.	  Moreover,	  a	  much	  larger	  community	  of	  people	  may	  
take	   an	   interest	   in	   the	   conduct	   or	   outcome	   of	   research,	   even	   if	   they	   are	   unlikely	   to	   be	  
physically	   affected	   by	   the	   trial	   activities	   themselves.	   For	   example,	   people	  who	   are	   afflicted	  
with	  a	  particular	  disease	  (along	  with	  their	  friends	  and	  family)	  have	  an	  obvious	  interest	  in	  the	  
outcome	  of	   research	  or	   clinical	   trials,	   even	   if	   they	  are	  not	   involved	  with	   specific	   trials.	   Such	  
groups	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  strongly	  supportive	  of	  research	  intended	  to	  improve	  their	  condition.	  In	  
a	   similar	   vein,	   people	   who	   care	   about	   causes	   such	   as	   protecting	   vulnerable	   groups	   or	  
endangered	  species	  may	  take	  an	  interest	   in	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  research	  activities,	  and	  may	  not	  
be	   unilaterally	   supportive	   of	   research	   goals	   or	   procedures.	   Although	   the	   nature	   of	  
responsibilities	   to	   such	   individuals	   or	   groups	   is	   quite	   different	   from	   those	   to	   communities	  
hosting	  the	  trial,	   it	   is	  clear	  that	  an	  effective	  plan	  for	  engaging	  a	  wide	  spectrum	  of	   interested	  
parties	  can	  be	  critical	  to	  the	  success	  of	  research,	  especially	  for	  projects	  that	  can	  be	  expected	  
to	  attract	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  attention	  in	  the	  press	  or	  monitoring	  from	  CSOs.	  	  
The	   plan	   for	   addressing	   engagement	   should	   include	   activities	   appropriate	   for	   each	   level.	   Each	   of	  
these	  activities	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  iterative	  and	  sustained	  during	  the	  entire	  research	  period,	  as	  
illustrated	  by	  the	  feedback	  arrow	  loops	  in	  Figure	  4.1.	  Each	  group	  of	  tasks	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  
ongoing	  component	  of	  the	  research	  activity,	  and	  the	  research	  plan	  should	   include	  a	  programmatic	  
discussion	  of	  how	  tasks	  in	  each	  of	  these	  three	  areas	  will	  be	  carried	  out	  by	  members	  of	  the	  research	  
team	  on	  an	  ongoing	  basis	  throughout	  all	  phases	  of	  the	  research	  activity.	  Researchers	  must	  also	  take	  
into	  account	  that	  communities	  and	  third	  parties	  may	  become	  engaged	  with	  each	  other	  independent	  
of	  the	  project.	  





One	  helpful	  way	   to	  use	   the	   three	   levels	  of	  activities	   for	  planning	  purposes	   is	   to	   focus	  on	  who	  will	  
need	   to	   be	   involved	   in	   completing	   them.	   Activities	   at	   all	   three	   levels	   of	   engagement	   involve	  
members	   of	   the	   research	   team,	   and	   will	   almost	   certainly	   involve	   staff	   from	   the	   sponsoring	  
organizations	  as	  well.	  Meeting	  ethical	   responsibilities	   to	   the	   full	   range	  of	   stakeholders	   in	   the	  host	  
community	   requires	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   work	   “on	   the	   ground”	   in	   the	   local	   areas	   encompassing	   the	  
research	  field	  sites.	  As	  will	  be	  explained	  further	  below,	  this	  may	  not	  imply	  contact	  with	  literally	  every	  
individual	  in	  the	  contiguous	  area,	  but	  it	  must	  be	  understood	  to	  require	  appropriate	  attention	  to	  local	  
forms	  and	  mechanisms	  of	  representation	  for	  those	  who	  will	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  research	  activities.	  
This	  may	  involve	  negotiation	  of	  the	  environmental	  and	  developmental	  goals,	  standards,	  and	  metrics	  
for	   the	   research.	   For	   example,	   directly	   affected	  parties	   and	   international	   civil	   society	   groups	   alike	  
may	  have	  a	  desire	  to	  participate	  in	  discussions	  about	  how	  risks	  to	  biodiversity	  are	  measured,	  or	  how	  
economic	  benefits	  are	  understood	  in	  relation	  to	  improvements	  in	  public	  health.	  One	  cannot	  assume	  
that	  all	  parties	  will	  see	  any	  and	  all	  forms	  of	  economic	  growth	  or	  resource	  development	  as	  beneficial,	  
and	   investigators	   should	   not	   assume	   that	   local	   communities	   would	   always	   be	   forthcoming	   or	  
comfortable	   with	   expressing	   these	   interests.	   There	   may	   be	   some	   areas	   of	   overlap	   between	   the	  
ethics	   issues	   that	   arise	   on	   the	   ground	   in	   interacting	   with	   local	   stakeholders,	   and	   the	   ethics	   of	  
environment	   and	  development	   that	   represent	   concerns	   of	   third	   parties.	   Some	   third	   parties	  might	  
decide	   to	   represent	   the	   interests	  of	   local	   people,	   though	   the	   local	   communities	  may,	  or	  may	  not,	  
view	  such	  representation	  as	  legitimate.	  Anticipating	  and	  preparing	  responses	  for	  the	  issues	  that	  are	  
likely	  to	  arise	  in	  such	  interactions	  is	  an	  example	  of	  something	  that	  falls	  into	  the	  category	  of	  “broader	  
ethical	  concerns”	  to	  be	  addressed	  at	  the	  project	  level.	  










Activities	  at	  all	  three	  levels	  will	  include	  the	  following.	  
• Ongoing	   literature	  and	  methodology	  development.	  Whether	   it	  be	  best	  practices	   for	  clinical	  
and	  epidemiological	  research,	  or	  engaging	  with	  communities,	  nongovernmental	  organizations	  
(NGOs)	   or	   the	   press,	   there	   now	   is	   a	   body	   of	   relevant	   literature	   that	   should	   be	   taken	   into	  
account	   in	   planning	   and	   implementation	   of	   a	   project	   of	   the	   scale	   required	   for	   GMM	   trials.	  
Appropriate	   review	   and	   application	   of	   this	   information	   will	   require,	   at	   the	   project	   level,	  
participation	  of	  team	  members	  or	  consultants	  with	  the	  necessary	  background	  and	  expertise.	  
• Task	  planning	  and	  implementation.	  Based	  on	  this	  literature,	  those	  responsible	  for	  the	  ethics	  
and	   engagement	   activities	   will	   undertake	   the	   planning	   and	   implementation	   of	   project	  
procedures.	  This	  may	  involve	  staff	  training,	  consultations,	  development	  of	  information	  about	  
the	  project	   (including	   language	  and	   culturally	   appropriate	   information	   for	   use	   in	   interacting	  
with	  residents	  at	  field	  sites),	  surveys,	  educational	  activities,	  workshops,	  negotiations,	  etc.	  	  
• Documentation	   and	   reporting.	   Record-­‐keeping	   requirements	   are	   specified	   with	   respect	   to	  
research	   involving	   human	   subjects.	   However,	   it	   must	   be	   stressed	   that	   other	   ethics	   and	  
engagement	  activities	   conducted	  under	   the	  project	  also	   should	  be	  documented	   to	  allow	   for	  
later	   reporting,	  and	  mechanisms	  should	  be	  developed	   to	  accomplish	   this.	  Records	  of	  ethical	  
deliberations	  as	  well	  as	  stakeholder	  interactions	  and	  agreements	  could	  prove	  important	  in	  the	  
case	   that	  challenges	   to	   the	  project	  arise.	  Reporting	   in	   the	   form	  of	  peer-­‐reviewed	  articles	  on	  





the	  ethics	  and	  engagement	  activities	  will	  enrich	  the	   literature	  and	  help	  with	  the	  planning	  of	  
future	  GMM	  research.	  
• Evaluation.	   Both	   internal	   and	   external	   evaluations	   of	   how	   well	   tasks	   at	   each	   of	   the	   three	  
levels	  are	  being	  performed	  should	  be	  part	  of	  the	  plan.	  One	  or	  more	  members	  of	  the	  project	  
team	  could	  potentially	  do	  internal	  evaluations,	  but	  the	  plan	  should	  specify	  such	  responsibility	  
explicitly.	  External	  evaluators	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  project	  management	  specialists,	  as	  well	  as	  
specialists	  in	  the	  ethical	  dimensions	  of	  public	  health.	  	  
• Iteration.	   Evaluation	   should	   lead	   back	   to	  methods	   development	   and	   planning.	   This	   process	  
will	  be	  repeated	  periodically	  as	  needed.	  
4.3	  Activities	  at	  the	  project	  level	  	  
Most	  scientists	  view	  their	  work	  as	  having	  value	  and	  a	  social	  purpose,	  and	  this	  may	  be	  especially	  so	  
for	   those	   conducting	   research	   on	   public	   health	   and	   disease	   control.	   However,	   scientists	   do	   not	  
always	  articulate	  the	  purpose	  of	  their	  research	  explicitly,	  or	  discuss	  its	  value	  with	  others.	  Reflection	  
is	  an	  activity	  of	  both	  articulating	  value	  and	  purpose,	  and	   initiating	  critical	  discussion	  of	   the	  project	  
among	  members	   of	   the	   project	   team.	   Reflective	   activities	   should	   encourage	  openness	   among	   the	  
research	  team	  to	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  social,	  medical	  or	  public	  health	  rationale	  for	  a	  project	  may	  
not	  be	  sufficiently	  well	  grounded	  to	  warrant	  its	  continuation.	  But	  more	  typically,	  these	  activities	  can	  
stimulate	   constant	   reconsideration	   of	   project	   aims	   and	   research	   design	   and	  methods	   to	   ensure	   a	  
continuous	  opportunity	  to	  bring	  project	  activities	  more	  fully	  in	  line	  with	  public	  health	  objectives	  and	  
social	  goals.	  	  
Making	   explicit	   the	   value	   and	   social	   purpose	   of	   a	   scientific	   research	   project	   initiates	   a	   broader	  
reflection	   that	   serves	   several	   key	   functions.	   First,	   an	   explicit	   discussion	   of	   how	   research	  will	   give	  
beneficial	   outcomes	   can	   yield	   unexpected	   improvements	   in	   project	   design.	   Conducting	   such	  
discussions	  with	  project	  team	  members,	  advisers	  and	  consultants	  increases	  the	  range	  of	  knowledge	  
and	   interests	   that	   can	   be	   incorporated	   into	   the	   research	   design,	   and	   will	   help	   to	   ensure	   that	  
important	  strategies	  or	  alternatives	  are	  not	  overlooked.	  This	  helps	  researchers	  avoid	  losing	  time	  by	  
pursuing	   strategies	   that	   may	   be	   technically	   feasible,	   but	   cannot	   be	   implemented	   due	   to	   their	  
incompatibility	  with	  social	  mores,	  legal	  mandates	  or	  other	  elements	  in	  the	  technical	  infrastructure.	  
Second,	   public	   presentations	   of	   a	   project’s	   motivation,	   goals,	   and	   ethical	   vision	   and	   explicit	  
articulations	   of	   the	   ethical	   considerations	   that	   guide	   the	   scientific	   work,	   and	   its	   relationship	   to	  
various	   social	   goals,	   disseminates	   this	   thinking	   to	   a	   broader	   audience	   and	   may	   prove	   helpful	   in	  
winning	  the	  trust	  and	  cooperation	  of	  host	  communities.	  Finally,	  the	  public	  record	  that	  is	  created	  by	  
documenting	  how	  and	  why	  the	  science	  was	  done	  creates	  an	  opportunity	  for	  others	  to	  learn.	  Canada	  
has	  pioneered	  approaches	  to	  embed	  such	  activities	  within	  large-­‐scale	  research	  projects	  dedicated	  to	  
biological	   research	   (Castle	  &	  Culver,	  2006;	  Coward,	  2006),	  and	   some	  of	   these	  may	   serve	  as	  useful	  
templates	  for	  GMM	  trials.	  
It	   is	  especially	  appropriate	   for	   researchers	  working	  on	  GMMs	  for	  disease	  control	   to	  engage	   in	  and	  
support	  such	  reflective	  activities	  within	  their	  trials.	  There	   is	  a	  well-­‐established	  record	  of	  conflicting	  
views	   on	   the	  most	   appropriate	   strategy	   for	   addressing	   persistent	   global	   health	   problems	   such	   as	  
malaria.	   Some	   authors	   express	   extreme	   skepticism	   about	   initiatives	   that	   propose	   “big	   science”	  





approaches	   (Packard,	   2007),	   as	   opposed	   to	   improved	   implementation	   of	   simpler	   and	   more	  
accessible	  local	  solutions.	  Parties	  involved	  in	  GMM	  research	  should	  be	  aware	  of	  this	  history	  and	  be	  
willing	  to	  reflect	  critically	  on	  the	  role	  of	  their	  own	  project	  in	  this	  enduring	  debate.	  Additionally,	  the	  
use	  of	  GM	  approaches	  on	  animal	  species	  provides	  these	  projects	  with	  a	  second	  linkage	  to	  research	  
traditions	  involved	  in	  well-­‐established	  debates	  (Thompson,	  2007).	  	  
Therefore,	  it	  is	  recommended	  that	  projects	  on	  GMM	  research	  include	  structured	  ethical	  reflection	  as	  
a	  specific	  and	  planned	  activity,	  and	  that	  both	  time	  and	  resources	  be	  allocated	  to	  ensure	  that	  this	  is	  
not	  neglected.	  It	  may	  be	  fully	  appropriate	  to	  schedule	  these	  activities	  in	  conjunction	  with	  key	  project	  
milestones.	  These	  should	  incorporate	  some	  form	  of	  public	  reporting	  on	  thinking	  within	  the	  project,	  
including	  “lessons	  learned”.	  Such	  public	  reporting	  might	  take	  the	  form	  of	  peer-­‐reviewed	  publications	  
in	  appropriate	  ethics	  or	  policy	  outlets,	  seminars	  or	  workshops,	  updates	  on	  the	  project	  website,	  etc.	  
(for	  example,	  see	  El-­‐Sayed	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Osrin	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Lavery	  et	  al.,	  2010a;	  McNaughton,	  2012).	  
4.4	  Activities	  at	  the	  host	  community	  level	  
To	  demonstrate	  the	  efficacy	  of	  GMMs	  for	  vector-­‐borne	  disease	  control	  the	  necessary	  trials	  are	  likely	  
to	  involve	  complex	  designs	  and	  will	  progress	  from	  purely	  entomological	  trials	  to	  trials	  involving	  the	  
measurement	  of	  epidemiological	  outcomes	  associated	  with	  GMM	  releases	  in	  defined	  areas	  (Section	  
2.	  Efficacy	  evaluation).	  At	  different	  phases	  of	  testing,	  different	  interactions	  come	  into	  play.	  
People	   living	   at	   the	   trial	   site	  may	   be	   in	   immediate	   physical	   contact	  with	   the	   research	   team,	   their	  
buildings	  and	  vehicles,	  and	  with	  any	  materials	  or	  substances	  that	  are	  released,	  intentionally	  or	  not,	  
into	  the	  environment.	  For	  GMM	  research,	  this	  includes	  the	  perceptions	  of	  people	  who	  may	  see,	  hear	  
or	   be	   bitten	   by	   any	   mosquitoes	   in	   the	   field-­‐testing	   area.	   There	   may	   be	   some	   ambiguity	   in	  
determining	  who	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  be	  affected	  in	  this	  sense,	  as	  there	  will	  be	  movement	  of	  both	  
humans	   and	   mosquitoes	   through	   the	   locale	   and	   complex	   opportunities	   for	   different	   types	   of	  
contact.	   Experience	  with	  GM	   crops	   illustrates	   the	   need	   also	   to	   consider	   the	   possibility	   that	   some	  
may	  have	  concerns	  about	   longer	  range	  economic,	  spiritual	  or	  cultural	  effects.	   Identifying	  who	  may	  
be	  affected	  by	  a	  GMM	  trial,	  and	  in	  what	  ways,	  is	  itself	  a	  key	  project	  level	  ethics	  activity.	  	  
	  How	  should	  risks	  associated	  with	  GMM	  trials	  be	  communicated?	  
GMM	  trials	  represent	  a	  challenge	  for	  conventional,	   individual-­‐focused	  research	  ethics,	  because	  the	  
associated	   interventions	   (the	   release	   of	  mosquitoes)	   are	   not	   administered	   to	   individuals,	   but	   are	  
literally	  released	  into	  communities.	  The	  interventions	  have	  their	  impact	  at	  a	  collective	  level.	  	  
Since	  mosquitoes	  are	  capable	  of	  unpredictable	  movement	  among	  locations,	  it	  will	  be	  impossible,	  in	  
advance,	   to	   identify	   all	   persons	  with	  whom	   they	  might	   come	   into	   contact.	   Indeed,	   in	   the	   general	  
case	  of	  vector	  biology	  research	   it	  has	  been	  proposed	  that	  biosafety	  oversight	   (Section	  3.	  Biosafety	  
and	   Section	  5.	   Regulatory	   frameworks)	  may	   be	   a	  more	   appropriate	  model	   than	   individual	   human	  
subjects	   protection	   (Aultman	   et	   al.,	   2000).	   Lessons	   may	   be	   taken	   from	   environmental	   health	  
programmes,	   which	   usually	   characterize	   risk	   in	   epidemiological	   terms	   that	   make	   it	   difficult	   to	  
describe	   the	   exact	   causal	   mechanisms	   of	   exposure	   or	   to	   translate	   population-­‐based	   exposure	  
calculations	   to	   the	   individual	   level.	   Such	  environmental	   risks	   typically	   are	  not	   amenable	   to	   ethical	  
procedures	  that	  presume	  an	  opportunity	  to	  exit	  or	  “opt	  out”	  of	   the	  risk-­‐bearing	  situation.	  What	   is	  





more,	   they	   raise	   considerations	   about	   the	   way	   that	   risks	   are	   distributed	   across	   economically,	  
politically	  or	  ethnically	  vulnerable	  populations—issues	  of	  environmental	  justice.	  There	  are	  no	  ready	  
analogues	  to	  environmental	  justice	  in	  standard	  human	  subjects	  research	  ethics	  (Lavery	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  
These	   similarities	   suggest	   that	   GMM	   trials,	   which	   involve	   exposure	   to	   potential	   environmental	  
hazards,	   may	   need	   to	   be	   evaluated	   from	   an	   ethical	   perspective	   that	   incorporates	   considerations	  
rarely	  contemplated	  within	  standard	  human	  subjects	  deliberations.	  
As	  the	  ethical	  evaluation	  of	  research	  places	  increasingly	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  the	  way	  that	  a	  research	  
activity	  is	  intended	  to	  benefit	  the	  parties	  that	  will	  be	  exposed	  to	  risks	  (Emanuel	  et	  al.,	  2004),	  it	  thus	  
becomes	   increasingly	   important	   to	   involve	   and	   empower	   those	   parties.	   This	   requires	   that	   the	  
relevant	   processes	   include	   adequate	   representation	   from	   the	   host	   community.	   Mechanisms	   to	  
accomplish	   this	   will	   vary	   according	   to	   location	   and	   societal	   norms.	   In	   some	   instances,	   special	  
measures	  and	   innovative	  organizational	  activities	  will	  be	  necessary,	  while	   in	  others	   it	  will	  be	  more	  
important	  to	  work	  with	  well-­‐established	  social	  and	  political	  procedures	  or	  institutions	  (McNaughton,	  
2010).	   Mechanisms	   for	   providing	   information	   on	   risk	   may	   need	   to	   be	   tailored	   to	   local	   cultural	  
practices	   and	   levels	   of	   linguistic	   and	   mathematical	   literacy	   (Shapiro	   &	   Meslin,	   2001).	   Greater	  
attention	  to	  these	  processes	  in	  research	  ethics	  review	  can	  help	  to	  avoid	  circumstances	  in	  which	  host	  
communities	   are	   simply	  passive	   recipients	  of	   activities	  designed	  and	  delivered	  by	  others	   (Crocker,	  
2008).	  	  
Informed	  consent	  in	  GMM	  trials	  
Informed	   consent	   is	   a	   process	   intended	   to	   ensure	   that	   human	   subjects	   who	   will	   be	   observed	   or	  
involved	  in	  a	  research	  activity	  are	  fully	  and	  explicitly	  advised	  of	  all	  risks,	  costs	  or	  inconveniences	  they	  
may	  bear	  as	  a	  result	  of	  participating	  as	  a	  research	  subject,	  and	  voluntarily	  agree	  to	  accept	  or	  bear	  
those	  risks	  and	  costs.	  Some	  commentators	  have	  argued	  that	  informed	  consent	  will	  be	  necessary	  to	  
ensure	   that	  GMM	  trials	   are	   conducted	  ethically.	  However,	   the	  precise	   circumstances	  under	  which	  
informed	  consent	  must	  be	  obtained,	  and	  from	  whom,	  require	  careful	  consideration.	  
Informed	   consent	   is	   universally	   recognized	   in	   research	   ethics	   regulations	   and	   guidelines	   as	   a	  
necessary	  protection	  for	  human	  research	  participants	  (Section	  5.	  Regulatory	  frameworks).	  Research	  
ethics	  guidelines	  and	  regulations	  generally	  rely	  on	  four	  criteria	  to	  determine	  whether	  an	  individual	  is	  
a	  research	  participant,	  and	  therefore	  should	  normally	  give	  informed	  consent	  as	  a	  condition	  of	  their	  
participation:	  (1)	  if	  an	  individual	  is	  directly	  intervened	  upon	  by	  an	  investigator;	  (2)	  if	  an	  individual	  is	  
deliberately	  intervened	  upon	  via	  manipulation	  of	  the	  individual’s	  environment	  by	  an	  investigator;	  (3)	  
if	   an	   individual	   interacts	   with	   an	   investigator	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   collecting	   data;	   or	   (4)	   if	   an	  
investigator	   obtains	   identifiable	   private	   information	   about	   the	   individual	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	  
collecting	  data	  (McRae	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  
Caged-­‐field	  trials	  or	  open	  releases	  of	  GMMs	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  research	  trial	  would	  not	  satisfy	  the	  
requirements	  of	  the	  first	  two	  criteria,	  since	  no	  individual	  is	  intervened	  upon	  directly	  or	  deliberately,	  
even	  if	  they	  live	  in	  close	  proximity	  to	  the	  cages	  or	  release	  sites.	  The	  third	  and	  fourth	  criteria	  focus	  on	  
the	   interactions	  between	   investigators	  and	   individuals	  who	  play	  some	  special	  role	   in	  generating	  or	  
facilitating	  the	  collection	  of	  study	  data.	  





In	  GMM	  trials	  there	  is	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  interactions	  with	  the	  host	  community,	  but	  only	  a	  select	  few	  
that	  are	  associated	  with	  data	  collection.	  In	  early	  phase	  trials,	  this	  would	  pertain	  to	  individuals	  who	  
agree	   to	   complete	   surveys	   or	   participate	   in	   interviews	   for	   research	   purposes	   associated	  with	   the	  
GMM	   trial.	   It	  would	   also	   pertain	   to	   those	   homeowners	  who	   agree	   to	   the	   placement	   of	  mosquito	  
traps	  for	  monitoring	  purposes,	  or	  who	  permit	  researchers	  access	  to	  their	  homes	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  
collecting	  mosquitoes.	  In	  particular,	  mosquito	  collection	  in	  homes	  for	  research	  purposes	  is	   likely	  to	  
be	   linked	   to	  global	  positioning	  system	   (GPS)	  data,	  which	  would	  be	   required	   for	   spatial	  analyses	  of	  
the	  spread	  and	  species	  composition	  of	  mosquitoes	  after	  releases.	  When	  these	  GPS	  data	  are	  highly	  
precise,	  they	  will	  effectively	  tie	  the	  associated	  mosquito	  data	  to	  specific	  households,	  thus	  rendering	  
the	  data	   identifiable	  at	   this	   level	  even	   if	   they	  are	  not	  personal	   in	  nature.	  Since	   it	   is	   the	  household	  
that	   is	   identified,	   and	   not	   an	   individual,	   the	   consent	   of	   the	   head	   of	   the	   household	   or	   her/his	  
designate	   is	   more	   appropriate	   than	   a	   requirement	   for	   all	   members	   of	   the	   household	   to	   provide	  
informed	   consent.	   And	   given	   the	   extremely	   low	   levels	   of	   risk	   associated	  with	   these	   types	   of	   data	  
collection	   activities,	   institutional	   review	   boards	   might	   further	   consider	   modifications	   of	   normal	  
consent	  procedures,	  such	  as	  verbal	  consent	  or	  full	  waivers	  of	  informed	  consent,	  as	  long	  as	  all	  other	  
necessary	  permissions	  and	  protections	  have	  been	  secured.	  	  
As	   trials	   progress	   from	   primarily	   entomological	   endpoint	   designs	   to	   incorporate	   epidemiological	  
endpoints,	   such	   as	   incidence	   of	   new	   infections	   with	   dengue	   or	   malaria,	   they	   will	   require	   the	  
collection	  of	  blood	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  clinical	  data.	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  data	  collected	  will	  constitute	  
identifiable	  personal	  information	  and	  individual	  informed	  consent	  will	  be	  required.	  	  
Two	  general	  conclusions	  follow	  from	  this	  analysis.	  First,	  simply	  living	  in	  the	  vicinity	  of	  a	  GMM	  release	  
is	   not	   sufficient	   grounds	   to	   require	   informed	   consent	   from	   any	   individual	   for	   an	   open	   release	   of	  
mosquitoes.	   Second,	   the	   interactions	   with	   individuals	   and	   households	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   data	  
collection	   in	   trials	  with	  both	  entomological	  and	  epidemiological	  endpoints	  are	   likely	   to	  give	  rise	   to	  
individual,	  or	  household-­‐level	  identifiable	  data	  and,	  therefore,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  specific	  exceptions	  
or	  waivers,	  will	  require	  informed	  consent.	  
What	  constitutes	  adequate	  authorization	  from	  participating	  communities	  to	  conduct	  the	  trial?	  
As	   described	   above,	   informed	   consent	   will	   be	   required	   in	   some	   circumstances,	   and	   it	   also	   is	  
expected	   that	  GMM	   trials	  will	   require	   formal	   authorization	   by	   relevant	   government	   authorities	   in	  
recognition	   of	   the	   country’s	   sovereignty	   (Section	   5.	   Regulatory	   frameworks).	   However,	   these	   two	  
levels	   of	   formal	   permission	   may	   still	   not	   fully	   acknowledge	   the	   range	   of	   interactions,	   rights	   and	  
interests	  within	  the	  host	  community.	  Measures	  necessary	  to	  fill	  this	  gap	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  being	  
guided	  by	   the	   informed	   consent	   goal	   of	   protecting	   the	   interests	   of	   those	  who	  will	   be	   affected	  by	  
research.	   But	   they	   may	   need	   to	   use	   alternative	   mechanisms	   for	   communicating	   the	   aims	   and	  
methods	  of	  the	  science,	  and	  the	  potential	  risks	  and	  benefits	  of	  the	  project	  at	  a	  broader	  level,	  and	  for	  
achieving	   sufficient	  assurance	   that	   the	   community	  has	  agreed	   that	   the	   research	  and	  public	  health	  
interventions	  should	  take	  place.	  	  
Community	   authorization	   and	   informed	   consent	   share	   several	   key	   elements.	   Both	   promote	   a	  
deliberative	  model	  for	  addressing	  ethical	  issues	  that	  arise	  in	  connection	  with	  research.	  Rather	  than	  
relying	   on	   strict	   rules	   or	   criteria	   that	  must	   be	   followed,	   the	   deliberative	   approach	  mandates	   that	  
ethical	   issues	  be	   considered	  before	   the	   research	   is	   actually	  undertaken	  and	  periodically	   reviewed.	  





Both	  are	  intended	  as	  a	  mechanism	  for	  demonstrating	  respect	  for	  persons	  who	  will	  be	  affected	  by	  a	  
research	   project	   or	   a	   public	   health	   intervention.	   Both	   imply	   “voice”,	   an	   opportunity	   to	   express	  
concerns	  and	  to	  receive	  replies	  that	  are	  addressed	  specifically	  to	  these	  concerns.	  A	  reply	  might	  take	  
the	  form	  of	  assurances	  or	  clarification	  of	  activities	  and/or	  risks,	  yet	  for	  the	  conditions	  of	  voice	  to	  be	  
met	   fully,	   affected	   parties	   must	   accept	   the	   assurances	   offered	   as	   a	   satisfactory	   response	   to	  
concerns.	   Response	   also	   might	   involve	   modifications	   to	   the	   plan	   that	   relieve	   concerns,	   such	   as	  
additions	  to	  RA	  or	  RM	  activities.	  	  
Community	   authorization	   differs	   from	   informed	   consent	   in	   at	   least	   three	   key	   respects.	   First,	   the	  
methods	  of	  informed	  consent	  that	  have	  dominated	  discussion	  of	  research	  ethics	  in	  the	  industrialized	  
world	   assume	   that	   consent	   is	   given	   or	   withheld	   by	   individuals.	   When	   possible,	   the	   individual	   in	  
question	  is	  the	  person	  who	  bears	  the	  risks,	  but	  in	  cases	  of	  children	  or	  people	  who	  are	  incapacitated,	  
a	  third	  party	  is	  authorized	  to	  give	  or	  withhold	  consent	  on	  their	  behalf.	  Community	  authorization	  is	  a	  
procedure	  intended	  to	  elicit	  agreement	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  group,	  often	  a	  political	  community	  such	  as	  a	  
neighbourhood	  or	   township.	  Thus,	  procedures	   for	   community	  authorization	  more	   typically	   rely	  on	  
norms	   for	   group	   decision-­‐making	   such	   as	   voting,	   consensus	   or	   negotiations	   with	   leaders	   and	  
representatives	  who	  are	  recognized	  as	  having	  the	  authority	  to	  speak	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  community	  as	  
a	  whole.	  Since	  norms	  for	  group	  decision-­‐making	  vary	  widely,	  it	  is	  especially	  critical	  that	  procedures	  
for	  identifying	  leaders	  and	  representatives,	  or	  for	  interacting	  with	  community	  groups,	  are	  based	  on	  
detailed	   knowledge	   of	   the	   locale,	   its	   traditions	   and	   its	   history	   of	   cooperation,	   exploitation	   and	  
conflict	  resolution	  (Christakas,	  1992).	  
Second,	   even	  where	   there	   are	   established	   leaders	   and	   decision-­‐makers	   in	   the	   host	   communities,	  
GMM	   trials	   are	   likely	   to	   involve	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   interests	   spread	   across	   a	   number	   of	   different	  
groups,	   not	   all	   of	  which	  will	   be	   governed	  by	   the	   same	   leaders.	  As	   a	   result,	   researchers	   should	  be	  
wary	  of	  assuming	  uncritically	  that	  any	  one	  decision-­‐maker	  can	  provide	  definitive	  representation	  of	  a	  
host	  community.	  One	  key	   implication	   for	  authorization	   is	   that,	  unlike	   individual	   informed	  consent,	  
there	  may	  not	  be	  one	  specific	  mechanism	  or	  point	  in	  time	  in	  which	  authorization	  is	  granted.	  Instead,	  
it	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   more	   of	   a	   judgement	   on	   the	   part	   of	   researchers	   that	   they	   have	   exercised	   the	  
appropriate	   level	  of	  diligence	   in	  eliciting	  and	   responding	   to	   the	   concerns	  of	   the	   interested	  parties	  
and	   groups,	   and	   vigilance	   in	  maintaining	   the	   necessary	   commitments	   and	   relationships	   once	   it	   is	  
determined	  that	  there	  is	  a	  general	  collective	  will	  to	  proceed.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  specific	  mechanism,	  
authorization	   may	   represent	   an	   accumulation	   of	   endorsements	   or	   assent	   by	   key	   stakeholders.	  
Collectively,	   these	   activities,	   which	   are	   sustained	   over	   the	   full	   duration	   of	   the	   GMM	   trial,	   from	  
planning	   to	  post-­‐trial	  negotiations,	   constitute	  community	  engagement,	  which	   is	  described	   in	  more	  
detail	  below.	  
Third,	   unlike	   individual	   informed	   consent	   in	   most	   biomedical	   research	   trials,	   community	  
engagement	  and	  authorization	  by	  the	  community	  for	  GMM	  trials	  will	  probably	  not	  be	  sufficient	  on	  
their	   own	   to	   allow	   trials	   to	   proceed.	   There	   will	   usually	   be	   a	   need	   to	   secure	   formal	   government	  
permission	  to	   import	  the	  GMMs	  to	  be	  used	  in	  the	  trials	  and	  to	  begin	  the	  planned	  trials	  (Section	  5.	  
Regulatory	  frameworks).	  Community	  authorization	  may	  play	  a	  role	  in	  regulatory	  decision-­‐making.	  
	  
	  






Community	   engagement	   is	   fundamental	   to	   the	   process	   of	   obtaining	   community	   authorization.	  
Engagement	   and	   involvement	   with	   the	   communities	   hosting	   the	   GMM	   trials	   must	   be	   guided	   by	  
detailed	  knowledge	  of	  the	  local	  community,	  its	  institutions	  and	  common	  practices.	  Finding	  out	  about	  
the	   kinds	   of	   concerns	   the	   community	   might	   have,	   about	   any	   past	   negative	   engagements,	   or	  
determining	   what	   the	   community	   wants/expects	   in	   terms	   of	   engagement	   or	   consent	   will	   be	  
important	   (McNaughton	   et	   al.,	   2010).	   Such	   information	   is	   best	   obtained	   through	   ongoing	  
relationships	   and/or	   extended	   ethnographic	   work	   with	   individuals	   from	   different	   social	   classes,	  
gender,	   occupation	   and	   social	   role.	   Establishment	   of	   the	   necessary	   relationships,	   which	   will	   be	  
unique	  to	  each	  setting	  in	  which	  GMM	  trials	  will	  be	  conducted,	  will	  be	  critical	  to	  putting	  in	  place	  an	  
appropriate	   process	   of	   ethical	   review	   and	   engagement,	   especially	   in	   the	   early	   stages	   of	   testing	  
(Hyder	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Marsh	  et	  al.,	  2011).	   In	  many	  cases,	  particularly	   in	  more	  traditional	  community	  
settings,	  community	  leaders	  may	  play	  a	  central	  role	  in	  introducing	  the	  researchers	  to	  the	  community	  
and	  its	  social	  structures	  (Tindana	  et	  al.,	  2011)	  and	  in	  providing	  various	  levels	  of	  ethical	  scrutiny	  and	  
permission	  (Diallo	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  
At	   the	  most	   general	   level	   of	   description,	   community	   engagement	   is	   a	   set	  of	   procedures	   and	   their	  
motivating	   ethical	   goals	   that	   aim	   to	   develop	   fair	   and	   respectful	   collaborative	   interactions	   with	  
communities	  around	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  new	  technology	  or	  intervention.	  It	  is	  carried	  out	  in	  a	  way	  
that	   protects	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   community	   while	   permitting	   the	   introduction	   and	   testing	   of	  
promising	  new	  technologies	  to	   improve	  health.	  Detailed	  guidance	  about	  what	  constitutes	  effective	  
community	   engagement	   is	   still	   under	   development.	   However,	   one	   of	   the	   first	   frameworks	   for	  
community	   engagement	   in	   global	   health	   research	   was	   developed	   specifically	   for	   GMM	   research	  
(Lavery	   et	   al.,	   2010b),	   and	   is	   a	   potentially	   very	   useful	   resource	   for	   the	   design	   of	   community	  
engagement	   activities	   to	   support	   authorization	   from	   host	   communities	   for	   early	   stage	   trials	   (Box	  
4.1).	   This	   study	   also	   addressed	   the	   issue	   of	   how	   to	   define	   the	   community	   for	   purposes	   of	  
engagement,	  citing	  two	  principles:	  1)	  the	  community	  comprises	  at	  least	  those	  individuals	  who	  share	  
identified	   risks	   associated	   with	   the	   proposed	   research	   project;	   and	   2)	   there	   may	   not	   be	   a	   pre-­‐
existing	   and	   established	   community	   as	   envisioned	   by	   the	   researchers,	   but	   rather,	   the	   relevant	  
community	   may	   take	   form	   progressively	   in	   response	   to	   specific	   aspects	   of	   the	   research,	   and	   to	  
engagement	  activities	  associated	  with	  the	  project	  (Lavery	  et	  al.,	  2010b).	  
Host	   communities	   for	   GMM	   trials	   will	   most	   likely	   have	   multiple	   "layers"	   of	   authority,	   such	   as	   a	  
municipal	   council,	   a	   Chief,	   village	   elders,	   a	   chamber	   of	   commerce,	   a	   farmers’	   association,	   or	   a	  
household.	  Each	  must	  effectively	  give	  its	  permission	  for	  a	  trial	  to	  proceed.	  This	  permission	  is	  seldom	  
determined	   in	  a	   single	  decision,	  but	   rather	  demonstrated	  and	  expressed	  over	   time	   in	   the	  ongoing	  
willingness	  to	  cooperate	  and	  participate	  with	  the	  trial	  in	  various	  ways,	  or	  not	  to	  actively	  oppose	  it.	  	  






Within	  the	  community	  engagement	  framework	  proposed	  by	  Lavery	  et	  al.	  (2010b)	  (Box	  4.1),	  items	  ii–
x	  address	  specific	  needs	  for	  information	  or	  activities	  that	  will	  almost	  certainly	  need	  to	  be	  supervised	  
by	   persons	   with	   training	   in	   appropriate	   field	   disciplines	   in	   the	   social	   sciences.	   Persons	   who	   are	  
naturally	   fluent	   in	   language,	   local	   tradition	   and	   customs,	   and	   who	   can	   translate	   between	   the	  
community	  and	  a	  research	  team	  while	  effectively	  communicating	  risk	  are	  rare.	  Furthermore,	  these	  
individuals	   will	   need	   to	   commit	   a	   significant	   amount	   of	   time	   to	   activities	   within	   the	   local	  
communities,	  and	   these	  activities	  will	   require	  a	   significant	   financial	   commitment	   from	  the	  project.	  
The	   composition	   of	   the	   research	   team	   should	   reflect	   the	   process	   for	   engaging	   with	   local	  
communities,	   gathering	   this	   information	   and	   integrating	   it	   into	   the	   project’s	   planning	   and	  
deliberation	   process.	   Depending	   on	   the	   competencies	   of	   both	   project	   staff	   and	   locally	   affected	  
parties,	   it	   may	   be	   appropriate	   to	   include	   representatives	   of	   affected	   groups	   within	   the	   project’s	  
governance	  mechanisms.	  	   	  
4.5	  Activities	  at	  the	  third	  party	  level	  	  	  
Those	  with	   interests	   in	  GMM	  trials	  will	  probably	  not	  be	   limited	  to	   individuals	  and	  households	  with	  
the	  closest	  geographical	  proximity	  to	  the	  trial	  sites.	  Instead,	  there	  may	  be	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  individuals	  
and	   groups	   with	   a	   legitimate	   interest	   in	   the	   conduct	   and	   outcomes	   of	   the	   trials.	   Relevant	   third	  
parties	  may	  include	  the	  following	  groups:	  
• persons	   associated	   with	   global	   or	   regional	   public	   health	   and	   international	   development	  
organizations,	  including	  governments;	  
• scientists	  and	  members	  of	  scientific	  organizations	  with	  disciplinary	  or	  trans-­‐disciplinary	  links	  
to	   research	  activities	  associated	  with	   field-­‐testing	  activities,	   including	   sciences	  dedicated	   to	  
public	  health	  and	  infectious	  disease;	  
Box	  4.1	  Points	  to	  consider	  for	  effective	  community	  engagement	  
(i)	  Rigorous	  site-­‐selection	  procedures.	  
(ii)	  Early	  initiation	  of	  community	  engagement	  activities.	  
(iii)	  Characterize	  and	  build	  knowledge	  of	  the	  community,	  its	  diversity	  and	  its	  changing	  needs.	  
(iv)	  Ensure	  the	  purpose	  and	  goals	  of	  the	  research	  are	  clear	  to	  the	  community.	  
(v)	  Provide	  information	  about	  the	  research.	  
(vi)	  Establish	  relationships	  and	  commitments	  to	  build	  trust	  with	  relevant	  authorities	  in	  the	  community:	  
formal,	  informal	  and	  traditional.	  
(vii)	  Understand	  community	  perceptions	  and	  attitudes	  about	  the	  proposed	  research.	  
(viii)	  Identify,	  mobilize	  and	  develop	  relevant	  community	  assets	  and	  capacity.	  
(ix)	  Maximize	  opportunities	  for	  stewardship,	  ownership,	  and	  shared	  control	  by	  the	  community.	  
(x)	  Ensure	  adequate	  opportunities	  and	  respect	  for	  dissenting	  opinions.	  
(xi)	  Secure	  permission/authorization	  from	  the	  community.	  
(xii)	  Review,	  evaluate	  and	  if	  necessary,	  modify	  engagement	  strategies.	  
Source:	  Lavery	  et	  al.	  (2010b).	  





• persons	   and	   organizations	   engaged	   in	   competing	   approaches	   to	   the	   control	   of	   infectious	  
diseases;	  
• members	   of	   organizations	   focused	   on	   promoting	   the	   interests	   and	   protecting	   the	   rights	   of	  
poor	  and/or	  historically	  marginalized	  people;	  
• members	   of	   organizations	   dedicated	   to	   the	   preservation	   of	   endangered	   species,	   genetic	  
diversity	  and	  threatened	  ecosystems;	  
• members	   of	   organizations	  with	   a	   history	   of	  monitoring	   the	   role	   of	   the	   sciences	   in	   debates	  
over	  the	  use	  of	  biotechnology;	  
• individuals	  and	  organizations	  with	  ties	  to	  national,	  regional	  and	  cultural	  groups	  active	  in	  the	  
areas	  where	  field	  testing	  is	  occurring;	  	  
• international	  organizations	  such	  as	  those	  within	  the	  United	  Nations	  system.	  
Some	  of	   these	  groups	  and	  the	   individuals	   involved	  with	  them	  may	  have	  either	   formal	  or	   relatively	  
well-­‐established	  ways	   to	   express	   views	   on	  GMM	  projects	   intended	   for	   controlling	   disease	   vectors	  
and	   to	   interact	   with	   project	   staff,	   while	   others	   may	   not.	   In	   light	   of	   experiences	   with	   the	   global	  
controversy	   over	   GMOs,	   it	   is	   wise	   from	   both	   an	   ethical	   and	   a	   strategic	   perspective	   for	   any	  
community	   engagement	   framework	   to	   include	   mechanisms	   and	   procedures	   for	   systematically	  
engaging	  with	  third	  parties.	  	  
There	   is	   not	   the	   same	   level	   of	   obligation	   to	   seek	   third	   parties	   out	   proactively	   to	   ensure	   they	   are	  
informed	  about	  the	  project,	  as	  is	  the	  case	  with	  those	  that	  may	  be	  affected	  by	  virtue	  of	  proximity	  to	  a	  
trial	  (formal	  interactions	  with	  government	  authorities	  required	  for	  regulatory	  approval	  are	  covered	  
under	   Section	   5.	   Regulatory	   frameworks).	   However,	   interaction	   with	   third	   parties	   is	   ethically	  
responsible	  because	  the	  parties	  listed	  above	  have	  legitimate	  interests	  in	  the	  conduct	  and	  outcomes	  
of	   GMM	   field	   testing.	   In	   order	   to	   fully	   satisfy	   the	   ethical	   requirement	   of	   respect	   for	   the	   relevant	  
communities,	   the	   project	   team	   must	   develop	   and	   implement	   planned	   activities	   to	   consider	   the	  
interests	   of	   third	   parties	   and	   engage	   with	   them	   in	   a	   respectful	   manner.	   The	   team	   must	   also	  
determine	  when	  duties	  to	  consider	  the	  interests	  of	  third	  parties	  or	  involve	  them	  in	  project	  decision-­‐
making	   or	   oversight	   are	   overridden	   by	   more	   compelling	   concerns	   or	   ethical	   responsibilities.	  
Engagement	  with	  third	  parties	  could	  grow	  to	  the	  point	  that	  the	  cost	  in	  time	  and	  resources	  hampers	  
other	  aspects	  of	   the	  project.	  The	  ethical	   responsibility	   to	   inform	  and	  engage	  third	  parties	  must	  be	  
balanced	   against	   the	   need	   to	   utilize	   time	   and	   other	   resources	   in	   completing	   the	   project’s	   overall	  
goals.	   Undertaking	   a	   process	   of	   stakeholder	   analysis	   early	   in	   the	   project	   may	   be	   helpful	   in	   this	  
regard,	  by	   facilitating	   the	   identification	  of	   third	  parties	  most	   likely	   to	   influence	   the	   success	  of	   the	  
project	  (Bryson,	  2004).	  	  
In	   addition	   to	   being	   ethically	   responsible,	   engagement	   with	   third	   parties	   may	   be	   of	   strategic	  
importance	   to	   the	   project’s	   success.	   Third	   parties	   may	   have	   information	   or	   comments	   that	   can	  
materially	   improve	  project	  activities.	  Their	  support	  and	  good	  wishes	  may	  contribute	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  
activities	  ranging	  from	  securing	  funding	  or	  regulatory	  approvals	  to	  facilitating	  interactions	  with	  other	  
scientists,	  suppliers,	  publication	  outlets	  and	   local	  officials.	  Strategically	  motivated	   interactions	  with	  
third	  parties	  are	  an	  inherent	  part	  of	  science	  (Latour,	  1987;	  Collins	  &	  Pinch,	  2002)	  and	  should	  not	  be	  
regarded	   with	   skepticism.	   Scientists	   are	   adept	   at	   some	   strategic	   interactions,	   especially	   those	  
relating	   to	   their	   disciplinary	   colleagues,	   but	   can	   be	   inept	   at	   others.	   In	   the	   history	   of	   agricultural	  
biotechnology,	   for	   example,	  many	   avoidable	  misunderstandings	   and	  much	  mistrust	   occurred.	   This	  





was	  because	  scientists	   in	  both	  public	  and	  private	  sector	  positions	  were	   insensitive	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  
consumers	   and	   environmental	   advocates	   perceived	   themselves	   to	   have	   legitimate	   interests	   that	  
were	   being	   neglected	   in	   the	   process	   of	   developing	   transgenic	   seeds	   and	   animal	   drugs	   (Charles,	  
2001).	  What	   is	  needed	  for	  strategic	  management	   is	  a	  broadening	  of	  the	  perspective	  that	  scientists	  
bring	   to	   their	   research	   to	   include	   an	   effort	   to	   understand	   and	   then	   interact	   with	   people	   holding	  
perspectives	   on	   the	   research	   project	   that	  may	   initially	   seem	   to	   be	   unrelated	   to,	   or	   at	   odds	  with,	  
those	  of	  the	  scientific	  team.	  	  
The	  mechanisms	  for	  accomplishing	  this	  kind	  of	  broader	  outreach	  and	  engagement	  are	  still	  not	  well	  
understood.	   One	   lesson	   that	   is	   now	   well	   established	   is	   that	   this	   kind	   of	   activity	   should	   not	   be	  
conceptualized	  solely	  in	  terms	  of	  public	  education,	  or	  of	  simply	  informing	  third	  parties	  of	  things	  that	  
the	  researchers	  know	  about	  GMM	  and	  vector	  control.	  Communications	  launched	  with	  this	  so-­‐called	  
“deficit	  model”	   of	   public	   engagement	   have	   been	   shown	   to	   not	   only	   fail,	   but	   also	   to	   substantially	  
increase	  opposition	  and	  mistrust,	  (Klienman,	  Eisenberg	  &	  Good,	  1978;	  Wynne,	  1996;	  Hansen	  et	  al.,	  
2003;	  Gjerris,	  2008;	  Toumey,	  2009).	  Rather,	   it	   is	  crucial	  to	  develop	  mechanisms	  of	   interaction	  with	  
third	  parties	  that	  are	  based	  on	  what	  Pielke	  (2007)	  calls	  “the	  honest	  broker”	  approach.	  The	  keys	  to	  
this	  approach	  are	   to	   first	   recognize	   that	   third	  party	   interests	   reflect	  values-­‐based	  standpoints	   that	  
inform	   the	   way	   that	   a	   scientific	   research	   project	   is	   going	   to	   be	   seen	   as	   either	   responsive	   to	   a	  
problem	   or,	   alternatively,	   as	   contributing	   to	   a	   problem.	   Second,	   it	   is	   critical	   to	   develop	  
communication	   materials	   about	   the	   project	   that	   are	   framed	   in	   response	   to	   these	   values-­‐based	  
perspectives.	  Putatively	  “neutral”	  descriptions	  of	  projects	  may	  fail	  to	  provide	  information	  that	  allows	  
third	  parties	  to	  gain	  a	  clear	  understanding	  of	  why	  the	  research	  is	  relevant	  to	  them.	  If	  such	  materials	  
are	  disseminated	   to	  parties	   that	   are	   already	   suspicious	  or	   skeptical	   of	   a	  project,	   they	   can	  actually	  
exacerbate	   feelings	   of	   mistrust.	   Finally,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   present	   a	   picture	   of	   the	   research	   that	  
includes	   both	   strengths	  and	  weaknesses	   relative	   to	   the	   values	   perspective	   that	  would	  motivate	   a	  
third	   party	   to	   take	   an	   interest	   in	   it.	   While	   such	   a	   communications	   strategy	   should	   strive	   to	   be	  
complete,	  it	  should	  also	  be	  sensitive	  to	  the	  need	  for	  concise	  treatment	  focusing	  on	  the	  problem	  at	  
hand.	  
Thus,	  projects	  should	  include	  a	  general	  communications	  strategy	  based	  on	  Pielke’s	  principles	  (2007).	  
These	  communications	  can	  be	  disseminated	  through	  an	  array	  of	  media,	   including	  the	   Internet	  and	  
through	  presentations	  at	  professional	  or	  public	  meetings	  relevant	  to	  key	  interests	  (e.g.	  environment,	  
public	  health,	  poverty	  and	  development,	  science	  policy).	  Other	  strategies	  for	  engagement	  with	  the	  
public	  utilize	  universities,	  television	  and	  science	  museums	  (Wilsdon	  &	  Willis,	  2003).	  	  
Once	  a	  public	  engagement	  strategy	  has	  been	  launched,	  there	  should	  be	  opportunities	  for	  follow-­‐up	  
activities.	  These	  could	   include	  provision	   for	   the	  submission	  of	  comments	  and	  questions,	  but	  might	  
also	   involve	  more	  extended	  interactions.	   It	   is	  crucial	  that	  third	  parties	   invited	   into	  engagements	  of	  
this	  sort	  are	  not	  made	  to	  feel	  that	  they	  are	  being	  placated,	  simply	  tolerated	  or,	  even	  worse,	  that	  the	  
engagement	   is	   simply	  a	   stalling	   tactic	  with	   little	   genuine	  opportunity	   for	   third	  parties	   to	  have	  any	  
substantive	  input	  (for	  example,	  Griffiths	  &	  Steinbrecher,	  2010).	  
Just	   as	   with	   discharging	   responsibilities	   for	   engagement	   with	   those	   immediately	   affected	   by	  
research,	   engagement	   with	   third	   parties	   will	   be	   more	   effective	   if	   researchers	   and/or	   consultants	  
with	   specialized	   skills	   are	   part	   of	   the	   project	   team.	  As	   such,	   there	   should	   be	   a	   component	   of	   the	  
research	  activity	   that	   is	  designed	  and	  dedicated	  to	   third	  party	  engagement.	   It	   should	  be	  equipped	  





with	  adequate	  personnel	  and	  budget,	  and	  this	  should	  include	  some	  time	  and	  energy	  commitments	  
from	   leaders	   in	   the	   biological	   science	   component	   of	   the	   research.	   This	   is	   an	   important	   point	   for	  
funders	  of	  GMM	  trials	  to	  understand,	  as	  these	  types	  of	  communications	  activities	  are	  not	  a	  standard	  
component	  of	  research	  budgets.	  	  
4.6	  	  When	  should	  ethics	  and	  engagement	  activities	  take	  place?	  
The	  timing	  for	  tasks	  such	  as	  securing	  authorization	  and	  support	  from	  those	  that	  will	  be	  affected	  by	  
the	  research	  will	  probably	  be	   implicit	  within	  the	  nature	  and	  goals	  of	  the	  activity.	   It	   is	   important	  to	  
stress	  that	  these	  procedures	  must	  be	  organized	  and	  conducted	  before	  they	  have	  an	  actual	  impact	  on	  
affected	  parties.	  However,	  agreement	  secured	  too	  far	  in	  advance	  will	  simply	  need	  to	  be	  renewed,	  as	  
people	  change	  their	  minds.	  Similarly,	  there	  will	  be	  a	  need	  to	  plan	  efforts	  to	  revisit	  these	  tasks	  over	  
the	  course	  of	  the	  project.	  	  
Phase	  1–2	  trials	  
The	  traditional	  model	  of	  engagement	  and	  outreach	  for	  scientific	  research	  that	  held	  sway	  for	  the	  first	  
half	   of	   the	   20th	   century	   would	   have	   envisioned	   little	   need	   for	   engagement	   activity	   at	   the	   early	  
stages	  of	   research,	  up	   to	  and	   including	   field	   testing	   for	   agricultural	  or	  public	  health	   interventions.	  
According	  to	  this	  view,	  the	  public	  did	  not	  need	  to	  be	  particularly	  aware	  of	  a	  research	  activity	  until	  
their	  help	  or	  cooperation	  was	  needed	  in	  actually	  undertaking	  a	  large-­‐scale	  intervention.	  However,	  as	  
cognizance	  of	  risks	  to	  human	  research	  subjects	  grew,	  and	  standards	  for	  procuring	  cooperation	  and	  
consent	  began	  to	  develop,	  researchers	  recognized	  that	  there	  were	  key	  activities	  needed	  to	   inform	  
and	   involve	   affected	   parties,	   even	   at	   this	   relatively	   preliminary	   stage	   of	   research.	  While	   it	   is	   less	  
likely	   that	  major	   controversies	  would	   erupt	   before	   field	   testing,	   the	   complexity	   of	  GMM	   research	  
suggests	   that	   it	   is	   advisable	   for	   researchers	   to	   commence	   the	   “broader	   issues”	   engagement	  
component	   as	   early	   as	   possible,	   and	   certainly	   before	   Phase	   1	   proof-­‐of-­‐concept	   work	   has	   been	  
completed.	   This	   could	   be	   done,	   for	   example,	   by	   collaborating	   on	   a	   publication	   that	   discusses	   the	  
ethical	   rationale	  behind	  proof-­‐of-­‐concept	  work.	  Need	  for	  stakeholder	  engagement	  and	  community	  
authorization	   activities	   would	   be	   expected	   to	   arise	   in	   Phase	   2	   of	   the	   proposed	   GMM-­‐testing	  
pathway.	  






A	   few	   key	   episodes	   in	   field-­‐testing	   have	   demonstrated	   how	   poorly	   executed	   public	   relations	   and	  
engagement	   strategies	   can	   sabotage	   research	   efforts,	   sometimes	   having	   extremely	   long-­‐lasting	  
effects.	  Particularly	  relevant	  to	  GMM	  field	  testing	  is	  an	  episode	  that	  occurred	  in	  conjunction	  with	  a	  
field	  release	  of	  male	  sterile	  mosquitoes	  as	  a	  component	  of	  research	  on	  vector	  control	  in	  India	  (Box	  
4.3).	   A	   cooperative	   project	   involving	   scientists	   from	   India	   and	   the	   USA,	   among	   others,	   was	  
conducting	   field	   trials	  with	  male	   sterile	  mosquitoes	   as	   basic	   research	   that	   could	   be	   adapted	   to	   a	  
number	   of	   disease	   control	   situations.	   However,	   suspicions	   were	   raised	   both	   locally	   and	   in	   the	  
national	   press	   about	   the	   nature	   and	   intent	   of	   this	   research,	   which	   were	   exacerbated	   by	   poor	  
communications,	  and	  the	  project	  was	  unable	  to	  continue	  (Anonymous,	  1975).	  This	  episode	  has	  been	  
repeatedly	   cited	   by	   those	   who	   warn	   that	   GMM	   field	   testing	   must	   be	   accompanied	   by	   effective	  
efforts	  to	  engage	  both	  local	  individuals	  in	  areas	  where	  field	  trials	  will	  be	  conducted	  and	  also	  activists	  
self-­‐identified	   as	   promoting	   pro-­‐poor,	   pro-­‐environmental	   issues	   and	   democratization	   of	   science	  
initiatives	  (Benedict	  &	  Robinson,	  2003;	  Curtis,	  2006;	  Knols	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  
These	   incidents	   illustrate	  why	   adequate	   plans	   for	   communication	   and	   engagement	   are	   important	  
even	   at	   the	   early	   field-­‐testing	   stage.	   This	   brief	   history	   of	   unfortunate	   episodes	   testifies	   to	   the	  
potential	   for	   misunderstandings	   that	   can	   cause	   irreparable	   damage	   to	   specific	   research	   efforts.	  
What	  is	  more,	  knowledge	  of	  these	  cases	  inclines	  some	  public	  advocates	  to	  be	  highly	  skeptical	  of	  the	  
intentions	   and	   ability	   of	   scientific	   research	   efforts	   to	   respect	   and	   involve	   an	   appropriate	   cross	  
section	   of	   stakeholders,	   affected	   parties	   and	   representative	   members	   of	   the	   interested	   public	  
through	   key	   phases	   of	   planning	   and	   executing	   field	   trial	   activities.	   While	   engagement	   activities	  
complement	   and	   support	   other	   project	   activities	   that	   are	   dedicated	   to	   the	   anticipation	   and	  
management	   of	   risks	   or	   regulatory	   compliance,	   the	   history	   of	   field	   trials	   gone	  wrong	   shows	   that	  
these	  components	  have	  a	  purpose	  that	  is	  independent	  of	  RM	  and	  regulatory	  compliance.	  Protecting	  
the	  integrity	  of	  the	  trial,	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  work	  both	  locally	  and	  in	  a	  global	  culture	  of	  support	  for	  the	  
project	  depends	  on	  an	  effort	  of	  good	  faith	  to	  engage	  social	  and	  ethical	  issues.	  	  
It	   is	   recommended	   that	   investigators	   work	   cooperatively	   with	   their	   institutional	   committees,	  
including	   committees	   responsible	   for	   research	   ethics	   review,	   and	   with	   the	   host	   communities	   to	  
Box	  4.2	  Disruption	  of	  the	  testing	  of	  male	  sterile	  mosquitoes	  in	  India	  
Public	  health	  scientist	  Robert	  S.	  Desowitz	  described	  an	  episode	  in	  one	  of	  his	  books	  written	  for	  a	  popular	  audience	  
that	  is	  instructive	  to	  consider:	  “On	  a	  morning	  in	  1975,	  a	  van	  bearing	  the	  blue-­‐and-­‐white	  logo	  of	  the	  World	  Health	  
Organization	  on	  the	  door—a	  snake	  caduceus	  through	  a	  global	  map—drives	  into	  the	  village	  center.	  The	  villagers,	  
who	  have	  a	  fear	  and	  loathing	  of	  snakes,	  regard	  the	  serpent	  van	  suspiciously.	  They	  begin	  to	  be	  even	  more	  suspicious	  
when	  a	  peculiar	  collection	  of	  men	  emerges	  from	  the	  van—a	  few	  undoubted	  Indians,	  some	  strange	  Orientals,	  and	  
some	  very	  white	  white	  men.	  An	  angry	  murmur	  of	  astonishment	  passes	   through	   the	  gathered	  group	  of	  villages	  
when	  these	  men	  remove	   large	  mesh-­‐covered	  cages	   from	  the	  vehicle,	  open	   the	  cages—and	  out	   flies	  a	  cloud	  of	  
mosquitoes.	  Without	  a	  word	  of	  explanation,	  the	  snake	  and	  mosquito	  men	  then	  return	  to	  their	  vehicle	  and	  drive	  
away.	  Several	  weeks	  later,	  the	  snake	  van	  appears	  again	  in	  the	  village	  and	  once	  more	  the	  strange	  foreigners	  release	  
a	  cloud	  of	  mosquitoes	  from	  the	  cages.	  The	  crowd	  reacts—chasing	  the	  men	  into	  the	  van,	  which	  makes	  a	  hurried	  
escape.	  A	  month	  or	  so	  later	  the	  vehicle	  appears	  again.	  The	  villagers	  burn	  it.”	  (Desowitz,	  1991:89.)	  
	  
Desowitz	   (1991)	   writes	   that	   the	   villagers	   complained	   to	   parliament,	   and	   that	   parliamentarians	   accused	   the	  
American	  scientists	  of	  conducting	  an	  experiment	  in	  biological	  warfare.	  It	  was	  later	  confirmed	  that	  these	  suspicions	  
were	  entirely	  unfounded	  (Powell	  &	  Jayaraman,	  2003).	  	  





avoid	   miscommunications	   and	   misunderstandings	   that	   could	   undermine	   trust	   and	   transparency.	  
When	   field	   releases	   begin,	   communications	   should	   be	   careful	   to	   explain	   that	   trials	   are	   research	  
activities	   intended	  to	  test	   the	  efficacy	  of	  a	  new	  technology,	  a	  protective	  effect	   is	  not	  assured,	  and	  
the	   community	   must	   continue	   to	   employ	   other	   available	   methods	   to	   protect	   themselves	   from	  
disease	  transmission.	  
Additionally,	  as	  described	  above,	  certain	  individuals	  may	  meet	  the	  criteria	  of	  research	  subjects,	  even	  
in	   the	   case	   of	   small	   entomologically	   focused	   Phase	   2	   studies,	   as	   a	   result	   of	   interventions	   or	  
interactions,	  such	  as	  the	  collection	  of	  specimens,	  data	  and	  private	   information.	  Unless	  determined	  
otherwise	   by	   the	   relevant	   institutional	   ethics	   committees,	   it	   may	   be	   presumed	   that	   informed	  
consent	  should	  be	  obtained	  from	  such	  individuals	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  collection	  of	  data.	  	  
Phase	  3	  
Efforts	   to	  engage	  potentially	  affected	  parties	  will	  expand	   in	  anticipation	  of	   larger	  Phase	  3	   trials.	   In	  
addition,	  human	  subjects	  issues	  will	  become	  more	  prominent,	  especially	  in	  trials	  seeking	  to	  evaluate	  
epidemiological	   efficacy	   where	   measurements	   of	   the	   incidence	   of	   infection	   and	   other	   medical	  
information	  will	  be	  required.	  Such	  trials	  are	   likely	   to	  assign	  groups	  of	   individuals	   to	  treatment	  and	  
control	   clusters,	   rather	   than	   to	   involve	   a	   randomized	   distribution	   of	   individual	   subjects.	   Some	  
individuals	  in	  clusters	  may	  have	  no	  direct	  contact	  with	  researchers,	  and	  their	  personal	  identities	  may	  
not	  be	  relevant	  to	  the	  research	  process.	  For	  these	  individuals,	  the	  above	  argument	  that	  they	  are	  not	  
subject	  to	  a	  direct	  effect	  of	  the	  research	  can	  be	  made.	  However,	  in	  Phase	  3	  trials	  for	  epidemiological	  
endpoints,	  data	  collection	  designed	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  health	  impact	  of	  GMM	  releases	  will	  require	  
the	  selection	  of	  individuals	  within	  the	  community	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  securing	  the	  necessary	  data	  or	  
personal	   information,	   for	  example,	   through	  surveys	  or	  blood	  samples,	  even	   in	   large-­‐scale	   trials.	   In	  
these	  large	  trials,	  procedures	  would	  resemble	  those	  of	  vaccine	  trials,	  which	  typically	  require	  multiple	  
interactions	   with	   individual	   participants	   over	   the	   course	   of	   the	   trial,	   and	   which	   also	   provide	  
appropriate	   contexts	   and	  moments	   for	   securing	   and	   reaffirming	   informed	   consent.	   An	   important	  
difference	   between	   GMM	   trials	   and	   vaccine	   trials	   is	   that	   in	   GMM	   trials,	   participants	   would	   be	  
consenting	  (or	  not)	  to	  the	  collection	  of	  data,	  not	  to	  the	  intervention	  itself	  (the	  GMM	  release),	  which	  
would	  not	  affect	  them	  at	  an	  individual	  level.	  
Planning	  for	  scaling	  up	  community	  engagement	  activities	  should	  commence	  well	  in	  advance	  of	  Phase	  
3	   trials.	   Community	   engagement	   at	   this	   broad	   scale	   will	   be	   challenging	   because	   of	   the	   inherent	  
difficulty	   in	   replicating	   across	   extensive	   and	   diverse	   populations	   the	   high-­‐quality,	   trusting	  
relationships	   between	   researchers	   and	   stakeholders	   that	  were	   possible	   through	   ongoing	   personal	  
interactions	   in	   Phase	   2	   trials.	   For	   large	   and	   multi-­‐site	   trials,	   additional	   mechanisms	   of	   public	  
engagement,	  perhaps	  including	  social	  and	  mass	  media,	  may	  need	  to	  be	  invoked	  to	  reach	  and	  obtain	  
feedback	   from	   a	   broader	   community	   than	   would	   have	   participated	   in	   Phase	   2	   testing.	   Such	  
mechanisms	   also	  may	   facilitate	  monitoring	   of	   public	   opinion	   and	   demonstrating	   trial	   acceptance.	  
Additional	   representational	   methods	   may	   need	   to	   be	   considered	   for	   obtaining	   community	  
authorization,	   and	   it	  will	   be	   important	   to	   ensure	   the	   validity	   of	   these	  methods.	   It	   has	   sometimes	  
been	  the	  case	   in	  cluster	  randomized	  trials	  of	  the	  type	  envisioned	  for	  Phase	  3	  GMM	  trials,	   that	  the	  
consent	  of	   the	   relevant	  cluster	  population(s)	  has	  been	  sought	   from	  a	  “guardian,”	   such	  as	  a	  village	  
elder	  or	  elected	  official,	  and	  perhaps	  without	  the	  knowledge	  of	  those	  involved	  in	  the	  trial,	   in	  order	  
to	  avoid	  the	  possibility	  of	  changing	  behaviour	  or	  otherwise	  biasing	  the	  control	  clusters	  (Edwards	  et	  





al.,	  1999).	  A	  meta-­‐study	  of	  such	  trials	  suggests	  that	  ethical	  issues	  have	  not	  been	  sufficiently	  clarified,	  
and	   that	   ambiguities	   leave	   open	   the	   potential	   for	   ethical	   abuse	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   level	   of	  
understanding	  and	  agreement	  that	  is	  required	  from	  the	  study	  population	  (Weijer	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  Thus,	  
even	   in	   the	   context	   of	   large-­‐scale	   trials,	   appropriate	   community	   engagement	   and	   community	  
authorization	   procedures	  will	   be	   expected	   to	   adhere	   to	   the	   principle	   of	   respect	   for	   communities,	  
aiming	  for	  widespread	  understanding	  and	  ongoing	  endorsement	  by	  those	  living	  at	  the	  trial	  site.	  	  
Another	  question	  that	  will	  be	  encountered	  in	  Phase	  3	  trials	  concerns	  the	  type	  of	  care	  that	  should	  be	  
provided	   to	   control	   groups	   during	   a	   randomized	   controlled	   trial.	   The	   ethical	   debate	   generally	  
focuses	   on	  whether	   the	   control	   group	   should	   receive	   a	   “proven	   effective”	   treatment,	   the	   “locally	  
available”	   treatment,	  or	   some	  other	   treatment	   (van	  der	  Graaf	  &	  van	  Delden,	  2009).	   It	   is	  not	   clear	  
that	  “standard	  of	  care”	  is	  even	  an	  appropriate	  concept	  for	  GMM	  trials,	  since	  the	  concept	  has	  been	  
imported	   uncritically	   from	   drug	   and	   vaccine	   trials	   that	   are	   different	   in	   several	   ethically	   relevant	  
ways.	  However,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  research	  ethics	  committees	  will	  require	  investigators	  to	  design	  trials	  
to	  ensure	  that	  other	  forms	  of	  vector	  control,	  or	  other	  treatments	  that	  reduce	  the	  amount	  of	  human	  
infection,	   and	   could	   therefore	   influence	   the	   background	   level	   of	   pathogen	   transmission,	   will	   be	  
provided.	  This	   type	  of	   requirement	   could	  have	  a	   significant	   impact	  on	   the	   trial’s	  design,	   since	   low	  
transmission	  levels	  will	  make	  the	  efficacy	  of	  GMMs	  more	  difficult	  to	  measure.	  For	  example,	  in	  GMM	  
trials	  for	  malaria	  control,	  one	  ethical	  question	  might	  be	  how	  actively	  to	  promote	  the	  concurrent	  use	  
of	   bed	   nets.	   Another	   such	   question	  will	   arise	   if	   and	  when	   a	  malaria	   or	   dengue	   vaccine	   becomes	  
available	  for	  public	  health	  intervention.	  
Further	  work	  will	  need	  to	  be	  done	  to	  determine	  the	  most	  appropriate	  way	  to	  conceptualize	   these	  
“standard	   of	   care”	   issues	   for	   GMM	   trials.	   But,	   as	   these	   specific	   aspects	   of	   ethical	   trial	   design	   are	  
being	   developed,	   investigators	   should	   prepare	   appropriate	   strategies	   for	   addressing	   them,	   along	  
with	   the	   rationales	   for	   adopting	   them.	   These	   will	   prove	   to	   be	   useful	   for	   research	   ethics	   review	  
committees	  and	  constitute	  an	  important	  aspect	  of	  the	  ethical	  reflection	  activities,	  described	  above.	  
As	   noted	   in	   Section	   5.	   Regulatory	   frameworks,	   the	   appropriate	   governmental	   and/or	   institutional	  
bodies	  will	  establish	  the	  requirements	  for	  regulatory	  compliance.	  A	  robust	  ethical	   inquiry	  informed	  
by	   a	   current	   understanding	   of	   the	   literature	   on	   trial	   design,	   relevant	   precedents,	   and	   current	  
government	  policy	  at	  field	  sites	  will	  enhance	  a	  GMM	  research	  group’s	  ability	  to	  develop	  appropriate	  
protocols	  and	  anticipate	  the	  concerns	  of	  regulatory	  authorities.	  	  
Phase	  4	  
When	   GMM	   strategies	   mature	   into	   widespread	   public	   health	   initiatives,	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   the	  
responsibilities	   for	   implementing	   these	   technologies	   will	   shift	   to	   the	   relevant	   local,	   regional	   or	  
national	   public	   health	   authorities.	   Controversy	   over	   the	   fluoridation	   of	   public	   water	   supplies,	  
regulation	  of	  tobacco	  use	  and	  vaccination	  testifies	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  not	  unusual	  for	  public	  health	  
interventions	   to	  be	  undertaken	  without	   the	  explicit	  approval	  of	  all	  affected	  parties	   (Cassidy,	  2007;	  
Powles,	   2009).	   They	   nevertheless	   have	   legitimacy	   when	   conducted	   within	   proper	   democratic	  
processes	  and	  institutions,	  and	  with	  proper	  mandates.	  Any	  public	  health	  initiative	  takes	  place	  within	  
the	  context	  of	   legal,	  regulatory	  and	  political	   institutions	  that	  are	  intended	  to	  resolve	  differences	  of	  
opinion	  and	  to	  negotiate	  matters	  concerning	  who	  bears	  what	  risks.	  When	  public	  health	  authorities	  
and	  the	  relevant	  ancillary	  institutions	  are	  functioning	  well,	  the	  responsibility	  to	  engage	  with	  affected	  
individuals	  will	  most	  likely	  be	  transferred	  to	  them	  once	  it	  has	  been	  established	  that	  the	  technology	  is	  





safe	  and	  effective.	  In	  cases	  where	  local	  or	  regional	  institutions	  are	  not	  functioning	  well,	  researchers	  
and	  sponsors	  may	  have	  additional	  responsibilities	  related	  to	  capacity	  building	  and	  planning	  with	  host	  
country	   agencies,	   and	   for	  maintaining	   the	   relationships	   of	   trust	   that	   were	   established	   during	   the	  
earlier	  phases	  of	  the	  trials.	  	  
4.7	  Who	  should	  undertake	  ethics	  and	  engagement	  activities?	  
The	  activities	  described	   in	   each	   section	  of	   this	   guidance	   framework	   are	  material	   to	   the	   successful	  
accomplishment	  of	   research	  objectives.	  As	   such	   they	  should	   involve	   lead	   researchers	  and	  will	  also	  
often	  require	  attention	  from	  other	  members	  of	  the	  project	  team	  who	  are	  focused	  on	  specific	  tasks.	  
However,	   there	   are	   aspects	   of	   each	   element	   that	   may	   require	   special	   skills	   and	   training	   that	  
biologists,	  medical	  personnel	  or	  public	  health	  specialists	  would	  not	  normally	  be	  expected	  to	  have.	  As	  
noted	  above,	  engagement	  with	  affected	  parties	  may	  require	  specialized	  knowledge	  of	   local	  culture	  
and	  institutions.	  In	  addition,	  engagement	  with	  third	  parties	  is	  increasingly	  characterized	  as	  requiring	  
skills	  for	  creating,	  maintaining	  and	  managing	  the	  forums	  in	  which	  discussions,	  consensus	  seeking	  and	  
negotiations	   can	   take	   place	   (Bäckstrand,	   2003;	   Dietz,	   Ostrom	   &	   Stern,	   2003).	   The	   abilities	   and	  
methods	   for	   accomplishing	   these	   tasks	   are	   themselves	   the	   focus	   of	   ongoing	   research	   in	  
communications	   and	   governance	   activities	   (Brown,	   Harris	   &	   Russell,	   2010).	   Project	   directors	   and	  
managers	  should	  consult	  with	  or	  contract	  specialists	  who	  can	  accomplish	  specialized	  elements	  of	  the	  
ethics	   and	   engagement	   plan	   (Kreuter	   et	   al.,	   2004;	   Brown,	   Harris	   &	   Russell,	   2010),	   and	   allowance	  
made	  in	  the	  project	  budget	  for	  these	  types	  of	  activities.	  However,	  researchers	  should	  not	  presume	  
that	  they	  can	  simply	  turn	  the	  ethics	  and	  engagement	  component	  of	  the	  project	  over	  to	  a	  contractor,	  
as	   the	   involvement	   of	   project	   leaders	   in	   ethical	   reflection	   and	   engagement,	   and	   communication	  
regarding	  research	  goals	  and	  conduct	  is	  vital.	  	  
4.8	  Capacity-­‐building	  goals	  
It	   is	   likely	   that	   project	   managers	   will	   discover	   a	   need	   for	   additional	   training	   of	   entomology	  
researchers	   about	   ethics	   obligations	   in	   vector	   biology	   research.	   Likewise,	   there	  may	  be	   a	   need	   to	  
train	   bioethicists	   and	   social	   scientists	   involved	   in	   the	   project	   about	   the	   unique	   situations	  
encountered	   in	   vector	   biology	   research.	   As	   discussed	   above,	   this	   is	   a	   complex	   subject	   where	   the	  
internationally	  accepted	  standards	  developed	  for	  clinical	  research	  are	  not	  always	  directly	  or	  clearly	  
transferable.	   Additionally,	   there	   may	   be	   a	   need	   to	   train	   institutional	   and	   national	   ethics	   review	  
committees	  on	  the	  importance	  and	  process	  of	  ethical	  review	  of	  GMM	  trials.	  In	  both	  developing	  and	  
developed	  countries,	  ethics	  review	  committees	  often	  lack	  vector	  biologists	  and	  awareness	  of	  ethical	  
issues	   in	   entomological	   research	   protocols/proposals.	   Attempts	   should,	   therefore,	   be	   made	   to	  
create	   awareness	   of	   such	   issues	   among	   committee	   members	   responsible	   for	   approving	   and	  
providing	   oversight	   for	   the	   planned	   trials,	   and	   to	   encourage	   the	   committees	   to	   seek	   appropriate	  
expertise	  when	  considering	  GMM	  research/trials.	  





Box	  4.3	  Typical	  ethical	  and	  engagement	  considerations	  to	  prepare	  for	  different	  phases	  of	  testing	  
Phase	  1:	  In	  the	  laboratory	  
• Within	  the	  project	  team	  and	  with	  project	  advisers,	  establish	  ongoing	  mechanisms	  for	  considering	  the	  
social	  purpose	  and	  public	  health	  value	  of	  the	  research	  and	  for	  responding	  to	  changing	  circumstances.	  
• Develop	  an	  initial	  communications	  plan	  with	  key	  messages	  that	  explain	  the	  project	  and	  contingency	  
plans	  for	  dealing	  with	  controversy.	  
• Initiate	   public	   reporting	   practices,	   as	   through	   publications,	   project	   website,	   etc.,	   to	   continue	  
throughout	  the	  project.	  
• Conduct	  preliminary	  stakeholder	  mapping;	  develop	  plans	  for	  discriminating	  among	  those	  who	  will	  be	  
affected	  by	   the	   research	  activities	   through	   specific	   interventions	  or	   interactions,	   other	  members	  of	  
host	  communities	  who	  have	  a	  stake	  in	  the	  trial,	  and	  those	  who	  may	  have	  legitimate	  but	  more	  distant	  
interests	  at	  stake;	  identify	  third	  parties	  most	  likely	  to	  influence	  the	  success	  of	  the	  project.	  
• Prepare	   plans	   for	   field-­‐site	   selection;	   commence	   discussions	   with	   local	   scientists	   and	   community	  
leaders	  to	  collect	  data	  for	  decision-­‐making.	  
	  
Phase	  2:	  Prior	  to	  initial	  field	  trials	  
• Develop	   informational	   materials	   appropriate	   for	   engagement	   with	   government	   officials,	   partner	  
institutions,	  local	  community	  and	  other	  stakeholders;	  develop	  plans	  for	  media	  engagement.	  
• Conduct	   more	   focused	   assessment	   of	   relevant	   local	   stakeholders;	   initiate	   interactions	   to	   build	  
understanding	  of	  the	  project	  among	  critical	  decision-­‐makers.	  
• Finalize	   site	   selection;	   build	   knowledge	   about	   the	   host	   community;	   develop	   plans	   for	   community	  
authorization	   and	   initiate	   activities	   to	   explain	   the	   project	   and	   elicit	   community	   feedback;	   enact	  
ongoing	  mechanisms	  to	  understand	  and	  respond	  to	  concerns.	  
• Secure	  community	  authorization	  and	  other	  necessary	  institutional	  and	  government	  approvals.	  
	  
Phase	  3:	  Prior	  to	  large-­‐scale	  release	  
• Review	  relevant	  precedents	  for	  trial	  design	  and	  broad-­‐scale	  community	  engagement.	  
• Develop	   locally	   appropriate	   communications	   plans	   for	  multiple	   field	   sites;	   consider	   that	   large-­‐scale	  
trials	  will	  most	  likely	  attract	  global	  attention	  and	  plan	  to	  respond	  accordingly.	  
• Develop	  a	  plan	  for	  large-­‐scale	  engagement,	  which	  may	  require	  additional	  mechanisms	  to	  interact	  with	  
and	   obtain	   feedback	   from	   broad	   and	   diverse	   populations;	   consider	   appropriate	   representational	  
methods	  to	  obtain	  and	  maintain	  authorization	  and	  ways	  to	  evaluate	  the	  validity	  of	  these	  methods.	  
• Take	   important	   ethical	   considerations	   into	   account	   in	   the	   development	   of	   the	   trial	   protocol	   and	  
ensure	  adequate	  oversight	  of	  human	  subjects	  research	  by	  the	  institutional	  ethics	  committee(s);	  obtain	  
all	  necessary	  institutional	  and	  government	  approvals.	  
	  
Phase	  4:	  Prior	  to	  deployment	  
• Assist	   agencies	   in	   host	   countries	   to	   develop	   methods	   for	   incorporating	   the	   technology	   into	   their	  
disease	  control	  programmes.	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GMM	   regulation	   is	   useful	   both	   for	   the	   scientists	   involved	   in	   their	   development	   and	   for	   the	  
general	   public,	   because	   it	   provides	   a	   recognized	   and	   respected	   mechanism	   for	   protecting	  
human	  health	  and	  rights,	  livestock,	  economics	  and	  the	  environment.	  A	  thorough,	  science-­‐based	  
GMM	  regulatory	  process	  that	   is	  publicly	  transparent,	  without	  conflict	  of	   interest,	  contains	  minimal	  
confidential	  business	  information,	  and	  provides	  allowance	  for	  public	  stakeholder	  input,	  will	  serve	  to	  
strengthen	  public	  confidence	  in	  and	  acceptance	  of	  GMM	  biotechnologies,	  their	  developers,	  and	  the	  
government	  agencies	  that	  regulate	  them.	  
Regulation	   controls	   the	   release	  of	  GMMs	   into	   the	   environment	  within	   sovereign	   states	   as	  well	   as	  
their	  transboundary	  movement.	  Pertinent	  developments	  are	  recorded	  in	  Table	  5.1.	  Precedents	  exist	  
from	  the	  regulation	  of	  other	  technologies,	  including	  other	  GM	  insects	  of	  agricultural	  importance	  that	  
can	   inform	   the	   formulation	  of	   regulatory	   pathways	   for	  GMMs.	  However,	   fundamental	   differences	  
between	   GMM	   and	   other	   GM	   technologies	   must	   be	   taken	   into	   consideration	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	  
inadvertently	   creating	   barriers	   to	   the	   development	   of	   a	   public	   health	   tool	   of	   potentially	   valuable	  
utility.	  Nonetheless,	  such	  considerations	  must	  not	  compromise	  the	  safe	  use	  of	  GMMs.	  	  
5.1	  The	  purpose	  of	  regulations	  
A	  regulation	   is	  an	  official	  rule	  to	  manage	  the	  conduct	  of	  those	  to	  whom	  it	  applies.	  Regulations	  are	  
usually	  developed	  from	  legal	  interpretations	  of	  enacted	  legislation,	  laws,	  or	  acts	  of	  a	  legislative	  body	  
and	  are	  implemented	  by	  government	  ministries	  or	  agencies	  under	  the	  authority	  of	  legislation,	  a	  law	  
or	  act.	  Regulation	  may	  be	  through	  the	  laws	  and	  official	  codes	  of	  a	  nation,	  state	  or	  province,	  county,	  
municipality,	   tribe	   or	   other	   jurisdictional	   unit,	   and/or	   under	   the	   authority	   of	   laws	   and	   regulations	  
enacted	   through	   provisions	   of	   a	   treaty	   ratified	   by	   participating	   states.	   A	   regulatory	   agency	   (also	  
called	   regulatory	   authority,	   ministry,	   regulatory	   body	   or	   regulator)	   is	   a	   public	   authority	   or	  
government	   entity	   responsible	   for	   exercising	   autonomous	   authority	   over	   some	   area	   of	   human	  
activity	  in	  a	  supervisory	  capacity.	  	  
Summary:	  	  The	  release	  of	  GMM	  into	  the	  environment	  will	  be	  controlled	  through	  the	  laws	  and	  regulations	  
of	  a	  nation,	   state,	  province,	  county,	  or	   lesser	   levels	  of	   jurisdiction.	  A	  number	  of	  GMM	  regulation	   types,	  
options	  and	  levels	  exist	  and	  may	  have	  to	  be	  addressed	  during	  GMM	  development,	  including:	  institutional	  
biosafety	  and	  ethics	  committees;	   laws	  and	  regulations	  governing	  human	  and	  animal	  pests,	  diseases	  and	  
drugs;	  laws	  and	  regulations	  pertaining	  to	  mosquitoes	  and	  threatened,	  endangered,	  and	  protected	  species	  
in	   respect	   to	  biodiversity;	  and	  new	   laws	  and	  regulations,	  which	  may	  be	  under	  development,	   specifically	  
for	  living	  or	  genetically	  modified	  organisms	  (LMOs	  or	  GMOs).	  An	  important	  resource	  for	  specific	  country	  
regulations	   and	   contacts	   relevant	   to	   GMM	   is	   the	   Cartagena	   Protocol	   on	   Biosafety,	   Biosafety	   Clearing-­‐
House.	  
Regulatory	  agencies	  will	  be	   involved	  at	  most	  phases	   in	  the	  research	  and	  development	  process	  for	  GMM	  
and	  may	  also	  be	  involved	  in	  post-­‐implementation	  surveillance.	  The	  mechanisms	  of	  regulation	  may	  include	  
institutional	   biosafety	   and	   ethics	   committee	   approvals,	   risk	   assessments,	   public	   comment	   periods,	   and	  
permits	   for	   importation	  and	  experiments,	   and	  may	   involve	  official	   review	  by	  more	   than	  one	   regulatory	  
agency.	  	  





The	  purpose	  of	  a	  regulatory	  agency	  in	  regard	  to	  GMMs	  is	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  safety	  of	  the	  public	  and	  
environment	   are	   protected	   against	   risks	   or	   damage.	   Risk	   and,	   sometimes,	   benefit,	   assessments	  
(Section	  3.	  Biosafety)	  are	  essential	  components	  of	  the	  regulatory	  process.	  A	  benefit	  assessment	  for	  
GMMs	   is	   that	   of	   performance	   or	   efficacy	   values	   for	   vector	   and	   vector-­‐borne	   disease	   reduction,	  
without	   which	   the	   increased	   or	   continued	   risk	   of	   disease	   would	   probably	   be	   increased	   in	   the	  
absence	   of	   alternative	   effective	   interventions	   (Section	   1.	   Introduction).	   Although	   performance	   or	  
efficacy,	  safety	  and	  RA,	  and	  public	  transparency,	  communication,	  and	  acceptance	  are	  subsumed	  as	  
part	   of	   the	   regulatory	   process,	   they	   are	   not	   covered	   in	   this	   section	   since	   they	   are	   discussed	  
elsewhere	  in	  this	  guidance.	  	  
Government	   agency	   regulation	   of	   GMMs	   could	   involve	   more	   than	   one	   regulatory	   authority	   and	  
require	   more	   than	   one	   permit	   or	   licence	   for	   importation	   of	   and	   research	   on	   a	   GMMs.	   Further	  
examples	  of	  potentially	  relevant	  regulations	  illustrate	  this	  issue.	  
5.2	  Biosafety	  
Institutional	   biosafety	   committees	   (IBCs)	   are	   charged	   by	   certain	   laws	   with	   the	   planning	   and	  
implementation	  of	  university	  and	  other	   research	   facility	  biosafety	  programmes	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	  
protecting	   the	   health	   and	   safety	   of	   all	   personnel	  working	  with	   potentially	   hazardous	   agents.	   IBCs	  
may	  be	  national	  or	  may	  exist	  at	   local,	  regional,	  state,	  provincial,	  or	  territorial	   levels	  of	  government	  
but	   they	  may	   not	   exist	   at	   an	   institutional	   level	   in	   some	   countries.	  Where	   they	   do	   not	   exist,	   they	  
should	  be	  part	  of	  capacity	  building	  by	  international	  or	  foreign	  aid	  organizations.	  IBCs	  may	  also	  draft	  
institutional	  biosafety	  policies	  and	  procedures	  and	  review	  individual	  research	  proposals	  for	  biosafety	  
concerns.	   Concerns	   relevant	   to	   GMMs	   may	   relate	   to	   the	   safe	   handling	   of	   recombinant	   DNA	   or	  
pathogens	  perceived	  to	  pose	  a	  health	  threat.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  USA,	  an	  IBC	  ensures	  that	  research	  
conducted	  at	  an	   institution	   is	   in	  compliance	  with	  National	   Institutes	  of	  Health	   (NIH)	  Guidelines	   for	  
Research	   Involving	  Recombinant	  DNA	  Molecules‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 	   and	   the	   select	   agent	   regulations	  under	   the	  
Public	  Health	  Security	  and	  Bioterrorism	  Preparedness	  and	  Response	  Act	  of	  2002,	  which	  authorizes	  
the	  regulation	  of	  the	  possession,	  use	  and	  transfer	  of	  select	  agents	  and	  toxins.	  The	  US	  Federal	  Select	  
Agent	  Program§§§§§§§§	  is	  jointly	  comprised	  of	  the	  Centers	  for	  Disease	  Control	  and	  Prevention/Division	  
of	  Select	  Agents	  and	  Toxins,	  and	  the	  Animal	  and	  Plant	  Health	  Inspection	  Services/Agricultural	  Select	  
Agent	   Program.	   The	   Federal	   Select	   Agent	   Program	   oversees	   the	   possession,	   use	   and	   transfer	   of	  
biological	  select	  agents	  and	  toxins,	  which	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  pose	  a	  severe	  threat	  to	  public,	  animal	  
or	  plant	  health,	  or	  to	  animal	  or	  plant	  products.	  It	  includes	  disease	  agents	  transmitted	  by	  mosquitoes,	  
but	  does	  not	  include	  Plasmodium	  spp.	  or	  dengue	  virus	  serotypes.	  This	  currently	  requires	  registration	  
of	   facilities	   including	   government	   agencies,	   universities,	   research	   institutions,	   and	   commercial	  
entities	  that	  possess,	  use,	  or	  transfer	  biological	  agents	  and	  toxins.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 	  NIH	  guidelines	  for	  research	  involving	  recombinant	  DNA	  molecules:	  
http://oba.od.nih.gov/rdna_ibc/ibc.html,	  accessed	  25	  May	  2014.	  	  
§§§§§§§§ 	  USA	  Federal	  Select	  Agent	  Programme:	  http://www.selectagents.gov/index.html,	  accessed	  25	  May	  
2014.	  
	  





5.3	  Human	  subjects	  
In	   research,	   regulations	  on	  human	  subjects	  generally	  apply	  when	  data	  will	  be	  obtained	  from	   living	  
individuals	   through	  an	   intervention	  or	   interaction,	  or	   identifiable	  private	   information	  will	  be	  made	  
available.	   This	   will	   be	   the	   case	   for	   certain	   aspects	   of	   GMM	   trials	   (Section	   4.	   Ethics	   and	   public	  
engagement).	  For	  example,	  in	  GMM	  trials,	  regulations	  on	  human	  subjects	  would	  apply	  to	  the	  taking	  
of	   blood	   specimens	   to	   measure	   epidemiological	   endpoints	   (an	   intervention)	   or	   personal	   opinion	  
surveys	  to	  understand	  concerns	  about	  the	  research	  (an	  interaction).	  
Institutional	   ethics	   committees	   (IECs),	   also	   known	   as	   institutional	   review	   boards	   (IRBs)	   or	   ethical	  
review	  boards,	  provide	  oversight	  for	  biomedical	  and	  behavioural	  research	  involving	  humans	  with	  the	  
aim	   to	   protect	   the	   rights	   and	   welfare	   of	   research	   subjects.	   Human	   subjects	   regulations	   and	   IECs	  
were	  developed	  in	  response	  to	  notorious	  abuses	  carried	  out	  in	  the	  past	  in	  the	  name	  of	  research	  (Box	  
5.3).	  
One	  role	  of	   IECs	   is	  to	  attempt	  to	  ensure	  that	  human	  participants	   in	  a	  clinical	  study	  understand	  the	  
facts,	   implications,	   and	   consequences	   of	   their	   participation.	   Informed	   consent	   is	   the	   mechanism	  
usually	   used	   for	   this	   purpose.	   Informed	   consent	   is	   intended	   to	   be	   a	   process	   of	   communication	  
between	   an	   individual	   contemplating	   taking	   part	   in	   a	   study	   or	   trial	   and	   the	   physician	   or	   scientist	  
administering	   the	   study,	   which	   results	   in	   the	   patient's	   decision	   regarding	   authorization	   or	  
agreement.	  The	  most	  important	  aspect	  of	  informed	  consent	  is	  voluntary	  agreement.	  In	  order	  to	  give	  
informed	   consent,	   the	   individual	   concerned	   must	   have	   adequate	   reasoning	   faculties	   and	   be	   in	  
possession	   of	   all	   relevant	   facts	   at	   the	   time	   of	   consent.	   Countries	   will	   vary	   in	   regard	   to	   laws	   and	  
regulations	   governing	   standards	   of	   informed	   consent	   that	   are	   required	   under	   common	   law	   and	  
statutory	   authorities.	   The	   components	   of	   informed	   consent	   have	   been	   delineated	   in	   many	  
venues.********* 	  
For	  aspects	  of	  GMM	  trials	  not	  falling	  under	  the	  definition	  of	  human	  subjects	  research,	  mechanisms	  
of	  community	  engagement	  and	  community	  authorization	  (Section	  4.	  Ethics	  and	  public	  engagement)	  
are	   recommended	   to	   communicate	   goals	   and	   risks	   of	   the	   project,	   and	   to	   obtain	   consent	   to	  
undertake	  testing.	  
	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
********* 	  Informed	  consent	  form	  templates:	  http://www.who.int/rpc/research_ethics/informed_consent/en/,	  
accessed	  25	  May	  2014.	  






5.4	  GMO	  regulation	  
Mosquito	  pests	  
The	   intent	   or	   purpose	   of	   introducing	   genetic	   traits	   in	   suppressing	   mosquito	   populations	   could	  
possibly	   be	   considered	   and	   regulated	   under	   the	   definition	   of	   a	   biopesticide	   when	   a	   pesticide	   is	  
defined	  as	  any	  substance	  or	  mixture	  of	  substances	  intended	  for	  preventing,	  destroying,	  repelling,	  or	  
mitigating	   any	   pest,	  which	   is	   the	  USA’s	   Federal	   Insecticide	   and	  Rodenticide	  Act	   (FIFRA)	   definition.	  
Other	  national	  pesticide	  legislation	  may	  regulate	  on	  the	  same	  basis	  of	  pesticidal	  intent.	  
Mosquitoes	  are	  livestock	  pests	  as	  well	  as	  human	  pests.	  As	  with	  existing	  legislation	  for	  crop	  pests	  and	  
diseases,	  many	  countries	  have	  developed	   legislation	   to	  prevent	  and	  control	  outbreaks	  of	   livestock	  
pests	  and	  diseases,	  as	  these	  issues	  are	  in	  the	  economic	  interests	  of	  most	  countries.	  In	  the	  USA,	  living	  
Box	  5.3	  The	  Nuremberg	  Code,	  1949	  
In	  medical	  research,	  the	  “Nuremberg	  Code”	  from	  Trials	  of	  War	  Criminals	  before	  the	  Nuremberg	  Military	  Tribunals	  
set	  a	  base	  standard	  following	  1947	  (Nuremberg	  Code,	  1949).	  There	  are	  10	  points	  concerning	  informed	  consent	  that	  
are	  described	  in	  the	  Nuremberg	  Code	  and	  are	  in	  National	  Institutes	  of	  Health,	  Directives	  for	  Human	  Experimentation	  
(NIH,	   2010).	   The	  Declaration	  of	  Helsinki	  was	   issued	  by	   the	  World	  Medical	  Association	   (WMA)	   as	   a	   set	   of	   ethical	  
principles	   for	   the	  medical	   community	   regarding	  human	  experimentation.	   The	  Declaration	   is	  not	   a	   legally	  binding	  
instrument	  in	  international	  law,	  but	  instead	  draws	  its	  authority	  from	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  it	  has	  been	  codified	  in,	  or	  
has	  influenced,	  national	  or	  regional	  legislation	  and	  regulations.	  	  
The	  Declaration	  more	  specifically	  addressed	  clinical	  research	  under	  the	  term	  “human	  experimentation”	  used	  in	  the	  
Nuremberg	  Code.	   The	  operating	  principles	  of	   the	  Declaration	   are	   the	   following:	   	   research	   should	  be	  based	  on	   a	  
thorough	  knowledge	  of	  the	  scientific	  background	  (Article	  11);	  a	  careful	  assessment	  of	  risks	  and	  benefits	  (articles	  16	  
and	  17);	  have	  a	   reasonable	   likelihood	  of	  benefit	   to	   the	  population	   studied	   (Article	  19);	  be	  conducted	  by	   suitably	  
trained	   investigators	   (Article	   15)	   using	   approved	   protocols;	   and	   be	   subject	   to	   independent	   ethical	   review	   and	  
oversight	  by	  a	  properly	  convened	  committee	  (Article	  13).	  The	  protocol	  should	  address	  the	  ethical	  issues	  and	  indicate	  
that	  it	  is	  in	  compliance	  with	  the	  Declaration	  (Article	  14).	  Studies	  should	  be	  discontinued	  if	  the	  available	  information	  
indicates	  that	  the	  original	  considerations	  are	  no	  longer	  satisfied	  (Article	  17).	  Information	  regarding	  the	  study	  should	  
be	  publicly	  available	  (Article	  16).	  Ethical	  responsibilities	  extend	  to	  publication	  of	  the	  results	  and	  consideration	  of	  any	  
potential	  conflict	  of	  interest	  (Article	  27).	  The	  interests	  of	  the	  subject	  after	  the	  study	  is	  completed	  should	  be	  part	  of	  
the	   overall	   ethical	   assessment,	   including	   assuring	   their	   access	   to	   care	   (Article	   30).	  Wherever	   possible,	   unproven	  
methods	  should	  be	  tested	  in	  the	  context	  of	  research	  where	  there	  is	  reasonable	  belief	  of	  possible	  benefit	  (Article	  32).	  	  
The	   International	   Covenant	   on	  Civil	   and	  Political	   Rights	   (ICCPR,	   1976)	   is	   a	  multilateral	   treaty	   adopted	  by	   the	  UN	  
General	  Assembly	  on	  16	  December	  1966,	  and	  implemented	  on	  23	  March	  1976.	  It	  commits	  its	  parties	  to	  respect	  the	  
civil	  and	  political	  rights	  of	  individuals,	  including	  the	  right	  to	  live,	  freedom	  of	  religion,	  freedom	  of	  speech,	  freedom	  of	  
assembly,	  electoral	   rights,	   and	   rights	   to	  due	  process	  and	  a	   fair	   trial.	   The	   ICCPR	   is	  part	  of	   the	   International	  Bill	  of	  
Human	  Rights,	   along	  with	   the	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	   (UDHR)	  and	   the	   International	  Covenant	  on	  
Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  (ICESCR),	  of	  which	  Article	  7	  states	  the	  following:	  	  “No	  one	  shall	  be	  subjected	  to	  
torture	  or	  to	  cruel,	  inhuman	  or	  degrading	  treatment	  or	  punishment.	  In	  particular,	  no	  one	  shall	  be	  subjected	  without	  
his	  free	  consent	  to	  medical	  or	  scientific	  experimentation.”	  
Sources:	  	  Nuremberg	  Military	  Tribunals	  (1949);	  WMA	  (1964);	  NIH	  (2010).	  	  
	  





modified	  or	  GM	  plants	  are	  regulated	  under	  legislation	  intended	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  crops	  under	  the	  
Plant	  Protection	  Act	  (PPA)	  of	  2000.	  GM	  Drosophila	  have	  been	  subject	  to	  importation	  and	  interstate	  
movement	  permits	  under	  this	  act	  and	  more	  movement	  permits	  for	  GM	  Drosophila	  have	  been	  issued	  
than	   for	   all	   other	   GMOs	   combined.	   GMMs	   have	   also	   been	   moved	   and	   tested	   in	   quarantine	  
containment	  facilities	  in	  the	  past	  under	  these	  same	  kinds	  of	  permits	  as	  a	  courtesy	  to	  GMM	  science	  
and	  scientists	  to	  facilitate	  their	  research.	  
The	   USA	   might	   have	   regulated	   GMMs	   under	   the	   Animal	   Health	   Protection	   Act	   (AHPA)	   of	   2002	  
because	   mosquitoes	   are	   livestock	   pests,	   as	   well	   as	   human	   disease	   vectors	   and	   pests.	   The	   US	  
Department	  of	  Agriculture	  (USDA),	  Animal	  and	  Plant	  Health	   Inspection	  Service	   (APHIS)	  administers	  
this	  Act.	  The	  USDA	  had	  already	  regulated	  GM	  fruit	  flies	  and	  the	  pink	  bollworm	  under	  the	  PPA,	  and	  
completed	   the	   first	   Environmental	   Impact	   Statement	   (EIS)	   ever	   done	   on	   any	   living	   modified	  
organism	   (LMO),	   plant	   or	   animal,	   as	  well	   as	   two	   Environmental	   Assessments	   (EAs)	   on	  GM	   insects	  
that	   are	   plant	   pests	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   US	   National	   Environmental	   Policy	   Act	   (NEPA).	   NEPA	  
includes	  a	  number	  of	  provisions	  for	  public	  stakeholder	  participation	   in	  the	   federal	  decision-­‐making	  
process.	  There	  are	  also	   litigation	  precedents	   in	   the	  USA	  going	  up	   to	   the	  Supreme	  Court	   that	  have	  
established	  that	  the	  implementation	  of	  FIFRA	  is	  the	  equivalent	  to	  NEPA.	  
Legislation	  pertaining	  to	  mosquito	  control	  exists	  in	  many	  countries	  including	  Australia	  (Queensland),	  
Malaysia,	   Singapore,	   the	   United	   Republic	   of	   Tanzania	   and	   the	   USA.††††††††† 	   This	   is	   mainly	   for	   the	  
purpose	  of	  enforcing	  control	  programme	  requirements,	  such	  as	  the	  elimination	  of	  larval	  habitats	  by	  
citizens.	  According	   to	   the	   Florida	   Statutes,	   the	   creation,	  maintenance,	  or	   causing	  of	   any	   condition	  
capable	  of	  breeding	  flies,	  mosquitoes,	  or	  other	  arthropods	  capable	  of	  transmitting	  diseases,	  directly	  
or	  indirectly	  to	  humans,	  are	  prohibited	  by	  regulation.	  In	  Malaysia,	  there	  are	  laws	  for	  the	  prevention	  
and	  control	  of	  vector-­‐borne	  diseases.	  These	  are:	  (a)	  Destruction	  of	  Disease-­‐Bearing	  Insects	  Act	  1975	  
(Act	   154);	   (b)	   Prevention	   and	   Control	   of	   Infectious	   Diseases	   Act	   1988	   (Act	   342);	   and	   (c)	   Local	  
Government	   Act	   1976	   (Act	   171).	   In	   Singapore,	   three	   pieces	   of	   legislation,	   namely,	   the	   Infectious	  
Diseases	  Act	   (IDA),	   the	  Control	  of	  Vectors	  and	  Pesticides	  Act	   (CVPA)	  and	   the	  Environmental	  Public	  
Health	  Act	  (EPHA)	  provide	  broad	  powers	  to	  prevent	  and	  control	  dengue	  (Seow,	  2001).	  Among	  those	  
countries	  in	  Africa	  with	  laws	  pertaining	  to	  breeding	  of	  mosquitoes,	  Tanzanian	  law	  goes	  back	  to	  1913,	  
with	   legislation	   governing	   the	   breeding	   of	   Anopheles	   spp,	   Aedes,	   spp.	   and,	   more	   recently,	   Culex	  
quinquefasciatus.	  	  
GM	  animals	  	  
Genetic	   modifications	   to	   animals	   are	   generally	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   affecting	   their	   physiology	   or	  
biology	   in	  ways	   to	  provide	  economic	  or	  health	  benefits.	  Animal	  drugs	  or	  pharmaceuticals	  are	  also	  
human	  interventions	  intended	  to	  similarly	  affect	  or	  alter	  animal	  physiology	  or	  biology.	  Legislation	  for	  
regulation	  of	  animal	   drugs	   is	   presently	   being	   used	   to	   regulate	  GM	  animals,	   including	  GM	   salmon,	  
developed	  for	   food	  and	  drugs	  and,	  more	  recently	  GMMs.	   In	  the	  USA,	  the	   legislation	   is	   the	  Federal	  
Food,	   Drug,	   and	   Cosmetic	   Act	   (FFDCA),	   and	   the	   implementing	   agency	   is	   the	   Food	   and	   Drug	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
††††††††† 	  The	  2009	  Florida	  statutes:	  
http://archive.flsenate.gov/Statutes/Index.cfm?StatuteYear=2009&Tab=statutes&Submenu=1	  (accessed	  25	  
May	  2014).	  
	  





Administration	  (FDA)	  within	  the	  Department	  of	  Health	  and	  Human	  Services	  (HHS).	  GMMs	  are	  being	  




Many	  countries	  have	  enacted	   legislation	  with	  regulation	  by	  environmental	  and/or	   fish	  and	  wildlife	  
management	   agencies	   for	   the	   protection	   of	   certain	   species	   against	   adverse	   effects	   from	   human	  
activities.	  Legislation	  also	  exists	  to	  protect	  species	  that	  have	  become	  threatened	  or	  endangered	  due	  
to	   human	   action	   resulting	   in	   potential	   extinction.	   Where	   other	   regulatory	   agencies	   do	   not	   have	  
authority	   because	   the	   nature	   of	   a	   LMO	  may	   not	   clearly	   fit	   their	   regulatory	   scope,	   environmental	  
agencies	  may	  have	   regulatory	  purview	  because	  of	  potential	   adverse	   impacts	  on	  protected	   species	  
and	   species	   diversity	   in	   the	   environment.	   In	   this	   same	   regard,	   regulation	   by	   other	   agencies	   may	  
require	  endangered	  and	  threatened	  species	  impact	  analysis	  as	  part	  of	  their	  regulatory	  process,	  as	  is	  
presently	  required	  in	  some	  countries,	  including	  the	  USA.	  The	  Convention	  of	  Biological	  Diversity	  (CBD,	  
2012)‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 	   and	   the	   Cartagena	   Protocol	   on	   Biosafety24	   are	   examples	   of	   treaties	   or	   covenants	  
applying	  to	  GMOs/LMOs	  and	  are	  based	  on	  protection	  of	  species	  diversity.	  	  
Some	   countries,	   such	   as	   Brazil,	   Kenya,	   Malaysia,	   Nigeria	   and	   Panama,	   have	   developed	   specific	  
legislation	  for	  LMOs	  that	  is	  based	  on	  GM	  plant	  experience,	  but	  includes	  other	  LMOs.	  Such	  legislation	  
is	   usually	   derived	   from	   the	   CPB,	   described	   in	   Appendix	   1.	   New	   legislation	   may	   require	   a	   new	  
regulatory	  agency	  to	  be	  established	  or	  may	  draw	  on	  other	  agencies	  or	  nongovernmental	  sources	  for	  
scientific,	   regulatory,	   and	   enforcement	   expertise.	   In	   some	   countries,	   this	   approach	   may	   result	   in	  
either	   biotechnology	   implementation	   delays	   or	   possibly	   regulatory	   decisions	   compromised	   by	  
inadequate	  science	  assessment	  capacity	  and	  conflict	  of	  interest.	  	  
Regulation	  of	  GMMs	  with	  drive	  systems	  capable	  of	  autonomous	  transboundary	  movement	  or	  even	  
movement	  by	  inadvertent	  human	  transport	  may	  invoke	  regulatory	  processes	  of	  adjacent	  countries.	  
Gene	   drive	   systems	   are	   designed	   and	   intended	   to	   spread	   throughout	   an	   ecozone	   regardless	   of	  
political	  boundaries.	  If	  it	  is	  known	  or	  expected	  that	  introduced	  traits	  will	  have	  transboundary	  effects,	  
then	  the	  need	  for	  multilateral	  regulatory	  approval	  by	  all	  countries,	  not	  separated	  by	  species	  barriers,	  
subject	  to	  introduction	  of	  a	  specific	  GMM	  should	  be	  considered.	  To	  engage	  a	  multilateral	  regulatory	  
process	   may	   involve	   international	   agreements,	   treaties,	   covenants,	   conventions,	   protocols,	   or	  
county	   approvals	   prior	   to	   introduction	   to	   one	   country	  within	   a	   contiguous	   ecozone.	   International	  
organizations,	  such	  as	  WHO,	  may	  be	  best	  suited	  to	  provide	  leadership	  in	  a	  multilateral/international	  
regional	   regulatory	   process	   for	   deploying	   GMMs	   intended	   to	   spread	   widely	   (see	   Appendix	   2	   for	  
further	  discussion).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 	  Convention	  of	  Biological	  Diversity:	  http://www.cbd.int/convention/,	  accessed	  13	  June	  2014.	  






Table	   5.1	   Recent	   regulatory	   and	   biosafety	   development	   chronology	   relevant	   to	   the	   testing	   and	  
implementation	  of	  modified	  vector	  insects	  
	  
Year	   Development	   Relevance	   Website	  
2000	   Cartagena	  Protocol	  on	  
Biosafety	  to	  the	  
International	  Convention	  on	  
Biological	  Diversity	  
Established	  Biosafety	  Clearing-­‐House	  for	  
information	  on	  national	  biosafety	  





African	  Model	  Law	  on	  
Biosafety	  
African	  Union	  drafted	  a	  model	  legal	  
instrument	  for	  developing	  national	  
biosafety	  legislations	  in	  2001	  that	  was	  
endorsed	  by	  the	  African	  Ministerial	  
Conference	  on	  Science	  and	  Technology	  in	  
November	  2007;	  several	  African	  countries	  







Consultations	  on	  GM	  
Vectors	  
Began	  the	  process	  of	  defining	  
requirements	  for	  testing	  and	  
implementation	  of	  GM	  vectors	  
http://www.sciencemag.o
rg/content/298/5591/119.
full	  	  	  
2002–
2007	  
International	  Project	  on	  
LMO	  Environmental	  RA	  
Methodologies	  
Identified	  and	  developed	  scientific	  
methodologies	  and	  teaching	  tools	  that	  can	  
be	  used	  for	  environmental	  RA	  and	  
management	  of	  transgenic	  plants,	  in	  
accordance	  with	  the	  Cartagena	  Protocol	  





2005	   International	  Plant	  
Protection	  Convention	  
(IPPC)	  Guidelines	  for	  the	  
Export,	  Shipment,	  Import	  
and	  Release	  of	  
Biological	  Control	  Agents	  
and	  Other	  Beneficial	  
Organisms	  
IPPC	  approved	  international	  standards	  for	  
RM	  related	  to	  biological	  control	  agents	  







2006	   Daegu	  Protocol	  on	  New	  
Technologies	  for	  Pest	  and	  
Disease	  Control	  	  
International	  effort	  initiated	  to	  establish	  
guidance	  for	  regulation	  of	  new	  
biotechnologies	  related	  to	  crop	  pests	  and	  




2006	   USDA	  Environmental	  
Assessment	  on	  field	  release	  
of	  genetically	  engineered	  
pink	  bollworm	  
USDA	  Animal	  and	  Plant	  Health	  Inspection	  
Service	  announced	  a	  final	  environmental	  
assessment	  and	  finding	  of	  no	  significant	  
impact	  to	  issue	  permit	  for	  confined	  field	  
trial	  in	  southwest	  US	  of	  transgenic	  plant	  











2007	   NAPPO	  	  Guidelines	  for	  
Importation	  and	  Confined	  
Field	  Release	  of	  Transgenic	  
Arthropods	  in	  NAPPO	  
Member	  Countries	  
NAPPO	  approved	  regional	  standard	  to	  
provide	  guidance	  in	  use	  of	  transgenic	  










Year	   Development	   Relevance	   Website	  
2007	   WHO-­‐TDR	  supported	  
regional	  centres	  in	  Africa,	  
Asia,	  and	  Latin	  America	  for	  
training	  in	  biosafety	  
assessment	  for	  human	  
health	  and	  the	  environment	  
of	  the	  use	  of	  GM	  disease	  
vectors	  
Capacity	   building	   through	   a	   series	   of	  
training	   courses	   targeting	   researchers,	  
policy-­‐makers,	   regulators,	   etc.,	   in	  
developing	   countries	   for	   decision-­‐making	  
on	   regulatory	   frameworks,	   biosafety,	   RA,	  
and	  ethical,	  social	  and	  cultural	  (ESC)	  issues	  













Development	  of	  best	  practices	  for	  the	  use	  
of	  GM	  mosquitoes,	  to	  be	  used	  as	  guidance	  





2008	   FNIH-­‐supported	  working	  
group	  on	  contained	  field	  
trials	  of	  vector	  mosquitoes	  
engineered	  to	  contain	  a	  
gene	  drive	  system	  
Development	  of	  guidance	  for	  the	  conduct	  
of	   Phase	   2	   contained	   field	   trials	   for	   GM	  
mosquitoes	   with	   self-­‐limiting	   or	   self-­‐




2009	   USDA	  Environmental	  Impact	  
Statement	  on	  Use	  of	  
Genetically	  
Engineered	  Fruit	  Fly	  and	  
Pink	  Bollworm	  in	  APHIS	  
Plant	  Pest	  Control	  
Programmes	  
USDA	  Animal	  and	  Plant	  Health	   Inspection	  
Service,	  in	  cooperation	  with	  several	  states	  
and	   foreign	   countries,	   conducts	   a	   full	   RA	  
of	   GE	   fruit	   fly	   species	   and	   pink	   bollworm	  
for	   use	   in	   various	   applications	   of	   the	  
sterile	  insect	  technique	  (RIDL),	  determines	  
it	   to	   be	   an	   environmentally	   preferable	  
alternative	   to	   current	   technology,	   and	  
announces	   intention	   to	   integrate	   use	   of	  









2009	   WHO-­‐TDR	  and	  FNIH-­‐
sponsored	  technical	  
consultation	  on	  progress	  
and	  prospects	  for	  the	  use	  of	  
GM	  mosquitoes	  to	  inhibit	  
disease	  transmission	  
Reviewed	   current	   status	   and	  
requirements	   for	   future	   development	   of	  
GM	   mosquitoes	   for	   malaria	   and	   dengue	  
control;	   initiated	   development	   of	   a	  
guidance	  framework	  for	  the	  evaluation	  of	  
GM	   mosquitoes	   including	   quality	  
standards	   for	   assessing	   safety,	   efficacy,	  





2010	   Ad	  hoc	  Technical	  Expert	  
Group	  on	  Risk	  Assessment	  
and	  Risk	  Management	  
under	  the	  Cartagena	  
Protocol	  on	  Biosafety	  
Developed	  a	  roadmap	  and	  guidance	  on	  RA	  
and	  RM	  of	  GMOs	  to	  supplement	  Annex	  III	  
of	   the	   Cartagena	   Protocol,	   with	   a	   special	  













Environment	  Agency	  Austria,	  International	  
Atomic	   Energy	   Agency	   (IAEA)	   and	   the	  
University	   of	   Bern	   produced	   a	  
scientific/technical	   report	   “Defining	  
environmental	  risk	  assessment	  criteria	  for	  
GM	   insects	   to	   be	   placed	   on	   the	   EU	  
market”	  
	  

















5.5	  Regulation	  in	  a	  stepwise	  research	  and	  development	  process	  
Regulatory	   oversight	  will	   usually	   be	   required	   in	  Phase	   1	   (Figure	   1.1)	   for	   importation	   and	   possibly	  
interstate/interregional	  movement	  permits.	  Inspections	  may	  be	  conducted	  to	  assess	  the	  security	  of	  
quarantine	   containment	   according	   to	   established	   guidelines.	   Institutional	   biosafety	   committees,	  
where	   they	   exist,	   would	   also	   be	   involved	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   this	   stage.	   Other	   regulatory	  
requirements	   could	   be	   for	   permits	   to	   rear	   mosquitoes	   and	   for	   permission	   to	   work	   with	   human	  
disease	   vectors	   and	   the	   disease	   agents,	   if	   applicable,	   in	   the	   regulatory	   jurisdictions	   where	   the	  
research	   is	   to	   be	   conducted.	   Provisions	   for	   surveillance	   and	   monitoring	   for	   escaped	   GMMs	   also	  
should	  be	  part	  of	  the	  regulatory	  requirements	  at	  Phase	  1	  because	  of	  possible	  containment	  failures,	  
since	  mosquitoes	  are	  small	  and	  mobile.	  Regulation	  at	  this	  stage	  of	  research	  and	  development	  should	  
also	   provide	   for	   emergency	   control	   or	   mitigation	  measures	   to	   eliminate	   escaped	   GMMs	   through	  
proven	   means,	   such	   as	   pesticide	   applications.	   International	   biotechnology	   product	   movement	  
permits	  and	  quarantine	  systems	  are	  already	  established	   in	  many	  countries	   for	  movement	  of	   living	  
plant	  and	  animal	  agents	  that	  may	  become	  pests.	  	  
Physically,	  physiologically	  and	  ecologically	  confined	  field	  trials	  in	  Phase	  2	  should	  require	  regulation	  in	  
which	   a	   RA	   (Section	   3.	   Biosafety)	   or	   other	   similar	   environmental	   assessment	   is	   conducted	   and	  
documented	   to	   supply	   scientific	   rationale	   and	   evidence	   that	   the	   confinement	   will	   provide	   the	  
expected	  degree	  of	  assurance	  that	  the	  GMMs	  will	  not	  escape	  into	  the	  surrounding	  environment	  and	  
become	  established	  and	   spread	  or	   result	   in	   spread	  of	   the	  genetic	   construct(s)	   into	  native	   sexually	  
compatible	  species.	  Provisions	  for	  surveillance	  and	  monitoring	  should	  also	  be	  part	  of	  the	  regulatory	  
requirements	   at	   this	   phase.	   Regulation	   should	   also	   provide	   for	   emergency	   control	   or	   mitigation	  
measures	   to	   eliminate	   escaped	   and	   established	   GMMs	   and	   constructs	   through	   proven	   methods.	  
Clear	  distinctions	  should	  be	  made	  between	  physically	  and	  ecologically	  confined	  field	  trials	  to	  define	  
what	   each	  means	   relative	   to	   the	   inadvertent	   dispersion	   of	   the	  GMMs	   because	   there	  would	  most	  
likely	  be	  different	  regulatory	  requirements	  according	  to	  the	  degree	  of	  containment	  or	  confinement	  
provided.	  
Open	   release	   trials	   under	   Phase	   3	   should	   require	   regulatory	   RA	   or	   other	   similar	   environmental	  
assessment	   documentation	   to	   provide	   a	   scientific	   rationale	   and	   evidence	   that	   the	   genetic	  
construct(s)	  are	  either	  self-­‐limiting	  or	  self-­‐mitigating,	  and	  if	  not	  100%	  self-­‐limiting,	  that	  the	  releases	  
will	   not	   then	   introduce	   genetic	   constructs	   into	   indigenous	   wild	   populations	   of	   vectors	   that	   may	  
result	   in	   increased	  biological	   fitness,	   increased	  or	  broadened	  disease	  vector	   capacity,	  or	   increased	  
human	   and	   animal	   nuisance	   impacts.	   The	   regulatory	   RA	   requirements	   for	   open	   release	  would	   be	  
commensurately	  more	  stringent	  than	  for	  confined	  or	  contained	  trials	   in	  which	  escape	  is	  prevented	  
by	   physical,	   physiological,	   or	   other	   barriers.	   For	   constructs	   that	   are	   intended	   to	   spread	   within	   a	  
vector	   population	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   population	   suppression	   or	   reducing	   capacity	   to	   transmit	  
diseases,	  there	  likewise	  should	  be	  regulatory	  requirements	  to	  establish	  scientifically	  that	  the	  genetic	  
construct(s)	  do	  not	  otherwise	   increase	  biological	   fitness,	  broaden	  vector	   capacity	   to	  other	  disease	  
agents,	  or	  increase	  human	  and	  animal	  nuisance	  impacts.	  In	  case	  of	  failure	  to	  perform	  as	  expected	  or	  
required,	  appropriate	  control	  or	  mitigation	  measures	  need	  to	  be	  available	  to	  eliminate	  escaped	  and	  
established	  GMMs.	  When	   transboundary	  movement	   to	  adjacent	   countries	  or	   states	  with	   separate	  
regulatory	   jurisdiction	   is	   expected	   or	   intended,	   then	   prior	   to	   the	   release	   of	   GMMs	   with	   genetic	  
constructs	  capable	  of	  expanding	  in	  a	  vector	  population,	  the	  regulatory	  requirement	  of	  the	  countries	  





or	   states	   into	  which	  animals	   containing	   the	   transgene	  may	  move	  also	  needs	   to	  be	  addressed	   (see	  
discussion	   of	   transboundary	  movement	   under	   paragraph	   5.6.4	   below).	   Phase	   2	   and/or	   3	   also	  will	  
also	  require	  assessment	  of	  impact	  on	  non-­‐target	  and	  beneficial	  species	  and	  include	  species	  that	  are	  
threatened	  or	  endangered	   in	  the	  environment.	  Satisfactory	  completion	  of	  Phase	  3	  trials	  may	  result	  
in	   regulatory	   approvals	   for	   programmatic	   implementation	   and	   no	   longer	   require	   regulatory	  
supervision	  for	  post	  implementation	  when	  all	  safety-­‐testing	  parameters	  are	  satisfied.	  
In	   Phase	   4,	   post	   implementation	   surveillance	   regulation,	   when	   required,	   should	   be	   intended,	  
designed	  and	   implemented	   to	  detect	  movement	  and	   introgression	  of	   the	  genetic	   construct	  within	  
vector	  populations	  and	  detect	  unintended	  changes	   in	  vector	  biology	   that	  may	   result	   in	  changes	   in	  
biological	  fitness,	  adverse	  changes	  in	  vectorial	  capacity,	  and	  changes	  in	  nuisance	  impacts.	  In	  case	  of	  
failure	   to	  perform	  as	  expected	  or	   required,	  emergency	  control	  or	  mitigation	  measures	  need	   to	  be	  
available	  to	  eliminate	  escaped	  and	  established	  GMMs.	  
5.6	  Additional	  considerations	  pertinent	  to	  GMM	  regulation	  	  
5.6.1	  Public	  consultation	  	  
Regulatory	  decision-­‐making	  should	  include	  opportunities	  for	  public	  consultation.	  In	  many	  cases,	  this	  
is	  mandated	  within	  the	  national	  regulatory	  process.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  USA,	  agencies	  are	  required	  
to	  make	  efforts	  to	  provide	  meaningful	  public	  involvement	  in	  their	  processes	  under	  NEPA.§§§§§§§§§ 	  This	  
principle	   is	  also	  applied	   in	  certain	  multinational	  agreements.	  The	  Cartagena	  Protocol	  specifies	   that	  
Parties	  shall	  promote	  and	  facilitate	  public	  awareness,	  education	  and	  participation,	  and	  ensure	  that	  
the	  public	  has	  access	  to	  information	  on	  LMOs	  that	  may	  be	  imported,	  and	  shall,	   in	  accordance	  with	  
their	  respective	  laws	  and	  regulations,	  consult	  the	  public	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  The	  United	  
Nations	   Economic	   Commission	   for	   Europe	   (UNECE)	   Convention	   on	   Access	   to	   Information,	   Public	  
Participation	   in	   Decision-­‐Making	   and	   Access	   to	   Justice	   in	   Environmental	   Matters********** 	   likewise	  
establishes	   a	   number	   of	   rights	   of	   the	   public	   (individuals	   and	   their	   associations)	   with	   regard	   to	  
transparency,	  consultation	  and	  access	  to	  justice.	  	  
Decision-­‐makers	  must	  be	  able	  to	  weigh	  all	  the	  evidence	  that	  they	  receive	  with	  regard	  to	  relevance	  
and	  quality.	  An	  example	  is	  provided	  in	  the	  WHO	  Handbook	  for	  Guideline	  Development	  (WHO,	  2012),	  
which	   takes	   into	   account	   factors	   such	   as	   the	   comprehensiveness	  of	   the	  materials,	   the	  method	  by	  
which	  risk	  of	  bias	  was	  assessed,	  the	  method	  by	  which	  the	  data	  were	  presented,	  and	  the	  similarity	  of	  
results	  from	  different	  studies.	  	  
5.6.2	  Litigation	  
Regulation	  by	   litigation	  may	  occur	  when	   the	   regulation	  does	  not	  have	   sufficient	  basis	   in	   law,	  or	   is	  
flawed	  by	  RA	  that	  does	  not	  meet	  Good	  Laboratory	  Practice	  and	  refereed	  publication	  standards	  or	  by	  
legally	   required	   administrative	   procedures.	   Litigation	   or	   lawsuits,	   court	   injunctions,	   court	   orders,	  
fines	  and	  penalties	  may	  then	  drive	  the	  regulatory	  process,	  usually	  after	  actions	  have	  occurred.	  There	  
have	   been	   several	   such	   lawsuits	   over	   GM/living	   modified	   crop	   plants.	   This	   is	   the	   least	   desirable	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
§§§§§§§§§ 	  National	  Environmental	  Policy	  Act	  (NEPA).	  Basic	  information:	  
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/basics/nepa.html,	  accessed	  25	  May	  2014.	  	  
********** 	  Aarhus	  Convention:	  http://www.unece.org/env/pp/introduction.html,	  accessed	  25	  May	  2014.	  





regulatory	   outcome	   for	   GMMs	   and	   may	   result	   in	   the	   loss	   or	   delay	   of	   beneficial	   public	   health	  
innovation	  as	  well	  as	  loss	  of	  public	  confidence.	  	  
5.6.3	   Capacity	   and	   institution	   building	   as	   an	   essential	   component	   of	   an	   informed	  
regulatory	  infrastructure	  
The	   building	   of	   regulatory	   capacity	   to	   evaluate	  GMMs	  will	   be	   unequivocally	   important.	   It	  may	   be	  
anticipated	  that	  there	  will	  be	  a	  need	  to	  train	  members	  of	  national	  regulatory	  authorities	  on	   issues	  
relevant	   to	   the	   review	   of	   entomological	   intervention	   trials.	   In	   many	   countries,	   members	   of	   the	  
national	   regulatory	   authority	   may	   have	   a	   pharmacy	   or	   medical	   background	   with	   experience	   in	  
regulating	  drugs,	  vaccines	  and	  devices.	  There	  is	  a	  strong	  probability	  that	  they	  will	  be	  unfamiliar	  with	  
trials	  of	  vector	  control	  tools,	  although	  there	  are	  exceptions	  (for	  example,	  in	  the	  United	  Republic	  of	  
Tanzania,	  review	  of	  vector	  control	  trials	  is	  done	  by	  the	  Tropical	  Pesticides	  Research	  Institute).	  	  
	  Moreover,	  although	  many	  developing	  countries	  have	  enacted	  national	  biosafety	  legislation,	  others	  
still	  do	  not	  have	  a	  regulatory	  framework	  to	  deal	  with	  GMOs.	  Even	  if	  legislation	  is	  present,	  there	  may	  
not	  be	  a	  functional	  system	  in	  place	  to	  regulate	  GMMs.	  If	  experience	  with	  RA	  and	  regulation	  of	  GMOs	  
exists,	  GM	  plants	  or	   crops	  may	  provide	   the	  only	  precedent.	  Because	  most	   legislation	  dealing	  with	  
GMOs	  assigns	  regulatory	  responsibility	  to	  a	  separate	  national	  biosafety	  authority,	  and	  because	  the	  
focus	  of	  those	  authorities	  will	  probably	  have	  been	  on	  GM	  crops,	  the	  composition	  of	  those	  bodies	  will	  
consist	  of	  members	  who	  have	  little	  experience	  with	  the	  technologies	  involved	  in	  producing	  GMMs	  or	  
how	  to	  regulate	  them.	  Regulatory	  paradigms	  set	  by	  experience	  with	  multinational	  GM	  plant	  or	  crop	  
corporations	  may	  result	  in	  high	  costs	  and	  extended	  indecision	  on	  regulatory	  approvals.	  Adoption	  of	  
a	  strict	  interpretation	  of	  the	  precautionary	  approach	  or	  principle	  (Appendix	  2)	  could	  also	  mean	  that	  
regulatory	  approvals	  would	  not	  be	  granted	  until	  all	  possible	  safety	  issues	  are	  resolved,	  regardless	  of	  
societal	   needs	   and	   potential	   benefits.	   This	   strict	   interpretation	   may	   be	   incorporated	   in	   capacity	  
building	  efforts	  conducted	  by	  groups	  opposed	  to	  GM	  technology.	  	  
Thus,	   it	  will	  be	  critical	  to	  begin	  working	  with	  regulators	  very	  early	  on	   in	  a	  GMM	  project	  to	   identify	  
the	   appropriate	   regulatory	   pathway	   and	   to	   initiate	   proactive	   communications	   that	   will	   build	  
understanding	  about	   the	  GMM	  technology	  as	  well	   as	   the	  goals	  and	  methodologies	  of	   the	  project.	  
There	  may	  be	  a	  need	  for	  additional	  training	  in	  vector	  biology	  procedures	  and/or	  biosafety	  to	  ensure	  
that	   decision-­‐makers	   are	   empowered	   to	   competently	   assess	   plans	   for	   GMM	   trials	   and	   reach	  
definitive	  and	  defensible	  conclusions.	  These	  needs	  must	  be	  anticipated,	  and	  means	  to	  address	  them	  
must	  be	  identified	  and	  budgeted	  for	  accordingly.	  	  
5.6.4	  Regulatory	  precedents	  for	  transboundary	  movement	  	  
Transboundary	   regulatory	   issues	   that	   apply	   to	   GMMs	   have	   been	   raised	   because	   mosquitoes	   are	  
mobile.	   For	   example,	   the	   anthropophilic	   Aedes	   aegypti	   vector	   of	   dengue	   and	   other	   diseases	   has	  
been	   spread	   by	   humans	   worldwide	   wherever	   suitable	   habitats	   exist,	   especially	   with	   increasingly	  
favourable	  peridomestic	  habitats	  provided	  by	  ever	  increasing	  human	  urbanization.	  Thus,	  RA	  and	  RM	  
plans	   should	   take	   into	   account	   the	   possibility	   that	   GMMs	   that	   are	   not	   100%	   sterile	   may	   move	  
autonomously	   across	   political	   borders	   into	   suitable	   habitats	   that	   are	   contiguous,	   or	   even	   into	  
regions	  separated	  by	  geographical	  or	  biological	  barriers	  due	  to	  human	  travel	  and	  transport.	  	  





The	  general	  consensus	  of	  international	  conventions	  that	  address	  transboundary	  movement	  of	  GMOs	  
or	   exotic	   agents,	   and	   that	   therefore	   may	   apply	   to	   GMMs,	   is	   that	   prior	   to	   release	   into	   the	  
environment	   or	   implementation,	   there	   should	   be	   a	   notification	   and	   a	   bilateral	   or	   multilateral	  
consultative	  process	  with	  other	  countries	  to	  which	  the	  GMMs	  may	  spread.	  With	  respect	  to	  GMMs	  
that	  are	  disease	  vectors,	  this	  could	  be	  within	  the	  context	  of	  a	  collaborative	  process	  for	  control	  of	  the	  
vector.	  	  
Relevant	  conventions	  that	  address	  transboundary	  movement	  include	  the	  following:	  	  	  
• The	   World	   Trade	   Organization	   (WTO)	   Agreement	   on	   the	   Application	   of	   Sanitary	   and	  
Phytosanitary	  Measures	  (SPS	  Agreement)	  (WTO,	  1994),	  Articles	  3,	  5	  and	  6;	  
• The	  Convention	  of	  Biological	  Diversity,	  (CBD,	  2014),35	  Articles	  3,	  4,	  5,	  14	  and	  17;	  
• The	  Cartagena	  Protocol	  on	  Biosafety,	  Articles	  4,	  6,	  8,	  14,	  and	  19;	  	  
• The	  International	  Plant	  Protection	  Convention	  (IPPC)	  Article	  7	  (International	  Cooperation)	  
and	   IPPC	   International	   Standards	   for	   Phytosanitary	   Measures	   (ISPM),	   Nos.	   3	   and	  
11;†††††††††† 	  
• Code	  of	  Conduct	  for	  the	  Import	  and	  Release	  of	  Exotic	  Biological	  Control	  Agents;‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 	  	  
• The	   ASEAN	   Agreement	   on	   the	   Conservation	   of	   Nature	   and	   Natural	   Resources,	   Article	   3	  
(ASEAN,	  	  	  1985);	  
• The	  Convention	  of	  Conservation	  of	  Nature	  in	  the	  South	  Pacific,	  Article	  V;	  	  
• The	   Convention	   for	   the	   Conservation	   of	   Biodiversity	   and	   the	   Protection	   of	   Wilderness	  
Areas	  in	  Central	  America,	  Article	  24;	  
• The	  International	  Health	  Regulations,	  as	  amended,	  1982.	  
Countries	  who	  are	  Parties	  to	  such	  conventions	  must	  develop	  their	  own	  regulations	  to	  implement	  the	  
requirements.	   The	   Cartagena	   Protocol	   describes	   an	   Advance	   Informed	   Agreement	   process	   that	  
would	   apply	   prior	   to	   the	   first	   intentional	   transboundary	   movement	   of	   GMMs	   intended	   for	  
environmental	   release	   in	   the	   receiving	   country	   (Article	   7,	   paragraph	   1).	   An	   example	   of	   how	   this	  
provision	   has	   been	   implemented	   within	   Europe	   is	   found	   under	   Regulation	   (EC)	   No	  
1946/2003§§§§§§§§§§ 	  of	  15	  July	  2003	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  on	  transboundary	  
movement	   of	   genetically	   modified	   organisms	   Official	   Journal	   L287	  of	   05.11.2003.*********** 	   This	  
regulation	   “aims	   to	   set	   up	   a	   common	   system	   for	   notifying	   and	   exchanging	   information	   on	  
transboundary	   movements	   of	   GMOs	   to	   third	   countries.	   The	   ultimate	   goal	   is	   to	   ensure	   that	  
movements	   of	  GMOs	   that	  may	  have	   adverse	   effects	   on	   the	   sustainable	   use	   of	   biological	   diversity	  
and	  on	  human	  health	  take	  due	  account	  of	  the	  environment	  and	  human	  health.”	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  accessed	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  2014.	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  Code	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  for	  the	  import	  and	  release	  of	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  control	  agents.	  FAO	  Corporate	  
Document	  Repository,	  Report	  of	  the	  Conference	  of	  FAO,	  28th	  Session:	  
http://www.fao.org/docrep/x5585e/x5585e0i.htm,	  accessed	  25	  May	  2014.	  
§§§§§§§§§§ 	  EUR-­‐Lex.	  Regulation	  No.	  1946/2003:	  http://eur-­‐
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber&lg=en&type_doc=Regulation&an_
doc=2003&nu_doc=1946,	  accessed	  25	  May	  2014.	  
*********** 	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  accessed	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  May	  2014.	  	  





5.6.5	  Precedents	  from	  biocontrol	  and	  other	  areas	  
	   The	  most	  relevant	  examples	  of	  multilateral	  collaborative	  transboundary	  efforts	  come	  from	  
the	  field	  of	  biocontrol.	  One	  such	  success	  was	  the	  introduction	  the	  parasitic	  wasp,	  Epidinocarsis	  lopezi	  
of	   the	  cassava	  mealybug,	  Phenacoccus	  manihoti,	   in	  Africa	   (Neuenschwander	  &	  Herren,	  1988).	  The	  
parasite	  was	   released	   in	  more	   than	  50	  sites	  and	  by	   the	  end	  of	  1986,	   it	  was	  established	  with	  good	  
results	   in	   16	   countries.	   National	   introductions	   were	   facilitated	   by	   inputs	   from	   international	  
organizations	   to	  guarantee	  the	  safety	  and	  efficacy	  of	   the	   introductions,	   including	  the	   International	  
Institute	  of	  Tropical	  Agriculture	  (IITA),	  the	  International	  Institute	  of	  Biological	  Control	  (IIBC)	  and	  the	  
African	   Union's	   Phytosanitary	   Commission	   (IAPSC).	   The	   IAPSC	   did	   not	  make	   blanket	   decisions	   for	  
member	   countries	   and	   releases	  were	   national	   decisions,	   once	   imported	   into	   quarantine.	   The	   IIBC	  
main	   concern	   was	   to	   ensure	   freedom	   from	   disease	   and	   hyperparasites,	   while	   IITA	   assisted	  
governments	   with	   local	   production,	   release	   and	   monitoring	   of	   parasites.	   IITA	   also	   coordinated	   a	  
large	   capacity	   building	   element	   in	   the	   programme,	  which	   helped	   create	   a	   generation	   of	   technical	  
people	  across	  Africa	  with	  knowledge	  of	  both	  biocontrol	  and	  quarantine,	  and	  this	  has	  been	  helpful	  to	  
further	  biocontrol	  projects	  in	  Africa	  (Wagge,	  2011,	  personal	  communication).	  
Another	   example	   of	   a	   successful	   regional	   programme	   is	   the	   biological	   control	   of	   the	   hibiscus	  
mealybug,	   Maconellicoccus	   hirsutus	   Green,	   in	   the	   Caribbean	   (Kairo	   et	   al.,	   2000).	   Examples	   of	  
regional	   disease	   control	   programmes	   include	   the	   Pan	   African	   Tsetse	   and	   Trypanosomiasis	  
Eradication	   Campaign	   (ADF,	   2004)	   and	   the	   Onchocerciasis	   Control	   Programme,††††††††††† 	   both	   of	  
which	  contain	  vector	  control	  components.	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  Onchocerciasis	  Control	  Programme	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  accessed	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  2014.	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Appendix	  1.	  Examples	  of	  national	  legislation	  and	  regulation	  
pertaining	  to	  GMMs	  
This	   appendix	   provides	   a	   brief	   description	   of	   the	   regulatory	   framework	   of	   several	   countries	   that	  
have	   engaged	   in	   or	   are	   contemplating	   GMM	   research.	   The	   most	   important	   resource	   for	   specific	  
country	   GMM	   regulation	   and	   contacts	   is	   the	   Cartagena	   Protocol	   on	   Biosafety,	   Biosafety	   Clearing-­‐
House.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 	   Another	   source	   of	   information	   is	   the	   Convention	   of	   Biological	   Diversity,	   Biosafety	  
Information	  Resource	  Centre.§§§§§§§§§§§ 	  
Brazil	  	  	  	  	  
In	   Brazil,	   Federal	   Law	   #	   11.105,************ 	   of	   March	   2005,	   is	   the	   principal	   legal	   framework	   for	  
biotechnology	   and	   provides	   safety	   regulation	   and	   inspection	   tools	   for	   activities	   concerning	  GMOs	  
and	  their	  by-­‐products.	  This	  law	  was	  implemented	  by	  the	  National	  Biosafety	  Council	  (CNBS),	  provided	  
a	   new	   format	   for	   the	   National	   Biosafety	   Technical	   Commission	   (CTNBio),	   and	   established	   a	  
framework	  through	  the	  National	  Biosafety	  Policy	  (PNB).	  CNBS	  is	   linked	  directly	  to	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  
President	  of	  Brazil	  and	  is	  responsible	  for	  providing	  the	  PNB.	  The	  CNBS	  is	  responsible	  for	  establishing	  
principles	   and	   guidelines	   for	   the	   administration	   of	   federal	   agencies	   that	   regulate	   biotechnology.	  
Also,	   CNBS	   analyses	   the	   socioeconomic	   impact	   of	   the	   commercial	   use	   of	   GMOs	   and	   their	   by-­‐
products	  and	  issues	  the	  final	  approval	  of	  licences	  and	  policies,	  when	  deemed	  necessary.	  	  
CTNBio	  belongs	  to	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Science	  and	  Technology	  of	  the	  Federal	  Government	  of	  Brazil	  and	  is	  
a	   consulting	   and	   deliberating	  multidisciplinary	   body	   that	   provides	   technical	   assistance	   to	   support	  
biotechnology	   decisions	   at	   the	   federal	   level.	   CTNBio	   is	   responsible	   for	   approvals	   of	   research	   and	  
development	  of	  GMOs	  under	  specific	  conditions	  and	  approval	  for	  tests	  or	  commercialization	  of	  any	  
biotechnology	  product	  for	  human,	  animal,	  and	  plant	  use.	  CTNBio	  must	  approve	  every	  laboratory	  or	  
facility	   that	   intends	   to	   manipulate	   genes	   for	   the	   creation	   of	   GMOs	   prior	   to	   operation.	   The	  
Commission	   has	   27	   members	   that	   include	   scientists	   with	   biotechnology	   backgrounds,	   federal	  
officers,	  lawyers	  and	  other	  experts.	  	  
In	  order	  to	  have	  a	  prior	  analysis	  before	  submission	  to	  CTNBio,	  all	  organizations	  (university,	  research	  
institution,	  and	  industry)	  must	  have	  an	  internal	  Biosafety	  Commission	  that	  does	  the	  initial	  evaluation	  
of	   the	   research.	  After	  approval	  at	   this	   first	   level,	   the	   research	  project	   is	   submitted	   to	  CTNBio.	  The	  
requirements	   for	   approval	   of	   commercial	   products	   are	   quite	   strict	   and	   may	   take	   years	   to	   be	  
accepted,	   but	  mainly	   involve	   new	  plant	   varieties.	   After	   approval,	   the	   executing	  organization	  must	  
periodically	  report	  on	  implementation	  and	  provide	  results	  to	  CTNBio.	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  Biological	  Diversity,	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  Protocol	  on	  Biosafety,	  Biosafety	  Clearing-­‐House:	  
http://bch.cbd.int,	  accessed	  25	  May	  2014.	  
§§§§§§§§§§§ 	  Convention	  of	  Biological	  Diversity,	  the	  Biosafety	  Information	  Resource	  Centre	  (BIRC):	  
http://bch.cbd.int/database/resources/,	  accessed	  25	  May	  2014.	  
************ 	  Government	  of	  Brazil.	  Lei	  No.	  11.105,	  de	  24	  de	  Marco	  de	  2005:	  
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2004-­‐2006/2005/Lei/L11105.htm,	  accessed	  25	  May	  2014.	  
	  






The	  Biosafety	  Act	  (2007)†††††††††††† 	  (Act	  678)	  established	  the	  National	  Biosafety	  Board	  to	  regulate	  the	  
release,	   import,	   export,	   and	   contained	   use	   of	   LMOs,	   and	   the	   release	   of	   their	   products	   with	   the	  
objectives	  of	  protecting	  human,	  plant	  and	  animal	  health,	   the	  environment	  and	  biological	  diversity.	  
The	   Board	   consists	   of	   the	   following	   members:	   	   Secretary	   General	   of	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Natural	  
Resources	   and	   Environment,	   who	   is	   the	   Chairman,	   and	   representatives	   from	   the	   ministries	   of	  
agriculture	   and	   agro-­‐based	   industry;	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Health,	  Ministry	   of	   Plantation	   Industries	   and	  
Commodities;	  Ministry	  of	  Domestic	  Trade	  and	  Consumer	  Affairs;	  Ministry	  of	  International	  Trade	  and	  
Industry;	  Ministry	   of	   Science,	   Technology,	   and	   Innovation;	   and	   not	  more	   than	   four	   other	   persons	  
who	  have	  the	  knowledge	  or	  experience	  or	  both	  in	  any	  of	  the	  disciplines	  or	  matters	  relevant	  to	  this	  
Act.	  A	  Director	  General	  is	  the	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Board	  and	  carries	  out	  duties	  required	  by	  it.	  
The	  stated	  functions	  of	  the	  Board	  are	  to:	  	  decide	  on	  all	  applications;	  to	  monitor	  activities	  relating	  to	  
LMOs	   and	   products	   of	   such	   organisms;	   promote	   research,	   development,	   education	   and	   training	  
activities	   relating	   to	   biosafety;	   and	   establish	   mechanisms	   to	   facilitate	   the	   collection,	   storage	   and	  
dissemination	  of	  data	  relating	  to	  LMOs	  and	  products	  of	  such	  organisms	  and	  biosafety.	  The	  Genetic	  
Modification	   Advisory	   Committee	   has	   been	   established	   to	   provide	   scientific,	   technical	   and	   other	  
relevant	  advice	  to	  the	  Director	  General.	  
An	   application	   for	   the	   approval	   of	   any	   release	   activity,	   or	   any	   importation	   of	   LMOs,	   or	   both	   is	  
submitted	  to	  the	  Director	  General	  and	   is	  accompanied	  with	  a	  RA,	  a	  RM	  report,	  and	  an	  emergency	  
response	   plan.	   The	   RA	   and	   RM	   reports	   are	   in	   a	   form	   prescribed	   by	   the	  Minister	   and	   contain	   an	  
assessment	  of	  the	  risk	  and	  adverse	  effect	  that	  such	  LMOs	  and	  products	  of	  such	  organisms	  will	  have	  
or	  are	   likely	   to	  have	  on	  human,	  plant	  and	  animal	  health;	   the	  environment	  and	  biological	  diversity;	  
and	   the	  proposed	  measures	   to	  be	  undertaken	   to	  prevent,	   reduce	  or	  control	   the	   risks	  and	  adverse	  
effects	   that	   they	   will	   have	   or	   are	   likely	   to	   have.	   The	   emergency	   response	   plan	   provides	   safety	  
measures	  and	  procedures	   for	  the	  protection	  of	  human,	  plant	  and	  animal	  health,	   the	  environment,	  
and	  biological	  diversity	  against	  harm	  or	  damage	  caused	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  by	  LMOs	  or	  products	  of	  
such	  organisms,	  as	  well	  as	  all	  necessary	  measures	  to	  be	  taken	  in	  the	  event	  of	  an	  emergency.	  
Information	  on	  Malaysian	  biosafety	  regulations	  and	  the	  National	  Safety	  Board	  decision	  to	  approve	  
GMM	  experimentation	  can	  be	  obtained	  from	  http://www.biosafety.nre.gov.my	  
Mexico	  
Mexico	   actively	   participated	   in	   negotiations	   leading	   to	   the	   Agreement	   on	   Biological	   Diversity	   and	  
when	   the	   Cartagena	   Protocol	   on	   Biosecurity	   was	   adopted.	   The	   Interministerial	   Commission	   on	  
Biosecurity	   and	   Genetically	  Modified	   Organisms	   (CIBIOGEM)‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 	   was	   created	   by	   Presidential	  
Decree	  on	  the	  5	  November	  1999	  (Villalobos,	  2006).	  Under	  Mexican	  Federal	  law,	  CIBIOGEM	  functions	  
to:	  	  present	  suggestions	  to	  the	  National	  Normalization	  Commission	  about	  Mexican	  official	  standards	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for	  the	  research,	  production,	  trade,	  import,	  export,	  movement,	  commercial	  use,	  and	  consumption	  of	  
LMOs;	   promote,	   together	   with	   the	   Comisión	   Nacional	   para	   el	   Uso	   y	   Conocimiento	   de	   la	  
Biodiversidad	   (CONABIO)	   [National	   Commission	   on	   the	   Use	   and	   Knowledge	   of	   Biodiversity],	   the	  
establishment	  of	   a	  data	  bank	  on	   the	  presence	  and	  distribution	  of	  native	   species	   related	   to	   LMOs,	  
and	  monitor	  mechanisms	   and	   evaluate	   the	   environmental	   impact,	   and	   the	   impact	   on	   human	   and	  
animal	   health	   resulting	   from	   the	   production	   and	   consumption	   of	   LMOs;	   set	   up	   an	   uniform	  
programme	  for	  the	  inspection	  of	  LMO	  research	  and	  production	  plants;	  and	  recommend	  methods	  for	  
the	   dissemination	   of	   information	   regarding	   the	   benefits,	   and	   possible	   risks	   of	   the	   use	   and	  
consumption	  of	  LMOs	  to	  the	  public.	  
Additionally,	  the	  1999	  decree	  established	  the	  Executive	  Secretary,	  the	  Technical	  Committee,	  and	  the	  
Consultative	   Council	   on	   Biosecurity.	   The	   Executive	   Secretary	   responsibilities	   include,	   but	   are	   not	  
limited	  to:	  ensuring	  that	  laws	  regarding	  biosecurity	  and	  the	  regulations	  of	  CIBIOGEM	  are	  followed	  by	  
government	   institutions;	   registering	   LMOs	   and	   their	   products	   and	   sub-­‐products;	   establishing	   and	  
maintaining	   an	  up-­‐to-­‐date	   registry	   of	   LMOs;	   and,	   establishing	   and	  maintaining	   an	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  data	  
bank	  regarding	  on	  the	  presence	  and	  distribution	  of	  native	  species	  related	  to	  LMOs.	  The	  activities	  of	  
the	   Technical	   Committee	   are	   coordinated	   by	   the	   Executive	   Secretary	   of	   CIBIOGEM,	   and	   include	  
preparing	   and	   suggesting	   to	   the	   Executive	   Secretary	   issues	   and	   regulations	   that	   have	   to	   be	  
submitted	  for	  consideration	  by	  CIBIOGEM,	  and,	  when	  suggested	  by	  CONABIO,	  reaching	  agreements	  
with	   the	   responsible	   institutions	   regarding	   the	   performance	   of	   risk	   analyses	   for	   LMOs	   and	   their	  
products	  and	  sub-­‐products.	  
USA	  
The	  USA	  is	  not	  a	  signatory	  agent	  to	  the	  CPB	  and	  uses	  its	  existing	  national	  legislation	  and	  agencies	  to	  
regulate	   LMOs	   under	   the	   Coordinated	   Framework	   for	   Regulation	   of	   Biotechnology,	   (US	   Office	   of	  
Science	   and	   Technology,	   1986).	   The	   26	   June	   1986	   Coordinated	   Framework	   for	   Regulation	   of	  
Biotechnology	  exists	  as	  an	  Executive	  Office	  of	  the	  President,	  Office	  of	  Science	  and	  Technology	  Policy	  
Federal	  Register	  51	  FR	  23302,	  announcement	  of	  policy	  notice	  for	  public	  comment,	  and	  is	  a	  guidance	  
and	  not	  a	  law	  in	  the	  USA.	  
In	  summary,	  this	  Federal	  Register	  notice	  announces	  the	  policy	  of	  the	  Federal	  agencies	  involved	  with	  
the	  review	  of	  biotechnology	  research	  and	  products.	  This	  notice	  includes	  separate	  descriptions	  of	  the	  
regulatory	  policies	  of	  FDA,	  EPA,	  Occupational	   Safety	  and	  Health	  Administration	   (OSHA),	  and	  USDA	  
and	   the	   research	   policies	   of	   the	   National	   Institutes	   of	   Health	   (NIH),	   National	   Science	   Foundation	  
(NSF),	   EPA,	   and	   USDA.	   The	   agencies	   will	   seek	   to	   operate	   their	   programmes	   in	   an	   integrated	   and	  
coordinated	   fashion,	   and	   together	   should	   cover	   the	   full	   range	   of	   plants,	   animals,	   and	  
microorganisms	   derived	   by	   the	   new	   genetic	   engineering	   techniques.	   To	   the	   extent	   possible,	  
responsibility	  for	  product	  use	  will	  lie	  with	  a	  single	  agency.	  Where	  regulatory	  oversight	  or	  review	  for	  a	  
particular	  product	  is	  to	  be	  performed	  by	  more	  than	  one	  agency,	  the	  policy	  establishes	  a	  lead	  agency	  
and	  consolidated	  or	  coordinated	  reviews.	  	  
While	   certain	   USDA	   and	   US	   Environmental	   Protection	   Agency	   requirements	   are	   in	   part	   new,	   the	  
underlying	   regulatory	   regimens	   are	   not	   new.	   Members	   of	   the	   agricultural	   and	   industrial	  
communities	  are	  familiar	  with	  the	  general	  requirements	  under	  these	  laws,	  which	  include	  the	  Federal	  





Plant	  Pest	  Act,	  The	  Plant	  Quarantine	  Act,	   the	  Toxic	  Substances	  Control	  Act	   (TSCA),	   the	  FFDCA,	  and	  
the	  FIFRA.	  Because	  this	  comprehensive	  regulatory	  framework	  uses	  a	  mosaic	  of	  existing	  federal	  law,	  
some	  of	  the	  statutory	  nomenclature	  for	  certain	  actions	  may	  seem	  inconsistent.	  Certain	  laws,	  such	  as	  
USDA's	  Federal	  Plant	  Pest	  Act,	  require	  a	  "permit"	  before	  a	  microorganism	  pathogenic	  to	  plants	  may	  
be	  transported	  between	  states	  or	  imported.	  Under	  other	  laws	  such	  as	  FIFRA,	  the	  agencies	  “license”	  
or	  “approve”	  the	  use	  of	  particular	  products.	  TSCA	  requires	  a	  “premanufacturing	  notification”.	  There	  
are	   also	   some	   variations	   among	   the	   agencies	   in	   the	   use	   of	   the	   phrase	   “genetic	   engineering.”	  
Agencies	   have	   agreed	   to	   have	   scientists	   from	   each	   other's	   staff	   participate	   in	   reviews.	   Each	  
regulatory	   review	  will	   require	   that	   the	   safety,	  or	   safety	  and	  efficacy,	  of	  a	  particular	  agricultural	  or	  
industrial	   product	   be	   satisfactorily	   demonstrated	   to	   the	   regulatory	   agency	   prior	   to	  
commercialization.	  	  
NEPA	   imposes	   procedural	   requirements,	   including	   an	   open	  public	   comment	   period	   consultation	  
phase	  announced	  in	  the	  USA	  Federal	  Register,	  on	  all	  Federal	  agencies	  to	  prepare	  an	  analysis	  prior	  to	  
making	  a	  decision	   to	   take	  any	  action	   that	  may	   significantly	  affect	   the	  environment.	  Depending	  on	  
the	   characteristics	   of	   a	   proposal,	   an	   environmental	   assessment	   (EA),	   or	   a	   broader	   environmental	  
impact	   statement	   (EIS)	   may	   need	   to	   be	   prepared	   in	   connection	   with	   the	   release	   of	   genetically	  
manipulated	  organisms.	  Threatened	  and	  endangered	  species	   impact	  assessment	   is	   required	  under	  
the	   Endangered	   Species	   Act	   (ESA).	   Federal	   regulatory	   decisions	   regarding	   permits	   for	   GMO	  
environmental	   release	   in	   the	  USA	  are	   subject	   to	  either	  EA	   for	   some	   trials	  or	   EIS	   for	   large-­‐scale	  or	  
programmatic	   use	   under	   NEPA.	   Examples	   of	   EAs	   and	   EIS	   can	   be	   found	   for	   Use	   of	   Genetically	  
Engineered	  Fruit	  Fly	  and	  Pink	  Bollworm	  in	  APHIS	  Plant	  Pest	  Control	  Programmes	  (USDA,	  2008).	  The	  
EIS	  was	  both	  a	  USA	  and	  international	  precedent	  because	  it	  was	  the	  first	  EIS	  ever	  done	  on	  any	  LMO	  in	  
the	   USA	   or	   elsewhere	   under	   comparable	   environmental	   laws	   of	   other	   countries.	   EA	   and/or	   EIS	  
environmental	   documentation	   required	   in	   the	   federal	   decision-­‐making	   process	   must	   provide	   for	  
alternatives	   so	   that	   different	   approaches	   may	   be	   considered	   besides	   the	   preferred	   or	   proposed	  
alternative.	  The	  Record	  of	  Decision	  for	  the	  final	  EIS	  on	  Use	  of	  Genetically	  Engineered	  Fruit	  Flies	  and	  
Pink	  Bollworm	  authorized	  the	  development	  and	  use	  of	  these	  genetically	  engineered	  insects	  in	  SIT	  for	  
USDA/state	  cooperative	  plant	  pest	  eradication	  and	  control	  programmes.	  Field	  release	  testing	  of	  GM	  
pink	  bollworm	  has	  been	  conducted	  in	  the	  USA.	  However,	  further	  large-­‐scale	  implementation	  has	  not	  
yet	  occurred,	  although	  an	  irradiated	  GE	  pink	  bollworm	  strain	  expressing	  a	  fluorescent	  marker	  gene	  
was	   used	   by	   the	   APHIS	   Plant	   pest	   programme	   (under	   permit),	   to	   mitigate	   accidental	   escapes	   of	  
fertile	  moths	  around	  the	  SIT	  pink	  bollworm	  mass-­‐rearing	  facility	  and	  to	  assess	  moth	  dispersal.	  
Although	  the	  USA	  regulatory	  route	  appears	  straightforward	  for	  GE	  insects	  that	  are	  plant	  pests,	  the	  
route	  for	  non-­‐plant	  pest	  species,	  such	  as	  GE	  mosquitoes,	  has	  been	  less	  clear.	  Although	  USDA-­‐APHIS	  
have	   experience	  with	   the	   regulation	   of	   GE	   insects,	   the	   two	   of	   the	   relevant	   statutes	   under	   which	  
USDA-­‐APHIS	   operates	   are	   the	   Plant	   Pest	   Act	   and	   the	   Animal	   Health	   Protection	   Act.	   Clearly,	   GE	  
mosquitoes	   are	   not	   plant	   pests	   and	   therefore	   could	   only	   be	   regulated	   by	   USDA-­‐APHIS	   under	   the	  
Animal	  Health	  Protection	  Act,	  which	  prohibits	  the	  importation	  or	  entry	  of	  any	  animal	  that	  is	  deemed	  
to	  disseminate	  any	  pest	  or	  disease	  of	   livestock	  within	  the	  USA.	  Mosquitoes	  are	  known	  to	  transmit	  
diseases	   to	   livestock,	   and	  USDA-­‐APHIS	  might	  be	   involved	   in	   their	   regulation	   from	   that	   standpoint.	  
However,	  when	  Oxitec	  Ltd,	  a	  UK	  based	  company,	   submitted	  an	  application	   to	  USDA-­‐APHIS	   for	   the	  
import	  and	  field	  release	  of	  GM	  Aedes	  aegypti	  for	  dengue	  control	  in	  2010,	  USDA-­‐APHIS	  decided	  that	  





they	  had	  no	  jurisdiction	  for	  the	  regulation	  of	  GM	  Aedes	  aegypti	  as	  there	  was	  no	  animal	  health	  risk.	  
The	  FDA-­‐CVM	  emerged	  as	  the	   lead	  agency	  with	  authority	  under	  the	  FFDCA.	  Their	  authority	  comes	  
from	  the	  definition	  of	  a	  drug	  under	  FFDCA	  for	  GE	  mosquitoes	  as	  “articles	  intended	  for	  the	  use	  in	  the	  
diagnostic,	   cure,	   mitigation,	   treatment	   or	   prevention	   of	   disease	   in	   man	   and	   other	   animals“	   and	  
“articles	  intended	  to	  affect	  the	  structure	  or	  any	  function	  of	  the	  body	  of	  man	  or	  other	  animals”.	  The	  
recombinant	   DNA	   construct	   when	   expressed	   in	   a	   GM	   animal	   including	   mosquitoes,	   meets	   the	  
definition	  of	  a	  drug	  in	  the	  FFDCA.	  Under	  this	  statute,	  FDA–CVM	  therefore	  become	  the	  lead	  agency,	  
under	  the	  coordinated	  framework	  for	  all	  GE	  animals	  requiring	  pre-­‐market	  approval.	  However,	  FDA-­‐
CVM	  has	  indicated	  in	  their	  Guidance	  document	  (FDA,	  2011),	  that	  they	  intend	  to	  exert	  enforcement	  
discretion	  for	  certain	  categories	  of	  GE	  animal.	  These	  include:	  (1)	  GM	  animals	  of	  non-­‐food-­‐species	  
that	   are	   regulated	   by	   other	   government	   agencies	   or	   entities,	   such	   as	   GM	   insects	   being	  
developed	   for	   plant	   pest	   control	   or	   animal	   health	   protection,	   and	   that	   are	   under	   APHIS	  
oversight;	   and	   (2)	  GM	  animals	  of	  non-­‐food	   species	   that	  are	   raised	  and	  used	   in	   contained	  and	  
controlled	  conditions	  such	  as	  GM	  laboratory	  animals	  used	  in	  research	  institutions.	  The	  FDA	  can	  
also	  exercise	  enforcement	  discretion	  based	  on	  the	  risk	  profile	  as	  it	  did	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  zebra	  
fish	   (Glo-­‐fish)	   genetically	   engineered	   to	   express	   a	   fluorescent	   gene	   and	   glow	   in	   the	  
dark.§§§§§§§§§§§§ 	   When	   FDA	   reviews	   an	   Investigational	   New	   Drug	   Application	   (INDA)	   or	   a	   New	  
Animal	  Drug	  Application	  (NADA)	   it	   is	  also	  subject	   to	  NEPA	  requirements,	   including	  a	  review	  of	  
environmental	  risks,	  as	  described	  previously.	  	  
European	  Union	  
In	  the	  European	  Union	  (EU),	  a	  formal	  RA	  is	  the	  mechanism	  by	  which	  the	  risks	  of	  the	  release	  of	  a	  LMO	  
are	  evaluated.	  The	  benefits	  of	  such	  a	  release	  are	  not	  taken	  into	  account	  within	  a	  RA	  in	  the	  EU.	  The	  
release	   of	   a	   GM	   insect	  within	   any	   EU	  member	   state	   is	   controlled	   by	   a	   directive	   of	   the	   European	  
Parliament	   and	   of	   the	   Council,	   known	   as	   the	   Deliberate	   Release	   Directive	   (EU,	  2001),	   which	  
regulates	   the	   release	  of	   all	   LMOs	   into	   the	   environment.	   For	   example,	   in	   the	  United	  Kingdom,	   the	  
release	   of	   a	   GM	   insect	   is	   controlled	   by	   ‘Deliberate	   Release’	   regulations	   transposed	   from	   the	   EU	  
Directive.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   a	   non-­‐commercial	   release,	   such	   as	   a	   field	   trial,	   the	   decision	   to	   approve	  
release	   would	   be	   made	   at	   national	   level	   by	   the	   United	   Kingdom’s	   Department	   for	   Environment,	  
Food,	   and	   Rural	   Affairs	   (DEFRA)	   in	   consultation	   with	   the	   independent	   scientific	   experts	   of	   its	  
Advisory	  Committee	  on	  Releases	  to	  the	  Environment	  (ACRE),	  which	  is	  responsible	  for	  assessing	  the	  
risks	   of	   the	   technology.	   For	   a	   commercial	   release,	   there	   is	   an	   initial	   assessment	   by	   one	   ‘lead’	  
member	   state,	   which	  must	   be	   satisfied	   with	   the	   information	   provided	   before	   the	   consultation	   is	  
opened	   up	   to	   the	   other	  member	   states.	   At	   the	   end	   of	   the	   process,	   the	   EFSA	  would	   be	   asked	   to	  
provide	   its	  opinion	  on	  any	  unresolved	   scientific	   issue.	  Member	   states	  must	   then	   reach	  a	  qualified	  
majority	  to	  approve	  any	  release	  based	  on	  scientific	  evidence.	  Should	  the	  member	  states	  fail	  to	  reach	  
a	  decision,	  the	  application	  then	  passes	  to	  the	  European	  Commission,	  which	  can	  approve	  or	  deny	  the	  
application	   based	   on	   the	   scientific	   opinion	   of	   EFSA.	   The	   EFSA	   has	   developed	   Guidance	   on	   the	  
Environmental	   Risk	   Assessment	   of	   Genetically	   Modified	   Animals,	   including	   insects.	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Appendix	   2.	   Guidance	   to	   additional	   information	   relevant	   to	   GMM	  
regulation	  	  
	  
International	  organizations,	  treaties	  and	  covenants	  	  
The	  World	  Trade	  Organization	  (WTO)	  Agreements	  and	  Public	  Health;	  A	  Joint	  Study	  by	  WHO	  and	  the	  
WTO	  Secretariat	   (WHO/WTO,	  2002).	   This	   study	  explains	  how	  WTO	  Agreements	   relate	   to	  different	  
aspects	  of	  health	  policies.	  It	  covers	  several	  areas	  including	  infectious	  disease	  control,	  environment,	  
and	   biotechnology.	   The	   study	   explains	   that	   countries	   have	   the	   right	   to	   take	  measures	   to	   restrict	  
imports	  or	  exports	  of	  products	  when	  necessary	  to	  protect	  the	  health	  of	  humans,	  animals,	  or	  plants.	  
If	   necessary,	   governments	  may	   put	   aside	  WTO	   commitments	   in	   order	   to	   protect	   human	   life.	   The	  
study	   discusses	   application	   of	   biotechnology	   to	   foods	   and	   potential	   health	   effects	   such	   as	   gene	  
transfer	  from	  plants	  to	  microbial	  or	  mammalian	  cells,	  transfer	  of	  antibiotic	  resistance,	  and	  allergenic	  
effects.	  	  
The	   WTO	   Agreement	   on	   the	   Application	   of	   Sanitary	   and	   Phytosanitary	   Measures	   (SPS	  
Agreement)************* 	   articles	   include,	   but	   are	  not	   limited	   to	   the	   following,	  which	   	   also	  pertain	   to	  
autonomous	  transboundary	  movement	  of	  GMMs:	  
Article	  1,	  General	  provisions	  –	  This	  Agreement	  applies	   to	  all	   sanitary	  and	  phytosanitary	  measures,	  
which	  may,	  directly	  or	   indirectly,	  affect	   international	  trade.	  A	  sanitary	  or	  phytosanitary	  measure	  is	  
any	  measure	  applied	  to	  protect	  animal	  or	  plant	  life	  or	  health	  within	  the	  territory	  of	  a	  member	  from	  
risks	  arising	  from	  the	  entry,	  establishment	  or	  spread	  of	  pests,	  diseases,	  disease-­‐carrying	  organisms,	  
or	  disease-­‐causing	  organisms.	  	  
Article	  2,	  Basic	  rights	  and	  obligations	  –	  Members	  have	  the	  right	  to	  take	  sanitary	  and	  phytosanitary	  
measures	  necessary	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  human,	  animal	  or	  plant	  life	  and	  health.	  
Article	  3,	  Harmonization	  –	  To	  harmonize	  sanitary	  and	  phytosanitary	  measures	  on	  as	  wide	  a	  basis	  as	  
possible,	  members	  shall	  base	  their	  sanitary	  or	  phytosanitary	  measures	  on	   international	  standards,	  
guidelines,	  or	  recommendations.	  Members	  shall	  play	  a	  full	  part,	  within	  the	  limits	  of	  their	  resources,	  
in	   the	   relevant	   international	   organizations	   and	   their	   subsidiary	   bodies,	   in	   particular	   the	   Codex	  
Alimentarius	  Commission,	  the	  International	  Office	  of	  Epizootics,	  and	  the	  international	  and	  regional	  
organizations	  operating	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  International	  Plant	  Protection	  Convention,	  to	  
promote	  the	  development	  and	  periodic	  review	  of	  standards,	  guidelines,	  and	  recommendations	  with	  
respect	  to	  all	  aspects	  of	  sanitary	  and	  phytosanitary	  measures.	  
Article	   5,	   Assessment	   of	   Risk	   and	   Determination	   of	   the	   Appropriate	   Level	   of	   Sanitary	   or	  
Phytosanitary	  Protection	  –	  Members	  shall	  ensure	  that	  their	  sanitary	  or	  phytosanitary	  measures	  are	  
based	   on	   an	   assessment,	   as	   appropriate	   to	   the	   circumstances,	   of	   the	   risks	   to	   human,	   animal,	   or	  
plant	   life	   and	   health,	   taking	   into	   account	   risk	   assessment	   techniques	   developed	   by	   the	   relevant	  
international	   organizations.	   In	   the	   assessment	  of	   risks,	  members	   shall	   take	   into	   account	   available	  
scientific	  evidence;	  relevant	  processes	  and	  production	  methods;	  relevant	   inspection,	  sampling	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
************* 	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  the	  Application	  of	  Sanitary	  and	  Phytosanitary	  Measures	  (SPS	  Agreement):	  





testing	  methods;	  prevalence	  of	  specific	  diseases	  or	  pests;	  existence	  of	  pest-­‐	  or	  disease-­‐free	  areas;	  
relevant	  ecological	  and	  environmental	  conditions;	  and	  quarantine	  or	  other	  treatment.	  
Article	  6,	  Adaptation	  to	  Regional	  Conditions,	  Including	  Pest-­‐	  or	  Disease-­‐Free	  Areas	  and	  Areas	  of	  Low	  
Pest	  or	  Disease	  Prevalence	   –	  Members	   shall	  ensure	   that	   their	   sanitary	  or	  phytosanitary	  measures	  
are	  adapted	   to	   the	   sanitary	  or	  phytosanitary	   characteristics	  of	   the	  area,	  whether	  all	  of	  a	   country,	  
part	  of	  a	  country,	  or	  all	  or	  parts	  of	  several	  countries	  from	  which	  the	  product	  originated	  and	  to	  which	  
the	  product	  is	  destined.	  
Article	   12,	   Administration	   –	   A	   Committee	   on	   Sanitary	   and	   Phytosanitary	   Measures	   is	   hereby	  
established	  to	  provide	  a	  regular	  forum	  for	  consultations.	  It	  shall	  carry	  out	  the	  functions	  necessary	  to	  
implement	  the	  provisions	  of	  this	  Agreement	  and	  the	  furtherance	  of	  its	  objectives,	  in	  particular	  with	  
respect	  to	  harmonization.	  	  
The	   SPS	   Agreement,	   Module	   8.1,	   Genetically	   Modified	   Organisms††††††††††††† 	   recognizes	   standards	  
developed	  by	  the	  IPPC	  and	  the	  World	  Organization	  for	  Animal	  Health	  and	  applies	  them	  to	  LMOs	  in	  
respect	  to	  the	  following:	  
• protection	   of	   human	   or	   animal	   life	   from	   risks	   arising	   from	   additives,	   contaminants,	   toxins,	   or	  
disease-­‐causing	  organisms	  in	  food,	  beverages,	  and	  feedstuffs;	  
• protection	  of	  human	  life	  from	  plant-­‐	  or	  animal-­‐carried	  diseases	  (zoonoses);	  
• protection	  of	  animal	  or	  plant	  life	  from	  pests,	  diseases,	  or	  disease-­‐causing	  organisms	  and;	  
• protection	  of	  a	  country	  from	  damage	  caused	  by	  the	  entry,	  establishment,	  or	  spread	  of	  pests.	  
Regulations	  on	  GMMs	  should	  conform	  to	  the	  provisions	  of	  this	  Agreement,	  such	  as	  scientific	  RA	  and	  
least	  trade-­‐restrictive	  measures.	  
The	  WTO	   Agreement	   on	   Technical	   Barriers	   to	   Trade	   (TBT)‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 	   allows	   governments	   to	   take	  
appropriate	   measures	   if	   they	   have	   a	   legitimate	   objective,	   such	   as	   protecting	   health	   or	   the	  
environment.	  
The	   CBD	   (UN,	   1992).	   Since	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   Convention,	   the	   Conference	   of	   the	   Parties	   have	  
initiated	  national	  action	  plans	  in	  over	  100	  countries	  and	  raised	  biodiversity	  awareness,	  which	  led	  to	  
the	  adoption	  of	   the	  CPB.24	  Mechanisms	   for	   implementing	   the	  CBD	  consist	  of	  National	  Biodiversity	  
Strategies	   and	   Action	   Plans	   (NBSAPs).	   The	   articles	   of	   the	   CBD	   that	  may	   pertain	   to	   transboundary	  
movement	  of	  GMMs	  include	  the	  following:	  
Article	  3,	  Principle	  –	  States	  have	  the	  sovereign	  right	  to	  exploit	  their	  own	  resources	  pursuant	  to	  their	  
own	  environmental	  policies	  and	  the	  responsibility	  to	  ensure	  that	  activities	  within	  their	   jurisdiction	  
do	  not	  cause	  damage	  to	  the	  environment	  of	  other	  states	  or	  of	  areas	  beyond	  the	  limits	  of	  national	  
jurisdiction.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
††††††††††††† 	  SPS	  Agreement	  Training	  Module:	  Chapter	  8.	  Current	  issues:	  8.1	  Genetically	  modified	  organisms	  
(LMOs):	  http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/sps_agreement_cbt_e/c8s1p1_e.htm#LMO,	  accessed	  25	  
May	  2014.	  
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 	  SPS	  Agreement	  Training	  Module:	  Chapter	  9.	  Health	  and	  other	  WTO	  Agreements:	  9.3	  Technical	  
barriers	  to	  trade:	  http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/sps_agreement_cbt_e/c9s3p1_e.htm,	  accessed	  





Article	   4,	   Jurisdictional	   Scope	   –	   The	   Convention	   applies	   to	   each	   contracting	   party,	   regardless	   of	  
whether	  the	  effects	  of	  their	  activities	  occur	  within	  or	  beyond	  the	  area	  of	  their	  national	  jurisdiction.	  
Article	  5,	  Cooperation	  –	  Each	  party	  shall,	  as	  far	  as	  possible	  and	  as	  appropriate,	  cooperate	  with	  other	  
contracting	   parties,	   directly	   or	   through	   competent	   international	   organizations	   in	   respect	   of	   areas	  
beyond	  national	  jurisdiction.	  
Article	  8,	  In-­‐situ	  Conservation	  –	  Each	  party	  shall	  establish	  or	  maintain	  means	  to	  regulate,	  manage,	  or	  
control	  the	  risks	  associated	  with	  the	  use	  and	  release	  of	  living	  modified	  organisms,	  which	  are	  likely	  to	  
have	  adverse	  environmental	  impacts,	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  risks	  to	  human	  health.	  	  
Article	   14,	   Impact	   Assessment	   and	   Minimizing	   Adverse	   Impacts	   -­‐	   Each	   Party	   shall	   introduce	  
appropriate	   procedures	   requiring	   environmental	   impact	   assessment	   of	   its	   proposed	   projects	   that	  
are	   likely	   to	   have	   significant	   adverse	   effects	   and	   allow	   for	   public	   participation.	   Each	   party	   shall	  
promote,	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   reciprocity,	   notification,	   exchange	   of	   information,	   and	   consultation;	  
bilateral,	   regional,	  or	  multilateral	  arrangements	  within	   the	  area	  under	   jurisdiction	  of	  other	   states.	  
Each	  Party	  shall	  notify	  immediately	  affected	  states	  of	  danger	  or	  damage.	  	  
Article	   17,	   Exchange	   of	   Information	   –	   The	   contracting	   parties	   shall	   facilitate	   the	   exchange	   of	  
information	  from	  all	  publicly	  available	  sources	  relevant	  to	  the	  conservation	  and	  sustainable	  use	  of	  
biological	  diversity,	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  special	  needs	  of	  developing	  countries.	  
The	  CPB	   is	   the	  most	   significant	   internationally	   ratified	   treaty	   to	   influence	   regulation	   of	   GMMs	   in	  
developing	   countries.	   It	   is	   a	   supplementary	   agreement	   to	   the	   CBD	   and	   is	   an	   international	   treaty	  
governing	   the	  movements	  of	  LMOs.	   It	  entered	   into	   force	   in	  September	  2003	  when	  the	  number	  of	  
signatory	  countries	  reached	  50	  and	  it	  now	  includes	  at	  least	  160	  nations,	   including	  most	  developing	  
countries.	   The	   CPB	   affirms	   the	   precautionary	   approach	   contained	   in	   Principle	   15	   of	   the	   Rio	  
Declaration	  on	  Environment	  and	  Development	  and	  Annex	  II	  of	  the	  Deliberate	  Release	  Directive	  of	  
the	  European	  Economic	  Community	   requiring	  regulators	  to	  consider	  all	  potential	  risks,	  even	  when	  
there	  is	  scientific	  uncertainty	  about	  their	  extent	  or	  existence.	  Principle	  15	  of	  the	  Declaration	  states	  
the	   following:	   	   “In	   order	   to	   protect	   the	   environment,	   the	   precautionary	   approach	   shall	   be	  widely	  
applied	  by	  States	  according	   to	   their	  capabilities.	  Where	   there	  are	   threats	  of	   serious	  or	   irreversible	  
damage,	   lack	  of	   full	   scientific	   certainty	   shall	  not	  be	  used	  as	  a	   reason	   for	  postponing	  cost-­‐effective	  
measures	  to	  prevent	  environmental	  degradation”.§§§§§§§§§§§§§ 	  
The	  precautionary	  principle	  or	  approach	   is	  analysed	   in	   the	  published	  European	  Commission	  of	   the	  
European	  Communities	  Communication	  on	  the	  Precautionary	  Principle	   (EC,	  2000).	  EU	  codifications	  
of	  the	  precautionary	  principle	  are	  further	  described	  in	  the	  Summaries	  of	  EU	  legislation.************** 	  	  
In	  the	  precautionary	  principle	  or	  approach,	  if	  an	  action	  or	  policy	  has	  a	  suspected	  risk	  of	  causing	  harm	  
to	  the	  public	  or	  to	  the	  environment,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  scientific	  consensus	  that	  the	  action	  or	  policy	  is	  
harmful,	   the	   burden	  of	   proof	   that	   it	   is	   not	   harmful	   falls	   on	   those	   taking	   the	   action.	   This	   principle	  
allows	  policy-­‐makers	   to	  make	  discretionary	  decisions	   in	  situations	  where	   there	   is	   the	  possibility	  of	  
harm	   from	   taking	   a	   particular	   course	   or	   making	   a	   certain	   decision	   when	   extensive	   scientific	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
§§§§§§§§§§§§§ 	  Rio	  Declaration	  on	  Environment	  and	  Development,	  Annex	  1,	  Principle	  15:	  
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-­‐1annex1.htm,	  accessed	  25	  May	  2014.	  
************** 	  Summaries	  of	  EU	  legislation:	  





knowledge	   on	   the	   matter	   is	   lacking.	   The	   principle	   implies	   that	   there	   is	   a	   social	   responsibility	   to	  
protect	  the	  public	  from	  exposure	  to	  harm	  when	  scientific	  investigation	  has	  found	  a	  plausible	  risk,	  but	  
interpretation	  has	  been	  extended	  by	  some	  to	  mean	  that	  regulatory	  approvals	  should	  not	  be	  granted	  
until	  all	  possible	  or	  theoretical	  risk	  and	  safety	  issues	  are	  scientifically	  resolved,	  regardless	  of	  societal	  
needs	  and	  potential	  benefits.	  	  
A	   significant	   provision	   of	   Protocol	   Article	   21	   is	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   Biosafety	   Clearing-­‐House	  
(BCH)42	  for	  the	  compilation	  and	  international	  exchange	  of	  important	  information	  on	  movement	  and	  
release	  of	  GM	  organisms.	  This	  useful	  database	  contains	  information	  relevant	  to	  LMOs	  and	  national	  
legislation	  with	  some	  governments	  having	  provided	  their	  biosafety	  regulatory	  frameworks	  and	  other	  
pertinent	   regulatory	   information	   including	   important	   contacts.	  The	  BCH	  purpose	   is	   to	   (a)	   facilitate	  
the	  exchange	  of	  scientific,	   technical,	  environmental	  and	   legal	   information	  on,	  and	  experience	  with	  
LMOs;	  and	  (b)	  assist	  parties	  to	  implement	  the	  CPB.	  	  
The	  Biosafety	   Information	  Resource	  Centre	  (BIRC)43	   is	  an	  electronic	  catalogues	  of	  biosafety-­‐related	  
publications	  and	  information	  resources	  including:	  news	  services,	  e-­‐mail	  list	  servers,	  online	  databases	  
and	   search	   engines,	   reports	   and	   case	   studies,	   journals,	   newsletters,	   and	   teaching	   materials	  
(manuals,	  toolkits,	  and	  presentations).	  Its	  objective	  is	  to	  increase	  the	  accessibility	  and	  utilization	  of	  
available	   biosafety	   information	   and	   resources	   for	   policy-­‐makers,	   educators,	   researchers,	   and	   the	  
general	  public.	  	  
Whereas	  national	  regulations	  take	  precedence,	  aspects	  of	  the	  CPB	  to	  be	  considered	  for	  planning	  of	  field	  trials	  
of	  GMMs	  are	  outlined	  below.	  	  
Protocol	  Article	  4	  –	  The	  Protocol	  applies	  to	  the	  transboundary	  movement,	  transit,	  handling,	  and	  use	  
of	  LMOs,	  taking	  also	  into	  account	  risks	  to	  human	  health.	  Under	  the	  protocol,	  a	  country	  that	  wants	  to	  
export	   LMOs	   for	   intentional	   introduction	   into	   the	   environment	   must	   seek	   advance	   informed	  
agreement	  from	  the	  importing	  recipient	  country.	  	  
Article	   6	   –	   The	   provisions	   of	   this	   Protocol	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   advance	   informed	   agreement	  
procedure	   shall	   not	  apply	   to	   LMOs	   in	   transit	   and	   transboundary	  movement	  of	   LMOs	  destined	   for	  
contained	   use.	   Contained	   use	   means	   any	   operation,	   undertaken	   within	   a	   facility,	   installation,	   or	  
other	   physical	   structure,	   which	   involves	   LMOs	   that	   are	   controlled	   by	   specific	   measures	   that	  
effectively	  limit	  their	  contact	  with,	  and	  their	  impact	  on,	  the	  external	  environment.	  
Article	   8	   –	   Pertains	   to	   notification	   and	   that	   “The	   notification	   shall	   contain,	   at	   a	   minimum,	   the	  
information	  specified	  in	  Annex	  I.”	  	  
Article	  10	  –	  Concerns	  decision	  procedures	  and	  that	  decisions	  taken	  by	  the	  party	  of	  import	  shall	  be	  in	  
accordance	  with	  Article	  15,	  which	  addresses	  risk	  assessment.	  
Article	   14	   –	   Concerns	   bilateral,	   regional	   and	   multilateral	   agreements	   and	   arrangements.	   “The	  
Parties	  shall	  inform	  each	  other,	  through	  the	  Biosafety	  Clearing-­‐House,	  of	  any	  such	  bilateral,	  regional	  
and	  multilateral	  agreements	  and	  arrangements	  that	  they	  have	  entered	  into.”	  
Article	   17	   –	   Concerns	   unintentional	   transboundary	   movements	   of	   living	   modified	   organisms	   and	  
emergency	  measures.	  
Article	   19	   –	   Regarding	   competent	   national	   authorities,	   states	   “Each	   Party	   shall	   designate	   one	   or	  





functions	  required	  by	  this	  Protocol	  and	  which	  shall	  be	  authorized	  to	  act	  on	  its	  behalf	  with	  respect	  to	  
those	  functions.”	  	  
Articles	  8,	  10	  and	  13	  and	  Annex	   III	  –	  Concerns	  environmental	  risk	  assessment,	  taking	   into	  account	  
human	  health.	  
Part	   II	   of	   the	   Final	   Report	   of	   the	   Ad	   Hoc	   Technical	   Expert	   Group	   on	   Risk	   Assessment	   and	   Risk	  
Management	  under	  the	  CPB†††††††††††††† 	  on	  Specific	  Types	  of	  LMOs	  and	  Traits,	  C.	  Risk	  Assessment	  of	  
Living	  Modified	  Mosquitoes	  addresses	  the	  following:	  	  
• scope:	  	  This	  document	  focuses	  on	  the	  specific	  aspects	  of	  RA	  of	  LM	  mosquitoes	  developed	  for	  use	  
in	  the	  control	  of	  human	  and	  zoonotic	  diseases;	  
• issues	   to	   be	   considered	   in	   the	   RA:	   effects	   on	   biological	   diversity	   (species,	   habitats,	   and	  
ecosystems);	  new	  or	  more	  vigorous	  pests,	  especially	  those	  that	  have	  adverse	  effects	  on	  human	  
health; harm	   to	   or	   loss	   of	   other	   species;	   and	   disruption	   of	   ecological	   communities	   and	  
ecosystem	  processes;	  
• gene	   flow:	   gene	   flow	   through	   cross-­‐fertilisation;	   horizontal	   gene	   flow;	   and	   persistence	   of	   the	  
transgene	  in	  the	  environment;	  
• evolutionary	   responses	   (especially	   in	   target	   mosquito	   vectors	   or	   pathogens	   of	   humans	   and	  
animals);	  and	  
• risk	  management	  strategies.	  
	  
The	   Nagoya–Kuala	   Lumpur	   Supplementary	   Protocol	   on	   Liability	   and	   Redress	   to	   the	   Cartagena	  
Protocol	  on	  Biosafety	  concerns	  the	  question	  of	  what	  would	  happen	  if	  the	  transboundary	  movement	  
of	   LMOs	   had	   caused	   damage.	   The	   negotiators	   were,	   however,	   unable	   to	   reach	   any	   consensus	  
regarding	  the	  details	  of	  a	  liability	  regime	  under	  the	  Protocol.	  As	  a	  result,	  an	  enabling	  clause	  to	  that	  
effect	  was	  included	  in	  the	  final	  text	  of	  the	  Protocol	  (Article	  27),	  which	  states:	  
The	  Conference	  of	  the	  Parties	  serving	  as	  the	  meeting	  of	  the	  Parties	  to	  this	  Protocol	  shall,	  at	  its	  first	  
meeting,	   adopt	   a	   process	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   appropriate	   elaboration	   of	   international	   rules	   and	  
procedures	  in	  the	  field	  of	  liability	  and	  redress	  for	  damage	  resulting	  from	  transboundary	  movements	  
of	   living	   modified	   organisms,	   analyzing	   and	   taking	   due	   account	   of	   the	   ongoing	   processes	   in	  
international	  law	  on	  these	  matters,	  and	  shall	  endeavor	  to	  complete	  this	  process	  within	  four	  years.	  
In	  February	  1999,	   the	  African	  Group	   in	   the	  CBD	  and	  the	  Organization	   for	  African	  Unity	   (OAU,	  now	  
the	   African	   Union)	   began	   to	   develop	   the	   African	  Model	   Law	   on	   Safety	   in	   Biotechnology.	   Its	   first	  
purpose	  was	  to	  provide	  for	  a	  harmonized	  approach	  towards	  biosafety	   in	  Africa	  serving	  as	  a	  model	  
legal	  instrument	  for	  developing	  national	  biosafety	  legislations.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 	  	  
The	  IPPC	  living	  modified	  organisms	  and	  pest	  risk	  analysis	  (Devorshak,	  2006)	  discussed	  the	  following	  
of	  relevance	  to	  transboundary	  movement	  of	  LMOs.	  The	  IPPC	  is	  a	  multilateral	  treaty	  with	  the	  purpose	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  Risk	  
Assessment	  of	  Living	  Modified	  Mosquitoes:	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  accessed	  25	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  2014.	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of	   protecting	   plants	   and	  plant	   health	   from	   the	   introduction	   and	   spread	  of	   pests	   of	   plants,	   and	   to	  
promote	  measures	   for	   the	   control	   of	   plant	   pests.	   Biological	   control	   agents	   used	   to	   control	   plant	  
pests	   fall	   under	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   IPPC.	   The	   IPPC	   is	   identified	   in	   the	  WTO’s	   SPS	  Agreement	   as	   the	  
international	  standard-­‐setting	  organization	  for	  plant	  health,	  and	  both	  the	  IPPC	  and	  SPS	  Agreement	  
also	  affirm	  the	  sovereign	  right	  of	  all	  member	  nations	  to	  take	  necessary	  measures	  to	  protect	  plant	  life	  
or	  health	  from	  the	  introduction	  and	  spread	  of	  pests.	  Members	  of	  the	  WTO	  are	  legally	  obligated	  to	  
base	  their	  phytosanitary	  measures	  on	  ISPM	  developed	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  IPPC.	  Like	  the	  SPS	  
Agreement	   and	   the	   IPPC,	   the	   CPB	   also	   requires	   countries	   to	   base	  measures	   for	   LMOs	   on	   RA.	   An	  
open-­‐ended	   expert	   working	   group	   that	   met	   in	   June	   2000	   included	   phytosanitary	   experts	   and	  
representatives	  of	   the	  CBD,	   agreed	   that	  organisms	   that	  do	  not	  pose	  a	   threat	   to	  plant	  health	   (e.g.	  
transgenic	  mosquitoes)	  do	  not	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  IPPC.	  
Provisions	   of	   the	   IPPC	   that	   may	   be	   relevant	   to	   GMM	   research	   and	   implementation	   include	   the	  
following.	  
• IPPC	   Standards	   for	   Phytosanitary	  Measures	   (2009)§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ 	   –	   Contain	   guidance	   that	  may	   be	  
useful	  for	  adopting	  and	  incorporating	  into	  national	  regulation	  of	  GMMs,	  especially	  pertaining	  to	  
international	  movement,	  release,	  and	  RA.	  	  
• IPPC	  ISPM	  No.	  2,	  Framework	  for	  Pest	  Risk	  Analysis	  (2009)	  –	  This	  standard	  provides	  a	  framework	  
that	  describes	  the	  pest	  risk	  analysis	  (PRA)	  process	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  IPPC.	  It	  introduces	  the	  
three	  stages	  of	  pest	  risk	  analysis:	  initiation,	  pest	  risk	  assessment,	  and	  pest	  risk	  management.	  
• IPPC	  Guidelines	  for	  the	  Export,	  Shipment,	  Import,	  and	  Release	  of	  Biological	  Control	  Agents	  and	  
Other	  Beneficial	  Organisms	   (ISPM	  No.	   03)	   (FAO,	   2005)	   –	   This	   standard	  provides	   guidelines	   for	  
RM	  related	  to	  the	  export,	  shipment,	   import,	  and	  release	  of	  biological	  control	  agents	  and	  other	  
beneficial	   organisms.	   It	   lists	   the	   related	   responsibilities	   of	   contracting	   parties	   to	   the	   IPPC,	  
National	   Plant	   Protection	   Organizations	   (NPPOs),	   or	   other	   responsible	   authorities,	   importers,	  
and	   exporters.	   The	   standard	   addresses	   biological	   control	   agents	   capable	   of	   self-­‐replication	  
(including	   predators,	   parasites,	   nematodes,	   phytophagous	   organisms,	   and	   pathogens,	   such	   as	  
fungi,	   bacteria,	   and	   viruses,	   as	  well	   as	   sterile	   insects	   and	   other	   beneficial	   organisms	   and	   also	  
includes	  those	  packaged	  or	  formulated	  as	  commercial	  products.	  Provisions	  are	  also	  included	  for	  
import	  for	  research	  in	  quarantine	  facilities	  of	  non-­‐indigenous	  biological	  control	  agents	  and	  other	  
beneficial	  organisms.	  The	  scope	  of	  this	  standard	  does	  not	  include	  LMOs.	  
The	   IPPC	   includes	   the	   following	  provision	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   regulation	  of	   biological	   control	   agents	  
and	  other	  beneficial	  organisms.	  Article	  7(1)	  states:	  
With	  the	  aim	  of	  preventing	  the	  introduction	  and/or	  spread	  of	  regulated	  pests	  into	  their	  territories,	  
contracting	   parties	   shall	   have	   sovereign	   authority	   to	   regulate,	   in	   accordance	   with	   applicable	  
international	  agreements,	  the	  entry	  of	  plants	  and	  plant	  products	  and	  other	  regulated	  articles	  and	  to	  
this	  end,	  may...c)	  prohibit	  or	  restrict	  the	  movement	  of	  regulated	  pests	   into	  their	  territories	  and	  d)	  
prohibit	  or	  restrict	  the	  movement	  of	  biological	  control	  agents	  and	  other	  organisms	  of	  phytosanitary	  
concern	  claimed	  to	  be	  beneficial	  into	  their	  territories.	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Contracting	  Parties	  (member	  nations)	  should	  designate	  an	  authority	  with	  appropriate	  competencies	  
to	  be	  responsible	  for	  export	  certification	  and	  to	  regulate	  the	  import	  or	  release	  of	  biological	  control	  
agents	  and	  other	  beneficial	  organisms.	  The	  responsible	  authority	  should:	  
• carry	   out	   pest-­‐risk	   analysis	   prior	   to	   import	   or	   release	   of	   biological	   control	   agents	   and	   other	  
beneficial	  organisms;	  
• ensure,	  when	  certifying	  exports,	  that	  the	  regulations	  of	  importing	  countries	  are	  complied	  with;	  
• provide	  and	  assess	  documentation	  as	  appropriate,	  relevant	  to	  the	  export,	  shipment,	   import	  or	  
release	  of	  biological	  control	  agents	  and	  other	  beneficial	  organisms;	  
• ensure	  that	  biological	  control	  agents	  and	  other	  beneficial	  organisms	  are	  taken	  either	  directly	  to	  
designated	   quarantine	   facilities	   or,	   if	   appropriate,	   passed	   to	  mass-­‐rearing	   facilities	   or	   directly	  
released	  into	  the	  environment;	  
• ensure	  that	  importers	  and,	  where	  appropriate,	  exporters	  meet	  their	  responsibilities;	  and	  
• consider	  possible	  impacts	  on	  the	  environment,	  such	  as	  impacts	  on	  non-­‐target	  invertebrates.	  
	  
IPPC*************** 	   ISPM	   No.	   11	   addresses	   risk	   analysis	   for	   quarantine	   pests	   including	   analysis	   of	  
environmental	  risks	  and	  LMOs.	  The	  standard	  provides	  details	  for	  the	  conduct	  of	  pest-­‐risk	  analysis	  to	  
determine	  if	  pests	  are	  quarantine	  pests.	   It	  describes	  the	  integrated	  processes	  to	  be	  used	  for	  RA	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  selection	  of	  RM	  options.	  Section	  S2	  of	  ISPM-­‐11	  includes	  guidance	  on	  evaluating	  potential	  
phytosanitary	   risks	   to	  plants	   and	  plant	  products	  posed	  by	   LMOs.	   This	   guidance	  does	  not	   alter	   the	  
scope	  of	  ISPM	  No.	  11	  but	  is	  intended	  to	  clarify	  issues	  related	  to	  the	  pest-­‐risk	  analysis	  for	  LMOs.	  	  
	  The	  Food	  and	  Agriculture	  Organization	  (FAO),	  Code	  of	  Conduct	  for	  the	  Import	  and	  Release	  of	  Exotic	  
Biological	  Control	  Agents.††††††††††††††† 	   	  The	  objectives	  of	   this	  Code	  are	  to	   facilitate	  the	  safe	   import,	  
export	   and	   release	   of	   exotic	   biological	   control	   agents	   by	   introducing	   internationally	   acceptable	  
procedures	   for	   all	   public	   and	   private	   entities	   involved	   particularly	   where	   national	   legislation	   to	  
regulate	   their	  use	  does	  not	  exist	  or	   is	   inadequate.	  The	  Code	  describes	   the	  shared	  responsibility	  of	  
the	   many	   segments	   of	   society	   involved	   and	   the	   need	   for	   cooperation	   between	   importing	   and	  
exporting	   countries.	   Standards	   are	   described	   that	   encourage	   responsible	   and	   generally	   accepted	  
trade	   practices,	   and	   assist	   countries	   to	   design	   regulations	   to	   control	   the	   suitability	   and	   quality	   of	  
imported	  exotic	  biological	  control	  agents.	  They	  also	  address	  the	  safe	  handling,	  assessment,	  and	  use	  
of	   such	   products.	   Responsibilities	   are	   outlined	   for	   the	   entities	  which	   are	   addressed	   by	   this	   Code,	  
including	   governments,	   individually	   or	   in	   regional	   groupings;	   international	   organizations;	   research	  
institutes;	   industry,	   including	   producers,	   trade	   associations,	   and	   distributors;	   users;	   and	   public-­‐
sector	  organizations	  such	  as	  environmental	  groups,	  consumer	  groups,	  and	  trade	  unions.	  	  
All	   references	   in	   this	   Code	   to	   a	   government	   or	   governments	   shall	   be	   deemed	   to	   apply	   equally	   to	  
regional	   groupings	   of	   governments	   for	   matters	   falling	   within	   their	   areas	   of	   competence.	  
Governments	   should	   designate	   the	   competent	   authority	   empowered	   to	   regulate	   or	   otherwise	  
control	  and,	  where	  appropriate,	   issue	  permits	  for	  the	   importation	  and	  release	  of	  biological	  control	  
agents.	   The	   organization	   should	   prepare	   a	   dossier	   for	   submission	   to	   the	   national	   authority	   if	   the	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organism	  has	  already	  been	  imported	  and	  is	  currently	  being	  held	  in	  containment,	  or	  if	  the	  organism	  is	  
being	  imported	  directly	  for	  release.	  It	  should	  include	  among	  other	  information,	  a	  RA	  to	  estimate	  the	  
possible	   environmental	   impact	   in	   the	   new	   area	   in	  which	   any	   possible	   risks	   to	   animal	   and	   human	  
health	  should	  be	  identified.	  This	  authority	  should	  consult	  with	  authorities	  in	  neighbouring	  countries	  
within	  the	  same	  ecological	  area	  and	  with	  relevant	  regional	  organizations	  to	  clarify	  and	  resolve	  any	  
potential	   conflicts	  of	   interest	   that	  may	  arise	  between	  countries.	  Where	  problems	   (i.e.	  unexpected	  
deleterious	   incidents)	   are	   identified,	   the	   authority	   is	   to	   consider	   and,	   where	   appropriate,	   ensure	  
corrective	  action	  is	  taken	  and	  inform	  all	  relevant	  interested	  parties.	  
The	  NAPPO,	   RSPM	   No.	   27,	   Guidelines	   for	   Importation	   and	   Confined	   Field	   Release	   of	   Transgenic	  
Arthropods	  in	  NAPPO	  Member	  Countries	  (NAPPO,	  2007)	  is	  a	  standard	  designed	  to	  provide	  guidance	  
to	   NAPPO	   member	   countries	   (Canada,	   Mexico	   and	   the	   USA)	   on	   importation	   and	   confined	   field	  
release	   of	   transgenic	   arthropods	   that	   are	   known	  plant	   pests	   or	   have	   the	   potential	   to	   affect	   plant	  
health.	   This	   includes	   transgenic	   arthropods	   used	   for	   biological	   control	   and	   transgenic	   beneficial	  
arthropods	  with	  the	  potential	  to	  affect	  plant	  health.	  Transgenic	  arthropod	  species	  that	  are	  not	  plant	  
pests,	   but	   that	   may	   pose	   a	   phytosanitary	   risk,	   because	   of	   genetic	   modification	   may	   also	   be	  
considered	   under	   this	   standard.	   Issues	   relating	   to	   the	   potential	   adverse	   impact	   of	   transgenic	  
arthropods	   on	   human	   and	   animal	   health	   or	   on	   biological	   diversity,	   and	   the	   environment	   beyond	  
direct	  and	  indirect	  impacts	  on	  plant	  health	  are	  not	  relevant	  to	  plant	  pest	  issues	  and	  fall	  outside	  the	  
scope	  of	   this	  NAPPO	  Standard.	  Guidance	   for	  unconfined	   release	  of	   transgenic	  arthropods	   into	   the	  
environment	  is	  not	  provided	  in	  this	  Standard.	  
The	  International	  Organization	  for	  Biological	  Control	  (IOBC)	   is	  an	  international	  body	  involved	  with	  
transgenic	   organisms.	   It	   has	   set	   up	   a	   global	   Working	   Group	   on	   LMOs	   in	   integrated	   plant	  
production.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 	  	  
The	   World	   Organization	   for	   Animal	   Health§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ 	   was	   founded	   in	   1924	   and	   is	   the	   world	  
organization	   for	   animal	   health.	   Some	   standards	   developed	   by	   the	  World	   Organisation	   for	   Animal	  
Health	  (OIE)	  deal	  with	  diseases	  that	  have	  human	  health	  and	  biosafety	  significance.	  The	  OIE	  has	  had	  a	  
Working	   Group	   on	   Biotechnology	   since	   1996.	   The	   OIE	   is	   principally	   concerned	   with	   animal	   or	  
livestock	  health	  issues	  that	  may	  be	  associated	  with	  GM	  animals	  and	  vaccines.	  Examples	  of	  subjects	  
from	  OIE	  sources	  involving	  biotechnology	  include:	  
• regulations	   governing	   veterinary	   medicinal	   products	   containing	   GMOs	   in	   the	   European	  
Community	  
• biotechnology	  applications	  in	  animal	  health	  and	  production	  
• disease-­‐resistant	  GM	  animals	  
• DNA	  vaccines	  for	  aquaculture	  
• traceability	  of	  biotech-­‐derived	  animals.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 	  The	  International	  Organisation	  for	  Biological	  and	  Integrated	  Control	  (IOBC).	  Working	  Group	  on	  
LMO's	  in	  integrated	  plant	  production:	  	  http://www.iobc-­‐wprs.org/expert_groups/wg.html,	  accessed	  25	  May	  
2014.	  






Reports,	  studies	  and	  initiatives	  
	  The	  Report	  on	  Defining	  Environment	  Risk	  Assessment	  Criteria	  for	  Genetically	  Modified	  Insects	  to	  
be	  Placed	  on	   the	   EU	  Market	   (Benedict,	   et	   al.,	   2010),	  written	  by	   the	   Environment	  Agency	  Austria,	  
International	  Atomic	  Energy	  Agency	  and	  the	  University	  of	  Bern,	  describes	  the	  ongoing	  developments	  
in	   the	   field	   of	   GM-­‐arthropods	   (transformed	   species,	   development	   purposes,	   and	   construction	   of	  
GM-­‐arthropods),	   and	   identifies	   potential	   adverse	   effects,	   as	  well	   as	  methods	   to	   investigate	   them.	  
Crucial	   arthropod	   characteristics	   and	   necessary	   baseline	   information	   are	   discussed	   and	   the	  
surrogate	   and	  modelling	   approaches	   evaluated	   for	   utility	   regarding	   the	   environmental	   RA	   of	  GM-­‐
arthropod.	  It	  was	  concluded	  that:	  
…the	  ERA	  of	  GM-­‐arthropods	  should	  consider	  various	  issues	  regarding	  the	  genetic	  modification,	  the	  
respective	   species,	   and	   the	   receiving	   environment.	   Potential	   risks	   could	   be	   identified	   concerning	  
gene	  flow	  and	  its	  consequences,	  effects	  on	  target	  and	  non-­‐target	  organisms,	  management	  practices	  
and	  measures,	   biogeochemical	   processes	   and	   human	   health.	   Since	   potential	   risks	   depend	   on	   the	  
method	   used	   for	   modification,	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   GM-­‐arthropod	   and	   the	   species	   itself,	   it	   is	  
recommended	  to	  follow	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  approach	  for	  the	  ERA	  of	  GM-­‐arthropods.	  
The	   University	   of	   Minnesota	   International	   Project	   on	   LMO	   Environmental	   Risk	   Assessment	  
Methodologies	   	   (IPLMO),**************** 	   is	   an	   initiative	   driven	   by	   public	   sector	   scientists,	   most	   of	  
whom	   have	   strong	   expertise	   in	   environmental	   science,	   as	   well	   as	   biotechnology,	   and	  
socioeconomics.	   The	   project	   has	   identified	   and	   developed	   scientific	   methodologies	   and	   teaching	  
tools	  (LMO,	  Environmental	  RA	  Project,	  2008)†††††††††††††††† 	  that	  can	  be	  used	  for	  environmental	  RA	  and	  
management	  of	  transgenic	  plants	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  Cartagena	  Protocol	  on	  Biosafety	  and	  other	  
international	  agreements.	  IPLMO	  has	  also	  produced	  a	  Problem	  Formulation	  and	  Options	  Assessment	  
Handbook	   (PFOA),	   which	   is	   a	   guide	   to	   the	   PFOA	   process	   and	   how	   to	   integrate	   it	   into	   an	  
environmental	   RA	   of	   LMOs	   (LMO,	   ERA	   Project,	   2007).	   The	   PFOA	   relies	   upon	   being	   transparent,	  
inclusive	  of	  all	  appropriate	  stakeholders,	  and	  rationally	  informed	  by	  the	  best	  available	  science.	  
The	  MosqGuide	   project‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 	   is	   funded	   by	  WHO-­‐TDR	   to	   provide	   best	   practice	   guidance	   for	  
the	  deployment	  of	  GMMs	  to	  control	  mosquito-­‐borne	  disease.	  The	  project	   is	  developing	  a	  series	  of	  
modules	  dealing	  with:	  1)	  overview	  of	  technology	  options,	  social,	  and	  regulatory	  issues;	  2)	  technology	  
research	  and	  production	  phase	  decisions;	  3)	  pre-­‐deployment	  country	  decisions;	  4)	  data	  handling	  and	  
environmental	  monitoring;	  5)	  field	  survey	  on	  attitudes	  for	  alternative	  control	  methods;	  6)	  curricula	  
for	  capacity	  building;	  and	  7)	  a	  prototype	  issues	  and	  response	  model.	  Also	  see,	  MosqGuide	  Module	  7:	  
Prototype	  issues/response	  model	  for	  decision	  making	  in	  deployment	  of	  GM	  mosquitoes	  –	  PROPOSAL.	  
This	  module	   is	   for	   a	   bio-­‐economic	  model	   designed	   to	   compare	   the	   costs	   and	   benefits	   of	   various	  
options	  for	  malaria	  control.	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  accessed	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The	   Daegu	   Protocol§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ 	   proposes	   regulatory	   use	   of	   an	   environmental	   impact	   assessment	  
(EIA),	  which	  may	  also	  be	  known	  as	  a	  strategic	  environmental	  assessment	  or	  environmental	   impact	  
statement,	  according	  to	  the	  country	  of	  use,	  but	  the	  purpose	  and	  content	  are	  generally	  similar.	  The	  
guidance	   is	   based	   on	   the	   use	   of	   EIA	   documentation	   and	   analysis,	   commonly	   used	   in	   Australia,	  
Canada,	  North	  America,	  the	  EU,	  and	  other	  countries	  as	  a	  format	  to	  provide	  for	  public	  transparency	  
of	   the	  process	  and	   to	  meet	  country	  government	   regulatory	  agency	  decision-­‐making	   requirements.	  
The	  EIA	   is	   a	  document	   that	   is	  developed	  openly	   to	   the	  public	  with	  all	   available	   scientific,	   societal,	  
and	   stakeholder	   input.	   Therefore,	   the	   public	   is	   provided	   the	   opportunity	   to	   be	   informed	   and	  
comment	  on	  decisions	  to	  release	  new	  forms	  of	  biotechnology	  into	  the	  environment	  before	  release	  
occurs.	  	  
Publications	  and	  conference	  reports	  
The	  objective	  of	  a	  meeting	  on	  status	  and	  RA	  of	  the	  use	  of	  transgenic	  arthropods	  in	  plant	  protection,	  
proceedings	   of	   a	   technical	   meeting	   organized	   by	   the	   Joint	   FAO/IAEA	   Programme	   of	   Nuclear	  
Techniques	   in	   Food	   and	   Agriculture	   and	   the	   Secretariat	   of	   the	   International	   Plant	   Protection	  
Convention	   (Devorshak,	  2006)	  were	   to:	   (1)	   review	  the	  current	  state	  of	   the	  art	  of	   transgenic	   insect	  
technology;	  (2)	  review	  the	  current	  regulatory	  framework	  in	  different	  countries;	  and	  (3)	  develop	  a	  set	  
of	   guidelines	   for	   RA	  of	   transgenic	   insects.	   Presentations	   addressed	   regulatory	   issues	   in	  Argentina,	  
Mexico,	  New	  Zealand,	  the	  USA	  and	  Zimbabwe.	  The	  participants	  concluded	  that	  regulatory	  approval	  
of	  any	  transgenic	  arthropod	  release	  will	  be	  on	  this	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis.	  With	  transgenic	  technology,	  
intellectual	  property	  rights	  of	  the	  strains	  will	  need	  to	  be	  addressed	  and	  the	  commercial	  deployment	  
of	   a	   transgenic	   strain	   will	   require	   a	   complex	   set	   of	   negotiations	   related	   to	   licensing	   and	   royalty	  
payments.	  	  
From	  a	  Risk	  Assessment	  Workshop	  on	  Transgenic	   Insects	   held	   in	  Kuala	   Lumpur,	  November	  2008,	  
sponsored	  by	  the	  United	  Nations	  Development	  Programme	  (UNDP)	  (Beech	  et	  al.,	  2009),	  a	  published	  
paper	   on	   deployment	   of	   innovative	   genetic	   vector	   control	   strategies:	   Progress	   on	   regulatory	   and	  
biosafety	   aspects,	   capacity	   building	   and	   development	   of	   best-­‐practice	   guidance	   reviewed	   current	  
regulation	  of	  GMMs	  in	  respect	  to	  the	  CPB	  and	  individual	  country	  needs.	  	  
The	   report	   from	   Progress	   and	   prospects	   for	   the	   use	   of	   genetically	  modified	  mosquitoes	   to	   inhibit	  
disease	  transmission:	  technical	  consultation	  on	  current	  status	  and	  planning	  for	   future	  development	  
of	   genetically	   modified	   mosquitoes	   for	   malaria	   and	   dengue	   control	   (TDR,	   2009)	   includes	  
presentations	   on	   GMM	   mosquito	   technologies	   in	   development;	   community	   communication	   and	  
collaboration	   strategies;	   public	   engagement;	   ecological	   RA;	   the	   transgenic	   insect	   environmental	  
impact	  statement	  done	  in	  the	  USA;	  Malaysia’s	  GMM	  regulatory	  experience;	  	  ethical,	  legal	  and	  social	  
implications;	  and	  guidance	  on	  GMM	  testing	  and	  development.	  Regulatory	  discussions	   included	  the	  
trilateral	   North	   American	   Plant	   Protection	   Organization	   standard,	   ratified	   in	   October	   2007,	   the	  
guidance	   developed	   by	   APHIS	   for	   permits;	   and	   the	   IPPC	   standard	   on	   deployment	   of	   beneficial	  
organisms.	  	  
Guidance	  for	  contained	  field	  trials	  of	  vector	  mosquitoes	  engineered	  to	  contain	  a	  gene	  drive	  system:	  
recommendations	  of	  a	  scientific	  working	  group	  (Benedict	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  Section	  8,	  concerns	  regulation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





of	   genetically	   engineered	  mosquitoes	   and	   the	   following	   topics	  were	   addressed	   in	   this	   section:	   	   1)	  
regulation	  at	  different	  international	  and	  national	  levels;	  2)	  regulatory	  costs;	  3)	  regulatory	  impact;	  4)	  
international	  organizations	  and	  covenants	  with	  potential	  relevance	  to	  genetically	  engineered	  vector	  
mosquitoes,	   including	  the	  Cartagena	  Protocol	  on	  Biosafety;	  5)	  addressing	  regulatory	  requirements;	  
6)	   a	   proactive	   approach	   to	   regulatory	   approval;	   and	   7)	   the	   USDA,	   APHIS	   Environmental	   Impact	  
Statement	  on	  GM	  insects.	  	  
Ethical,	   social,	   and	   cultural	   considerations	   for	   site	   selection	   for	   research	  with	   genetically	  modified	  
mosquitoes	   (Lavery,	   Harrington	   &	   Scott,	   2008)	   addresses	   regulatory	   issues	   and	   administrative	  
discussions	  and	  concluded	  the	  following:	  	  	  
The	   prevailing	   international	   framework	   governing	   the	   import	   of	   GM	   organisms	   is	   the	   Cartagena	  
Protocol	   on	   Bio-­‐safety…Signatories	   of	   the	   Cartagena	   Protocol	   (and	   countries	   that	   voluntarily	  
acceded	  to	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  agreement	  without	  being	  formal	  signatories)	  are	  required	  to	  establish	  
mechanisms	  to	  deal	  with	  the	   import	  and	  regulation	  of	  GM	  organisms…The	  process	  of	  determining	  
the	  key	  authorities	  proved	  to	  be	  extremely	  important,	  because	  it	  provided	  a	  clear	  point	  of	  contact	  
(in	   at	   least	   one	   candidate	   country)	   to	   address	   detailed	   questions	   related	   to	   the	   proposed	  
research…Because	  all	  research	  activities	  must	  conform	  to	  local	   laws,	   it	   is	   important	  to	  have	  a	  clear	  
understanding	  of	  what	  laws	  deal	  with	  the	  issues	  in	  the	  host	  country,	  especially	  if	  specific	  legislation	  
is	   not	   yet	   in	   force…It	   is	   common,	   under	   these	   conditions,	   for	   activities	   related	   to	   the	   import	   and	  
research	  with	  LMOs	  to	  be	  conducted	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  a	  battery	  of	  existing	  laws,	  each	  of	  which	  
might	   address	   specific	   elements	   of	   the	   proposed	   import	   and	   research	   uses…Another	   regulatory	  
issue	  with	  important	  implications	  for	  the	  ethics	  of	  research	  involving	  GM	  insects	  is	  the	  requirement	  
for	   risk	   assessment	  before	   the	   research,	  which	   varies	   from	  country	   to	   country…This	   issue	  may	  be	  
particularly	   contentious	  with	   respect	   to	  environmental	   impact	  assessments	  of	   the	   research,	  which	  
may	  be	  a	  regulatory	  requirement…and	  thus	  may	  be	  a	  formal	  requirement	  for	  the	  investigators.	  
A	  monograph	   on	   Ethical,	   legal	   and	   social	   issues	   of	   genetically	   modifying	   insect	   vectors	   for	   public	  
health	   (Macer,	   2003;	   2005)	   considered	   a	   range	   of	   ethical	   issues	   including	   animal	   rights,	   informed	  
consent,	   community	   consensus	   and	   environmental	   viewpoints	   and	   states	   that	   each	   community	  
needs	   to	   decide	   its	   own	   priorities	   for	  methodology	   of	   disease	   policy	   guidance	   for	   ethical	   genetic	  
engineering	  and	  to	  negotiate	  with	  neighbouring	  countries.	  	  
The	   approach	   to	   genetically	  modify	   insects	   raises	   few	   intrinsic	   ethical	   issues;	   however,	   important	  
environmental	   and	   human	   health	   concerns	   need	   to	   be	   assessed	   before	   release	   of	   any	   GM	  
insects…The	  policy	  that	  each	  community	  adopts	  should	  be	  the	  product	  of	  open	  dialogue	  involving	  all	  
sectors	  of	  society.	  It	  can	  be	  expected	  that	  this	  process	  will	  take	  years	  and	  not	  all	  communities	  will	  
endorse	  genetic	  control	  approaches	  to	  insect	  vectors.	  
An	  article	  entitled	  When	  biotech	  crosses	  borders	   (Angulo	  &	  Gilna,	  2008)	   states	   that	   rapid	  action	   is	  
needed	  to	  address	   loopholes	   in	  the	   international	  governance	  of	  self-­‐dispersing	  GMOs	  purposefully	  
released	  for	  the	  management	  of	  wild	  species	  and	  diseases.	  
A	  letter	  to	  the	  editor	  in	  Nature	  Biotechnology	  by	  Marshall	  (2010)	  titled	  The	  Cartagena	  Protocol	  and	  
genetically	   modified	   mosquitoes	   discussed	   in	   Part	   II,	   C.	   the	   Risk	   assessment	   of	   living	   modified	  
mosquitoes,	   and	   posed	   issues	   and	   called	   for	   a	   broader	   discussion	   on	   GMMs	   to	   address	   their	  





Perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  issue	  inadequately	  addressed	  by	  the	  guidance	  document	  is	  the	  ability	  
of	  mosquitoes	  engineered	  with	  gene	  drive	  systems	  to	  propagate	  transgenes	  across	  national	  borders	  
in	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  international	  agreement…The	  scenario	  of	  containment	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  
to	  GM	  mosquitoes	  because,	  before	  an	  open	  release,	  trials	  are	  being	  discussed	  that	  would	  take	  place	  
in	  field	  cages	  exposed	  to	  the	  ambient	  environment	  in	  a	  location	  that	  the	  species	  naturally	  inhabits.	  
Ostera	  and	  Gostin	   (2011)	  advocate	   for	  new	  regulatory	  pathways	   for	   research	  and	  development	  of	  
GM	   arthropods	   to	   control	   disease,	   including	   “an international process for rigorous examination of 
scientific evidence, ethical values, and dispassionate review before genetically or biologically modified 
arthropod vectors are released into the natural environment.”	  They	  argue	  for	  a	  balanced	  approach	  in	  any	  
new	  regulation	  and	  that,	  “if	  the	  scientific	  evidence	  demonstrates	  significant	  disease	  reduction	  with	  
low	  ecological	  risks,	  the	  precautionary	  principle	  should	  not	   impede	  meaningful	  benefits	   for	  human	  
health.”	  	  	  	  	  	  
A	  guide	  to	  designing	  legal	  and	  institutional	  frameworks	  on	  alien	  invasive	  species	  (Shine,	  Williams	  &	  
Gündling,	  2000)	  addresses	  alien	  species	  including	  those	  that	  may	  be	  unintentionally	  introduced	  and	  
LMOs	  as	  a	  subset	  of	  alien	  species	  stating	  that:	  “it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  release	  or	  escape	  of	  transgenic,	  
recombinant	   or	   novel	   DNA	   might	   have	   severe	   and	   irreversible	   effects	   on	   environmental	   safety.”	  	  
Potential	   health	   impacts	   are	   discussed	   in	   respect	   to	   invasive	  microorganisms	  with	  west	  Nile	   virus	  
provided	   as	   a	   recent	   example.	   A	   number	   of	   regional	   international	   agreements,	   not	   previously	  
mentioned,	  with	  applicability	  to	  GMMs	  are	  listed	  in	  this	  chapter	  including	  the	  following:	  
• the	   ASEAN	   Agreement	   on	   the	   Conservation	   of	   Nature	   and	   Natural	   Resources	   (ASEAN,	   1985)	  
requires	  parties	   to	  endeavour	   to	   regulate	  and,	  where	  necessary,	  prohibit	   introduction	  of	  alien	  
species	  (Article	  3[3]);	  
• the	   Convention	   of	   Conservation	   of	   Nature	   in	   the	   South	   Pacific	   provides	   that	   parties	   shall	  
carefully	   consider	   the	   consequences	  of	  deliberate	   introduction	   into	  ecosystems	  of	   species	  not	  
previously	  occurring	  therein	  (Article	  V	  [4]);	  	  
• the	  Convention	   for	   the	  Conservation	  of	  Biodiversity	  and	   the	  Protection	  of	  Wilderness	  Areas	   in	  
Central	  America	  (Managua,	  1992)	  that	  requires	  the	  adoption	  of	  mechanisms	  to	  control	  all	  exotic	  
species,	  which	  threaten	  ecosystems,	  habitats,	  and	  wild	  species	  (Article	  24);	  
• The	  International	  Health	  Regulations	  (IHR)	  (Geneva,	  1969,	  as	  amended,	  1982)	  were	  adopted	  by	  
the	  WHO’s	  World	  Health	  Assembly.	  They	  are	  designed	  to	   insure	  maximum	  security	  against	  the	  
spread	  of	  infectious	  diseases	  to	  humans.	  	  
	  
An	  Overview	   of	   existing	   international/regional	   mechanisms	   to	   ban	   or	   restrict	   trade	   in	   potentially	  
invasive	  alien	  species	  (Council	  of	  Europe,	  2006)	  summarizes:	  	  
Globalization	  provides	  vastly	  expanded	  opportunities	  for	  species	  to	  be	  transported	  to	  new	  locations	  
through	   a	  wide	   range	   of	   pathways.	   Those	   alien	   species	   that	   become	   established	   and	   spread	   can	  
have	  serious	  implications,	  not	  just	  for	  the	  environment	  and	  communities,	  but	  also	  for	  national	  trade	  
and	   development…Prevention	   measures	   should	   be	   applied	   to	   pathways	   for	   introduction	   and	   be	  
internationally	  or	  regionally	  coordinated.	  	  
A	   report	   by	   the	  PEW	   Initiative	   on	   Food	   and	  Biotechnology	   (2004)	  made	   the	   following	   statements	  
concerning	   GM	   insects:	   	   “Genetically	   modified	   insects	   may	   offer	   public	   health	   and	   agricultural	  





whether	   the	   agency	   involved	   would	   have	   the	   tools	   it	   needed	   to	   assess	   and	   manage	   the	   risks	  
involved.”	   	  This	  report	  concludes	  that	  the	  USA	  federal	  government	  “lacks	  a	  coordinated	  regulatory	  
approach	  to	  ensure	  that	  all	  GM	  insects	  are	  reviewed	  for	  potential	  environmental,	  agricultural,	  food	  
safety,	   and	   public	   health	   risks	   and	   that	   the	   international	   regulatory	   regime	   for	   approving	   such	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